George Carlin and Erga Omnes: the Petrobras Bribery Scandal Expands

On this date in 2008 George Carlin died. If you grew up in the late 1960s or early 1970s and you had anti-parental or anti-establishment inklings, which of course all teenagers do, you knew about George Carlin. In the early 1960s, Carlin was a relatively clean-cut, conventional comic. But around 1970, he reinvented himself as an eccentric, biting social critic and commentator. In this new incarnation, Carlin began appealing to a younger, hipper audience. He grew out his hair and added a beard together with a wardrobe in the stereotypically hippie style.

Carlin’s comedy also became counter-culture, not Cheech and Chong, hippy-dippy dopers, but with pointed jokes about religion, politics yet with frequent references to drugs. His second album with his new routine, FM/AM, won a Grammy Award for Best Comedy Recording. My favorite cut was the 11 O’Clock News. But it was his third album Class Clown that had, what I believe, to be the greatest comedy monologue ever, the profanity-laced routine “Seven Words You Can Never Say on Television.” When it was first broadcast on New York radio, a complaint led the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to ban the broadcast as “indecent.” The US Supreme Court later upheld the order, which remains in effect today. The routine made Carlin a hero to his fans and got him in trouble with radio brass as well as with law enforcement; he was even arrested several times, once during an appearance in Milwaukee, for violating obscenity laws.

Interestingly I thought about Carlin and his pokings of the Establishment (AKA The Man) when I read several articles over the weekend about the recent spate of arrests around the Petrobras bribery and corruption scandal. In article in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), entitled “Brazil Probe Sweeps Up Corporate Magnates” Will Connors, Rogerio Jelmayer and Paul Kiernan reported that “Brazilian officials arrested the heads of two Latin American construction giants, alleging they helped to mastermind a cartel that stole billions of dollars from state-run oil company Petrobras with the help of corrupt politicians to whom they paid kickbacks.” Also arrested with the heads of the two companies, Marcelo Odebrecht, head of Odebrecht SA and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Andrade Gutierrez, Otávio Azevedo.

The WSJ article reported that “Odebrecht is Latin America’s largest construction conglomerate, with business in the U.S., Europe and Africa, and whose head, Marcelo Odebrecht, is a household name in Brazil. Andrade Gutierrez has business in 40 countries. The privately owned companies are deeply involved in the development of stadiums and infrastructure for the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro.” Moreover, Odebrecht is reported to have “a presence in 21 countries”. Obviously a question is if the company had engaged in bribery and corruption in Brazil, did they do so in any of the other countries in which they are doing business?

Interestingly, these arrests “come months after the heads of other construction companies were detained by Brazilian authorities.” Indeed in a BBC article in , entitled “Petrobras scandal: Top construction bosses arrested in Brazil”, David Gallas said, “Odebrecht had been named by former Petrobras executives as one of the companies that allegedly paid bribes in exchange for contracts with the oil firm, but until now the firm had not been targeted by investigators.” The WSJ article quoted Brazilian prosecutor Carlos Fernando dos Santos Lima who said at a news conference that the executives from the two companies had not been arrested earlier as the entities, “had a more sophisticated system for making the alleged bribe payments, using foreign bank accounts in Switzerland, Monaco and Panama, so it took longer to prove their case.” David Fleischer, a Brasilia based political analyst, quoted in the WSJ article was even more circumspect. He said, “The prosecutors are very careful. If you’re going after big fish you want to make sure you can take them down.”

Brazilian police said the arrests were “Erga omnes” which the WSJ translated from Latin as “towards all”. I thought about that statement in light of the ongoing debate about enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) here in the US. On one side is the Chamber of Commerce and their allies who raise the ever-burgeoning cry that the Department of Justice (DOJ) needs to prosecute the invidious ‘Rogue employees’ who violate the FCPA. You will notice they never want the DOJ to look at the executives who might facilitate payment of bribes in the first place; whether through faux commitment to doing business in compliance, failing to properly allocate resources to compliance and ethics, simply rewarding those employees who git ‘er done no matter what the circumstances or (my favorite) putting a paper program in place and calling it a best practices compliance program.

