Chamber of Commerce: Corporations Form the Cornerstone of FCPA Compliance

Recently one of the most unlikely sources for praise of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) came out to inform us all that corporations are the cornerstone of FCPA compliance and enforcement. You may be surprised to find out that it came from the US Chamber of Commerce. It did not come in the form of Congressional testimony in praise of the FCPA but in the Chamber’s Amicus Curie filing in a case currently being considered by the Texas Supreme Court. Regardless of the forum, the praise was just as strong and hopefully just as lasting.

The Texas Supreme Court recently held oral arguments in the appeal of Shell v. Writt. Unusually for a state supreme court case, it touches on the FCPA. The issue before the Court is whether Shell’s internal FCPA investigation is absolutely privileged from a defamation claim by persons named in the report as having violated the FCPA. Being as this is Texas, with a state supreme court just to the right of Attila the Hun, it is easy to determine what the outcome of the case will be, the company will win.

Procedurally, Writt, the plaintiff claiming defamation from Shell’s report of its internal investigation that it provided to the Department of Justice (DOJ), lost at the trial court on summary judgment. The trial court found that Shell had an absolute privilege because the report was turned over to a government agency investigating the matter. The court of appeals reversed this decision holding that because the internal investigation was voluntary, not mandatory, that only a conditional privilege existed and sent the matter back to the trial court for further proceedings. Shell appealed this court of appeals decision to the Texas Supreme Court.

Interestingly, the US Chamber of Commerce filed an amicus brief in the appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, supporting Shell. In its brief, the Chamber came out with full guns blazing in support of the FCPA and for full internal investigations and self-disclosure by companies. At the start of its brief, the Chamber comes out four square in support of the FCPA stating, “Since 1977, and especially over the last decade, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) has played a very significant role in the federal regulation of multinational corporations. By punishing bribery and other illicit influence of foreign officials by U.S. companies, the statute seeks to improve the integrity of American businesses, promote market efficiency, and maintain the reputation of American democracy abroad.”

The Chamber noted the importance of the FCPA to both the US government and to US businesses. It stated, “Over the past decade, the FCPA has taken on renewed importance for both the U.S. government and American businesses.” As to the importance that the US government places on FCPA enforcement, the Chamber cited to the following, “DOJ officials have publicly stated that “enforcement of the FCPA is second only to fighting terrorism in terms of priority.”” Lastly, because of this focus, “FCPA compliance is now a main focus of concern for U.S. businesses.” Moreover, US companies are now ““light years ahead of where [they were] circa the mid-to-late 1990s,” with companies “implementing more rigorous and sophisticated compliance protocols,” including thorough internal investigations and candid self reporting.”

The Chamber did not stop there with its high praise of the FCPA and the importance of the FCPA and its enforcement for US businesses. The Chamber next turned to US businesses role in FCPA enforcement and compliance when it said, “the government has always relied upon businesses to cooperate with investigations and self-report any potential violations by corporate employees. “Federal enforcement authorities have consistently encouraged, if not as a practical matter demanded, that as to the FCPA companies voluntarily conduct internal investigations, disclose potential violations and cooperate with government investigations.” With their vast resources, individualized focus, and access to documents and witnesses, “companies are actually much better positioned to gather more information more quickly overseas than the Justice Department or the SEC.”” Perhaps channeling some of the criticisms of the recent General Motors (GM) and FIFA investigations, the Chamber recognizes that more than simply results must be shared with the DOJ when it stated, “The government requires that corporations provide not just information on violations that they are certain of, but rather any “relevant information and evidence,” as well as identification of “relevant actors inside and outside the company.””

The money line from the Chamber’s brief is the following, “Corporate cooperation, internal investigation, and self-reporting thus form the cornerstone of FCPA compliance and enforcement.” It could not be clearer from this statement the importance that a robust internal investigation protocol, coupled with self-disclosure bring to FCPA compliance. The FCPA Guidance states, “once an allegation is made, companies should have in place an efficient, reliable, and properly funded process for investigating the allegation and documenting the company’s response, including any disciplinary or remediation measures taken. Companies will want to consider taking “lessons learned” from any reported violations and the outcome of any resulting investigation to update their internal controls and compliance program and focus future training on such issues, as appropriate.”

Thus internal investigations coupled with self-reporting provide both companies and the US government towards the same goal; greater compliance with the FCPA because the Chamber recognizes that the FPCA plays a vital role in international business and corruption prevention and prosecution. The Chamber even cites, favorably, the Congressional logic for the enactment of the FCPA by stating, “Congress determined that such practices tarnish the image of American democracy abroad, impair confidence in American businesses, hamper the efficiency of the market, anger the citizens of otherwise friendly foreign nations, and, put simply, are “morally repugnant” and “bad business.”” Finally, the Chamber acknowledges the importance of the FCPA for both US and international investors; both in the US and for companies abroad by concluding, “The FCPA is a valuable statute that helps to reduce corruption and to reinforce public and investor confidence in the markets here and abroad.”

This brief lays out one of the strongest articulations of the power of the FCPA. I did not expect the Chamber to come out so forcefully in favor of what that many business types continually bemoan. The Chamber’s recognition that FCPA compliance and enforcement are cornerstones of the protection of US businesses; US business interests and investor confidence across the globe is a welcome addition to the FCPA dialogue.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

Tommy Lewis, Dicky Maegle and the DOJ Call for Individual Prosecutions

Tommy Lewis died this week. For those of you uninitiated in college football, Lewis was an Alabama football player who jumped up off the Alabama bench to tackle Rice University halfback Dicky Maegle, who was scampering untouched down the sideline for a touchdown in the 1954 Cotton Bowl. Lewis’ off the bench tackle led to a flag and the referees’ awarding Maegle a 95-yard touchdown on the play. Why did Lewis do it? As reported in his obituary in the Houston Chronicle, Lewis always maintained he was “too full of Alabama”. Maegle, perhaps more charitably, said, “He was a good guy who got caught up in the moment and the excitement.”

I thought about Maegle and Lewis when I was re-reading and considering the recent remarks of Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division Leslie R. Caldwell at the recent Ethics and Compliance Officers Association (ECOA) Conference. As Mike Volkov said in his post on Tuesday, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) communicate quite clearly what their enforcement priorities are; one does not have to read tea leaves, it is out there in black and white for all to see and hear. Caldwell’s remarks would seem to follow this observation of Volkov.

Caldwell made clear that the DOJ will prosecute individuals for violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). In her remarks she said, “When criminal misconduct is discovered, a critical factor in the department’s prosecutorial decision making is the extent and nature of the company’s cooperation. The department’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations provides that prosecutors should consider “the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents.””

Recognizing that “Corporations do not act, but for the actions of individuals” Caldwell then laid down some quite strong prescriptions which compliance practitioners need to be cognizant about. Caldwell stated, “Now let me flesh out the often discussed, but sometimes poorly understood, concept of cooperation. Most companies now understand the benefits of voluntarily disclosing the misconduct before we come asking, and the benefits of conducting an internal investigation and providing facts about the misconduct to the government. But companies all too often tout what they view as strong cooperation, while ignoring that prosecutors specifically consider “the company’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents.””

She went on to add, “In all but a few cases, an individual or group of individuals is responsible for the corporation’s criminal conduct. The prosecution of culpable individuals – including corporate executives – for their criminal wrongdoing continues to be a high priority for the department. For a company to receive full cooperation credit following a self-report, it must root out the misconduct and identify the individuals responsible, even if they are senior executives.”

