FCPA Compliance and Ethics Blog

April 10, 2015

International Anti-Corruption Enforcement Efforts

ARound the GlobeWhile the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is still the most widely recognized and enforcement anti-bribery and anti-corruption law across the globe, there have been a number of initiatives which will lead directly to greater anti-bribery and anti-corruption enforcement. This increased enforcement will lead to increased risks for companies that do not have anti-bribery and anti-corruption compliance programs in place. This post discusses the efforts of other countries to enact and enforce legislation to curb bribery and corrupt across the globe.

China 

Over the past 18 months, GlaxoSmithKline PLC (GSK) was embroiled in a very public, very nasty bribery and corruption investigation. It culminated in the conviction of GSK and the assessment of a $491 million fine, criminal conviction of four senior GSK China subsidiary managers and the criminal convictions of two ancillary GSK-hired investigators. The entry of the Chinese government into the international fight against corruption and bribery is truly a game-changer. While there may be many reasons for this very public move by the Chinese government, it is clear that foreign companies are now on notice. Doing business the old fashioned way will no longer be tolerated. This means that international (read: western) companies operating in China have a fresh and important risk to consider; that being that they could well be subject to prosecution under domestic Chinese law.

The international component of this investigation may well increase anti-corruption enforcement across the globe. First of all, when other countries notorious for their endemic corruptions, for example India, see that they can attack their domestic corruption by blaming it on international businesses operating in their country, what lesson do you think they will draw? Most probably that all politics are local and when the localities can blame the outsiders for their own problems they will do so. But when that blame is coupled with violations of local law, whether that is anti-bribery or anti-price fixing, there is a potent opportunity for prosecutions.

One of the audit failures of GSK was around well known compliance risks in China, including (1) event abuse planning; (2) mixture of legitimate and illegitimate travel; (3) other collusion with travel agencies; and (4) parallel itineraries. So those risks are well known and have been documented. While the cost of monitoring is high and would involve the tedious work of verifying millions of receipts by calling hotels, airlines and office supply stores and scrutinizing countless transactions for signs of fraud; if your compliance risks are known for a certain profile, then you should devote the necessary resources to making sure you are in compliance in that area.

Brazil 

While GSK was a harbinger of international anti-corruption investigations and enforcement actions based on domestic anti-bribery laws; Brazil and its state-owned energy company Petrobras may become the world’s largest corruption investigation. In a New York Times (NYT) article, entitled “Scandal Over Brazilian Oil Company Adds Turmoil to the Presidential Race”, the scandal was detailed by a former Petrobras official, Paulo Roberto Costa. Mr. Costa was the person who oversaw the company’s refining operations. He has admitted to having engaged in the receipt of bribes for at least a 10 year period “equivalent to 3 percent of the value of the deals from the Brazilian construction companies that obtained the contracts” to build refineries. This amounted to literally millions being “stashed in bank accounts in Switzerland and the Cayman Islands.” He “inflated budgets for new projects” by 3% and then had that amount kicked back to him as bribes. The allegations were verified “through an associate, Alberto Youssef, a black-market money dealer who testified that he helped launder funds in the scheme. Mr. Youssef, who has also accepted a plea deal, testified that more than a dozen of Brazil’s largest construction companies had paid hefty bribes to obtain lucrative Petrobras contracts.” Interestingly, Brazilian President Rousseff “has also effectively acknowledged the prevalence of corruption inside the executive suites of Petrobras, while denying that she had known about the kickbacks when they were taking place.”

The scandal has not only engulfed suppliers to Petrobras in Brazil. It has now moved to the international stage. From shipyards in Singapore, which have been alleged to have paid bribes to Petrobras, to Rolls Royce in Great Britain which has been alleged to have paid bribes for the sale of turbine engines; this scandal truly is international in scope and may engulf more companies going forward. In addition to violations of Brazilian law, the US government has reportedly opened an investigation, as Petrobras USA is a US stock-exchange issuing entity and subject to the FCPA. Indeed, in the US there are already multiple shareholder derivative lawsuits against the US entity for mis-representing its true value because of the corruption allegations against the company in Brazil.

The Petrobras scandal continues to make news almost daily and its repercussions continue to reverberate across the globe. The FCPA Blog, in an article entitled “Swiss AG freezes $400 million in Petrobras bribe probe”, stated that in Switzerland alone there are nine open investigations into alleged money laundering tied to Petrobras. In mid-March the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland (OAG) announced that they had issued an order to freeze $400 million of assets allegedly tied to a Petrobras corruption scheme. The FCPA Blog further stated the OAG announced “The release of over $120 million reflects Switzerland’s clear intention to take a stand against the misuse of its financial center for criminal purposes and to return funds of criminal origin to their rightful owners.”

The domestic Brazilian Anti-Bribery Law, the Clean Company Act, enacted into law in 2014, is uniquely designed for oversight by internal audit. Compliance programs will be evaluated on three prongs: the structure of the program; specifics about the legal entity; and an evaluation of the program’s efficiency. The first prong will include consideration of the existence of mechanisms for reporting suspected or actual misconduct, training, code of conduct, policies and procedures, periodic risk assessments, and application of disciplinary measures against employees (including senior management too) involved in wrongdoing. Under the second prong, the compliance risks associated will be considered. Compliance programs should be tailored to the company’s risks; “one-size-fits-all” programs will not be accepted. The third prong will consist of a case-by-case verification, that it is not simply a paper program.

Finally, and no doubt spurred by the Petrobras corruption scandal, the FCPA Blog also reported, in another article entitled “After protests, Brazil president issues anti-graft regulations”, that Brazilian President Dilma Roussef issued a presidential decree with regulations under the Clean Company Act. The new regulations issued address some of the crucial questions concerning the administrative procedure for imposing corporate liability and assessing fines. It also set out the criteria for determining fines, evaluating compliance programs, and entering into leniency agreements. Finally, the decree also provides that books and records accuracy and completeness will be a key criterion for evaluating compliance programs, no doubt inspired by the FCPA accounting provisions. As the FCPA Blog said, “The regulations under the Clean Company Act are a critical milestone in the effort to restore credibility to Brazil’s federal government, in light of its past commitments to fighting corruption in the corporate world.”

Conclusion 

What does all of the above mean for a global company? It means that some law that prohibits bribery and corruption will cover your business. It will not and does not matter if you are a US, UK or Brazilian company doing business outside of your home country, somewhere a law prohibiting bribery and corruption will cover your actions. Even if you are not covered by the FCPA, the UK Bribery Act or the Clean Company Act, if you are doing business in a local country you can still be subject to prosecution under its domestic anti-bribery laws. This means that there will be greater enforcement going forward and greater cooperation between enforcement agencies.

For businesses the only response to this plethora of new laws is to implement and enhance a best practices anti-bribery/anti-corruption compliance program and there are several examples that companies can follow to do so. In the US, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) provided their suggestions with their Ten Hallmarks of an Effective Compliance Program; the UK Ministry of Justice (MOJ) has provided commentary on the Six Principles of an Adequate Procedures compliance program and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has put forth its Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance.

All of these anti-bribery/anti-corruption regimes set forth easily digested concepts that a company could implement. However, there must be more than simply a paper program in place. A company must actually do compliance for it to be effective. By making compliance a part of normal business practices, it will be possible to prevent, detect and then remediate any bribery or corruption issues that may arise.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2015

April 3, 2015

Why Tone at the Top Matters and Join the FCPA Professor in Houston

IMG_1173Over this week I have looked at some issues related to compensation and methods from other disciplines that a compliance practitioner might use to test and then improve a company’s third party management regime. Today, I want to go back to the starting point for any compliance program; that is the Tone at the Top. I was reminded of the absolute necessity of having a management not only committed to following the law but the actual doing of compliance when I read about the guilty verdicts in the Atlanta schools cheating scandal.

