Senn Interview, Part II – A Discussion of the Decision to Self-Disclosure

In today’s post, I continue to explore my recent interview of Mara Senn, a partner at Arnold & Porter LLP in Washington DC. Senn is a white-collar practitioner who whose practice includes representing companies in investigations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). In Part I, we reviewed Senn’s thought on how to prepare and deal with a FCPA investigation. Today I review her thoughts on the decision to self-disclose if a potential FCPA violation arises.

One of the things that has always been difficult is to quantify the benefits of self-disclosure of a potential FCPA violation by a company to the Department of Justice (DOJ) or Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). At least for the DOJ, its base line analysis for calculating penalties comes from the US Sentencing Guidelines. As stated in the FCPA Guidance, “To determine the appropriate penalty, the “offense level” is first calculated by examining both the severity of the crime and facts specific to the crime, with appropriate reductions for cooperation and acceptance of responsibility, and, for business entities, addi­tional factors such as voluntary disclosure, cooperation, pre-existing compliance programs, and remediation.”

The Sentencing Guidelines, §8C2.5(g) states that an overall fine can be reduced through the following:

(g)       Self-Reporting, Cooperation, and Acceptance of Responsibility  

If more than one applies, use the greatest:

• If the organization (A) prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation; and (B) within a reasonably prompt time after becoming aware of the offense, reported the offense to appropriate governmental authorities, fully cooperated in the investigation, and clearly demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct, subtract 5 points; or
• If the organization fully cooperated in the investigation and clearly demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct, subtract 2 points; or
• If the organization clearly demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct, subtract 1 point. 

Both the DOJ and SEC representatives consistently state in speeches and other public commentary on the benefits of self-disclosure. Some commentators, notably Mike Volkov in his blog, caution that any decision to self-disclose should be well thought through and that if an issue can be resolved through an internal investigation, subsequent remediation and ongoing monitoring to make sure it does not happen again, self-disclosure many not be warranted. In my podcast interview with Mara Senn I ask her how she might help a client work through this most difficult issue.

While self-reporting has in many ways become the norm in many situations where a company uncovers what might arguably be a FCPA violation; Senn comes down that self-reporting should be “the exception and not the rule.” She first pointed to the “structure of self-reporting, the thing that I think gets lost in the shuffle is there’s absolutely no legal obligation to self-disclose in FCPA cases, at all. There may be other disclosure obligations, because of a public company or what have you, but under the law of the FCPA, and under criminal law, no company has an affirmative duty to self-disclose.”

She went on to explain unlike in anti-trust or cartel cases, “where the first company who’s the first in to self-report gets immunity. It’s a totally different structure in the FCPA area for many reasons, most of which are appropriate, but you don’t get immunity, you get cooperation credit”. This cooperation credit is based on the Sentencing Guidelines cited above but Senn explained that, from her perspective, “The problem is, a lot of these calculations are very very opaque. Under the sentencing guidelines, you get a 5-point decrease if you self-report, cooperate, and accept responsibility. You get 2 points off if you cooperate and accept responsibility, and then just 1 point for accepting responsibility. Under this system, supposedly, self-disclosure standing alone is worth 3 points, and each of the other ones are worth 1.” This leads her to believe that “in my experience, you get almost as much credit, if not as much credit, for cooperating with the government once they come to you, even if you didn’t disclose in the first place. The myth is that self-disclosure is some kind of really big bump in cooperation credit. I think, in practice, that really doesn’t bear water.” This leads her to believe that “This idea of credibility by self-disclosing is so intangible, and it’s not quantifiable.”

I posed the question of credibility with the government. One of things that I consistently advocate is that you need to have credibility with the DOJ or SEC when you sit across the table at any point during a FCPA investigation. I had thought that self-disclosure would add to that credibility. However Senn explained that it is the lawyer or law firm representing the company that can go a long way towards establishing credibility. She said, “For those of us who regularly appear before the government, we already have credibility, and they understand that the client may or may not agree with recommendations we make, and they know that we’ll be a straight shooter once we’re in front of them, however we get in front of them.” But is more than the lawyer or law firm that brings credibility; it is actions of the company as well. Of course this means the steps the company has taken and its cooperation with the government during the pendency of the FCPA investigation.

Senn even described a visual way to think through this by describing an X and Y-axis that creates four squares. She articulated it as follows, “On one axis, you have the seriousness of the potential violation, and then the likelihood of discovery on the other axis. In both of these areas, both the seriousness and the likelihood of discovery, I draw the line to be in a more rational, but it may be different, than the traditional norm.”

I asked Senn about the plethora of ways that a FCPA violation or issue can be reported now and if that should play a role the calculus to self-disclose or not. I found her response very interesting. She said, “I think that the likelihood of discovery issue is really really important if you think that companies get a lot of credit for self-reporting. If you don’t think that, which I don’t think that they do particularly, then really the focus is on cooperation and not so much on the self-reporting itself.” Even with the wide spread knowledge of Dodd-Frank whistleblower awards and protections Senn believes that “most employees really don’t realize they can get money from the government if they are whistleblowers on these sorts of things. I don’t think it’s been particularly well publicized, and obviously employers are not training their employees to explain to them that they can be whistleblowers.” She even pointed to the recent statistics from the SEC report on whistleblowers, stating, “If you look at the latest SEC whistleblower report, only 4.3% of the tips reported were FCPA cases. It’s not like people are hitting down their door with all these FCPA cases.”

I found Senn thoughts on the issue of self-disclosure certainly an interesting way to consider this most complex and significant issue. For all the criticism of FCPA Inc. and the FCPA Paparazzi, it also demonstrates the importance of having counsel well versed in both the legal issues of the FCPA and representing a company before the government in the event your company is in an investigation.

In Part III of my series on Senn’s interview, I will focus on her thoughts on remediation of any FCPA violation and steps going forward.

To listen to the full Mara Senn interview, go to the FCPA Compliance and Ethics Report, by clicking here, or download it from iTunes.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2015

Critiquing FCPA Enforcement and the GSK Domestic Corruption Conviction

Recently the FCPA Professor posted a blog, entitled “Look in the Mirror Moments”, in which he used written commentary by the US Secretary of the Treasury to the Chinese government about the Chinese governments anti-trust investigations as a mechanism to explore critiques of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement. In this post, he compared certain aspects of FCPA enforcement to the Chinese corruption enforcement action against GlaxoSmithKline PLC (GSK). Leaving aside the differences in anti-trust enforcement (price-fixing, monopolistic behavior and illegal collusion) and anti-corruption enforcement (bribery), I wanted to review his critiques through the prism of the known facts of the GSK enforcement action.

The FCPA Professor had the following comments about FCPA enforcement, in comparison with the Chinese corruption enforcement action against GSK. He said,

“Without in any way trying to comprehensively compare the overall U.S. legal system to the overall Chinese legal system, the following attributes of FCPA enforcement must at least be acknowledged. 

The vast majority of corporate FCPA enforcement actions lack transparency and the resolution documents (whether a non-prosecution agreement, deferred prosecution agreement or civil administrative order) are the result of an opaque process ultimately controlled by the same office prosecuting or bringing the action. 

As to the swiftness of FCPA enforcement actions, one can only assume that the majority of general counsels and board of directors of companies under FCPA scrutiny would be jumping for joy if the scrutiny – from start to finish – would resolve itself in 15 months rather than the typical 3-5 years (and in some instances more) of FCPA scrutiny lingering.”