Indeed those progenitors of relaxed enforcement want the DOJ to back off and let them do business the old fashioned way. However, if the bribery and corruption news from the first half of this year has told the world anything, it is about the dire effects of allowing such illegal conduct to take place and warning against slacking off laws which mandate doing business without bribery and corruption. In another WSJ article, entitled “Roots of a Brazilian Scandal That Weighs Heavily on the Nation’s Economy, Politics”, Marla Dickerson noted, “The scandal has crippled Petrobras, Brazil’s largest and most important company. In late April, the company wrote off more than $16 billion related to losses from graft and overvalued assets. The company’s woes have all but paralyzed the nation’s oil and gas sector. Hurt by slumping oil prices and strapped for cash, Petrobras has slashed investments, sparking a wave of credit downgrades, bankruptcies and layoffs among its suppliers that the weighed on Brazil’s economy.”

I wonder what George Carlin might have thought about all of this. He might have said that what else would you expect but I am relatively certain he would have done so while also sticking his thumb in the eye of The Man. 

For a YouTube version of the 11 O’Clock News, click here.

For a YouTube version of the 7 words you can never say on television, click here.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2015

 

King Arthur Week – The Green Knight and the Protection of Whistleblowers – Part IV

We continue our King Arthur themed week with an exploration of one of the most interesting characters in the Arthur canon, The Green Knight, so called because his skin and clothes are green. The meaning of his greenness has puzzled scholars since the discovery of the poem, that identifies him as the Green Man, a vegetation being in medieval art; a recollection of a figure from Celtic mythology; a Christian symbol or the Devil himself. According to Wikipedia, C. S. Lewis suggested the character was “as vivid and concrete as any image in literature” and J. R. R. Tolkien called him the “most difficult character” to interpret in the introduction to his edition of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight. His major role in Arthurian literature includes being a judge and tester of knights, and as such the other characters see him as friendly but terrifying and somewhat mysterious.

In his primary story with Sir Gawain, the Green Knight arrives at Camelot during a Christmas feast, holding a bough of holly in one hand and a battle-axe in the other. Despite disclaim of war, the knight issues a challenge: he will allow one man to strike him once with his axe, under the condition that he return the blow the following year. At first, Arthur takes up the challenge, but Gawain takes his place and decapitates the Green Knight, who retrieves his head and tells Gawain to meet him at the Green Chapel at the stipulated time. One year later, while Gawain is traveling to meet the Green Knight, he stays at the castle of Bercilak de Hautedesert. At Bercilak’s castle, Gawain’s loyalty and chastity is tested, Bercilak sends his wife to seduce Gawain and arranges that they shall exchange their gains for the other’s. On New Year’s Day, Gawain meets the Green Knight and prepares to meet his fate, where upon the Green Knight feints two blows and barely nicks him on the third. He then reveals that he is Bercilak, and that Morgan le Fay had given him the double identity to test Gawain and Arthur.

I thought about this story of testing when I read an article in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), entitled “SEC Gives More Than $600,000 to Whistleblower in Retaliation Case” by Rachel Louise Ensign. She reported on the Paradigm securities matter where an award was made to the whistleblower, which was settled by the firm late last year. The settlement was for $2.2MM and $600, 000 of that amount was paid to the whistleblower for the firm’s retaliation against him. This was the first award to a whistleblower for retaliation from the act of whistleblowing. The award is 30% of $2.2MM, which is the maximum amount a tipster can get under the program. The agency said the “unique hardships” he faced were a factor in the size of his award. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Enforcement Director, Andrew Ceresney, was quoted in the article as saying ““We appreciate and recognize the sacrifice this whistleblower made and the important role the whistleblower played in the success of the SEC’s first anti-retaliation enforcement action.””

This award to a whistleblower caps a stunning couple of weeks for whistleblowers who have brought information forward under the Dodd-Frank whistleblowing provisions. First there was the KBR pre-taliation fine and Cease and Desist Order.  In this matter, KBR was fined for having language in its internal employee Confidentiality Agreement (CA) that required employees to go to the company’s legal department before releasing certain confidential information to outside parties such as the SEC. The SEC held that such restrictions violated the “whistleblower protection Rule 21F-17 enacted under the Dodd-Frank Act. KBR required witnesses in certain internal investigations interviews to sign confidentiality statements with language warning that they could face discipline and even be fired if they discussed the matters with outside parties without the prior approval of KBR’s legal department. Since these investigations included allegations of possible securities law violations, the SEC found that these terms violated Rule 21F-17, which prohibits companies from taking any action to impede whistleblowers from reporting possible securities violations to the SEC.” This was in the face of zero findings that KBR had actually used such language or restrictions to prevent any employees from whistleblowing to the SEC.