In an article in the New York Times (NYT), entitled “Atlanta Educators Are Convicted of Racketeering”, reporter Alan Blinder detailed the guilty verdicts handed down in an Atlanta state Superior Court this week where 11 of 12 defendants were convicted in a lengthy trial. Blinder wrote, “On their eighth day of deliberations, the jurors convicted 11 of the 12 defendants of racketeering, a felony that carries up to 20 years in prison. Many of the defendants — a mixture of Atlanta public school teachers, testing coordinators and administrators — were also convicted of other charges, such as making false statements, that could add years to their sentences.” Most stunningly, the trial judge “ordered most of the educators jailed immediately, and they were led from the courtroom in handcuffs.”

The school district’s top administrator Dr. Beverly Hall, channeling her inner Ken Lay, had the temerity to pass away during the trial so there was no finding as to her conduct. Unrepentant to end she said “she had done nothing wrong and that her approach to education, which emphasized data, was not to blame.” When interviewed back in 2011, Dr. Hall had said, “I can’t accept that there’s a culture of cheating. What these 178 are accused of is horrific, but we have over 3,000 teachers.”

Think about those two statements for a moment. They mimic the same tired excuses used by apologizers in the anti-corruption world. First it was only a small subset of those involved who actually broke the law. In other words, the oldie but goodie rogue employee(s) defense. It did have the notable exception that there were 178 roguies out there lying and cheating. But more than the rogue employee defense, she emphasized that she obtained results, the scores on the State of Georgia’s standardized tests for public schools improved dramatically under her watch. In the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) anti-corruption world that is the same as “we had to do it to compete” argument. It is equally as inane as the rogue employee defense.

Moreover, a State of Georgia investigation “completed in 2011, led to findings that were startling and unsparing: Investigators concluded that cheating had occurred in at least 44 schools and that the district had been troubled by “organized and systemic misconduct.” Nearly 180 employees, including 38 principals, were accused of wrongdoing as part of an effort to inflate test scores and misrepresent the achievement of Atlanta’s students and schools. Investigators wrote in the report that Dr. Hall and her aides had “created a culture of fear, intimidation and retaliation” that had permitted “cheating — at all levels — to go unchecked for years.” How is that for tone from the very top?

I bring you another example from a company I once worked at whose management locked themselves behind bolted doors on a floor in the building not accessible by any employees. And just in case someone did make onto this executive floor, there was an armed police presence as a last ditch security measure. The locked down top floor was after the following security measures were already in place: (1) you had to badge in to get into the parking garage, (2) building access was by card entry, (3) elevator access was by card entry, and (4) floor access was by card entry.

Why would senior executives barricade themselves behind such massive physical protection? Did they do this because crazed competitors were sending in assassins, because the company was so profitable and hence unassailable as a competitor? How about something more nefarious such as international hit squads roaming through international businesses in Houston, picking off key executives? Alas the explanation was not anything so exotic. With all of these security measures in place the reason was to keep mere mortal employees away from senior management. What type of message that does send to employee? Much like the one I had growing up, speak only when spoken to.

The point of all this is that tone does matter. Senior management must be committed and communicate its commitment to not only obeying laws but also complying with laws. In the FCPA world, that means you must have a compliance program in place that meets the Ten Hallmarks of an Effective Compliance Program as set out in the FCPA Guidance.

On a completely different note as a compliance practitioner, if you want to have a shot at some serious professional growth and you are in the Houston area, somewhere else in Texas or anywhere else in the South, I suggest you consider attending the FCPA Professor’s FCPA Institute, which will be held in Houston on Monday, May 4 and Tuesday, May 5. The Professor’s goal in leading this first Texas FCPA Institute is “to develop and enhance fundamental skills relevant to the FCPA and FCPA compliance in a stimulating and professional environment with a focus on learning. Information at the FCPA Institute is presented in an integrated and cohesive way by an expert instructor with FCPA practice and teaching experience.” Some of the topics, which will be covered, include the following:

  • An informed understanding of why the FCPA became a law and what it seeks to accomplish;
  • A comprehensive understanding of the FCPA’s anti-bribery and books and records and internal controls provisions and related enforcement theories;
  • Various realties of the global marketplace which often give rise to FCPA scrutiny;
  • The typical origins of FCPA enforcement actions including the prominence of corporate voluntary disclosures;
  • The “three buckets” of FCPA financial exposure and how settlement amounts in an actual FCPA enforcement action are typically not the most expensive aspect of FCPA scrutiny and enforcement;
  • Facts and figures relevant to corporate and individual FCPA enforcement actions including how corporate settlement amounts are calculated;
  • How FCPA scrutiny and enforcement can result in related foreign law enforcement investigations as well as other negative business effects from market capitalization issues, to merger and acquisition activity, to FCPA related civil suits; and
  • Practical and provocative reasons for the general increase in FCPA enforcement.

In other words, it is what you have come to expect from the FCPA Professor; well-thought out reasoned analysis, practical knowledge and learning, and provocative thinking and assessment. But this is also your chance to attend a two-day Institute with one of the most original thinkers in the FCPA space. The FCPA Institute will provide insights into the topics more near and dear to my heart as a ‘nuts and bolts guy’. In addition to the above substantive knowledge, FCPA Institute participants will gain in-demand, practical skills to best manage and minimize FCPA risk by:

  • Practicing FCPA issue-spotting through video exercises;
  • Conducting a FCPA risk assessment;
  • Learning FCPA compliance best practices, including as to third parties;
  • Learning how to effectively communicate FCPA compliance expectations; and
  • Grading a FCPA code of conduct.

In addition, attorneys who complete the FCPA Institute may be eligible to receive those all-important Continuing Legal Education (CLE) credits. The sponsors, King & Spalding, will be seeking CLE credit in CA, GA, NY, TX and if needed in NC and VA. Actual CLE credit will be determined at the end of the program based on actual program time. Attorneys may be eligible to receive CLE credit through reciprocity or attorney self-submission in other states as well.

I hope that you can join the FCPA Professor for this FCPA Institute. I have previously said, “if the FCPA Professor writes about it you need to read it. While you may disagree with him, your FCPA perspective and experience will be enriched by the exercise.” I would now add to this statement that if the FCPA Professor puts on his FCPA Institute you should attend. Not only will you garner a better understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of the law and the plain words of its text; you will also be able to articulate many of the issues which befall companies caught up in a FCPA investigation to your senior management in a way that will help them understand the need for a robust compliance program.

To register for the FCPA Institute, or for more information, click here.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2015

March 30, 2015

Compensation Incentives in a Best Practices Compliance Program

Compensation IncentivesOne of the areas that many companies have not paid as much attention to in their Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) anti-corruption compliance programs is compensation. However the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have long made clear that they view incentives, rewarding those employees who do business in compliance with their employer’s compliance program, as one of the ways to reinforce the compliance program and the message of compliance. As far back as 2004, the then SEC Director of Enforcement, Stephen M. Cutler, said “[M]ake integrity, ethics and compliance part of the promotion, compensation and evaluation processes as well. For at the end of the day, the most effective way to communicate that “doing the right thing” is a priority, is to reward it.” The FCPA Guidance states the “DOJ and SEC recognize that positive incentives can also drive compliant behavior. These incentives can take many forms such as personnel evaluations and promotions, rewards for improving and developing a company’s compliance pro­gram, and rewards for ethics and compliance leadership.”

In a Harvard Business Review (HBR) article, entitled “The Right Way to Use Compensation, Mark Roberge, Chief Revenue Officer of HubSpot, wrote about his company’s design and redesign of its employee’s compensation system to help drive certain behaviors. The piece’s subtitle indicated how the company fared in this technique as it read, “To shift strategy, change how you pay your team.” Several interesting ideas were presented, which I thought could be applicable for the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) or compliance practitioner when thinking about compensation as a mechanism in a best practices compliance program.