The difficulty I have with both of these points is that one cannot separate the Chinese enforcement action against GSK from the Chinese legal system that produced it. Let’s start with the ‘jumping for joy’ prong. The initial difference to note is that the Chinese enforcement action was a domestic prosecution based upon Chinese domestic law for bribery and corruption of Chinese. It was not a US (or UK) company violating US (or UK) laws. This means that the relevant documents and witness were in the locality where the investigation was performed. Even when a key witness, GSK China Country Manager Mark Reilly was in the UK, he voluntarily returned to China to give evidence but was prevented from leaving the country without being charged with a crime. So as far as is known, there were no government-to-government requests for information, no Letters Rogatory or use of any other international discovery mechanism to obtain evidence.

Moreover, the procedural protections in place under US (and UK) criminal procedure simply do not exist in China. There is no right to counsel, no right against self-incrimination, no right to confront witness and not even a right to know what the charges against you might be. These lack of rights were certainly borne out in the speed in which the Chinese investigative authorities were able to obtain evidence and public confessions from GSK principals involved in the bribery and corruption. The first 30-day timeline of the GSK investigation went as follows:

• June 28, 2013 – Local Police announced they have place GSK officials under investigation for economic crimes.
• July 11, 2013 – Public Security Ministry issued statement accusing GSK of bribery.
• July 15 , 2013 – Four senior company execs ‘detained’. Finance chief barred from leaving country.
• July 16, 2013 – GSK General Counsel (GC) placed under ‘house arrest’ along with 30 other employees. One of the four GSK China executives who were detained, admited to bribery allegations on Chinese state television.
• July 22, 2013 – GSK formally apologized for breaking Chinese law regarding domestic bribery and corruption.
• July 26, 2013 – Peter Humphrey, a UK citizen and his wife, a naturalized US citizen, both hired by GSK in an ancillary matter related to the GSK corruption scandal were arrested but not told of the charges against them.

A little over one year later, in July, 2014 the trial of Humphrey and his wife was announced. Orignially it was to be held in secret with both Humphrey and his wife still not told of the formal charges against them. However after diplomatic protests by both the US and UK governments, Humphrey and his wife were both convicted and sentenced in an open trial, albeit lasting only one day, on August 8, 2014. The charges against them were announced at trial. Thereafter, GSK pled guilty in a secret one-day trial GSK was fined approximately $491MM and China Country Manager Mark Reilly and four other GSK China business unit executives were found gulity. They were all sentenced to jail but given suspended sentences.

How did the Chinese government develop its evidence so quickly? One of the defendant’s, admitted, on state run televison, his involvement in the bribery scheme only 18 days after the investigation was announced by Chinese authorities. Indeed, GSK itself made a public apology only 24 days after the announcement by the Chinese authorities it was under investigation. We now know that GSK was informed by a whistleblower of allegations of bribery and corruption as early as January 2013 yet in June GSK announced it had not found anything to substantiate these allegations.

I believe the answer is found in the differences in the Chinese and US legal systems. It all starts with the following: in China you are presumed guilty while in the US (and the UK), you are presumed innocent until proven guilty. In an article in the New York Times (NYT), entitled “Presumed Guilty in China’s War on Corruption”, Andrew Jacobs and Chris Buckley wrote that the “war on corruption often operates beyond the law in a secret realm of party-run agencies”. The process “Known as Shuanggui, it is a secretive, extralegal process that leaves detainees cutoff from lawyers, associates and relatives.” Moreover, even as a case moves through the Chinese criminal justice system, defendants’ counsel “have limited access to evidence, witnesses, and their clients.” It does not get any better when a defendant actually goes to court because “Lawyers say Chinese courts rarely allow them to call defense witnesses, while prosecutors frequently withhold cruical evidence.” Finally, of the 8,110 officials charged with corruption “in the first half of this year, 99.8 percent were convicted”. To this rather amazing trial court conviction rate, I would add the the prosecution does even better on appeal, never losing to a convicted defendant.

Does that sound like a system in which you would jump for joy if you were caught up in, even knowing that the time from announcment of investigation until 99.8% chance of conviction awaited you? Even if the government investigation only took 14 months? In the US, corporations have the same rights as individuals at trial; to cross-examine witness, to be made aware of the charges against it, those charges must be brought with specficity, right to counsel, right to an open trial and right to appeal. These rights are all enshrined in the US Constitution. Those rights are not present for individuals or corporations under Chinese law or jurisprudence.

But the FCPA Professor also critiqued the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in FCPA enforcements with the following observation: The vast majority of corporate FCPA enforcement actions lack transparency and the resolution documents (whether a non-prosecution agreement, deferred prosecution agreement or civil administrative order) are the result of an opaque process ultimately controlled by the same office prosecuting or bringing the action.When a company enters into negotiation with the DOJ and SEC it is with legal counsel in tow. Even if we in the general public are not privy to these negotiations over the terms and conditions of enforcement actions I am confident that there is some give and take. Further, while I only have personal knowledge of one negotiation for the specific terms of a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA), the lawyer representing the company made clear it was a negotiation. It was not a Diktat with sentencing simply pronounced by the DOJ. Does the office which handles the investigation also handle the settlement negotiation? Yes but that is what prosecutors do each and every day in every city, county, town, hamlet, state and federal jurisdiction in this country.

Just as it takes two to tango, it takes two to negotiate. The DOJ does not negotiate with itself. Another party is sitting across the table and that other party is the company involved in the FCPA investigation. Why is that company there in the room negotiating? Because the company has assessed its interest and determined that it would be better off settling than going to trial. This is in the face of DOJ failures in the trial court in the Gun Sting cases, the O’Shea trial and the trial court overturning the verdict in the Lindsey Manufacturing conviction. Simply because there is a negotiation between the DOJ and a private party does not make it some nefarious process, even if the prosecutors hold the upper hand.

As far as the fines and penalites, there has been nothing to suggest the basis of the $491MM fine assessed against GSK. That amount is a bit less than the amounts initially reported that GSK China paid out as bribes, somewhere over $500MM. At least in the US, there are the Sentence Guidelines which form some basis of the calculation. Of course there is always some prosecutorial discretion to lessen a fine or penalty below the suggested amount. We have seen that occur this year with the HP enforcement action and recently Asst. Attorney General Leslie Caldwell suggested that Alcoa could have been fined over $1bn for its conduct, while the actual fine was $384MM. It is appropriate for prosecutors to have such discretion.

While the DOJ is also critiqued that DPAs (and Non-Prosecution Agreement [NPAs]) are essentially the same as going to trial with a near 100% success rate, I think this belies the number of declinations that the DOJs gives out. Unfortunately (and here the FCPA Professor and I do agree); there is not enough information given out about declinations; either regarding the raw numbers or the specific reasons for a declination. Only if a company agrees or is required to make such information public does it become known. Nevertheless, there is the recent example of Layne Christensen, which received a declination. In an article in Compliance Week, entitled “How Two Companies Got Regulators to Drop FCPA Charges”, Jaclyn Jaeger reported on the reasons the company sustained this result of receiving a declination through interviews with Christensen GC, Steve Crooke, its Chief Compliance Officer (CCO), Jennafer Watson and its outside counsel Russ Berland. Jaeger detailed the specific steps the company took and we can all see the effect it had upon the DOJ, through the declination to prosecute the company.