Fortunately the DOJ is not asking for undercover corporate sting operations because, as Caldwell explained, “We are not asking that you become surrogate FBI agents or prosecutors, or that you use law enforcement tactics like body wires.  And we do not need to hear you say that executive A violated a particular criminal law. All we are saying is that we expect you to provide us with facts. We will take it from there. But a company that interviews its employees in an effort to whitewash the facts or spread the company’s narrative spin risks receiving any cooperation credit.”

This is about as clear a warning as you can expect to receive. But the difficulty it puts company’s in is in regard to their internal investigations. Last week Joel Schectman, writing in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article entitled, “Are Internal Bribery Probes Private?”, explored the issue of whether such investigations are privileged, in the context of a current individual FCPA prosecution. In the matter of Joseph Sigelman, the former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) PetroTiger Ltd. Co., Schectman reported that “Prosecutors say the payments of approximately $333,500 to the wife for “consulting services” was actually a bribe to her husband to win a contract for PetroTiger worth around $39.6 million.”

Some or all of the underlying facts were turned over to the DOJ by PetroTiger’s internal investigation. The Defendant Sigelman wants to obtain copies of whatever PetroTiger turned over to the DOJ, arguing that the company waived any claim of attorney/client privilege “when it divulged the investigation’s findings to third parties, including officials of the United States.” The company has refused to hand over its internal investigation to the defendant based on this claim of attorney/client privilege.

What happens if a company, or its law firm gets the investigation wrong and falsely accuses an individual? Should the company be protected? That is the issue currently before the Texas Supreme Court in a libel case styled, Shell v. Writt. It involves our old friend Panalpina Inc. and its customer Royal Dutch Shell. David Smyth, in a post entitled “Texas Court of Appeals Has Put Some FCPA Internal Investigations in an Awkward Spot”, said the DOJ contacted Shell about its dealings with Panalpina. Sometime later, “Shell agreed to conduct an internal investigation into its dealings with Panalpina.” Smyth noted that, “Shell submitted an investigative report that pointed the finger at Writt.  Specifically, Shell said Writt had been involved in illegal conduct in a Shell Nigerian project by recommending that Shell reimburse contractor payments he knew to be bribes and failing to report illegal contractor conduct he was aware of.”

Writt sued Shell for libel and Shell defeated Writt at the trial court on the basis that it had an “absolute privilege to say what it did in its investigative report to the DOJ.”

However, a Texas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court ruling holding that absolute privilege does not apply where a party voluntarily turns over information to a prosecutor before a judicial proceeding is initiated or contemplated. As Smyth explained, “In the court’s view, DOJ was acting purely in a prosecutorial and non-judicial capacity.” Shell has appealed this matter to the Texas Supreme Court, which has accepted the case for review.

There are several difficult issues from the facts of this case. Smyth points to one when he ended his piece, “FCPA investigations these days are a different animal, and probably deserving of different treatment by the courts. As of now, a company conducting an internal FCPA investigation in Texas has to ask, what do we do if one of an investigation reveals one of our employees as a bad actor? Do we say as much in the report we turn over to the government, as the government surely expects? If we do, are we signing on for libel litigation by the employee?” But now Caldwell has made clear that the DOJ expects companies to “identify the individuals responsible, even if they are senior executives”. If you are one of the individuals so identified, are you entitled to know what the accusations against you might be? What if the company’s lawyers got it wrong? Should they have a duty?

Moreover, there are a plethora of procedural protections available to criminal defendants not available to civil defendants or even those who are the subject of internal corporate investigations. Should a Miranda warning now be given during internal corporate investigations? Is the right to remain silent and not self-incriminate oneself available in such an investigation? In paper entitled “Navigating Potential Pitfalls in Conducting Internal Investigations: Upjohn Warnings, “Corporate Miranda,” and Beyond” Craig Margolis and Lindsey Vaala, of the law firm Vinson & Elkins LLP, explored the pitfalls faced by counsel, both in-house and outside investigative, and corporations when an employee admits to wrong doing during an internal investigation, where such conduct is reported to the US Government and the employee is thereafter prosecuted criminally under a law such as the FCPA.

Employees who are subject to being interviewed or otherwise required to cooperate in an internal investigation may find themselves on the sharp horns of a dilemma requiring either (1) cooperating with the internal investigation or (2) losing their jobs for failure to cooperate by providing documents, testimony or other evidence. Many US businesses mandate full employee cooperation with internal investigations or those handled by outside counsel on behalf of a corporation. These requirements can exert a coercive force, “often inducing employees to act contrary to their personal legal interests in favor of candidly disclosing wrongdoing to corporate counsel.”  Moreover, such a corporate policy may permit a company to claim to the US government a spirit of cooperation in the hopes of avoiding prosecution in “addition to increasing the chances of learning meaningful information.”

Where the US Government compels such testimony, through the mechanism of inducing a corporation to coerce its employees into cooperating with an internal investigation, by threatening job loss or other economic penalty, the in-house counsel’s actions may raise Fifth Amendment due process and voluntariness concerns because the underlying compulsion was brought on by a state actor, namely the US Government. Margolis and Vaala note that by utilizing corporate counsel and pressuring corporations to cooperate, the US Government is sometimes able to achieve indirectly what it would not be able to achieve on its own – inducing employees to waive their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and minimizing the effectiveness of defense counsel’s assistance.

All of the above would seem to make clear the need for company’s to get their internal investigations done right. If you are going to receive credit from the DOJ going forward, your investigations must be done thoroughly, in a timely manner and provide to the DOJ the information that Caldwell has laid out that they want. At least currently in Texas, a company has to get it right or risk being sued if they mis-identify a potential criminal actor.

Tommy Lewis and Dicky Maegle? Lewis made a mistake, probably carried away in the heat of the moment. What did Maegle have to say about him on the occasion of his death? “He was very remorseful, and I thought he was sincere. I liked him. We became friends.” Let’s hope your employees still like your company at the end of an internal investigation.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

 

 

Come On Get Happy – The Partridge Family and GSK’s Internal Investigation

Today we celebrate an anniversary of one of the all-time lows in the American cultural milieu; for on this date in 1970, the television show The Partridge Family appeared on the ABC Television network. Symbiotically created from the ashes of the television show The Monkees and the real-life family pop group The Cowsills; The Partridge Family starred, as its TV-mom, Oscar winning actress Shirley Jones and as her eldest TV son, and teenaged girl heartthrob, her real-life stepson David Cassidy. Proving once again that 1960s and 1970s television really was largely a cultural wasteland, the family romped and sang their way across a never-ending sunny southern California in multi-colored converted school bus. While the episodes themselves were as close to putrid as one can get, they did have better success with their lip-synced music from each episode. One song, I Think I Love You, reached No. 1 on the Billboard Pop Charts that year.

I thought about this strange convergence of history and culture (or perhaps the lack of culture) when considering more lessons learned from the GlaxoSmithKline PLC (GSK) corruption scandal. I was particularly focused on GSK’s response to at least two separate reports from an anonymous whistleblower (brilliantly self-monikered as GSK Whistleblower) of allegations of bribery and corruption going on in the company’s China business unit. One of the clear lessons from the GSK matter is that serious allegations of bribery and corruption require a serious corporate response. Not, as GSK appears to have done, in their best Inspector Clouseau imitation, not being able to find the nose on their face.