Obviously Roberge and HubSpot were focused on creating and retaining a customer base for a start-up company. However because the company was a start-up, I found many of their lessons to be applicable for the compliance practitioner. As your compliance program matures and your strategy shifts, “it’s critical that the employees who bring in the revenue-the sales force-understand and behave in ways that support the new strategy. The sales compensation system can help ventures achieve that compliance.” The prescription for you as the compliance practitioner is to revise the incentive system to focus your employees on the goals of your compliance program. This may mean that you need to change the incentives as the compliance programs matures; from installing the building blocks of compliance to burning anti-corruption compliance into the DNA of your company.

Roberge wrote that there were three key questions you should ask yourself in modifying your compensation incentive structure. First, is the change simple? Second, is the changed aligned with your company values? Third, is the effective on behavior immediate due to the change?

Simplicity

Your employees should not need “a spreadsheet to calculate their earnings.” This is because if “too many variables are included, they may become confused about which behaviors” you are rewarding. Keep the plan simple and even employee KISS, Keep it simple sir, when designing your program. If you do not do so, your employees might fall back on old behaviors that worked in the past. Roberge notes, “It should be extraordinarily clear which outcomes you are rewarding.”

The simplest way to incentive employees is to create metrics that they readily understand and are achievable in the context of the compliance program that you are trying to implement or enhance. This can start with attending Code of Conduct and compliance program training. Next might be a test to determine how much of that training was retained. It could be follow up, online training. It could mean instances of being a compliance champion in certain areas, whether with your employee base or third party sales force.

Alignment

As the CCO or compliance practitioner, you need to posit the most important compliance goal your entity needs to achieve. From there you should determine how your compensation program can be aligned with that goal. Roberge cautions what the DOJ and SEC both seem to understand, that you should not “underestimate the power of your compensation plan.” You can tweak your compliance communication, be it training, compliance videos, compliance reminders or other forms of compliance messaging but it is incumbent to remember that “if the majority of your company’s revenue is generated by salespeople, properly aligning their compensation plan will have greater impact than anything else.”

The beauty of this alignment prong is that it works with your sales force throughout the entire sales channel. So if your sales channel is employee based then their direct compensation can be used for alignment. However such alignment also works with a third party sales force such as agents, representatives, channel ops partners and even distributors. Here Roberge had another suggestion regarding compensation that I thought had interesting concepts for third parties, the holdback or even clawback. This would come into place at some point in the future for these third parties who might meet certain compliance metrics that you design into your third party management program.

Immediacy

Finally, under immediacy, it is important that such structures be put in place “immediately” but in a way that incentives employees. Roberge believes that “any delay in the good (or bad) behavior and the related financial outcome will decrease the impact of the plan.” As a part of immediacy, I would add there must be sufficient communication with your employee or other third party sales base. Roberge suggested a town hall meeting or other similar event where you can communicate to a large number of people.

Even in the world of employee compensation incentives, there should be transparency. He cautioned that transparency does not mean the design of the incentive system is a “democratic process. It was critical that the salespeople did not confuse transparency and involvement with an invitation to selfishly design the plan around their own needs.” However, he did believe that the employee base “appreciated the openness, even when the changes were not favorable to their individual situations.” Finally, he concluded, “Because of this involvement, when a new plan was rolled out, the sales team would understand why the final structure was chosen.”

So just as Roberge, working with HubSpot as a start-up, learned through this experience “the power of a compensation plan to motivate salespeople not only to sell more but to act in ways that support a start-up’s evolving business model and overall strategy”; you can also use your compensation program as such an incentive. For the compliance practitioner one of the biggest reasons is to first change a company’s culture to make compliance more important but to then burn it into the fabric of your organization. But you must be able to evolve in your thinking and professionalism as a compliance practitioner to recognize the opportunities to change and then adapt your incentive program to make the doing of compliance part of your company’s everyday business process.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2015

March 18, 2015

The Blue Geranium – SEC Enforcement of the FCPA – Part III

Blue GeraniumIn Christie’s The Blue Geranium a difficult and cantankerous semi-invalid wife is looked after by a succession of nurses. They changed regularly, unable to cope with their patient, with one exception Nurse Copling who somehow managed the tantrums and complaints better than others of her calling. The wife had a predilection for fortunetellers and one announced that the wallpaper in the wife’s room was evil; pronouncing she should “Beware of the Full Moon. The Blue Primrose means warning; the Blue Hollyhock means danger; the Blue Geranium means death.” Four days later, one of the primroses in the pattern of the wallpaper in the wife’s room changed color to blue in the middle of the night, when there had been a full moon.

On the morning after the next full moon, the wife was found dead in her bed with only her smelling salts beside her. Once again Miss Marple has the solution remembering that potassium cyanide resembled smelling salts in odor. The wife took what she thought were smelling salts but was in reality potassium cyanide. The flowers on the wallpaper had been treated with litmus paper which the turned the geranium in question blue, which unmasked the killer.

I found this story to be an interesting way to introduce the topic of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) damage remedies. While some are obvious, such as the fines and penalties which are listed in the text of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), another one, that being profit disgorgement must be seen through the lens of multiple legislations.

Monetary Fines

The damages that are available to the SEC differ in some significant aspects from those available to the Department of Justice (DOJ) in its enforcement of the criminal side of the FCPA. According to the FCPA Guidance, “For violations of the anti-bribery provisions, cor­porations and other business entities are subject to a civil penalty of up to $16,000 per violation. Individuals, including officers, directors, stockholders, and agents of companies, are similarly subject to a civil penalty of up to $16,000 per violation, which may not be paid by their employer or principal. For violations of the accounting provisions, SEC may obtain a civil penalty not to exceed the greater of (a) the gross amount of the pecuniary gain to the defendant as a result of the violations or (b) a specified dollar limitation. The specified dollar limitations are based on the egregious­ness of the violation, ranging from $7,500 to $150,000 for an individual and $75,000 to $725,000 for a company.”

As straightforward as these monetary amounts may seem, the totals can become very large very quickly. As noted by Russ Ryan in a guest post on the FCPA Professor’s blog, entitled “Former SEC Enforcement Official Throws The Red Challenge Flag, the SEC significantly multiplied those amounts in a default judgment context against former Siemens executives by claiming that “four alleged bribes should be triple-counted as three separate securities law violations – once as a bribe, again as a books-and-records violation, and yet again as an internal-controls violation – thus artificially multiplying four violations to create twelve.” Further, under the specific books-and-records and internal-controls allegations “the SEC was super aggressive, taking the position that these classically non-fraud violations involved “reckless disregard” of a regulatory requirement, thus allowing the SEC to demand the maximum $60,000 per violation in “second-tier” penalties rather than the $6,000 per violation in the “first-tier” penalties ordinarily associated with non-fraud violations.”

Profit Disgorgement

In addition to the above statutory fines and penalties, “SEC can obtain the equitable relief of disgorgement of ill-gotten gains and pre-judgment interest and can also obtain civil money penalties pursuant to Sections 21(d)(3) and 32(c) of the Exchange Act. SEC may also seek ancillary relief (such as an accounting from a defendant). Pursuant to Section 21(d)(5), SEC also may seek, and any federal court may grant, any other equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors, such as enhanced remedial measures or the retention of an independent compliance consultant or monitor.” These remedies can be sought in a federal district court of through the SEC administrative process.