The debate about the costs of FCPA enforcement actions, the proper role of DPAs/NPAs and length of time of investigations is a healthy one and living in the open society that we have in the US, one that we will continue to have. Since I am not a prosecutor (or ex-prosecutor), I cannot look in the mirror at FCPA enforcement but I can review the facts of the DOJ and SEC’s FCPA enforcement, contrasted with the Chinese domestic bribery and corruption proseuction of GSK and believe that there is no basis for comparing the two systems, as they are so different in too many fundamental aspects.

I can however say one thing with absolute certainly; wherever you do want to be, a Chinese jail is not high on the list.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

The Weatherford FCPA Settlement, Part III

Yesterday, I reviewed the conduct which Weatherford International Limited (Weatherford) engaged in over a period from 2002-2011 in connection with its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) investigation, noted the deficiencies in its compliance program and its internal controls and even how the company intentionally impeded the investigations of both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Today, I want to look at how the company changed course in mid-stream during the investigation, brought in a top-notch and well respected lawyer as its Chief Compliance Officer (CCO), created a best-in-class compliance program; all of which saved the company millions of dollars in potential fines and penalties.

1. I.                    DOJ Fine Calculation

To resolve the criminal aspects of this case, Weatherford agreed to pay an $87.2 million criminal penalty as part of a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with the DOJ. There was also another $65.6 million paid to the SEC. However the figure paid to the DOJ was at the very bottom range of a potential criminal penalty. The range listed in the DPA was from $87.2 to $174.3 million. In coming up with this range under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, it is significant for the actions that Weatherford did not receive credit for during the pendency of the investigation. The company did not receive a credit for self-reporting. The company only received a -2 for its cooperation because prior to 2008 the company engaged in activities to impede the regulators’ investigation.

So the fine range could have been more favorable to the company. But the key is that Weatherford received the low end of the range. How did they do this?

A.     New Sheriff in Town

One of the key things Weatherford did was bring in Billy Jacobson as its CCO and give him a seat at the table of the company’s Executive Board. He was a Federal Prosecutor in the Fraud Section, Criminal Division, US Department of Justice. He also served as an Assistant Chief for FCPA Enforcement Department so we can assume he understood the FCPA and how prosecutors think through issues. (Jacobson also worked as a State Prosecutor in New York City, with my former This Week in FCPA co-host Howard Sklar, so shout out to Howard.) Jacobson was not hired directly from the DOJ but after he had left the DOJ and had gone into private practice. There is nothing that shows credibility like bringing in a respected subject matter expert and giving that person the tools and resources to turn things around.

But more than simply bringing in a new sheriff, Weatherford turned this talk into action by substantially increasing its cooperation with the government, thoroughly investigating all issues, turning over the results to the DOJ and SEC and providing literally millions of pages of documents to the regulators. The company also cleaned house by terminating officers and employees who were responsible for the illegal conduct.

B.     Increase in Compliance Function

In addition to establishing Jacobson in the high level CCO position, the company significantly increased the size of its compliance department by hiring 38 compliance professionals and conducted 30 anti-corruption compliance reviews in the countries in which Weatherford operates. This included the hiring of outside consultants to assess and review the company’s compliance program and beefing up due diligence on all third parties, including those in the sales and supply chain, joint venture (JV) partners and merger or acquisition (M&A) candidates. The company also agreed to continue to enhance its internal controls and books and records to prevent and/or detect future suspect conduct.

If you have ever heard any of the current Weatherford compliance professionals speak at FCPA conferences, you can appreciate that they are first rate; that they know their stuff and the company supports their efforts on an ongoing basis.

C.     Best in Class Compliance Program

During the pendency of the investigation, Weatherford moved to create a best practices compliance program. They appear to have done so and agreed in the DPA to continue to maintain such a compliance program. Under Schedule C to the DPA, it set out the compliance program which the company had implemented and continued to keep in place, at least during the length of the DPA. It included the following components.

1. High level commitment from company officials and senior management to do business in compliance with the FCPA.
2. A substantive written anti-corruption compliance code of conduct.
3. Written policies and procedures to implement this code of conduct.
4. A robust system of internal controls, including accounting and financial controls.
5. Risk assessments and risk reviews of its ongoing business.
6. No less than annual assessments of its overall compliance program.
7. Appropriate oversight and responsibility of a Chief Compliance Officer.
8. Effective training for all employees and relevant third parties.
9. An effective compliance function which can provide guidance to company employees.
10. A robust internal reporting system.
11. Effective investigations of any reported compliance issue.
12. Appropriate incentives for employees to do business ethically and in compliance.
13. Enforced discipline for any employee who violates the company’s compliance program.
14. Suitable due diligence and management of third parties and business partners.
15. A correct level of pre-acquisition due diligence for any merger or acquisition candidate, including a risk assessment and reporting to the DOJ if the company uncovers and FCPA-violative conduct during this pre-acquisition phase.
16. As soon as practicable, Weatherford will integrate any newly acquired entity into its compliance regime, including training of all relevant new employees, a FCPA forensic audit and reporting of any ongoing violations.
17. Ongoing monitoring, testing and auditing of the company’s compliance function, taking into account any “relevant developments in the field and the evolving international and industry standards.”

D.    Monitor

Weatherford also agreed to an external monitor. However, the term of the monitor is not the entire length of the three-year DPA; the term of the monitor is only 18 months. The monitor’s primary function is to assess the company’s compliance with the terms of the DPA and report the results to the DOJ at least twice during the terms of the monitorship. After this 18 month term the DOJ will allow the company to self-report to the regulators. It should be noted that the term of the external monitor can be extended by the DOJ.

II.                Conclusion

It certainly has been a long, strange journey for Weatherford. I should note that I have not discussed at all the Oil-For-Food aspect of this settlement, which was an additional $100MM penalty to the company. However, with regard to the FCPA aspects of the matter, there are some very solid and telling lessons to be drawn from this case. First and foremost is that cooperation is always the key. But more than simply cooperating in the investigation is that a company should take a pro-active approach to putting a best-in-class compliance program in place during, rather than after the investigation concludes. Also, a company cannot simply ‘talk-the-talk’ but must come through and do the work to gain the credit. The bribery schemes that the company had engaged in and the systemic failures of its compliance program and internal controls, should serve as a good set of examples for the compliance practitioner to use in assessing a compliance program.

The settlement also sends a clear message from both the DOJ and SEC on not only what type of conduct will be rewarded under the US Sentencing Guidelines, but what they expect as a compliance program. One does not have read tea leaves or attempt to divine what might be an appropriate commitment to compliance to see what the regulators expect these day.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

The Weatherford FCPA Settlement, Part II

Yesterday, I reviewed the Weatherford International Limited (Weatherford) Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) settlement. Today I will take a more focused look at the bribery schemes involved and the failure of the company to bring internal controls up to standard or even follow its own compliance program. Weatherford’s compliance program was a joke but worse was its conduct, which many in the company knew was illegal and reported internally but the company did not stop the conduct. The company also, early on in the investigation, actively impeded regulators access to personnel and documents. However, and this is one of the key messages from the Weatherford FCPA enforcement action, the company truly ‘turned it around’. Tomorrow we will explore how the company made this dramatic turnaround.

The bribery schemes had four basic scenarios and, for those of you keeping score at home, I have summarized them below.