Further, and more nefariously, was GSK’s documented treatment of and history with internal whistleblowers. One can certainly remember GSK whistleblower Cheryl Eckard. A 2010 article in The Guardian by Graeme Wearden, entitled “GlaxoSmithKline whistleblower awarded $96m payout”, where he reported that Eckard was fired by the company “after repeatedly complaining to GSK’s management that some drugs made at Cidra were being produced in a non-sterile environment, that the factory’s water system was contaminated with micro-organisms, and that other medicines were being made in the wrong doses.” She later was awarded $96MM as her share of the settlement of a Federal Claims Act whistleblower lawsuit. Eckard was quoted as saying, “It’s difficult to survive this financially, emotionally, you lose all your friends, because all your friends are people you have at work. You really do have to understand that it’s a very difficult process but very well worth it.” So to think that GSK may simply have been SHOCKED, SHOCKED, that allegations of corruption were brought by an internal whistleblower may well be within the realm of accurate.

There would have seemed to have been plenty of evidence to let the company know that something askance was going on in its Chinese operations. The international press was certainly able to make that connection early on in the scandal. An article in the Financial Times (FT), entitled “China accuses GSK of bribery” by Kathrin Hille and John Aglionby, reported “GSK said it had conducted an internal four-month investigation after a tip-off that staff had bribed doctors to issue prescriptions for its drugs. The internal inquiry found no evidence of wrongdoing, it said.” Indeed after the release of information from the Chinese government, GSK said it was the first it had heard of the investigation. In a prepared statement, quoted in the FT, GSK said ““We continuously monitor our businesses to ensure they meet our strict compliance procedures – we have done this in China and found no evidence of bribery or corruption of doctors or government officials.” However, if evidence of such activity is provided we will act swiftly on it.”

Laurie Burkitt, reporting in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) in an article entitled “China Accuses Glaxo of Bribes”, wrote that “Emails and documents reviewed by the Journal discuss a marketing strategy for Botox that targeted 48 doctors and planned to reward them with either a percentage of the cash value of the prescription or educational credits, based on the number of prescriptions the doctors made. The strategy was called “Vasily,” borrowing its name from Vasily Zaytsev, a noted Russian sniper during World War II, according to a 2013 PowerPoint presentation reviewed by the Journal.” Burkitt reported in her article that “A Glaxo spokesman has said the company probed the Vasily program and “[the] investigation has found that while the proposal didn’t contain anything untoward, the program was never implemented.”” From my experience, if you have a bribery scheme that has its own code name, even if you never implemented that scheme, it probably means that the propensity for such is pervasive throughout the system.

I have often written about the need for a company to have an investigative protocol in place so that it is not making up its process in the face of a crisis. However the GSK matter does not appear to be that situation. It would not have mattered what investigation protocol that GSK followed, it would seem they were determined not to find any evidence of bribery and corruption in their China business unit. So the situation is more likely that GSK should have brought in a competent investigation expert law firm to head up their investigation in the face of this anonymous whistleblower’s allegations.

In an ACC Docket article, entitled “Risks and Rewards of an Independent Investigation”, authors James McGrath and David Hildebrandt discuss the use of specialized outside counsel to lead an independent internal investigation as compliance and ethics best practices. This is based upon the US Sentencing Guidelines, under which a scoring system is utilized to determine what a final sentence should be for a criminal act. Factors taken into account include the type of offense involved and the severity of the said offense, as well as the harm produced. Additional points are either added or subtracted for mitigating factors. One of the mitigating factors can be whether an organization had an effective compliance and ethics program. McGrath and Hildebrandt argue that a company must have a robust internal investigation.

McGrath and Hildebrandt take this analysis a step further in urging that a company, when faced with an issue such as an alleged Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violation, should engage specialized counsel to perform the investigation. There were three reasons for this suggestion. The first is that the Department of Justice (DOJ) would look towards the independence and impartiality of such investigations as one of its factors in favor of declining or deferring enforcement. If in-house counsel were heading up the investigation, the DOJ might well deem the investigative results “less than trustworthy”.

Matthew Goldstein and Barry Meier discussed the need for independence from the company being investigated in an article the New York Times (NYT) about the General Motors (GM) internal investigation entitled “G.M Calls the Lawyers”. They quoted William McLucas, a partner at WilmerHale, who said, “If you are a firm that is generating substantial fees from a prospective corporate client, you may be able to come in and do a bang-up inquiry. But the perception is always going to be there; maybe you pulled your punches because there is a business relationship.” This is because if “companies want credibility with prosecutors and investors, it is generally not wise to use their regular law firms for internal inquiries.” Another expert, Charles Elson, a professor of finance at the University of Delaware who specializes in corporate governance, agreed adding, “I would not have done it because of the optics. Public perception can be affected by using regular outside counsel.””

Adam G. Safwat, a former deputy chief of the fraud section in the Justice Department, said that the key is “Prosecutors expect an internal investigation to be an honest assessment of a company’s misdeeds or faults, “What you want to avoid is doing something that will make the prosecutor question the quality of integrity of the internal investigation.”” Also quoted was Internal Investigations Blog editor, Jim McGrath who said, “A shrewd law firm that gets out in front of scandal can use that to its advantage in negotiating with authorities to lower penalties and sanctions. There is a great incentive to ferret out information so they can spin it.”

The GSK experience in China will inform compliance practitioners for years to come with the company’s plethora of miss-steps. Perhaps one day the company will become as successful as The Partridge Family and they can open their annual meeting with The Partridge Family Theme – Come On Get Happy!

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

A Surprise in Progressive Rock – FCPA Internal Investigations

This past weekend I saw some great bands and heard some great music. On Friday night I finally got to see Yes perform two fabulous albums, Close to the Edge and Fragile complete uncut and straight through. To say I was blown away would be putting it mildly. But there was one great revelation that I received from the show and that was the opening band, Syd Arthur. They are an English band, from Canterbury, and very much the inheritors of the prog rock mantle from bands such as Yes. Their sound was simply amazing and if you are into progressive rock at all, I would suggest you check them out.

I thought about my surprise on finding a more current and certainly younger band so proudly carrying the prog rock mantle when I returned back to Houston and was contacted by a reporter asking for my comments about the appeal of Shell v. Writt to the Texas Supreme Court. For those compliance practitioners amongst you who may have placed this state court libel action to the recesses of your mind or never even heard about it; it is something you should pay attention to as the case has some clear implications about the manner in which companies conduct and use internal investigations.

The case has a long involved Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) history. It involves Panalpina and its customer Shell. David Smyth, in his great blog Cady Bar the Door, reported, in a post entitled “Texas Court of Appeals Has Put Some FCPA Internal Investigations in an Awkward Spot”, the Department of Justice (DOJ) contacted Shell about its dealings with Panalpina. Sometime later, “Shell agreed to conduct an internal investigation into its dealings with Panalpina. As Shell’s “managing counsel” later testified, “Shell agreed to conduct the internal investigation with the understanding that it would ultimately report its finding to the DOJ . . . .” A DOJ Fraud Section attorney wrote a follow-up letter noting, “[I]t is our understanding that Shell intends to voluntarily investigate its business dealings with Panalpina Inc. and all other Panalpina subsidiaries and affiliates.”” Unfortunately for all involved, “Shell submitted an investigative report that pointed the finger at Writt.  Specifically, Shell said Writt had been involved in illegal conduct in a Shell Nigerian project by recommending that Shell reimburse contractor payments he knew to be bribes and failing to report illegal contractor conduct he was aware of.”