As explained by Marc Alain Bohn, in a blog post on the FCPA Blog entitled “What Exactly is Disgorgement?” profit “Disgorgement is an equitable remedy authorized by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that is used to deprive wrong-doers of their ill-gotten gains and deter violations of federal securities law. The Act gives the SEC the authority to enter an order “requiring accounting and disgorgement,” including reasonable interest, as part of administrative or cease and desist proceedings”. In another article Bohn co-authored with Sasha Kalb, entitled “Disgorgement – the Devil You Don’t Know” published in Corporate Compliance Insights (CCI), they set out how such damages are calculated. They said, “In calculating disgorgement, the SEC is required to distinguish between legally and illegally obtained profits. The first step in such calculations is to identify the causal link between the unlawful activity and the profit to be disgorged. Once this causal link is established, the SEC may assert its right to disgorge illicit profits that stem from this wrong-doing. Because calculations like these often prove difficult, courts tend to give the SEC considerable discretion in determining what constitutes an ill-gotten gain by requiring only a reasonable approximation of the profits which are causally connected to the violation.”

However if you read the FCPA quite closely you will not find any language regarding profit disgorgement as a remedy. Nevertheless a simple reading of the statute does not limit our inquiry as to this remedy. In a Note, published in the University of Michigan Journal of International Law, entitled “The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of Profits and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution and Deterrence”, author David C. Weiss explained the development of the remedy of profit disgorgement. As noted by Bohn, profit disgorgement was always available to the SEC from the very beginning of its existence, through the enabling legislation of 1934. But as explained by Weiss, in the completely unrelated legislation entitled The Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, profit disgorgement was “authorized by statute [as a remedy to the SEC] without a limitation to the FCPA.”

Finally, and what many compliance practitioners do not focus on for SEC enforcement of the FCPA, was the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Weiss said, “The most recent change to the way in which the SEC enforces the FCPA—and a critical development to consider—is SOX, which affects virtually all of the SEC’s prosecutions, including those under the FCPA. When assessing penalties, the SEC draws on SOX to provide great latitude in determining the types of penalties it enforces. While SOX did not amend the FCPA itself, it did amend both civil and criminal securities laws relating to compliance, internal controls, and penalties for violations of the Exchange Act. Since the enactment of SOX, the SEC has possessed the power to designate how a particular penalty that it assesses will be classified.” [citations omitted]

There has been criticism of the SEC using profit disgorgement as a remedy. As far back as 2010, the FCPA Professor criticized this development in his article “The Façade of FCPA Enforcement” where he found fault with the remedy of profit disgorgement for books and records violations or internal controls violations only, where there is no corresponding “enforcement action charging violations of the anti-bribery provisions.” He wrote “It is difficult to see how a disgorgement remedy premised solely on an FCPA books and records and internal controls case is not punitive. It is further difficult to see how the mis-recording of a payment (a payment that the SEC does not allege violated the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions) can properly give rise to a disgorgement remedy.”

Bohn and Kalb said, “Over the last six years, disgorgement has served to significantly increase the financial loss that companies are exposed to in FCPA enforcement matters. In addition to the considerable civil penalties often imposed by the SEC as part of FCPA settlements, the SEC has made clear that it will not hesitate to seek recovery of large sums through disgorgement provided they are reasonably related to the alleged misconduct. Yet the methodology used by the SEC to support the amounts it seeks to disgorge has not been much discussed.  In the absence of adequate guidance as to how these sums are calculated, disgorgement poses an even greater risk in the current aggressive FCPA enforcement climate.” I would only add to their conclusion that profit disgorgement is here to stay.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2015

March 17, 2015

The Companion and SEC Enforcement of the FCPA – Part II

The CompanionI will use Agatha Christie’s short story The Companion as the introduction to today’s blog post. This story, related by one of the Tuesday story-telling group of detective aficionados, Dr. Lloyd, and is about two people who are related yet take different paths. It involves the death of a woman while on vacation on the Island of Gran Canaria. The deceased was named Mary Barton and she died while trying to save her companion, one Amy Durrant, from drowning. Sometime later Miss Durrant was deemed missing and presumed drowned off the coast of Cornwall. However there was a double crime as Durrant had actually drowned Barton in Gran Canaria and then faked her own death in Cornwall, however she had returned home to Australia where she actually died within a month of returning. It turned out that Durrant was a cousin to Barton and her only living relation. Since both women were now dead, Barton’s not inconsiderable estate passed on to Durrant’s children, which was her plan all along.

All of which informs today’s topic that being the difference in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement resolution tools from those used by the Department of Justice (DOJ). While both the SEC and DOJ use Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs); there are other tools in the SEC arsenal, which the DOJ does not use. These revolve around the fact that in FCPA enforcement, the DOJ handles criminal prosecution and the SEC handles things on the civil side of FCPA enforcement.

Traditionally the SEC obtains a Cease and Desist order by going to a federal district court. The FCPA Guidance states, “In a civil injunctive action, SEC seeks a court order compelling the defendant to obey the law in the future. Violating such an order can result in civil or criminal contempt proceedings. Civil contempt sanctions, brought by SEC, are remedial rather than punitive in nature and serve one of two purposes: to compensate the party injured as a result of the violation of the injunction or force compliance with the terms of the injunction.”

In most cases the defendant does not contest these Orders and there are no admissions made by the defendant regarding conduct that may have violated the FCPA. While there has been significant criticism of ‘No Admission’ settlements entered into by the SEC, these types of settlements are not expected to change where there is no corresponding criminal action. In a 2013 speech, SEC Chair Mary Jo White announced an expansion of the “admit” policy, and explained that while “neither admit nor deny” settlements would remain the norm, the SEC would now require defendants to admit wrongdoing “in certain cases where heightened accountability or acceptance of responsibility through the defendant’s admission of misconduct may be appropriate”. SEC enforcement chief, Andrew Ceresney, has added that defendants may be required to admit violations in cases of “egregious misconduct,” such as cases involving obstruction of the SEC’s investigation or harm to large numbers of investors.

However the past year or so, the SEC has moved to handle FCPA enforcement actions through an administrative process. As explained in the FCPA Guidance, “SEC has the ability to institute various types of administrative proceedings against a person or an entity that it believes has violated the law. This type of enforcement action is brought by SEC’s Enforcement Division and is litigated before an SEC administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ’s decision is subject to appeal directly to the Securities and Exchange Commission itself, and the Commission’s decision is in turn subject to review by a U.S. Court of Appeals.”

In a post on the FCPA Blog, entitled “Are Administrative Proceedings the New Civil Complaints?” Marc Alain Bohn explored this expanded use of administrative law proceedings in SEC enforcement of the FCPA, by noting, “which was facilitated in part by a 2010 Dodd-Frank amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 that enables the SEC to collect civil penalties through administrative proceedings.” Moreover, Bohn noted a couple of significant differences in going through a federal district court to obtain a Cease and Desist Order and going through the SEC administrative process. He said, “FCPA cases resolved via administrative proceeding require no judicial approval, as opposed to the settlement of formal civil complaints. This distinction is important because district court judges have complicated several SEC prosecutions in recent years by demanding changes to negotiated settlements or dismissing charges or otherwise limiting claims. In addition, the imposition of a cease-and-desist order under an administrative proceeding requires only that the SEC establish a likelihood that a defendant will violate federal securities law, in contrast with the “reasonable likelihood” required by a court-ordered injunction.” [citations omitted]

The FCPA Professor has been unremitting in his criticism of this administrative settlement process, citing a complete lack of transparency in the process, among other criticisms. Mike Volkov, perhaps more charitably, wrote, “The SEC’s “new” use of administrative proceedings for FCPA cases demonstrates its unwillingness to face judicial scrutiny and undermines the effectiveness of its enforcement program. The SEC likes to play on its home turf and for some reason feels that going to court is not as important.” Whatever your view on the use of the administrative process might be I would only say that it is here to stay so you had better be ready to participate in it if you find yourself in a SEC FCPA enforcement action.