In another part if its Press Release regarding the KBR case Director Ceresney said, “By requiring its employees and former employees to sign confidentiality agreements imposing pre-notification requirements before contacting the SEC, KBR potentially discouraged employees from reporting securities violations to us. SEC rules prohibit employers from taking measures through confidentiality, employment, severance, or other type of agreements that may silence potential whistleblowers before they can reach out to the SEC.  We will vigorously enforce this provision.”

Then we have the case of Tony Menendez, who was profiled by Jessie Eisinger in an article entitled “The Whistleblower’s Tale: How An Accountant Took on Halliburton”. The article told the story of a whistleblower, who took his concerns to government regulators and was then outed by the company as the SEC whistleblower and retaliated against. Interestingly, the SEC took no action on the whistleblower claims and the company argued on appeal that “since the SEC hadn’t brought any enforcement action, his complaint about the accounting was unfounded.” The company also claimed that simply because the whistleblower was identified by name, this alone was not the basis for a “material adverse action” against him. While Halliburton won at the administrative hearing level, it lost at the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

So now there is a Court of Appeals opinion holding that if whistleblowing was a “contributing factor” only to the retaliation. Further, the employee is not required to prove motive. Well-known whistleblower expert Jordan Thomas also explained in the Eisinger article, “Whistleblowers can be victims of retaliation even if they are ultimately proved wrong as long as they have a “reasonable” belief that the company was doing something wrong.”

It appears that the SEC will be more like the Green Knight going forward. It will be a tester to determine if retaliation against whistleblowers occurs. From preventing companies from trying to stop whistleblowing via CA’s, to monetary awards for retaliation even where there is no SEC or government action taken, to the award to whistleblowers as a part of an SEC settlement for retaliation by their former employers; the SEC is making very clear that they will test how your company treats whistleblowers. If the SEC finds your company’s conduct lacking, you may well be facing something like the Green Knight going forward.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2015

The Petrobras Scandal and Corruption of Political Parties Under the FCPA

When does bribery and corruption move from a business issue to a political issue to a national issue? Why should US companies be held to the gold standard of anti-corruption laws? Should the US government even care if US companies engage in bribery of politicians and political parties outside the US? I pose these questions as we see some of these issues now being played out in real time in Brazil.

Earlier this month, a Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article by Rogerio Jelmayer and Jeffrey T. Lewis, entitled “Brazil Graft Probe Reaches Higher Up” said that “A widening investigation into alleged corruption at Brazil’s state-controlled oil company edged closer to President Dilma Rousseff on Wednesday when police arrested her ruling political party’s treasurer. The official, João Vaccari Neto, was charged with receiving “irregular donations” for the Workers’ Party from some suppliers to the oil company” [Petrobras]. Moreover, one cooperating witness, Pedro Barusco, “told a congressional hearing in March that he amassed nearly $100 million in bribes as a part of the alleged bribery schemes and the Workers’ Party may have received twice as much.”

But the corruption scandal appears to be much broader than simply one politician. Another WSJ article, by reporters Paulo Trevisani and Paul Kiernan, entitled “Brazil Attorney General Seeks Corruption Probe Approval”, said that the Brazilian Attorney General “has asked the Supreme Court for permission to proceed with investigations against an undisclosed number of politicians”. He asked for “28 probes involving 54 persons”. Interestingly, this part of the Brazilian corruption probe is separate and apart from the “team of prosecutors who have been working on the case from the southern Brazilian city of Curitba”. The reason is that under Brazilian law “special treatment is afforded to high-ranking authorities, whose cases my be heard by the Supreme Court.” This anomaly required “any evidence pointing to government officials or lawmakers had to be sent to” the Brazilian Attorney General.

As the corruption scandal continues to morph, allegations have reached the level of last year’s Brazilian Presidential election. Mary Anastasia O’Grady, also writing in the WSJ, in an article entitled “An Escalating Corruption Scandal Rocks Brazil”, said that interviewed defeated Presidential candidate Aécio Neves, head of the Social Democracy Party of Brazil, told her that he lost the election because of “organized crime”. This was not some dark mafia plot but came about from “alleged skimming operations at the government-owned oil company.” She went on to note, “Prosecutors allege that Petrobras contractors were permitted to pad their contracts and remit the excess as kickbacks to the oil company, which passed hundreds of millions of dollars to politician and, more importantly the PT.” The PT is the ruling party currently led by Brazilian President Rousseff.