Writt sued Shell for libel and Shell defeated Writt at the trial court on the basis that it had an “absolute privilege to say what it did in its investigative report to the DOJ.” In Texas absolute privilege applies because the unfettered flow of information to the judicial system and administrative proceedings is favored over the worry that someone might be wrongly named in such information.

However, a Texas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court ruling holding that absolute privilege does not apply where a party voluntarily turns over information to a prosecutor before a judicial proceeding is initiated or contemplated.

As Smyth explained, “In the court’s view, DOJ was acting purely in a prosecutorial and non-judicial capacity.  Shell submitted its investigative report on February 5, 2009, and DOJ did not file a criminal complaint against the company until November 2010, 20 months later.  As the court said, “Just because the DOJ ultimately filed a judicial proceeding against Shell does not establish that it was proposing that one be filed when it contacted Shell on July 3, 2007 or received Shell’s report on February 5, 2009.””

Shell has appealed this matter to the Texas Supreme Court. Under Texas law, an appeal to the Texas Supreme Court is discretionary and at this point, the Texas Supreme Court has not indicated whether it will accept the case. Interestingly the US Chamber of Commerce submitted a letter brief, on behalf of its members, urging the Texas Supreme Court to accept the case for review. In its penultimate paragraph it states, “At the end of the day, it is an unavoidable truth that any business that wishes to be a good corporate citizen by reporting its FCPA violations to regulators will necessarily implicate its own employees of wrongdoing. Thus, any rule that imposes costs on a company implicating its employees in wrongdoing will necessarily chill voluntary reporting of FCPA violations and impose unfair burdens on those companies who nonetheless choose to self-report.”

One of the more interesting arguments made by the Chamber was that there is currently enough incentive for companies to get investigations right. While noting that the Court of Appeals had worried about the “concern that absolute immunity from suit might motivate parties to “deflect blame” for FCPA violations onto its employees “without fear of consequence””; the Chamber said, “But there are more effective ways to prevent false reports. For example, false statements to government officials are already a crime punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Moreover, a false report against an employee would also implicate the business itself. After all, corporations act through their employees. Far from deflecting blame, then, a false accusation of an FCPA violation against an employee would incriminate the company as well.”

The real problem with this argument is that it leaves no remedy for any employee who is wrongly accused (libeled in legal parlance) in an internal FCPA investigation report. It has always been against the law to give false reports to government officials so nothing is new in that argument. One might argue that the civil justice system is better to evaluate such wrongful claims. But Smyth points to another reality when he ended his piece with the following, “FCPA investigations these days are a different animal, and probably deserving of different treatment by the courts.  As of now, a company conducting an internal FCPA investigation in Texas has to ask, what do we do if one of an investigation reveals one of our employees as a bad actor?  Do we say as much in the report we turn over to the government, as the government surely expects? If we do, are we signing on for libel litigation by the employee?”

Whatever the Texas Supreme Court decides, this case points to the need to do your best to get it right. That means having an investigation protocol that you can follow. It may mean having outside counsel handle an investigation when it is appropriate. If you conclude that one or more of your employees has violated the FCPA, you need to be able to back up that assertion with facts, evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

When to Bring in Investigative Counsel and Why

When should you bring in a true outsider to handle an internal investigation? What about specialized investigative counsel? Jim McGrath, who often writes about the need for specialized investigative counsel, has also pointed out on several occasions that having an independent eye on things is also a plus. However, rarely do we see both questions played out so publicly as is currently going on in the General Motors (G.M.) recall investigation. Indeed, Matthew Goldstein and Barry Meier discussed these  questions in Sunday New York Times (NYT) Business Section article by, entitled “G.M Calls the Lawyers”.

For those of you not familiar with G.M.’s problems, McGrath also wrote about them in his Internal Investigations Blog, in a post entitled “What Did GM Know and When Did They Know It?” McGrath describes the current issues as “the revelation that General Motors is the target of probes by Congress and by the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration over its handling of ignition switch defects in at least six of its popular automobiles. Failures in these switches may have resulted in as many as thirteen deaths and seemingly point to quality control failures at the automaker.” Others have estimated the death totals much higher for this defect. And, as McGrath notes, the key question is ‘what did GM know and when did they know it’?

Interestingly G.M. has hired two law firms to handle the investigation. One is King & Spalding, which handled much of the product liability litigation over the alleged defect and the second is Jenner & Block. In the NYT article, a prominent plaintiff’s lawyer, Lance Cooper, who fought GM and King & Spalding on this product liability litigation noted the obvious when he said, “They are part of the story.” By this he meant that “King & Spalding’s switch from a fierce defender of G.M. to a potential inquisitor into the company’s actions may also pose a conflict. For one, some of the firm’s lawyers may have to ask their own colleagues if they advised G.M. about whether to recall the vehicles at the time the Melton case was settled.”

More importantly for G.M., the retention of “outside counsel in these cases is part investigation, part public-relations gambit and part legal strategy. In most cases, the goal isn’t to publicly flog a company or its top executives, but rather to limit damage to an institution’s reputation or to contain the financial harm to shareholders of a publicly traded company. And it does so under the protection of the attorney-client privilege. From the point of view of the company, a well-done internal investigation can shape the accepted story of what happened — and produce findings that allow the company to negotiate for lower penalties from prosecutors or regulators down the road.” But, more importantly, to “achieve those ends, the law firms conducting the investigations must be viewed as forthright and uncompromised. In this respect, some critics have already questioned G.M.’s choices.”

The NYT quoted another lawyer, William McLucas, a partner at WilmerHale, who said, “If you are a firm that is generating substantial fees from a prospective corporate client, you may be able to come in and do a bang-up inquiry. But the perception is always going to be there; maybe you pulled your punches because there is a business relationship.” This is because if “companies want credibility with prosecutors and investors, it is generally not wise to use their regular law firms for internal inquiries.” Another expert, Charles Elson, a professor of finance at the University of Delaware who specializes in corporate governance, agreed, adding, “I would not have done it because of the optics. Public perception can be affected by using regular outside counsel.””

Adam G. Safwat, a former deputy chief of the fraud section in the Justice Department, said that the key is “Prosecutors expect an internal investigation to be an honest assessment of a company’s misdeeds or faults, “What you want to avoid is doing something that will make the prosecutor question the quality of integrity of the internal investigation.”” The aforementioned Jim McGrath was also interviewed for the article. He said, “A shrewd law firm that gets out in front of scandal can use that to its advantage in negotiating with authorities to lower penalties and sanctions. There is a great incentive to ferret out information so they can spin it.”

All of these concerns are equally valid in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) or UK Bribery Act investigation context. But they are layered upon the Fair Process Doctrine. This is because procedural fairness is one of the things that will bring credibility to your Compliance Program. This Doctrine generally recognizes that there are fair procedures, not arbitrary ones, in a process involving rights. Considerable research has shown that people are more willing to accept negative, unfavorable, and non-preferred outcomes when they are arrived at through processes and procedures that are perceived as fair. Adhering to the Fair Process Doctrine in your Compliance Program is critical for you, as a compliance specialist or for your Compliance Department, to have credibility with the rest of the workforce.

In internal investigations, if your employees do not believe that the investigation is fair and impartial, then it is not fair and impartial. Further, those involved must have confidence that any internal investigation is treated seriously and objectively. I have recently written about several aspects of internal investigations, in order to emphasize how to handle internal whistleblower complaints in light of the Dodd-Frank implications. One of the key reasons that employees will go outside of a company’s internal hotline process is because they do not believe that the process will be fair.