Another criticism of this process is what might be called the home court advantage. In an article in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), entitled “Firms oppose SEC’s internal enforcement process”, reporter Hazel Bradford quoted Terry Weiss, an attorney with Greenberg Traurig LLP in Atlanta, for the following “I have no problem with fairness when (a case) is brought in a federal District Court and when it is overseen by a federal District Court judge who is appointed by the president of the United States and approved by the U.S. Senate. I have a significant problem when you have (administrative law judges) who are picked by the SEC.” The problem with this argument is that ALJ’s have been a part of the federal enforcement process for a wide variety of agencies, department and issues since the 1930s. To say the SEC is using an approved administrative process that violates the Constitution seems to me to be a stretch.

Another area the SEC has in common with the DOJ in FCPA enforcement is that they both sometimes decline to bring enforcement actions. The FCPA Guidance cites back to the SEC Enforcement Manual for the “guiding principles” in determining whether the Commission will bring a FCPA enforcement action. The factors the SEC will determine, which are the same for enforcement actions against entities or individuals., are listed as follows:

  • the seriousness of the conduct and potential violations;
  • the resources available to SEC staff to pursue the investigation;
  • the sufficiency and strength of the evidence;
  • the extent of potential investor harm if an action is not commenced; and
  • the age of the conduct underlying the potential violations.

It is important to understand these differences in resolution vehicles and tactics used by the SEC, separate and apart from the DOJ. The civil jurisdiction of FCPA enforcement entails some differences in approach by the SEC. It is important that any Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) or compliance practitioner understand these differences in the event their company goes through a FCPA investigation or enforcement action. We saw three significant FCPA enforcement actions last fall, Smith & Wesson, Layne Christensen and Bio-Rad, where there was no corresponding DOJ FPCA enforcement action brought jointly with the SEC enforcement action. As anti-corruption compliance programs mature, it may well be that this could portend the future. Just as with The Companion simply because it appears that two are together, they may have their own separate callings. Tomorrow I review some of the unique damages available to the SEC in a FCPA enforcement action.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2015

March 16, 2015

Miss Marple Short Stories and SEC Enforcement of the FCPA, Part I

Miss Marple Short StoriesI am a huge Agatha Christie fan. I have read most of the Poriot novels and many of the Jane Marple novels as well. However, I was not aware of Christie’s work in the short story format until I recently read a volume entitled Miss Marple Short Stories. This volume included 13 short stories first published in 1932. In many ways reading them was like revisiting an old friend, who had new stories to tell me that I had not previously heard. So in honor of my love of Agatha Christie and her short stories, I will theme my blog posts this week around one of her original short stories, published as The Thirteen Problems.

The first story was called The Tuesday Night Club and introduced Miss Marple and her cast of characters around these stories. Each was asked to relate some mystery and the others would try and solve the mystery. As with most of Christie’s writing, there were the stories and the characters who were, in many ways, stories themselves so there was a double layer of intersection. In this story a wife died of poisoning and her husband was the prime suspect. However Miss Marple deduced that the couple’s longtime housekeeper who has gotten “into trouble” through a liaison with the husband had poisoned the wife in hope’s of marrying the now widow. The group around Miss Marple was astounded when her deduction was confirmed by the storyteller when he related the housekeeper’s own deathbed confession.

Just as many readers may not have focused on Agatha Christie’s work in the short story format, many Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) practitioners tend to focus on Department of Justice (DOJ) FCPA enforcement actions. However, just as Christie aficionados who did not focus on her short stories, many FPCA compliance practitioners do not tend to focus on FCPA enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). To help address this, over the next week I will discuss issues relating to SEC enforcements.

Today, I begin with reviewing some jurisdictional issues unique to the SEC; commonly referred to as the FCPA accounting provisions, they consist of the books and records provisions which, as set out in the FCPA Guidance, requires that “issuers must make and keep books, records, and accounts that, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect an issuer’s transactions and dispositions of an issuer’s assets and internal controls requirements.” Under the internal controls provisions, “issuers must devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to assure management’s control, authority, and responsibility over the firm’s assets.”

Perhaps the most interesting thing about the ‘accounting provisions’ under the FCPA as stated in the FCPA Guidance, is as follows: , “Although the accounting provisions were originally enacted as part of the FCPA, they do not apply only to bribery-related violations. Rather, the accounting provisions ensure that all public companies account for all of their assets and liabilities accurately and in reasonable detail”. [emphasis supplied] This means there can be strict liability for stand alone violations of these provisions, with no ties back to the corrupt intent or elements of a FCPA violation are present.

Who is covered under SEC enforcement of the FCPA? 

The SEC prosecutes ‘issuers’ who are defined as a company “that has a class of securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act or that is required to file annual or other period reports pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act.” The SEC also enforces the FCPA against companies “whose securities trade on a national securities exchange in the United States, including foreign issuers with exchange traded American Depository Receipts” and trade in over-the counter markets. While the SEC does not bring enforcement actions against private companies, private companies are also subject to the FCPA, just as public companies for bribing a foreign government official, in violation of the FCPA.

Accounting Provisions

Consistent with the concern that bribe payments are often disguised as other types of payments in a company’s books and records, “requires issuers to “make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.”” The “in reasonable detail” qualification was adopted by Congress “in light of the concern that such a standard, if unqualified, might connote a degree of exactitude and precision which is unrealistic.” The addition of this phrase was intended to make clear “that the issuer’s records should reflect transactions in conformity with accepted methods of recording economic events and effectively prevent off-the-books slush funds and payments of bribes.”

The Guidance goes on to give several examples of SEC enforcement actions of the books and record provisions where bribes were mischaracterized in a company’s books and records. Such examples include bribes paid out in the guise of commissions, royalties or consulting fees. Another prominent example includes reimbursement for sales and marketing or miscellaneous expenses where no such activity occurred. A favorite has been mischaracterized travel and entertainment expenses. Finally, a large group of often over-looked expenses include free goods for demonstration products, intercompany accounts, vendor payments and customer write-offs.

A key distinction of FCPA enforcement by the SEC from other types of accounting fraud is that there is no materiality requirement under the FCPA. Typically, internal audit, external audit or even forensic accounting, only review material transactions. Obviously for a large multi-national company subject to the FCPA, materiality could be millions of dollars or multiplies thereof. However we have seen FCPA enforcement actions with corrupt payments made in the low thousands of dollars.

Internal Controls Provisions

The FCPA says that internal controls requires issuers to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that—

(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization;

(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for assets;

(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; and

(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences.

As further explained in the FCPA Guidance, “the Act defines “reasonable assurances” as “such level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs.” Neither the FCPA nor the FCPA Guidance specifies a particular set of controls that companies are required to implement. However the FCPA Guidance does note, “the internal controls provision gives companies the flexibility to develop and maintain a system of controls that is appropriate to their particular needs and circumstances.”

Moreover, the FCPA Guidance recognizes that “An effective compliance program is a critical component of an issuer’s internal controls.” To do so, a company needs to access its risk and then design and implement a system of internal controls to “account the operational realities and risks attendant to the company’s business.” The FCPA Guidance suggests some of these areas should include “the nature of its products or services; how the products or services get to market; the nature of its work force; the degree of regulation; the extent of its government interaction; and the degree to which it has operations in countries with a high risk of corruption”. But the over-riding key is to assess your company’s FCPA compliance risks and set up a set of internal controls to help manage those risks effectively.

Other SEC Enforcement Areas Relating to FCPA Compliance 

In addition to the accounting provisions there are other laws and regulations that the SEC enforces and ties into FCPA enforcement. As noted in the FCPA Guidance, “Issuers have reporting obligations under Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act, which requires issuers to file an annual report that contains comprehensive information about the issuer. Failure to properly disclose material information about the issuer’s business, including material revenue, expenses, profits, assets, or liabilities related to bribery of foreign government officials, may give rise to anti-fraud and reporting violations under Sections 10(b) and 13(a) of the Exchange Act.”