I.                   Corrupt Conduct

Weatherford Bribery Box Score

Country	Bribery Scheme	Government or SOE Official Involved	Amount of Bribe Paid
Angola	Payments through 3rd parties	Sonagol Drilling Manager	$250K
Angola	JV Partners	Government Ministers, wives and other relatives	$810K
Congo	Payments thru 3rd parties	SOE officials	$500K
Middle East Countries	Unauthorized distributor discounts	SOE officials	$11.8MM
Algeria	Improper travel and entertainment	SOE officials	$35K
Albania	Misappropriation of company funds	Tax Auditors	$41K

Angola

In Angola two separate bribery schemes were used. The first involved payment of a $250,000 bribe to the Sonagol Drilling Manager. To funnel the bribe the company retained a Swiss agent who paid the money. This Swiss agent billed Weatherford for non-existent and fraudulent services. He would retain a percentage of the total he billed as a commission and would pass the remainder to the Sonagol Drilling Manager. The bribery of the Drilling Manager also included a week long, all-expenses paid trip to Italy and Portugal, where only one of the days was business related.

The company continued this further creativity when it set up a joint venture (JV) which had two local JV partners, JV Partner A and JV Partner B. Partner A consisted of Sonagol government officials, their wives and other relatives and held a 45% stake in the overall JV. JV Partner B’s principals included the relative of an Angolan Minister, the relative’s spouse, and another Angolan official. It held 10% of the overall JV interest. Neither of these JV Partners contributed capital, expertise or labor to the JV. In addition to the straight quid pro quo of awarding Weatherford 100% of the Angolan well screens market, these JV Partners had contracts which were awarded to Weatherford competitors, revoked after the initial award and then awarded them to Weatherford.

Congo

In the Congo, Weatherford made over $500,000 in commercial bribe payments through the same Swiss Agent they had utilized in the initial Angolan bribery scheme to employees of a commercial customer, a wholly-owned subsidiary of an Italian energy company, between March 2002 and December 2008. The Swiss Agent’s role in the scheme included submitting false invoices and sending payments to individuals as directed by Weatherford Services Limited (WSL) employees and others. WSL employees created and sent false work orders to the Swiss Agent. The Swiss Agent, WSL employees and others knew the services would not be performed and that the work orders were a pretext to funnel money to the Swiss Agent. The Swiss Agent forwarded the money, less a commission, once again based on fraudulent invoices for non-existent services.

The Middle East

In certain un-named Middle Eastern countries between the years of 2005 and 2011 another Weatherford subsidiary employed another bribery scheme to funnel payments to officials of state owned National Oil Company (NOC). This bribery scheme entailed the awarding of improper “volume discounts” to a company that served as an agent, distributor and reseller which supplied Weatherford products to a state-owned and controlled NOC, believing that those discounts were being used to create a slush fund with which to make bribe payments to decision makers at the NOC.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Complaint noted that as early as 2001, officials at the un-named national oil company directed Weatherford to sell goods to the company through a particular distributor. Prior to entering into the contract with the distributor, Weatherford did not conduct any due diligence on the distributor, despite: (a) the fact that the distributor would be furnishing Weatherford goods directly to an instrumentality of a foreign government; (b) the fact that a foreign official had specifically directed the company to contract with that particular distributor; and (c) the fact that Weatherford executives knew that a member of the country’s royal family had an ownership interest in the distributor. In late 2001, the company entered into a representation agreement with the distributor to sell its Completion and Production Systems products to the NOC.

Thereafter, the distributor created a slush fund by providing the distributor with unauthorized volume and pricing discounts, in addition to the agent’s 5% commission. Company employees intended that the slush fund would be used to pay officials at the un-named NOC. The “volume discounts” to the distributor were typically between 5-l0% of the contact price. The discounts allowed the distributor to accumulate funds which were used to pay bribes to the NOC officials.

Algeria

Weatherford also provided improper travel and entertainment to officials of the Algerian NOC, Sonatrach, which did not have any legitimate business purpose. The SEC Complaint detailed the following improper travel and entertainment provided to Sonatrach officials:

• June 2006 trip by two Sonatrach officials to the FIFA World Cup soccer tournament in Hanover, Germany;
• July 2006 honeymoon trip of the daughter of a Sonatrach official; and
• October 2005 trip by a Sonatrach employee and his family to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for religious reasons that were improperly booked as a donation.

In addition, on at least two other occasions, Weatherford provided Sonatrach officials with cash sums while they were visiting Houston. For example, in May 2007, Weatherford paid for four Sonatrach officials, including a tender committee official, to attend a conference in Houston. Further, the company provided an approximate $24,000 cash advance for the trip where there was no evidence of any legitimate business purpose or promotional expenses.

Albania

In Albania, Weatherford had a tax evaluation problem. To deal with this issue the general manager and financial manager of the company’s Italian subsidiary misappropriated over $200,000 of company funds, to fund a bribery scheme involving Albanian tax auditors. The general manager, financial manager and the Albania country manager made $41,000 in payments to Albanian tax auditors who questioned details of the company’s accounts and demanded payment to close out the audit or speed up the certification process in 2001, 2002 and 2004.

The general manager and financial manager misappropriated the funds by taking advantage of Weatherford’s inadequate system of internal accounting controls. They misreported cash advances, diverted payments on previously paid invoices, misappropriated government rebate checks and received reimbursement of expenses that did not relate to business activities. A memo drafted by the general manager and financial manager in the months after their co-worker confronted them discussed the misappropriated funds and indicated that funds were paid to tax auditors in Albania and others for the benefit of Weatherford. This was the bribery scheme which was reported to the company and the internal whistle-blower employee was terminated.

II.                Program Deficiencies Lack of Cooperation

The DPA laid out in equally stark terms the complete and utter disregard, non-existence of and/or complete failure of any systemic compliance program, prior to 2008. These deficiencies included:

• Failure to establish internal accounting controls to prevent bribery and corruption;
• Failure to perform due diligence on any prospective third parties, including who they were, ultimate beneficial ownership and business justifications;
• Failure to perform due diligence or in any meaningful manage joint venture partners;
• Failure to have any meaningful internal controls for gifts, travel and entertainment;
• No effective internal reporting system for FCPA violations or issues; and
• (Most amazingly) No Chief Compliance Officer or even compliance professionals in a multi-billion dollar, multi-national company in the energy industry.

In addition to all of the above, Weatherford engaged in active conduct to impede the investigations of both the SEC and DOJ. In one instance, the company told investigators that a key witness was dead when he was not only still alive and well but working for Weatherford. In other instances, the company, emails were deleted by employees prior to the imaging of their computers. It was also noted that Weatherford failed to secure important computers and documents and allowed potentially complicit employees to collect documents subpoenaed by the staff.

Tomorrow, the Weatherford compliance comeback.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

What is ‘Acceptance of Responsibility’ Under the US Sentencing Guidelines?

One of the things that I am often asked is how are fines and penalties calculated for Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violations? The Department of Justice (DOJ)/Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) FCPA Guidance has the following explanation. First, the offense level is calculated pursuant to the US Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) §§2C1.1 or 2B1.1, by starting with the base offense level and increasing it as warranted by any applicable specific offense characteristics. The next reference is made to the organizational guidelines found in Chapter 8, which lay out the structure for determining the final advisory guideline fine range for organizations. The base fine itself consists “of the greater of the amount corresponding to the total offense level, calculated pursuant to the guidelines, or the pecuniary gain or loss from the offense.”