This fairness has several components. One would be the use of outside counsel, rather than in-house counsel to handle the investigation. Moreover, if a company uses a regular firm, it may be that other outside counsel should be brought in, particularly if the regular outside counsel has created or implemented key components that are being investigated. Further, if the company’s regular outside counsel has a large amount of business with the company, then that law firm may have a very vested interest in maintaining the status quo. Lastly, the investigation may require a level of specialization that in-house or regular outside counsel does not possess.

Living in Houston, this all played out in disastrous results during the Enron scandal. Near the end of Enron’s run, its regular outside counsel, Vinson & Elkins, investigated questionable accounting practices at Enron. As the NYT article noted, “The firm’s investigation is viewed as an utter failure or a corporate whitewash. The review essentially gave Enron a clean bill of health just months before it collapsed in one of the biggest accounting frauds of all time. In 2006, the law firm paid $30 million to Enron’s bankruptcy estate to resolve claims that its actions had contributed to the energy company’s demise.”

All of this means, your company needs to get it right in the hiring of outside counsel to handle an investigation. As McGrath wrote at the end of his blog, “the Jenner and King people will have to make like Howard Baker and ask what the president – or other ranking person with reporting authority to NHTSA – knew and when they knew it. Because the cover-up is usually worse than the underlying wrong and this one could cost GM $35 million and its reputation.” The NYT article ended with the following, “The best internal investigations are the ones that don’t receive much media attention. A company deals with a problem quickly, and if there’s something to report to authorities, the company tends to be treated leniently for its forthrightness.” Amen.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

Board Investigations and the Curse of the Mummy’s Tomb – Part II

Yesterday I began an exploration of a recent article in the Corporate Board magazine, entitled “Successful Board Investigations” by David Bayless and Tammy Albarrán, partners in the law firm of Covington & Burling LLP. In Part I, I reviewed the authors’ five key objectives, which they believe a board must pursue to ensure a successful investigation. Today, I will look at the authors’ seven considerations to facilitate a successful board investigation.

1.             Consider whether you need independent outside counsel

The authors consider that the appearance of partiality “undermines the objectivity and credibility of an investigation.” That means you should not use your regular counsel. The authors cite to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) analysis of how independent board members truly are to explain the need for independent counsel. They state, “the SEC considers the following criteria when determining whether (and how much) to credit self-policing, self-reporting, remediation and cooperation” which will consist of the following factors:

• Did management, the board or committees consisting solely of outside directors oversee the review?
• Did company employees or outside persons perform the review?
• If outside persons, have they done other work for the company?
• If the review was conducted by outside counsel, had management previously engaged such counsel?
• How long ago was the firm’s last representation of the company?
• How often has the law firm represented the company?
• How much in legal fees has the company paid the firm?

As Andre Agassi might say, ‘perception is reality’.

2.             Consider hiring an experienced “investigator” to lead the internal investigation

Noted internal investigation expert Jim McGrath has written and spoken about the need to utilize specialized counsel in any serious investigation. If a board is leading an investigation, I would submit by definition it is serious. The authors say that your investigation needs to lead by a lawyer with significant experience in conducting internal investigations; a strong background in criminal or SEC enforcement; and has substantive experience in the particular area of law at issue. The traits are needed so that your designated counsel will think like an investigator, not like an in-house lawyer or civil litigator.

3.             Consider the need to retain outside experts

In any Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) or other anti-corruption investigation, there will be the need for a wider variety of subject matter experts (SME’s) than a compliance professional. The authors correctly recognize that “ if there are accounting issues, forensic accountants might be needed. In this day and age, an electronic discovery consultant is often required, and can be a cost effective option for gathering and processing electronic data for review.” These types of investigations will most probably be cross-border as well and this will require other varieties of expertise. The authors caution that, “The lowest bid may not necessar­ily be the best for a particular investigation. While cost is important, understand the limitations of each consultant and, with input from your investigator, determine which consultant best meets your goals.”

4.             Analyze potential conflicts of interest at the outside and during the investigation

The authors see two types of conflicts of interest that may come to light during an investigation. First is the one which comes up when the law firm or lawyers conducting the inves­tigation are those whose prior legal advice has some bearing on the matters being investigated because a company’s regular outside lawyers represent the company. During an internal investigation, however, the lawyers may be hired by, and represent, the board or its committee. The second occurs when a lawyer or law firm jointly represents the board and employees at the company as regulators have become increasingly concerned with joint representations. Moreover, “The trickier question is what to do when there simply is a risk that representing one client could limit the lawyers’ duties to the other.” So in these situations, joint representation may not be appropriate.

5.             Carefully evaluate Whistleblower allegations

With the advent of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) and Dodd-Frank, whistleblowers have become more important and taking their allegations seriously is paramount. This does not mean trying to find out who the whistleblowers might be to punish or stifle them, even if they are located outside the United States and therefore do not have protections under these laws. They can still get hefty bounties. The authors recognize that companies can come to grief when “companies run into problems when whistleblower allegations are discounted, if not outright dismissed, especially if the whistleblower has a history of causing trouble or is perceived as incompetent. When this type of whistleblower makes a claim, it is easy to presume ulterior motives.” While such motives might exist, it does not matter one iota when it comes to the investigation, as “Regulators are very wary of boards that do not satisfactorily evaluate a whistleblower’s complaint based on a perception of the whistleblower himself, as opposed to the substance of the complaint.”

6.             Request regular updates from outside counsel, without limiting the investigation

These types of investigations are long and very costly. They can easily spin out of cost control. But, by trying to manage these costs, a board might be perceived as placing improper limits on the investigation. The “goal is to strike the right balance between the cost of the investigation and its thoroughness and credibility.” To do so, the authors advise that flexibility is an important ingredient. A board can begin the project with an agreed upon initial scope of work and then “revisit the scope of work as the investigation progresses. If conduct is discovered that legitimately calls for expanding the scope of the investigation, then the board can revisit the issue at that point. Put another way, the scope of what to investigate is not a static, one-time decision. It can, and usually does, evolve.” By seeking regular updates and questioning counsel on what they are doing and why, directors can manage costs, while at the same time ensuring that the investigation is sufficiently thorough and credible.

7.             Consider whether an oral report at the conclusion of the investigation is sufficient

While there may be instances in which, due to complexity and the nature of allegations involved, a written report is necessary, the authors believe that there may be times when an oral report delivered to a board is better than a written report for “a written report may be easier to follow and appear to be the logical conclusion to an investigation, it is an expensive and time-consuming endeavor, and it comes with great risk.” The authors indicate three reasons for this position.

First, it is much easier to inadvertently waive the attorney-client privilege if a written report is created and in the wrong hands, such a written report may well create “a road map to a plaintiff” in any shareholder action. Second, once those findings and conclusions are written they may become “set in stone. If later information comes to light that impacts the report’s conclusions, altering the conclusions may undermine the credibility of the entire investigation. So, retaining flexibility to change the findings if further information is later learned is a real advantage of an oral report.” Third, and finally, “it takes time to prepare a well-written and thorough report. When an internal investigation must be conducted quickly, spending time to prepare a written report may not be an efficient use of time.” For all of these reasons, and perhaps others, an oral report presented to the board and documented in the Board of Director meeting minutes may be sufficient.