There are also several sections under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) that have FCPA implications. These include SOX §302 that requires the principle officers of a company “take responsibility for and certify the integrity of these company’s financial reports on a quarterly basis.” Under SOX §404 companies must present annually their conclusion “regarding the effectiveness of the company’s internal controls over accounting.” Finally, SOX §802 prohibits “altering, destroying, mutilating, concealing or falsifying records, documents or tangible objects” with the intent to obstruct or influence a federal investigation, such as the FCPA.

The remainder of this week I will tie another Miss Marple short story to another SEC FCPA enforcement issue. I hope that you will tune in for the next installment.

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This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2015

March 12, 2015

Protections for CCOs from Wrongful Termination

Wrongful TerminationThis week the Houston Texans unceremoniously cut the franchise’s greatest player in its short history, receiver Andre Johnson. This was after his being hauled into the office of the head coach and being told that he would only need to work half as hard next year. As reported by Jerome Solomon in the Houston Chronicle article entitled “Move inevitable, but team bungles its handling”, Head Coach Bill O’Brien told Johnson that his catch total would drop from the 84 he has averaged in his 12 year career with the Texans down to “around 40 passes next season.” But O’Brien went on to add the team’s certain Hall of Fame receiver “wasn’t likely to be a starter next season, definitely not for all of the games.” So much for playing your best player at his position on a full-time basis, but hey, at least the information was made public.

Now imagine you are a Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) and have been one of your company’s senior management for the better part of the past 12 years. While you may not have been the most important member of the management team you certainly have helped navigate the company through rough compliance waters. Now imagine the company Chief Executive Officer (CEO) who tells you that although he has no one in mind to replace you (other than a less experienced and a smaller-salaried compliance specialist) your services will only be needed half the time in the coming year. What if this is in response to advice the head of the company did not like? What should the response be?

You can consider the departure from MF Global of its Chief Risk Officer, the financial services equivalent of a CCO. As reported in a New York Times (NYT) article entitled “MF Global’s Risk Officer Said to Lack Authority” Ben Protess and Azam Ahmed reported that the company replaced its Chief Risk Officer, Michael Roseman, after he “repeatedly clashed with Mr. Corzine [the CEO] over the firm’s purchase of European sovereign debt.” He was given a large severance package and left the company. When he left, there was no public reason given. His replacement was brought into the position with reduced authority.

If you are a public company, you may well need to heed the advice of fraud and compliance expert Jonathan Marks, a partner at Crowe Horwath LLP, who advocates that any time a CCO, a key executive, is dismissed it should be an 8K reporting event because the departure may be a signal of a change in the company’s attitude towards compliance or an alleged ethical breach had taken place. A similar view was expressed by Michael W. Peregrine in a NYT article entitled “Another View: MF Global’s Corporate Governance Lesson”, where he wrote that a “compliance officer is the equivalent of a “protected class” for governance purposes, and the sooner leadership gets that, the better.” Particularly in the post Sarbanes-Oxley world, a company’s CCO is a “linchpin in organizational efforts to comply with applicable law.” When a company fires (or asks him/her to resign), it is a significance decision for all involved in corporate governance and should not be solely done at the discretion of the CEO alone.

In its Code of Ethics for Compliance and Ethics Professionals, the Society for Corporate Compliance and Ethics (SCCE) has postulated Rule 1.4, which reads, “If, in the course of their work, CEPs become aware of any decision by their employing organization which, if implemented, would constitute misconduct, the professional shall: (a) refuse to consent to the decision; (b) escalate the matter, including to the highest governing body, as appropriate; (c) if serious issues remain unresolved after exercising “a” and “b”, consider resignation; and (d) report the decision to public officials when required by law.” As commentary to this rule, the SCCE said, “The duty of a compliance and ethics professional goes beyond a duty to the employing organization, inasmuch as his/her duty to the public and to the profession includes prevention of organizational misconduct. The CEP should exhaust all internal means available to deter his/her employing organization, its employees and agents from engaging in misconduct. The CEP should escalate matters to the highest governing body as appropriate, including whenever: a) directed to do so by that body, e.g., by a board resolution; b) escalation to management has proved ineffective; or c) the CEP believes escalation to management would be futile. CEPs should consider resignation only as a last resort, since CEPs may be the only remaining barrier to misconduct. A letter of resignation should set forth to senior management and the highest governing body of the employing organization in full detail and with complete candor all of the conditions that necessitate his/her action. In complex organizations, the highest governing body may be the highest governing body of a parent corporation.”

What about compensation? The Department of Justice (DOJ) has made clear that it expects a CCO to resign if the company refuses advice and violates the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The former head of the DOJ-FCPA unit Chuck Duross went so far as to compare CCOs and compliance practitioners to the Texans at the Alamo. To be fair to Duross, I think he was focusing more on the line in the sand part of the story, while I took that to mean they were all slaughtered for what they believed in. But whichever interpretation you may choose to put on it, the DOJ clearly expects a CCO to stand up and if a CEO does not like what they say, he or she must resign. This puts CCOs and compliance practitioners in a very difficult position, particularly if there is no exit compensation for doing the right thing by standing up.

I think the next step should be for the DOJ and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to begin to discuss the need for contractual protection of CCOs and other compliance practitioners against retaliation for standing up against corruption and bribery. The standard could simply be one that protects a CCO and other compliance practitioners against termination without cause. Just as the SEC is investigating whether companies are trying to muzzle whistleblowers through post-employment Confidentiality Agreements, I think they should consider whether CCOs and other compliance practitioners need more employment protection. I think the SEC should also consider the proposals of Marks regarding the required 8K or other public reporting of the dismissal or resignation of any CCO. Finally, I would expand on Peregrine’s suggestion and require that a company Board of Directors approve any dismissal of a CCO. With these protections in place, a CCO or compliance practitioner would have the ability to confront management who might take business decisions that violate the FCPA.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2015

 

 

March 10, 2015

Taking the Rolls Out for a Spin? Maybe You Should Avoid Brazil

Rolls RoyceJust as the GlaxoSmithKline PLC (GSK) case in China heralded a new day in international anti-corruption enforcement, the Petrobras case may be equally important going forward. The scope and breadth of the investigation is truly becoming worldwide. Last fall, one of the first questions raised was why was the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was investigating the company as it is headquartered in Brazil. While there is subsidiary Petrobras USA, which is a publicly listed company, it was not immediately apparent what role the US entity might have had in the bribery scandal, which was apparently centered in Brazil. However some recent revelations from across the pond may shed some light on the topic.

As with any corruption scandal there are both bribe payors and bribe receivers. The Petrobras corruption scandal initially focused on the bribe receivers in Petrobras. But last month one of the key bribe receivers, who is now cooperating with the Brazilian authorities, Pedro Barusco has identified the UK Company Rolls-Royce Group PLC as a bribe payor. As reported in the Financial Times (FT) by Samantha Pearson and Joe Leahy, in an article entitled “Rolls-Royce accused in Petrobras scandal”, Barusco has “told police he personally received at least $200,000 from Rolls-Royce — only part of the bribes he alleged were paid to a ring of politicians and other executives at the oil company.”

However the allegations moved far beyond simply Rolls-Royce. The article also reported, “Brazil’s authorities are already investigating allegations that Petrobras officials accepted bribes from SBM Offshore, a Netherlands-based supplier of offshore oil vessels. SBM has said it is co-operating with the investigation. Units of two Singaporean companies, Keppel Corporation and Sembcorp Marine, along with three Brazilian shipbuilders with large Japanese shareholders, have also been accused of participating in the bribes-for-contracts scheme.” Finally, they reported that “Mr Barusco alleged that his friend Luiz Eduardo Barbosa, a former executive of Swiss engineering group ABB, was responsible for organising bribes from Rolls-Royce, SBM and Alusa, a Brazilian construction company.”