It has not yet been reported that any US companies are under investigation by the Brazilian Attorney General for the bribing of politicians or a political party such as the President’s Workers’ Party. However, for any US companies that have been engaged in trying to influence elections in Brazil through campaign contributions, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) specifically incorporates politicians, political parties and candidates for political offices as foreign government officials for purposes of the Act. In the 2012 FCPA Guidance it states, “The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions apply to corrupt payments made to (1) “any foreign official”; (2) “any foreign political party or official thereof ”; (3) “any candidate for foreign political office”; or (4) any person, while knowing that all or a portion of the payment will be offered, given, or promised to an individual falling within one of these three categories. Although the statute distinguishes between a “foreign official,” “foreign political party or official thereof,” and “candidate for foreign political office,” the term “foreign official” in this guide generally refers to an individual falling within any of these three categories.”

Additionally, politicians and political parties are incorporated into the FCPA through the accounting provisions of the FCPA. As further stated in the FCPA Guidance, “Additionally, individuals and entities can be held directly civilly liable for falsifying an issuer’s books and records or for circumventing internal controls. Exchange Act Rule 13b2-1 provides: “No person shall, directly or indirectly, falsify or cause to be falsified, any book, record or account subject to [the books and records provision] of the Securities Exchange Act.” And Section 13(b)(5) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5)) provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly circumvent or knowingly fail to implement a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsify any book, record, or account ….”. The Exchange Act defines “person” to include a “natural person, company, government, or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a government.”

The most well known FCPA enforcement action involving bribes paid to politicians was the Halliburton/KBR enforcement action. For those of you who may have forgotten this case, which has the third highest FCPA fine of all-time, Halliburton subsidiary KBR admitted that a consortium which it led paid Nigerian officials at least $132 million in bribes for engineering, procurement and construction contracts awarded between 1995 and 2004 to build liquefied natural gas facilities on Bonny Island, Nigeria. The consortium was named TSKJ and consisted of subsidiaries of the following entities: KBR; Technip, a French company; ENI, an Italian company; and JGC, a Japanese company. There was also a corrupt agent involved in paying the bribes, Jeffrey Tesler and another Japanese company Marubeni Corporation.

BONNEY ISLAND SETTLEMENT BOX SCORE

Entity	Fine, Penalty and Disgorgement of Profits (in $ millions)
Halliburton (KBR)	$579
ENI	$365
Technip	$338
JGC	$218
Marubeni Corp	$50
Jeffery Tesler (the Bag Man)	$149
Total	$1,699

 

So for those of you keeping score at home, there has been, and could be fines, penalties and profit disgorgement of over $1.699 billion. This figure does not include the amount paid out by these corporations for attorneys’ fees, forensic costs and other professional fees, which can be only speculated about.

 The Petrobras scandal continues to morph and to grow way beyond the bounds of simple commercial bribery. One of the goals in the passage of the Act was to prevent US companies from illegally influencing foreign officials and foreign elections through the payments of bribes. The Petrobras scandal may well demonstrate to the world community how important it is to remember that now is certainly not the time to try and weaken either the FCPA or its enforcement going forward. If there is ever to be a truly level playing field in commerce across the globe, it will be by enforcement of anti-corruption laws such as the FCPA that makes it safe for US businesses to compete on the global stage and compete on the basis of quality, not bribe paid.

But the morphing of the Petrobras bribery scandal into the Brazilian political scene may also demonstrate how commercial bribery can work to corrupt a democratic political system. If the money paid from bribes for commercial contracts worked its way into the Brazilian election, this would be perversion of the democratic process. It is this commercial issue that demonstrates why businesses, particularly US businesses, have a role in the international fight against bribery and corruption. It also seems to me to be a straight line from commercial bribery to political corruption to the explosion of terrorism against such corruption. While the FCPA may not have been passed with this connection to terrorism in mind, it is certainly an important US government tool in that fight as well.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2015

The Intersection of the FCPA, TI-CPI and Tax Appeals in Brazil

The Transparency International-Corruptions Perceptions Index (TI-CPI) is released each year in November. The TI-CPI rates Brazil as 69^th out of 175 countries on its index, coming in with a score of 43 out of 100. I wonder if TI might consider an interim report this year on Brazil? As things keep going, more and more corruption is alleged to be a part of the everyday fabric of the country. While the Petrobras and related scandals have been well chronicled, the overall stench of corruption just keeps spreading and spreading.

Recently it was announced yet another set of investigations around corruption has begun. This time it involves the Brazilian Finance Ministry’s Administrative Council for Tax Appeal. In an article in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), entitled “Brazil Probes New Bribery Allegations”, Paulo Trevisani reported that this is an “arbitration board that hears appeals from taxpayers who dispute how much they owe the [Brazilian] government.” The investigation would appear to be widespread as “Prosecutors said 74 companies and 24 individuals are under investigation.”