The authors conclude their piece by stating, “By keeping in mind the issues addressed above, the board will be better prepared for the investigation and readily able to exercise good judgment throughout the review. A well-conducted investigation by the board may spare the company further disruption and costs associated with follow-on investigations by the regulators, or at the very least minimize the company’s exposure.” I would only add that by following some of the prescriptions set out by Bayless and Albarrán your Board might also avoid the fate that befell Lord Carnarvon and the Curse of the Mummy’s Tomb.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

Board Investigations and the Curse of the Mummy’s Tomb – Part I

On this day in 1923, the tomb of King Tut was opened. It created a worldwide stir that has in many ways continued down into the 21^st century. Clearly, the boy ruler influenced Steve Martin , (How’d you get so funky?, Funky Tut). Moreover, when the King Tut exhibit first toured the US in the 1970s, it sold out everywhere that it went. And, of course, there was the Curse of the Mummy’s Tomb, which led to some great Universal classic horror pictures. This curse may have killed the dig’s benefactor, Lord Carnarvon who died just months after entering the tomb in November 1923, but the archeologist who discovered King Tut, Howard Carter, seemingly outlived the curse, dying at the age of 64 on the eve of World War II.

I thought about the techniques employed by these two archeologists in the Curse of the Mummy’s Tomb when I read an article in the Corporate Board magazine, entitled “Successful Board Investigations” by David Bayless and Tammy Albarrán, partners in the law firm of Covington & Burling LLP. Why the Curse of the Mummy’s Tomb? It is because if a Board of Directors does not get an investigation which it handles right, the consequences can be quite severe. Over the next two posts I will explore the article by Bayless and Albarrán. Today in Part I, I will review the author’s five key objectives, which they believe a board must pursue to ensure a successful investigation. Tomorrow. in Part II, I will review the authors seven considerations to facilitate a successful board investigation.

The authors recognize that the vast majority of investigations will be handled or directed by in-house counsel. However, if and when such an investigation is needed, it is critical that it be handled with great care and skill. The authors note that “While this task is fraught with peril, there are a number of steps a board can take to ensure that the investigation accomplishes the board’s goals, which will enable it to make informed decisions, and withstands scrutiny by third parties” because it is this third party scrutiny, in the form of regulators, government officials, judges/arbitrators or plaintiffs’ counsel in shareholder actions, who will be reviewing any investigation commissioned by a Board of Directors. The authors believe that there are five key goals that any investigation led by a Board of Directors must meet. They are:

Thoroughness – The authors believe that one of the key, and most critical, questions that any regulator might pose is just how thorough is an investigation; to test whether they can rely on the facts discovered without having to repeat the investigation themselves. Regulators tend to be skeptical of investigations where limits are placed (expressly or otherwise) on the investigators, in terms of what is investigated, or how the investigation is conducted. This question can be an initial deal-killer particularly if the regulator involved views an investigation insufficiently thorough, its credibility is undermined. And, of course, it can lead to the dreaded ‘Where else’ question.

• Objectivity – Here the authors write that any “investigation must follow the facts wherever they lead, regardless of the consequences. This includes how the findings may impact senior management or other company employees. An investigation seen as lacking objectivity will be viewed by outsiders as inadequate or deficient.” I would add that in addition to the objectivity requirement in the investigation, the same must be had with the investigators themselves. If a company uses its regular outside counsel, it may be viewed with some askance, particularly if the client is a high volume client of the law firm involved, either in dollar amounts or in number of matters handled by the firm.
• Accuracy – As in any part of a best practices anti-corruption compliance program, the three most important things are Document, Document and Document. This means that the factual findings of an investigation must be well supported. For if the developed facts are not well supported, the authors believe that the investigation is “open to collateral attack by skeptical prosecutors and regulators. If that happens, the time and money spent on the internal investigation will have been wasted, because the government will end up conducting its own investigation of the same issues.” This is never good and your company may well lose what little credibility and good will that it may have engendered by self-reporting or self-investigating.
• Timeliness – Certainly in the world of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement, an internal investigation should be done quickly. This has become even more necessary with the tight deadlines set under the Dodd-Frank Act Whistleblower provisions. But there are other considerations for a public company such as an impending Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quarterly or annual report that may need to be deferred absent as a timely resolution of the matter. Lastly, the Department of Justice (DOJ) or SEC may view delaying an investigation as simply a part of document spoliation. So timeliness is crucial.
• Credibility – One of the realities of any FCPA investigation is that a Board of Directors led investigation is reviewed after the fact by not only skeptical third parties but also sometimes years after the initial events and investigation. So not only is there the opportunity for Monday-Morning Quarterbacking but quite a bit of post event analysis. So the authors believe that any Board of Directors led investigation “must be (and must be perceived as) credible as to what was done, how it was done, and who did it. Otherwise, the board’s work will have been for naught.”

To help manage these five issues the authors have seven tangible considerations they suggest that a Board of Directors follow to help make an investigation successful. Tomorrow I will review and scrutinize these seven considerations.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

Tales from the Crypt-Rule No. 1 ‘Nothing is as it Seems’

Ed. Note-today we begin a series by a couple of anonymous compliance practitioners who will write about some of the real world experiences that they have encountered. I hope that you will not only enjoy but find useful in addressing some compliance and ethics issues that you may face in your job.

Tales From the Crypt: Tough Choices for Tough Cookies

Tough Cookie 1 has spent the more than half of her 20+ legal career working in the Integrity and Compliance field, and has been the architect of award-winning and effective ethics and compliance programs at both publicly traded and privately held companies.  Tough Cookie 2 is a Certified Internal Auditor and CPA who has faced ethical and compliance challenges in a variety of industries and geographies and recently led a global internal audit team. Our series “Tales from the Crypt: Tough Choices for Tough Cookies” are drawn largely from real life experiences on the front line of working in Integrity & Compliance, and personal details have been scrubbed to protect, well, you know, just about everyone…

Nothing is as it Seems

Fans of the hit show NCIS know that Agent Gibbs has countless “rules of engagement” from “Rule # 11 – let it go when the case is closed” to “Rule #5 – don’t get personally involved.”  The following scenario  leverages Rule #1 in the Integrity & Compliance field – Nothing, absolutely nothing, is as it seems.

Whether new to the field (a “probie”) or a seasoned veteran to Integrity & Compliance, you’ll agree that you quickly learn that there are at least three sides to every story (even if there are only 2 “players”), and it is your job to be politically savvy enough to uncover hidden agendas, and rapidly become not only a highly skilled listener, but also be part cop, part advocate, part HR professional, all rolled into one.  I often tell people that 80-90% of what I do boils down to common sense paired with great communication skills. Good communicators understand the needs of and cater their communications to their audience.

The following tale from our crypt is about harassment, and how good communication skills are critical to avoiding harassment in the workplace.  Simplified to its basest element, harassment truly is in the eye of the beholder – what might offend one person won’t offend another.  It’s the actor’s duty to ensure that he or she is aware of their audience, and doesn’t cross the line in word or deed to offend or cause undue stress.  In other words, cater your words and deeds to your audience, intended or otherwise, with sincerity and respect, and the battle is nearly won.  In the legal sense of harassment, the “eggshell plaintiff” rule is the perfect analogy   – it doesn’t matter if the kick to the leg (conduct) was a mere tap that wouldn’t even bruise someone else.  If the person receiving the kick has a weakness in their leg (perceives harassment) that causes it to break (feels victimized – the eggshell plaintiff), the kicker has a duty to make amends.  In the corporate world, it’s also the supervisor’s duty to take proactive steps to prevent reoccurrence if someone does cross the line, and cultivate a sincere desire to respect others in the workplace.

I recall an incident that took place at a factory – the helpline call came in, indicating that a certain fellow was “incessantly harassing” the caller during her shift (second), and she was requesting that his shift be changed to third shift so she could avoid being harassed any further.