Rolls-Royce is currently under investigation by the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) and Department of Justice (DOJ) for allegations of corruption in several countries. Katherine Rushton, reporting in The Telegraph in an article entitled “Rolls-Royce investigated in US over bribery claims”, said “Rolls-Royce is being investigated by the US Department of Justice (DoJ), following allegations that its executives bribed officials in Indonesia, China and India in order to win lucrative contracts.” She cited to the company’s annual report for the following, ““The group is currently under investigation by law enforcement agencies, primarily the Serious Fraud Office in the UK and the US Department of Justice. Breaches of laws and regulations in this area can lead to fines, penalties, criminal prosecution, commercial litigation and restrictions on future business.””

But more than simply Rolls-Royce, readers will recognize several names from a rogue gallery of companies either implicated with corruption violations or under investigation. SBM Offshore was a poster child last year for the DOJ deferring to foreign authorities to prosecute claims of bribery and corruption. I wonder if SBM Offshore attested in its settlement documents with the relevant Netherlands authorities that it had not engaged in any other bribery and corruption beyond that which was the basis of its settlement? I wonder if the company made any such averments to the DOJ? I wonder if the DOJ will make any such deferments again given the SBM Offshore settlement with the Dutch authorities? What about ABB?

In addition to the above, SBM Offshore may be the most relevant example in the debate of an international double jeopardy standard. Jordan Moran, writing in the Global Anti-Corruption Blog, has consistently argued that international double jeopardy is a bad idea. Most recently, in an article entitled “Why International Double Jeopardy Is a Bad Idea”, he said, “when it comes to the global fight against transnational bribery, double jeopardy probably isn’t all it’s cracked up to be. To begin, most arguments calling for the U.S. and other OECD member countries to recognize international double jeopardy are nonstarters.”

Also interesting was the reference to ABB as the company went through its own Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement action. As reported by Dick Cassin, in a 2010 FCPA Blog post entitled “ABB Reaches $58 Million Settlement (Updated)”, the company “reached a settlement Wednesday with the DOJ of criminal FCPA charges and will pay a fine $19 million. And in resolving civil charges with the SEC, the company will disgorge $22.8 million and pay a $16.5 million civil penalty. ABB Ltd’s U.S. subsidiary, ABB Inc., pleaded guilty to a criminal information charging it with one count of violating the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA and one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA. The court imposed a sentence that included a criminal fine of $17.1 million.” There was no information at that time as to whether the individual that Barusco named as the bribe payment facilitator, one Luiz Eduardo Barbosa, was involved in the prior ABB enforcement action in any way.

We have one or more companies, who are under current DOJ investigations, now being investigated in connection with the Petrobras bribery scandal. There are also companies that have gone through prior bribery and corruption enforcement actions now identified in the scandal. All of this now leads me to have some type of understanding of why the SEC might be investigating Petrobras USA. First, and most probably, it would be to see if the US entity was involved in the apparent decade long bribery scheme that the Brazilian parent now finds itself embroiled in. What if the US subsidiary was paying bribes to its parent to obtain or retain a benefit? Next would be any evidence of violations of the accounting provisions or internal controls requirements found in the FCPA. Finally, the SEC might be looking at Petrobras USA to see who its suppliers might be and if those companies merited investigation. Similar to looking that the Panalpina customer lists the SEC could review the Petrobras USA contractor list.

Just as GSK heralded the first time the Chinese government prosecuted a western company for violation of Chinese law, I believe the Petrobras bribery scandal will be a watershed. The outpouring of information and allegations at this time point to a multi-year, truly worldwide, bribery scheme. While it may in part have been Petrobras officials shaking down contractors for payments, it really does not matter under the FCPA or UK Bribery Act. If any company subject to either or both of those laws paid monies to Petrobras I expect they will be fully prosecuted. Further, given the arguments against an international double jeopardy standard made by Moran and others AND the apparent recidivism of prior bribery offenders, some companies may be in for a long and expensive ride.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2015

March 9, 2015

Who is Responsible for Complying with the FCPA?

7K0A0014-2The Department of Justice (DOJ) still faces criticism over its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement strategy. Some decry that it is too aggressive, that the DOJ has moved into waters Congress never intended the DOJ to navigate into regarding the FCPA. Others worry that the DOJ, through its use of settlement mechanisms such as Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements (DPAs and NPAs), let corporations off to easily with fines and other monetary penalties being the equivalent of a slap on the wrist. Yet another school of thought says that it is up to the DOJ to tell companies how not to engage in bribery and corruption by specifying precisely what type of anti-corruption compliance program to put into effect.

One thing these commentariat all have in common is that they generally do not look to those responsible for obeying the law, i.e. companies and persons who are subject to the FCPA, for their responsibility of complying with the law. Such failure seems to me to be sadly misplaced. But it is not simply Mike Volkov’s FCPA Paparazzi who fail to assess a corporation’s role in their failure to comply with the law; unfortunately it is also company leaders themselves.

We recently were treated to another such display of ‘What Me Worry?’ mentality by HSBC Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Stuart Gulliver when he said, “Can I know what every one of 257,000 people is doing?” Leaving aside the issue of whether a corporate CEO who has signed one of the largest DPAs in the history of the world (for money-laundering, not FCPA violations); should admit he (1) he doesn’t care or (2) his company is too unwieldy for it to obey the laws that you and I follow everyday; Gulliver inadvertently hit upon one of the key concepts of a best practices compliance program. That concept is a well-rounded program that assures compliance, not some all knowing, all seeing narcissist at the top.

In a Financial Times (FT) article entitled “Too big to manage”, Andrew Hill blasted Gulliver’s statement as “disingenuous” but went on to state, “Knowing what every employee is doing is not the leader’s responsibility. But by using a combination of the right structure, the latest technology and, above all, by imbuing a company with the correct culture and reinforcing regular communication with visits to the shop floor, he or she should be able to limit the chance of a major scandal.” Hill quoted management thinker Henry Mintzberg for the following, ““You can’t excuse [scandals] by saying we have so many employees. You . . . have got to be on the ground to have a sense of what your organisation is all about.””

This means a CEO is not required to know everything but he does need to have an overall sense of whether his company is moving in a direction to do things such as follow the law. I would say this is even truer when you have promised (yet again) in a DPA that your company will follow the law. It also means that the leader sets the tone. If your leader takes the position that he or she cannot know what everyone is doing; that tone will be communicated down to the field troops but the message will be that said maximum leader does not care what the middle and lower levels are doing. Hence the DOJ would say that it all starts with Tone at the Top. Sadly Gulliver does not seem to acknowledge, let alone understand, that issue.

But more than simply having a leader that cares and is engaged; Gulliver’s statement belies other aspects of a best practices compliance program. Technology provides a mechanism for oversight of a compliance regime. Under the FCPA Ten Hallmarks of an Effective Compliance Program, monitor is recognized as a key element so your company should establish a regular monitoring system to spot issues and address them. Effective monitoring means applying a consistent set of protocols, checks and controls tailored to your company’s risks to detect and remediate compliance problems on an ongoing basis. To address this, your compliance team should be checking in routinely with the finance departments in your foreign offices to ask if they’ve noticed recent accounting irregularities. Regional directors should be required to keep tabs on potential improper activity in the countries they manage. Additionally, the global compliance committee should meet or communicate as often as every month to discuss issues as they arise. These ongoing efforts demonstrate your company is serious about compliance.

In addition to monitoring, structural controls are recognized as an important element. Hill said that large companies “must use structural means to maintain control.” One of the best explanations of the use of internal controls as a structural component of any best practices compliance program comes from Aaron Murphy, a partner at Foley and Lardner in San Francisco, in his book entitled “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act”, where he said, “Internal controls are policies, procedures, monitoring and training that are designed to ensure that company assets are used properly, with proper approval and that transactions are properly recorded in the books and records. While it is theoretically possible to have good controls but bad books and records (and vice versa), the two generally go hand in hand – where there are record-keeping violations, an internal controls failure is almost presumed because the records would have been accurate had the controls been adequate.”