Interestingly not only is the Finance Ministry investigating the allegations but also the Brazilian internal revenue service, the Brazilian federal police and the Brazilian federal prosecutors office. In what would seem to indicate the inherent conflict of interest in the Finance Ministry investigating itself, Trevisani reported the “Finance Ministry said the alleged scheme wasn’t systematic but rather, involved “isolated acts” carried out by a small group of government tax officials. When prosecutors announced the investigation on March 26 they said that losses to the nation’s treasury totaled $6.1 billion over 15 years.” Oops.

While the entities and individuals under investigation have not been named, “a leading investigator on the case said companies under investigation include Ford Motor Brazil, a unit of Ford Motor Co.; JBS, the world’s largest meatpacker, the Brazilian unit of the Spanish bank Banco Santander SA; and Brazil’s second largest private-sector bank, Bradesco SA.” You may recall from an earlier blog post I noted that Brazil’s third largest state-owned bank Caixa Econômica Federal (Caixa) is also under investigation for corruption.

However, this new corruption scandal is the first time that non-Brazilian companies have come under investigation outside of the Petrobras scandal. The WSJ article noted, “Brazil’s tax system is among the most onerous and complex in the world. Penalties can be steep. That has fostered an environment where corruption can flourish, [un-named] experts say. “Taxes in Brazil are so high and complicated that it is easy for companies to get in trouble with the taxman,” the leading investigator told The Wall Street Journal. The investigator said frequent tax disputes created opportunities for ill-intentioned public servants to profit by helping firms circumvent red tape. Prosecutors say the probe began in 2013 after they received an anonymous letter describing details of the alleged scheme.”

An article in forbes.com, entitled “Ford On List Of Companies Suspected Of Brazilian Tax Fraud” by Kenneth Rapoza, went further than the WSJ article when it laid out the list of “companies are under investigation for taking part in various tax bribery schemes” and then listed the amounts they allegedly avoided paying. The Top Ten list is:

• Santander: R$3.3 billion
• Bradesco: R$2.7 billion
• Ford: R$1.7 billion
• Gerdau: R$1.2 billion
• Light: R$929 million
• Banco Safra: R$767 million
• RBS: R$672 million
• Camargo Correa: R$668 million
• Mitsubishi: R$505 million
• Banco Industrial: R$436 million

An article in businessinsider.com, entitled “Brazil uncovers multibillion-dollar tax fraud”, reported that this investigation, dubbed Operation Zeal, had uncovered that “the [tax] body managed to obtain tax appeals board rulings in the companies’ favor by either cutting penalties or waiving them altogether. In return, officials allegedly received bribes from some 70 companies believed to have benefited from the scheme. A written statement issued by Brazilian federal police stated “The investigations, begun in 2013, showed the organization acted within the body sponsoring private interests, seeking to influence and corrupt advisors with a view either to securing the cancellation or reduction of penalties from tax authorities”. Moreover, “Police said the scam could have netted the companies as much as 19 billion reais ($5.9 billion) but evidence uncovered so far amounts to around a third of that amount.” Finally, and perhaps most ominously, the article said, “Federal police organized crime chief Oslain Campos Santan said the total sums could end up being “as much” as that involved in the Petrobras scam”.

This new Brazilian corruption scandal recalls the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement action against the Houston-based Parker Drilling Company. According to the Department of Justice (DOJ) Press Release issued at the time of the announcement of the conclusion of the matter, the company was issued a tax assessment on its drilling rigs. The Press Release went on to state, “According to court documents, rather than pay the assessed fine, Parker Drilling contracted indirectly with an intermediary agent to resolve its customs issues. From January to May 2004, Parker Drilling transferred $1.25 million to the agent, who reported spending a portion of the money on various things including entertaining government officials. Emails in which the agent requested additional money from Parker Drilling referenced the agent’s interactions with Nigeria’s Ministry of Finance, State Security Service, and a delegation from the president’s office. Two senior executives within Parker Drilling at the time reviewed and approved the agent’s invoices, knowing that the invoices arbitrarily attributed portions of the money that Parker Drilling transferred to the agent to various fees and expenses. The agent succeeded in reducing Parker Drilling’s TI Panel fines from $3.8 million to just $750,000.”