Fact 1: the caller was a woman (side 1)

Fact 2: the implicated party was a man (side 2)

Fact 3: the two parties worked second shift (undisputed common ground)

Everything else in the call gives rise to the “third” side of the story.  We proceeded with our investigation, as the caller was “generous” enough to provide her identity as well as the alleged harasser’s identity.  Our first order of business, of course, was to interview both parties.  The caller was interviewed first. Her story was one of his relentless harassment, from daily cat calls to interrupt her work, leaving suggestive notes at her work station, removing and not replacing her critical tools, and spoiling her lunch by pouring soda in her lunch box.  We asked her if there was anyone who could verify her claims, witnesses to the incidents she described.  Her response was “no, he always does things to me when no one else is around to witness them.”

We then interviewed the implicated party – the man.  We first asked him to describe, in his own words, his “relationship” with the caller, after advising him that a helpline call came in implicating himself and the caller (without telling him the nature of the complaints).  His proceeded to break down in front of us, visibly relieved at the opportunity to speak, and commenced to reveal a story of a whole year of terrorization by the caller against him, since the day he started working at the factory.  We learned from him that the caller had applied for his job but was passed over as unqualified.    He believed that she had been making his life miserable as an act of revenge for the job she coveted and felt she deserved as a tenured employee.  When asked why he never brought it to our attention, he said he felt he had no recourse, since her hostility did not precisely fit the harassment definition in the training he had received in the past year.  He was also embarrassed that he hadn’t been able to handle it quietly on his own.

As we did with the caller, we asked him if there were any witnesses to this behavior, and he referred us to several co-workers who had work stations near his.  We interviewed them as well, and his claims of bullying and hostility were confirmed by every single one, with specific incidents instigated by the caller provided freely by the witnesses.   We advised our victim to make us immediately aware of any subsequent incidents following our interviews.

The challenge is that harassment is usually thought of in terms of prohibited workplace behaviors related to legally “protected classes,” such as race, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, religion and the like.  In this case, the gray area is bullying – where a co-worker creates a hostile work environment not based on any protected class under the law or a colleague does and says things interpreted as demeaning and demoralizing without giving rise to legal recourse.  This is where harassment training often falls short, and absolutely needs to rise above the letter of the law and address the spirit of the code of conduct for your organization.  You have to consider the types of behaviors being demonstrated and what they “communicate” to the audience.  If your company values statement includes “respect for people,” as many do, any behaviors that give rise to a hostile work environment, regardless of a protected class or not, are a violation of your company standards and you need to address them as a Key Performance Indicator (“KPI”) for the people involved without delay.  If your values statement does not include “respect for people” and your harassment training does not include situations and scenarios of bullying and hostility, perhaps it’s time you thought about updating them.

Ending workplace bullying is an urgent matter, and the work is never done – you must continually address bullying and hostility on a frequent basis to sensitize your people to your expected standards.  In this instance, the caller clearly was in the wrong, and the implicated party was a victim.  We put the caller on probation, advising her that a repeat occurrence would not be tolerated.  We changed the equipment that she was working on to another station that was on the opposite end of the factory floor, and modified shift breaks and lunchtimes so that neither party would have occasion to cross paths unless done so intentionally.  We refreshed our communications on workplace conduct and respect to include sessions on bullying and hostility that does not fall under a protected class, and we asked the plant manager to speak to it at his next line meeting with all his managers.   We urged our employees to “speak up” and “make the call” if they witnessed activities that they believed demonstrated a lack of respect.  We did everything we thought we needed to do to correct the situation, and validated our response with our more than ample resources, guidelines and legal counsel. 

Done and done? Hardly…  A few weeks later, I saw the HR manager and asked how things were going between the caller and her “victim.”  I was shocked to learn that the victim committed suicide two weeks earlier, apparently because our caller had renewed her bullying with fevered intensity, incensed that she had to learn a new piece of equipment, and couldn’t have her lunchtime with her buddies, “because of him.”   The day following the fellow’s suicide, the caller did not return to work, and our efforts to find her were fruitless as she had moved out of town, with no forwarding address.   I was, to say the least, devastated.  Regardless of the letter of the law, bullying and workplace hostility is something you cannot ignore, and must be addressed without delay.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the authors. The authors are not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The authors shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. 

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

Who Had the Worse Day – Peyton Manning or Banks and Investment Funds?

The Seattle Seahawks gave the Denver Broncos an old-fashioned tail-whoopin’ in Super Bowl history on Sunday. I admit that I was pulling for the old guy, Peyton Manning to pull out another one but I did like Seattle, particularly getting +2.5 points. Not that they needed them and I certainly did not see such a beat down coming. Manning’s reaction was about what you might assume from a professional at this stage of his career, measured yet clearly disappointed. Yes he had a very bad day and one that he will probably rue the day for some time down the road.

But there was some other news on Monday that may cause other groups to do more than ‘rue the day’. You know when you are on the front page of the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) in an article about the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) it has the distinct possibility to be unpleasant. The said WSJ, entitled “Probe Widens Into Dealings Between Financial Firms, Libya” by Joe Palazzolo, Michael Rothfield and Justin Baer, reported that the Justice Department has joined an ongoing Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) probe into “banks, private equity funds and hedge funds that may have violated anti-bribery laws (IE. FCPA) in their dealings with Libya’s government-run investment fund.” Ominously the WSJ noted that the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) participation had not been previously reported. As the DOJ generally investigates potential criminal violations of the FCPA and the SEC generally investigates the civil side of things this could be quite ominous indeed.

The firms named in the WSJ article included the following: Credit Suisse Group AG, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Société Générale SA, the private-equity firm Blackstone Group LP and hedge-fund operator Och-Ziff Capital Management Group. This is in addition to the previous announcement that Goldman-Sachs was being investigated. All of the claims relate to “investment deals made around the time of the financial crisis and afterward, these people said. In the years leading up to Libya’s 2011 revolution, Western firms—encouraged by the U.S. government—raced to attract investment money from the North African nation, which was benefiting from oil sales and recently had opened to foreign investment.”

The WSJ reported that the investigation is centering on certain third parties involved in the transactions, “At the center of the probe is a group of middlemen, known as “fixers,” operating in the Middle East, London and elsewhere, people familiar with the matter said. The fixers established connections between investment firms and individuals with ties to leaders in developing markets, including those in the Gadhafi regime.” The government is looking into these third party’s “roles in arranging deals between financial firms and Libyan officials, people familiar with the matter said. The fixers acted as placement agents, similar to those in the U.S. who have come under scrutiny for steering investments to large public retirement funds. In some cases, the sovereign-wealth-fund fixers collected a “finder’s fee”.”  It was reported that “Some of the fixers had connections to at least two of Gadhafi’s sons—primarily his second son, Seif al-Islam Gadhafi, who was most involved with the sovereign-investment fund, according to people familiar with the matter. Seif al-Islam Gadhafi was captured by rebels.” Interestingly, many of the underlying facts now being investigated came to light only after the overthrow of the Gadhafi Regime.