The base fine is then multiplied by “a culpability score that can either reduce the fine to as little as five percent of the base fine or increase the recommended fine to up to four times the amount of the base fine.” As described in USSG §8C2.5, this culpability score is determined by taking into account numerous factors “such as the size of the organization committing the criminal acts; the involvement in or tolerance of criminal activity by high-level personnel within the organization; and prior misconduct or obstructive behavior.” The culpability score can be reduced if the “organization had an effective preexisting compliance program to prevent violations and if the organization voluntarily disclosed the offense, cooperated in the investigation, and accepted responsibility for the criminal conduct.”

I thought about some of the basis for the calculations in the context of the ongoing reports about News Corp’s chairman, Rupert Murdoch, and his remarks which were recorded in March of this year when he spoke to a group of journalists from The Sun, a News Corp entity. The FCPA Blog, in a post entitled “On secret tape, Murdoch reportedly acknowledges Fleet Street’s ‘corrupt culture‘, reported that “A covert recording from March seems to capture News Corporation chairman Rupert Murdoch suggesting that bribery is part of the Fleet Street culture.” The Guardian, in an article entitled “Rupert Murdoch revealed – tape exposes the media mogul’s real opinions”, detailed further excerpts from the recording by noting he was annoyed with the police who he believes are “incompetent”, additionally he was not sure that setting up the Management and Standards Committee (MSC) which performed the company’s internal investigation was a good idea and, finally, Murdoch “lays into lawyers, accusing them of getting rich by trawling through millions of emails.” Just when you think it cannot get any worse (or better – depending on your perspective) The Guardian states, “He talks of the News of the World in personal terms: “We got caught with dirty hands, I guess” before launching into a further attack on the police: “The cops are totally incompetent … It’s just disgraceful what they’re doing … It’s the biggest inquiry ever, over next-to-nothing.””

How is that for ‘tone-at-the-top’? Even the News Corp owned Wall Street Journal (WSJ), in an article entitled “Murdoch Recording Piques Interest of Police, Lawmakers”, said “Mr. Murdoch’s remarks in the meeting sharply contrast with his public contrition over the newspapers’ alleged use of illegal reporting tactics.” But more than just this general statement how would Murdoch’s statements be analyzed under the culpability score used in FCPA cases? Would an admission by Murdoch that there was a culture of bribery and corruption on Fleet Street weigh under the factor of “tolerance of criminal activity by high-level personnel within the organization”? How about the potential reduction for accepting responsibility for the criminal conduct?

Murdoch’s remarks are in stark contrast to other reports of the actions taken by News Corp. In an article in the July issue of Corporate Counsel magazine, entitled “Doubling Down”, reporter Sue Reisinger profiled News Corp General Counsel (GC) and Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) Gerson Zweifach. In her article, Reisinger discussed the MSC, which led the company’s internal investigation of not only the bribery allegations but also the phone hacking scandal. It was information discovered in the course of the MSC’s internal investigation, and later turned over to the relevant government authorities, which led to many of the arrests of News Corp employees. The MSC and its work have clearly been one of the aggressive approaches taken by News Corp during the investigation. But The Guardian reported Murdoch may feel differently about such cooperation now when it stated, “He admits to a measure of panic as the reason for setting up the MSC to provide information to the police: “The police were about to invade this building … it was done to protect the business.””

Reisinger also reported that the FBI has opened its own investigation of News Corp. She also reported that the DOJ “has said that it’s examining whether the company accessed voicemails of 9/11 victims, as well as whether it violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act”. So it is probably very helpful to News Corp that it instituted a new compliance program, based in part on the settlement of a shareholder derivative lawsuit. Reisinger said “A commitment to the program is included in the settlement document. The program seeks a more centralized approach to managing risk while still allowing for local autonomy.” Putting together a best practices compliance program during the pendency of a FCPA investigation is certainly one of the most powerful steps a company can take to help to ameliorate a potential FCPA penalty, the Parker Drilling enforcement action has certainly made that clear.

I would normally say that actions speak louder than words. But what is the DOJ to make over the taped remarks of Murdoch? The Guardian article ends with the following “But the real significance of the tape is that it reveals the true, unexpurgated Rupert Murdoch. As I have said often since the hacking scandal first broke, as the man at the top I believe he has been responsible for the journalistic culture at Wapping. This tape appears to prove my point.” I no longer think it is a question in the News Corp investigation “What did the President know and when did he know it?” If such a culture existed and the person who knew about it and tolerated it is still at the helm, does this impact the DOJ’s analysis under either the USSG or the culpability score? Further, does it matter if you belittle your own internal investigation, even up to the point where you suggest it should have never been done?

We do know that the DOJ takes quite a dim view of any company which settles and then claims that, you know we really didn’t do anything wrong. Standard Chartered shows us what the DOJ’s response was when its chairman claimed that the bank had engaged in “no wilful act to avoid sanctions; you know, mistakes are made – clerical errors” related to its myriad of conduct in doing business with Iran, in violation of US trade sanctions. The response was that two weeks later, he was required to eat those words when he “said those comments were “both legally and factually incorrect”” and retracted them. “Standard Chartered Bank unequivocally acknowledges and accepts responsibility . . . for past knowing and wilful criminal conduct in violating US economic sanctions laws and regulations”.

But that was after all a Bank which had admitted to its violations, agreed to a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) and to pay a large fine. Here News Corp has made no such admission or agreement. And since acceptance of responsibility is only one factor under the culpability score, perhaps News Corp can garner more credit for its cooperation and creation of a best practices compliance program. Then again perhaps it is all simply a misunderstanding. The Guardian also reported that “A statement released by Murdoch’s spokesman said: “Mr Murdoch welcomes the opportunity to return to the Select Committee and answer their questions. He looks forward to clearing up any misconceptions as soon as possible.”

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

DS&S DPA: Lessons Learned for the Compliance Practitioner

On Monday, June 18, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the resolution of a matter involving violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) by Data Systems & Solutions LLC (DS&S), a US entity based in Virginia. The settlement resulted in the company agreeing to a two year and 7 day Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA). The case was interesting for a number of reasons and it has some significant lessons which the compliance practitioner can put into place in a corporate compliance program. The charges related to DS&S’s business included the design, installation and maintenance of instrumentation and controls systems at nuclear power plants, fossil fuel power plants and other critical infrastructure facilities. In reading the Criminal Information, I can only say that this was no one-off or rogue employee situation but this was a clear, sustained and well known bribery scheme that went on within the company.

I.                   The Criminal Information

The bribery scheme involved payments made to officials at a state-owned nuclear power facility in Lithuania, named Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP). The payments were made to allow DS&S to obtain and retain business with INPP. The Information listed contracts awarded to DS&S in the amount of over $30MM from 1999 to 2004. Significantly, DS&S did not self-disclose this matter to the DOJ but only began an investigation after receiving a DOJ Subpoena for records.