I would advocate that it is the interplay of the right message, tools in place to communicate and enforce the message and then oversight to ensure compliance with the message that allows a 250,000 plus employee base company to have a chance to operate in compliance with their legal obligations. Echoing this maxim, Hill quoted Rick Goings, Chairman and CEO of Tupperware Brands Corporation, for the following, “Wars are won not by generals, but by non-commissioned officers. If you have the right kind of structure…and behind that a value system, I think you can do it.”

HSBC continues to be the poster child for compliance lessons learned, whether intentional or not. Hill concluded his piece with the following, “The lesson may be that, irrespective of the size of the company, executives who lose touch with how their staff are using the culture they preach are courting embarrassment and scandal. The trend towards large companies operating through smaller units, with more autonomy and accountability for their actions, does not absolve leaders from meeting their traditional responsibilities to know what is happening on the frontline. As Prof Fischer suggests, they should manage according to the old Russian proverb that Ronald Reagan adopted when dealing with the Soviet Union in the 1980s: trust, but verify.”

There is a plethora of compliance regimes that companies can look to in order to create a best practices compliance program. Simply put, it is a relatively straightforward exercise; perhaps not easy but certainly there are well-articulated compliance programs that companies can follow. To continue to criticize the DOJ (and Securities and Exchange Commission) for failing to communicate what they wish to see in a best practices compliance program, simply fails to take into account the responsibility that corporations have in complying with US laws. The information is out there in abundance. Even a weekend article in the FT lays it out for you.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2015

March 4, 2015

Minnie Minoso Broke Barriers; Goodyear Pushes Compliance Forward

Minnie MinosoYesterday we celebrated the hard-nosed playing style of Anthony Mason, who recently passed away. Today we honor a true pioneer in professional baseball, Minnie Minoso, or Mr. White Sox. Minoso was the first black Cuban to play in Major League Baseball (MLB) when he debuted for the Cleveland Indians in 1949. In 1951, he was traded to the Chicago White Sox and he became a southside fixture for the rest of the decade. While his numbers were less than 2000 hits and 200 home runs, he was a fearless and speedy base runner and a nine-time All Star. Similarly to Mr. Cub, Ernie Banks, the Chicago White Sox erected a statue in tribute to Mr. White Sox outside their ballpark. Even President Obama was moved to release a statement about Minoso saying in part, “Minnie may have been passed over by the Baseball Hall of Fame during his lifetime, but for me and for generations of black and Latino young people, Minnie’s quintessentially American story embodies far more than a plaque ever could.”

The contribution of Minoso in the exorable march of MLB towards integration informed part of my reading of the recent Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (Goodyear) Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement strategy of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). This enforcement action was a solo effort by the SEC; there was no corresponding Department of Justice (DOJ) criminal enforcement action. So following this past fall’s triumvirate of SEC enforcement actions involving Smith & Wesson, Layne Christenen and Bio-Rad, the SEC continues to bring enforcement actions based upon the books and records and internal controls civil requirements of the FCPA. Therefore the Goodyear enforcement action is one which provides many lessons to be learned by the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) or compliance practitioner going forward and should be studied quite carefully by anyone in the compliance field.

The Bribery Schemes

As set out in the SEC Cease and Desist Order (the Order), Goodyear used several different bribery schemes in different countries, all violating the FCPA. In Kenya, Goodyear became a minority owner in a locally owned business which apparently paid bribes the old-fashioned way, in cash to the tune of over $1.5MM, yet falsely recorded the cash bribe payments as “promotional expenses.” In Angola, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the company paid approximately $1.6MM in bribes by falsely marking up invoices with “phony freight and customs clearing costs.” The subsidiary made the payments in cash and through wire transfers to various government officials. Finally, the subsidiary apparently cross-referenced the bribes it paid as follows, “As bribes were paid, the amounts were debited from the balance sheet account, and falsely recorded as payments to vendors for freight and clearing costs.” In other words a complete, total and utter failure of internal controls to forestall any of the foregoing.

Internal Controls Violations

The Order set out the section of the FCPA that the company violated. Regarding the internal controls, the Order stated, “Under Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act issuers are required to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that (i) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for assets; (iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; and (iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences.”

The Comeback

Equally important for the CCO or compliance practitioner are the specific steps that Goodyear took to remediate the situation it found itself in through these illegal payments. When the company received the initial reports about “the bribes, Goodyear promptly halted the improper payments and reported the matter to Commission staff.” Moreover, the company also cooperated extensively with the SEC. As noted in the Order, “Goodyear also provided significant cooperation with the Commission’s investigation. This included voluntarily producing documents and reports and other information from the company’s internal investigation, and promptly responding to Commission staff’s requests for information and documents. These efforts assisted the Commission in efficiently collecting evidence including information that may not have been otherwise available to the staff.”

In the area of internal remediation, regarding the entity in Kenya, where Goodyear was a minority owner in a local business, the company got rid of its from its corrupt partners by divesting its interest and ceasing all business dealings with the company. Goodyear is also divesting itself of its Angolan subsidiary. The Order also noted that Goodyear had lost its largest customer in Angola when it halted its illegal payment scheme. The company also took decisive disciplinary action against company employees “including executives of its Europe, Middle East and Africa region who had oversight responsibility, for failing to ensure adequate FCPA compliance training and controls were in place at the company’s subsidiaries in sub-Saharan Africa.”

Finally, in a long paragraph, the SEC detailed some of the more specific steps Goodyear took in the area of remediation. These steps included:

  • Improvements to the company’s compliance function not only in sub-Saharan Africa but also world-wide;
  • In Africa, both online and in person training was beefed up for “subsidiary management, sales and finance personnel”;
  • Regular audits were instituted by the company’s internal audit function, which “specifically focused on corruption risks”;
  • Quarterly self-assessment questionnaires were required of each subsidiary regarding business with government-affiliated customers;
  • For each subsidiary, there were management certifications required on a quarterly basis that required, “among other things controls over financial reporting; and annual testing of internal controls”;
  • Goodyear put in a “new regional management structure, and added new compliance, accounting, and audit positions”;
  • The company made technological improvements to allow the company to “electronically link subsidiaries in sub-Saharan Africa to its global network”;

However these changes were not limited to improvement of Goodyear’s compliance function in Africa only. At the corporate headquarters, Goodyear created the new position of “Vice President of Compliance and Ethics, which further elevated the compliance function within the company”. There was expanded online and in-person training at the corporate headquarters and other company subsidiaries. Finally, the company instituted a new “Integrity Hotline Web Portal, which enhanced users’ ability to file anonymous online reports to its hotline system. With that system, Goodyear is also implementing a new case management system for legal, compliance and internal audit to document and track complaints, investigations and remediation.”

The specific listing of the compliance initiatives or enhancements that Goodyear pushed after its illegal conduct came to light is certainly a welcomed addition to SEC advice about what it might consider some of the best practices a company may engage in around its compliance function. Moreover, this specific information can provide audit and information to the compliance practitioner of strategies that he or she might use to measure a company’s compliance program going forward. The continued message of cooperation and remediation as a way to lessen your overall fine and penalty continues to resonate from the SEC. Finally, just as Minoso helped move forward the integration of baseball and civil rights in general, the Goodyear FCPA enforcement action demonstrates that the SEC will continue to prosecute cases around the failure of or lack of internal controls. The clear import is that a company must have an appropriate compliance internal control regime in place. We are moving towards a strict liability standard under the FCPA around internal controls, which I will have much more to say about later but for now – you have been warned.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2015

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