Further north, another group may have an occasion to rue the day. As reported in the FCPA Blog, in a post entitled “More SNC-Lavaline execs face charges in ongoing corruption probe”, two former SNC-Lavalin officials were charged by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) last Friday. The two men charged were Stephane Roy, a former vice-president at SNC-Lavalin, who was charged with fraud, bribing a foreign public official, and contravening a United Nations economic measures act related to Libya. Also charged was former executive vice-president Sami Abdallah Bebawi with fraud, two counts of laundering the proceeds of a crime, four counts of possession of property obtained by crime, and one count of bribing a foreign public official. These charge, added to prior charges bring the number of former SNC-Lavalin executives to four for their conduct regarding allegations of bribery and corruption in Libya. This is in addition to another two company executives who were charged for bribery and corruption regarding a company project in Bangladesh.

And finally are our friendly bankers and their continuing anti-money laundering (AML) woes. Just last week, UBS Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Sergio Ermotti, said at the World Economic Forum in Davos that it was not right to criticize bankers for criminal acts “most of the bad behavior that has landed UBS and others in hot water was caused by small groups of rogue employees and doesn’t reflect broader cultural problems in the industry.” Criticism could not come from interested stakeholders, such as stockholders, or those who had money in his bank. Indeed criticism could not even come from regulators.

Apparently some regulators take their jobs a bit more seriously than Ermotti might like. Reuters reported, in an article entitled “Bankers anxious over anti-money-laundering push to go after individuals”, that at the Securities Industry Financial Markets Association conference, John Davidson, E*Trade Financial’s global head of AML, said that the “new push by regulators and lawmakers to hold individuals, rather than just institutions, accountable for regulatory violations involving money laundering is spooking members of the U.S. financial industry.” He further said that this aggressive trend and a new vigorous AML bill, introduced in Congress by Representative Maxine Waters, entitled “Holding Individuals Accountable and Deterring Money Laundering Act”, were all “a little scary.” He found the trend towards more AML enforcement against individuals “an incredibly disturbing trend.” The reason it is so scary, an un-named top level compliance officer said, is “that compliance officers at the largest Wall Street institutions were feeling especially nervous because the power structures in those institutions sometimes did not give compliance officers enough authority to act.”

But more than compliance officers may rue the day. Jordan’s reported that the Board of Directors at financial institutions are also concerned. In article entitled “Money laundering tops boardroom concerns amid threat of criminal prosecution” it reported “concerns in boardrooms are now at an all-time high” and corporate boardrooms in some of the country’s leading banks are now sitting up and taking notice of money laundering as a concern, after the threat of criminal prosecution became something of a reality. The recently released KPMG Global Anti-Money Laundering Survey noted that 88 per cent of executives have now placed money laundering back at the head of a list of concerns addressed in their boardrooms. Brian Dilley, global head of the AML Practice at KPMG, was quoted as saying “Anti-money laundering has never been higher on senior management’s agenda, with regulatory fines now running into billions, regulatory action becoming genuinely license threatening, and criminal prosecutions of firms and individuals becoming a reality.”

So who do you think had the worse day or even couple of days?

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

Internal Investigations: Doing One can be a Compliance Best Practice

The US Navy contract scandal took an interesting twist recently when one of its contractors, Inchcape Shipping Services, which had been suspended from doing business with the Navy for “conduct indicating questionable business integrity”, was reinstated as reported in an article in the New York Times (NYT), entitled “Audit Planned in Fraud Case as Navy Reinstates Shipper” by Christopher Drew and Danielle Ivory. They reported, “The move came after a federal judge questioned whether the service had presented enough evidence to justify the suspension.”

The suspension seems to have been based upon a 2008 internal investigation by the company itself which it turned over to the Navy in late 2012, when a federal judge ordered the company to give Navy investigators a copy of an internal company audit from 2008 into some of the questionable billings. However, “after Inchcape challenged its suspension in December, the main evidence that the Navy presented was that 2008 audit. James F. Merow, a judge on the Court of Federal Claims, said that it did not appear that the Navy’s suspension office had “conducted any meaningful investigation” of other documents “despite having had time to do so.””

The article said that “Faced with the possibility that the judge might dismiss the suspension, records show, the Navy agreed to lift it in exchange for promises from the company to follow federal rules, refund overcharges, and hire independent monitors and auditors.” Further, in addition and in exchange for lifting of the suspension, “the company has agreed to pay for an independent audit that could help the Justice Department determine how much it may have overcharged the government.”

The rather curious fact about this agreed upon audit is that the Navy has known the allegations of over-charging since 2010. Further, the Navy had subpoenaed the company’s records back in 2011. However, the Navy had not gotten around to auditing those subpoenaed records. Drew and Ivory reported that “Former federal contracting officials said that the need to hire an outside auditor also showed how little the Navy had done to get to the bottom of the accusations against Inchcape since they first surfaced in 2010. They quoted Charles Tiefer, a professor at the University of Baltimore School of Law and a former member of the federal Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan for the following, “To wait for the Navy to do a serious audit is like waiting for Godot. Considering that the Navy has sat on its hands for years, getting an accounting from a private firm is a sign of desperation.” Rather curiously when “Asked why they had not conducted their own audit, Navy officials said they had not had “full access” to the documents subpoenaed from Inchcape.”

I thought about how devastating it would be if a corporation, which had access to its own records, waited two years to begin an investigation of allegations of “conduct indicating questionable business integrity” or violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The FCPA Guidance says “An effective compliance program should include a mechanism for an organization’s employees and others to report suspected or actual misconduct or violations of the company’s policies on a confidential basis and without fear of retaliation. Companies may employ, for example, anonymous hotlines or ombudsmen. Moreover, once an allegation is made, companies should have in place an efficient, reliable, and properly funded process for investigating the allegation and documenting the company’s response, including any disciplinary or remediation measures taken.” From this I believe that the FCPA Guidance requires that companies not only have “in place” an efficient [and] reliable process for investigating an allegation, but that the investigation be properly funded as well.

Moreover, as with the Navy, the inclusion of specialized counsel to handle the investigation may be appropriate as it is viewed as a best practice. There are several reasons to bring in an outside investigation firm. Initially, the investigation must be perceived as fair. If your employees do not believe that the investigation is fair and impartial, then it is not fair and impartial. Further, those involved must have confidence that any internal investigation is treated seriously and objectively. You need to also consider the relationship between the investigation firm and the company, which hired it. If a company utilizes its regular outside counsel to perform the investigation and the results turn out favorably for the company, the regulators may ask if the investigation was a “whitewash”. If a regulatory authority, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or Department of Justice (DOJ) cannot rely on a company’s own internal investigation, it may perform the investigation all over again with its own personnel.

Additionally, if there are serious allegations made concerning your company’s employees engaging in criminal conduct, a serious response is required. Your company needs to hire some seriously good lawyers to handle any internal investigation. These lawyers need to have independence from the company so do not call your regular corporate counsel. Hire some seriously good investigative lawyers. I believe that there is another reason to hire outside counsel. It is also important because, no matter what the outcome of your investigation, you will most probably have to deal with the government. If the investigation does reveal actionable conduct, your company will need legal counsel who is most probably an ex-DOJ prosecutor or ex-AUSA to get your company through that process. Even if there is a finding of no criminal activity, you will need very competent and very credible counsel to explain the investigation protocol and its results to the government.

So why did the Navy not perform any adequate investigation of Inchcape Shipping before suspending them after having the company’s records for over two years? Did the Navy not have the technical expertise to read, review and analyze the Inchcape Shipping billing records? Are US Navy auditors too busy with other allegations of fraud and corruption to hav e reviewed the documents subpoenaed from Inchcape Shipping? No one knows the answer but in the realm of private sector corporations it required that the company have the ability to investigate itself or bring in outside counsel who can perform the investigation. Under any definition of a best practices compliance program, such a resource is a requirement.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014