The Players Box Score

DS&S Officials	INPP Officials	Subcontractors
Exec A – VP of Marketing and Business Development (BD)	Official 1 – Deputy Head of Instrumentation and Controls Department	Subcontractor A – Simulation Technology Products and Services
	Official 2 – Head of Instrumentation and Controls Department	Subcontractor B – Beneficially owned by Official 1 and which employed INPP Officials
	Official 3 – Director General at INPP	Subcontractor C – Shell company used a funneling entity to pay bribes
	Official 4 – Head of International Projects at INPP
	Official 5 – Lead SW Engineer at INPP

The bribery scheme used by DS&S recycled about every known technique there is to pay bribes. The Information listed 51 instances of bribes paid or communications via email about the need to continue to pay bribes. The bribery scheme laid in the Information reflected the following techniques used by:

•       Payment of bribes by Subcontractors to Officials on behalf of DS&S;
•       Direct payment of bribes by DS&S into US bank accounts controlled by INPP Officials;
•       Creation of fictional invoices from the Subcontractors to fund the bribes;
•      Payment of above-market rates for services allegedly delivered by the Subcontractors so the excess monies could be used to fund bribes;
•      Payment of salaries to INPP Officials while they were ‘employed’ by Subcontractor B;
•       Providing travel and entertainment to Officials to Florida, where DS&S has no facilities and which travel and entertainment had no reasonable business purpose; and last but not least…
•      Purchase of a Cartier watch as a gift.

II.                The Deferred Prosecution Agreement

I set out these details with some specificity for two reasons. The first is that the Information is a must read for anyone in Internal Audit who reviews books and records. It gives you the precise types of Red Flags to look for. But secondly is the fact that DS&S received a discount of 30% off the low end of the penalty range as calculated under the US Sentencing Guidelines. The calculation as listed in the DPA is as follows:

Calculation of Fine Range:

Base Fine $10,500,000

Multipliers 1.20(min)/2.40(max)

Fine Range $12,600,000/$25,200,000

The ultimate fine paid by DS&S was only $8.82MM, which the DPA states is “an approximately thirty-percent reduction off the bottom of the fine range…” So for the compliance practitioner the question is what did DS&S do to get such a dramatic reduction? We know that one thing they did NOT do was self-report as the DPA notes that this case began as a DOJ investigation and DS&S received Subpoenas “in connection with the government’s investigation.” However, after this initial delivery of Subpoenas DS&S engaged a clear pattern of conduct which led directly to this 30% discount of the low end of the fine range. The DPA reports that DS&S took the following steps:

 

• Internal Investigation. DS&S initiated an internal investigation and provided real-time reports and updates of its investigation into the conduct described in the Information and Statement of Facts.
• Extraordinary Cooperation. DS&S’s cooperation has been extraordinary, including conducting an extensive, thorough, and swift internal investigation; providing to the Department searchable databases of documents downloaded from servers, computers, laptops, and other electronic devices; collecting, analyzing, and organizing voluminous evidence and information to provide to the DOJ in a comprehensive report; and responding promptly and fully to the DOJ’s requests.
• Extensive Remediation. The number of steps DS&S took in regard to remediation included the following:
  • Termination of company officials and employees who were engaged in the bribery scheme;
  • Dissolving the joint venture and then reorganizing and integrating the dissolved entity as a subsidiary of DS&S;
  • Instituting a rigorous compliance program in this newly constituted subsidiary;
  • Enhancing the company’s due diligence protocols for third-party agents and subcontractors;
  • Chief Executive Officer (CEO) review and approval of the selection and retention of any third-party agent or subcontractor;
  • Strengthening of company ethics and compliance policies;
  • Appointment of a company Ethics Representative who reports directly to the CEO;
  • The Ethics Representative provides regular reports to the Members Committee (the equivalent of a Board of Directors in a LLC); and
  • A heightened review of most foreign transactions.
  • Enhanced Compliance Program. More on this in the next section.
  • Continued Cooperation with DOJ. The company agreed to continue to cooperate with the Department in any ongoing investigation of the conduct of DS&S and its officers, directors, employees, agents, and subcontractors relating to violations of the FCPA and to fully cooperate with any other domestic or foreign law enforcement authority and investigations by Multilateral Development Banks.

III.             Enhanced Compliance Obligations

One of the interesting aspects of the DS&S DPA is that there are 15 points listed in the Corporate Compliance Program, attached as Schedule C to the DPA, rather than the standard 13 items we have seen in every DPA since at least November 2010. The new additions are found on items 13 & 14 on page C-6 of Schedule C and deal with mergers and acquisitions. They read in full:

13. DS&S will develop and implement policies and procedures for mergers and acquisitions requiring that DS&S conduct appropriate risk-based due diligence on potential new business entities, including appropriate FCPA and anti-corruption due diligence by legal, accounting, and compliance personnel. If DS&S discovers any corrupt payments or inadequate internal controls as part of its due diligence of newly acquired entities or entities merged with DS&S, it shall report such conduct to the Department as required in Appendix B of this Agreement.

14. DS&S will ensure that DS&S’s policies and procedures regarding the anticorruption laws apply as quickly as is practicable to newly acquired businesses or entities merged with DS&S and will promptly:

a. Train directors, officers, employees, agents, consultants, representatives, distributors, joint venture partners, and relevant employees thereof, who present corruption risk to DS&S, on the anti-corruption laws and DS&S’s policies and procedures regarding anticorruption laws.

b. Conduct an FCPA-specific audit of all newly acquired or merged businesses as quickly as practicable.

This language draws from and builds upon the prior Opinion Release 08-02 regarding Halliburton’s request for guidance during an attempted acquisition and the Johnson and Johnson (J&J) Enhanced Compliance Obligations which were incorporated into its DPA. While the DS&S DPA does note that it is specifically tailored as a solution to DS&S’s FCPA compliance issues, I believe that this is the type of guidance that a compliance practitioner can rely upon when advising his or her clients on what the DOJ expects during Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A). The five keys under these new items, 13 & 14 highlighted above, are: (1) develop policies and procedures for M&A work prior to engaging in such transactions; (2) full FCPA audit of any acquired entities “as quickly as practicable”; (3) report any corrupt payments or inadequate internal controls it discovers in this process to the DOJ; (4) apply DS&S anti-corruption policies and procedures to the newly acquired entities; and (5) train any persons who might “present a corruption risk to DS&S” on the company’s policies and procedures and the law.

IV.              Summary

The DS&S DPA provides some key points for the compliance practitioner. First and foremost, I believe that it demonstrates the reasonableness of the DOJ. The bribery scheme here was about as bad as it can get, short of suitcases of money carried by the CEO to pay bribes. The company did not self-report, yet received a significant reduction on the minimum level of fine. The specificity in the DPA allows a compliance practitioner to understand what type of conduct is required to not only avoid a much more significant monetary penalty but also a corporate monitor. Lastly, is the specific guidance on FCPA compliance in relation to M&A activities, to the extent that if anyone in the compliance arena did not understand what was required in the M&A context; this question would seem to be answered in the DS&S DPA.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2012

What is ‘Extraordinary Cooperation’ in an FCPA Enforcement Action?

In the recent BizJet Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA), which detailed a litany of corrupt payments made and approved at the highest level of the company to obtain and retain business in Mexico and Panama, the company received a monetary fine of more than 30% under the low end of the amount suggested by the US Sentencing Guidelines. How did the company obtain this fine reduction? Through what the Department of Justice (DOJ) termed “extraordinary cooperation”. I have often wondered what the term “extraordinary cooperation” meant so when I attended a panel at the recent 2012 Global Ethics Summit, entitled “Engaging with the Government: What’s Changed?” I put that question to panelist Ty Cobb, a partner in the Washington DC office of Hogan Lovells.

As a general rule, Cobb noted that ‘extraordinary cooperation’ will not be the definition given by the company but by the DOJ. This is an important discussion to have with your client very early on to set a proper expectation. A company must be credible at all times, it cannot selectively report facts but must report both good and bad facts to the DOJ. Lastly, each matter is a separate negotiation and must stand on its own feet. He said that a company does not have to completely roll over to every request made by the DOJ as there can and should be negotiations by investigative or other specialized counsel who interact with the DOJ throughout the process.

Cobb also provided some guidance on the specific steps which might lead to a penalty reduction.

Did you go high enough?

First what did the company do to the persons involved in the bribery and corruption? Was there discipline to the parties? How high up did the company go to discharge or discipline those involved in the bribery and corruption? Did discipline or discharge go up to the highest levels of the company if persons at those levels were involved in the bribery or corruption?

Did your retraining go down low enough?

Here Cobb focused on retraining of employees. He said that it was important that your post incident training go down to an appropriate level of employees in the company. While he did not say how low that level might be, clearly the better approach would be to over-include rather than under-include for training. This seems to imply that full and significant training must be provided to more than simply high risk employees.

Provide access to documents and individuals

A company’s investigative team will probably have to review thousands if not millions of pages of documents and electronic communications. Obviously a summary of the relevant documents and electronic communications will need to be provided to the DOJ but if the government wants access to the full set of documents, that will also be required. Access to employees for DOJ interviews will also be required. This can be tricky as it may intersect with ‘did you go high enough’ listed above regarding termination. Many companies desire to terminate employees determined to be involved in such conduct immediately but if you do so, they may not cooperate with an internal investigation. It may also make it difficult for your company to make such terminated employees available to the DOJ for interview.

Best practices program going forward

One of the things consistently mentioned in DPAs and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) is that a company which reaches such an agreement with the DOJ always agrees to institute a rigorous compliance program going forward. As the compliance programs listed in Attachment C (or Attachment B to a NPA) are monikered as minimum best practices this would seem to indicate that the companies involved went beyond the minimum. DPAs, such as the Johnson and Johnson (J&J) DPA, go so far as to create and embrace “Enhanced Compliance Obligations” which detail compliance policies and procedures which go beyond the minimum best practices.

Self Monitorships

The BizJet DPA also includes a concept which has appeared in several recent DPAs. BizJet agreed that it would report “at no less that twelve-month intervals during the three year term” [of the DPA] to the DOJ on “remediation and implementation of the compliance program and internal controls, policies and procedures” as set forth in the DPA. The initial report was required to be delivered one year from the date of the DPA and would also include BizJet’s proposals “reasonably designed to improve BizJet’s internal controls, policies and procedures for ensuring compliance with the FCPA and other applicable anti-corruption laws.”

Cobb’s observations, together with the information that can be gleaned from the BizJet DPA, provide some general parameters that a compliance practitioner may use to understand more completely what the term ‘extraordinary cooperation’ might be defined from the perspective of  the DOJ. The DOJ has consistently rewarded companies which provide such cooperation with penalties below those suggested by the US Sentencing Guidelines. However, such cooperation is not a walk in the park and as someone who has worked at a company during a very intensive post-DPA monitorship, I can attest that such cooperation is far beyond ‘normal’ cooperation and truly is ‘extraordinary’. Yet at the end of the day, the internal cost appears to be well worth it.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2012

The BizJet DPA: Cooperation is the Key

Last week, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the resolution of an enforcement action under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) involving the Tulsa based company, BizJet. The company is in the business of providing aircraft maintenance, repair and overhaul services (MRO) to customers in the US and internationally. BizJet ran into FCPA trouble regarding its Latin American operations, specifically in the countries of Mexico and Panama. BizJet employees and executives were involved in multi-year running bribery scheme which paid hundreds of thousands of dollars for these MRO contracts. These payments were discussed at the highest levels of the company, including the Board of Directors, and occurred from 2004 until 2010.

BizJet Bribery Box Score

The Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) listed the following instances of recorded bribery, a/k/a the “BizJet Bribery Box Score”.

BizJet Executive or Employee Named	Payment Made To	Amount of Payment	Others Involved
Sales Manager  A	Official 6	Cell Phone and $10K	Executive B and C
Sales Manager A	Official 3	$2K	Executive  B
Executive B, C and Sales Manager A	Official 2	$20K
Executive C	Official 2	$30K	Sales Manager A
Executive B	Mexican Federal Police Chief	$10K	Executive C and Sales Manager. A
Executive C	Official 5	$18K	Sales Manager A
Sales Manager A	Official 4	$50K
Sales Manager A	Mexican Federal Police	$176	Executive C
Sales Manager A	Official 4	$40K
Sales Manager A	Mexican Federal Police	$210K	Executive C
Sales Manager A	Official 5	$6K	Executive C
Executive C	Official 5	$22K

The above bribes were characterized as “commission payments” and “referral fees” on the company’s books and records. Payments were made from both international and company bank accounts here in the United States. In other words, this was as clear a case of a pattern and practice of bribery, authorized by the highest levels of the company, paid through US banks and attempts to hide all of the above by mis-characterizing them in the company’s books and records.

Reduction in Monetary Fine

I set out these facts as listed in the DPA in some detail to show the serious nature of enforcement action. However, the clear import that I found in this is that a company can make a comeback in the face of very bad facts. The calculation of the fine, based upon the factors set out in the US Sentencing Guidelines, ranged between a low of $17.1MM to a high of $34.2MM. The final agreed upon monetary penalty was $11.8MM. This is obviously a significant reduction from the suggested low or high end, or as was noted by the FCPA Blog “BizJet’s reduction was 30% off the bottom of the fine range, and a whopping 65% off the top of the fine range.”

How did BizJet achieve this reduction and avoid an external monitor? As reported by the FCPA Professor, the following were factors:

(a) following discovery of the FCPA violations during the course of an internal audit of the implementation of enhanced compliance related to third-party consultants, BizJet initiated an internal investigation and voluntarily disclosed to the DOJ the misconduct …;

(b) BizJet’s cooperation has been extraordinary, including conducting an extensive internal investigation, voluntarily making U.S. and foreign employees available for interviews, and collecting, analyzing, and organizing voluminous evidence and information for the DOJ;

(c) BizJet has engaged in extensive remediation, including terminating the officers and employees responsible for the corrupt payments, enhancing its due diligence protocol for third-party agents and consultants, and instituting heightened review of proposals and other transactional documents for all BizJet contracts;

(d) BizJet has committed to continue to enhance its compliance program and internal controls, including ensuring that its compliance program satisfies the minimum elements set forth in the” corporate compliance program set forth in an attachment to the DPA; and

(e) “BizJet has agreed to continue to cooperate with the DOJ in any ongoing investigation of the conduct of BizJet and its officers, directors, employees, agents, and consultants relating to violations of the FCPA.

Reports to the DOJ

As mentioned, the company avoided an external monitor. However, it agreed that it would report “at no less that twelve-month intervals during the three year term” [of the DPA] to the DOJ on “remediation and implementation of the compliance program and internal controls, policies and procedures” which were listed in Attachment C to the DPA (the DOJ guidelines for a minimum best practices compliance program). The initial report was required to be delivered one year from the date of the DPA and would also include BizJet’s proposals “reasonably designed to improve BizJet’s internal controls, policies and procedures for ensuring compliance with the FCPA and other applicable anti-corruption laws.”

Cooperation is the Key

Last week I attended the Ethisphere 2012 Global Ethics Summit where Lanny Breuer closed the conference. He did not present a speech but engaged in dialogue with Alex Brigham and took questions from the audience. One of the clear points Breuer emphasized was that if companies will come to the DOJ, make a voluntary disclosure and fully cooperate, it will pay dividends. I believe that this is clearly the case in the BizJet matter. Here you had a multi-year bribery scheme in place, not only approved at the highest levels of the company but with active involvement from senior managers, yet the final monetary penalty was almost 30% below even the lowest in the Sentencing Guideline range. Clearly BizJet benefited through its cooperation with the DOJ and that message should be made clear to any other company which might find itself in such a “fine mess.”

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2012

The President and Lin-sanity: Lesson Learned III For Your Compliance Program

Lin-sanity still reigns and it may well now have reached its penultimate level. What evidence do I have of this cultural phenomenon? It is that both US President Barack Obama AND Sarah Palin are now on the Lin-sanity bandwagon. Palin, who played basketball in high school, is pictured at the left with the highly coveted Lin gear outside her Manhattan hotel. Not to be outdone, last week on the B.S. Report, a weekly podcast hosted by the Sports Guy Bill Simmons, held at the White House, President Barrack Obama talked about Lin-sanity and his fellow Harvard alum Jeremy Lin.

The President made an interesting comment, which I thought spoke to an ongoing issue in the compliance world. His observation was that Lin’s in-game success did not happen overnight, so question for you where were all of the ubiquitous NBA coaches all through his practices during the 15 months he has been in the NBA? The President thought that some coach, should have seen something, which indicated Lin had some talent. While we can ponder the wisdom of the 30+ coaches, between the Warriors and Rockets, who all blew that one, one of the things that the President’s comment brought up for me is the role of training in any best practices compliance program. Why you might ask? The answer is because one of focuses within an organization is to not only develop talent, but to evaluate talent in everyday work situations; similar to evaluating a basketball player in practice. So the Lin-sanity Lesson III is that one of the areas of training is to teach business unit employees to coach and evaluate compliance talent in an organization.

This is an area that Human Resources (HR) can be of great assistance to the Compliance Department. Compliance can take the lead in training on the substance of compliance. However, HR can assist in training managers to evaluate and audit employees on whether they conduct themselves within a culture of compliance and ethics. This is the traditional role of HR. While there is a training requirement for any minimum best practices compliance program, based upon the requirements in the US Sentencing Guidelines, I would submit that there is an opportunity to bring additional and more focused HR based training to bear which would enable a company to develop leaders who are thoroughly grounded in compliance and ethics.

Under the US Sentencing Guidelines, companies are mandated to “take reasonable steps to communicate periodically and in a practical manner its standards and procedures, and other aspects of the compliance and ethics program, to the individuals referred to in subdivision (B) by conducting effective training programs and otherwise disseminating information appropriate to such individuals’ respective roles and responsibilities.” This requirement would also suggest that training results should also be evaluated and once again HR can fill this role. As part of this evaluation, a candidate for promotion can be assessed in not only their interest in the area but their retention of the materials going forward. Lastly, HR can evaluate how a candidate for promotion incorporates compliance and ethics not only into his or her work but how the candidate might help to foster a culture of compliance in the company.

President Obama’s remark about Jeremy Lin and what he may have shown in practice brought up the day-to-day work that any NBA player must go through which is watched by numerous NBA coaches. This concept is the same in a business organization. The day-to-day practices equate to how employees comport themselves whilst doing the routine and daily business of their companies. It’s a good bet that if an employee acts in an ethical manner in his or her routine dealings, they will do so in a situation which requires conducting business through a culture of compliance. HR is a part of the corporate organization that can evaluate these day-to-day scenarios. HR can also train business unit employees to evaluate personnel on compliance and ethics issues. You should not miss this opportunity to watch and evaluate your employees!

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2012

Code of Conduct – The Cornerstone of Your FCPA Compliance Program

The cornerstone of a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) compliance program is the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines (FSG). They contain seven (7) basic compliance elements that can be tailored to fit the needs and financial realities of any given organization. From these seven compliance elements the Department of Justice (DOJ) has crafted its minimum best practices compliance program which is now attached to every Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) and Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA). The FSG assumes that every effective compliance and ethics program begins with a written standard of conduct; i.e. a Code of Conduct. What should be in this “written standard of conduct? The starting point, as per the FSG, reads as follows:

Element 1

Standards of Conduct, Policies and Procedures (a Code of Conduct)

An organization should have an established set of compliance standards and procedures. These standards should not be a “paper only” document, but a living document that promotes organizational culture that encourages “ethical conduct” and a commitment to compliance with applicable regulations and laws.

 In each DPA and NPA over the past 18 months the DOJ has said the following as item No. 1 for a minimum best practices compliance program.

1. Code of Conduct. A Company should develop and promulgate a clearly articulated and visible corporate policy against violations of the FCPA, including its anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions, and other applicable foreign law counterparts (collectively, the “anti-corruption laws”), which policy shall be memorialized in a written compliance code.

In an article in the SCCE Complete Compliance and Ethics Manual, 2^nd Ed., entitled “Essential Elements of an Effective Ethics and Compliance Program”, authors Debbie Troklus, Greg Warner and Emma Wollschlager Schwartz, state that your company’s Code of Conduct “should demonstrate a complete ethical attitude and your organization’s “system-wide” emphasis on compliance and ethics with all applicable laws and regulations.” Your Code of Conduct must be aimed at all employees and all representatives of the organization, not just those most actively involved in known compliance and ethics issues. From the board of directors to volunteers, the authors believe that “everyone must receive, read, understand, and agree to abide by the standards of the Code of Conduct.” This would also include all “management, vendors, suppliers, and independent contractors, which are frequently overlooked groups.”

There are several purposes identified by the authors which should be communicated in your Code of Conduct. Of course the overriding goal is for all employees to follow what is required of them under the Code of Conduct. You can do this in a Code by communicating what is required of them, to provide a process for proper decision-making and then to require that all persons subject to the Code of Conduct put these standards into everyday business practice. Such actions are some of your best evidence that your company “upholds and supports proper compliance conduct.”

The substance of your Code of Conduct should be tailored to the company’s culture, and to its industry and corporate identity. It should provide a mechanism by which employees who are trying to do the right thing in the compliance and business ethics arena to do so. The Code of Conduct can be used as a basis for employee review and evaluation. It should certainly be invoked if there is a violation. To that end suggest that your company’s disciplinary procedures be stated in the Code of Conduct. These would include all forms of disciplines, up to and including dismissal, for serious violations of the Code of Conduct. Further, your company’s Code of Conduct should emphasis it will comply with all applicable laws and regulations, wherever it does business. The Code needs to be written in plain English and translated into other languages as necessary so that all applicable persons can understand it.

As I often say, the three most important things about your FCPA compliance program are document, document and then document. The same is true of communicating your company’s Code of Conduct. You need to do more than simply put it on your website and tell folks it is there, available and that they should read it. You need to document that all employees, or anyone else that your Code of Conduct is applicable to, has received, read, and understands the Code. For employees, it is important that a representative of the Compliance Department, or other qualified trainer, explains the standards set forth in your Code of Conduct and answers any questions that an employee may have. Your company’s employees need to attest in writing that they have received, read, and understood the Code of Conduct and this attestation must be retained and updated as appropriate.

The DOJ expects each company to begin its compliance program with a very public and very robust Code of Conduct. If your company does not have one, you need to implement one forthwith. If your company has not reviewed or assessed your Code of Conduct for five years, I would suggest that you do in short order as much has changed in the compliance world.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2012