So with all of the above that has been written about in the past few weeks, where do you think Brazil should be on the TI-CPI? While its rating of 43 out of 100 may not seem too low or perhaps more accurately too much perceived corruption, it may be time for a mid-year reassessment. Certainly if you are a Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) or compliance practitioner you may wish to perform your own reassessment. If you have any dealings with the Brazilian Finance Ministry’s Administrative Council for Tax Appeal, you need to perform an internal investigation starting today on all information you can find about the process and results. For if the results were extremely favorable the reason for the achievement may have violated both Brazilian law and the FCPA.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2015

Right to Retire Or Termination: Remediation of Leadership To Foster Compliance

Many historians have long given 476 AD as the date of the fall of the Roman Empire. Further, it was from this date forward that Europe began its long slide into the abyss, which came to be known as the Dark Age. However, this view was challenged in 1971 by Peter Brown, with the publication of his seminal work “The World of Late Antiquity”. One of the precepts of Brown’s work was to reinterpret the 3rd to 8^th centuries not as simply a decline of the greatness that had been achieved in the heydays of the Roman Empire, but more on their own terms. It was in the year of 476 AD that the last Roman Emperor, Romulus Augustulus, left the capital of Rome in disgrace. However as Brown noted, he was not murdered or even thrown out but allowed to retire to his country estates, sent there by the conquers of the western half of the Roman Empire, the Goths. Not much conquering going on if a ruler is allowed to ‘retire’, it was certainly a replacement but not quite the picture of marauding barbarians at the gate.

I thought about this anomaly of retirement by a leader in the context where a company or other entity might be going through investigations for corruption and non-compliance with such laws as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) or UK Bribery Act. Yesterday I wrote about three recent articles and what they showed about a company’s oversight of its foreign subsidiaries. Today I want to use these same articles to explore what a company’s response and even responsibility should be to remediate leadership under which the corruption occurs. The first was an article in the New York Times (NYT), entitled, “Another Scandal Hits Citigroup’s Moneymaking Mexican Division” by Michael Corkery and Jessica Silver-Greenberg. Their article spoke about the continuing travails of Citigroup’s Mexican subsidiary Banamex. Back in February, the company reported “a $400 million fraud involving the politically connected, but financially troubled, oil services firm Oceanografía.”

This has led Citigroup to ever so delicately try to oust the leader of its Mexico operations, Mr. Medina-Mora, by encouraging him to retire. While Citigroup did terminate 12 individuals around the Oceanografía scandal earlier in the year, it has not changed the employment status of the head of the Mexico business unit. This may be changing as the article said, “In a delicate dance, Citigroup is encouraging its Mexico chairman, Manuel Medina-Mora, 64, to retire, according to four people briefed on the matter. The bank has been quietly laying the groundwork for his departure, which could come by early next year, the people said. Still, Mr. Medina-Mora’s business acumen and connections to the country’s ruling elite have made him critical to the bank’s success in Mexico. Citigroup and its chairman, Michael E. O’Neill, cannot afford to alienate Mr. Medina-Mora and risk jeopardizing those relationships, these people said.”

Should Mr. Medina-Mora be allowed to retire? Should he even be required to retire? What about the ‘mints money’ aspect of the Mexican operations for Citigroup? Was any of that money minted through violations of the FCPA or other laws? What will the Department of Justice (DOJ) think of Citigroup’s response or perhaps even its attitude towards this very profitable business unit and Citigroup’s oversight, lax or other?

Does a company have to terminate employees who engage in corruption? Or can it allow senior executives to gracefully retire into the night with full pension and other golden parachute benefits intact? What if a company official “purposely manipulated appointment data, covered up problems, retaliated against whistle-blowers or who was involved in malfeasance that harmed veterans must be fired, rather than allowed to slip out the back door with a pension.” Or engaged in the following conduct, “had steered business toward her lover and to a favored contractor, then tried to “assassinate” the character of a colleague who attempted to stop the practice.” Finally, what if yet another company official directed company employees to “delete hundreds of appointments from records” during the pendency of an investigation?

All of the above quotes came from a second NYT article about a very different subject. In the piece, entitled “After Hospital Scandal, V.A. Official Jump Ship”, Dave Phillips reported that two of the four VA Administration executives who engaged in the above conduct and were selected for termination, had resigned before they could be formally terminated. The article reported that the VA “had no legal authority to stop” the employees from resigning. Current VA Secretary Robert McDonald was quoted in the article as saying, “It’s also very common in the private sector. When I was head of Procter & Gamble, it happened all the time, and it’s not a bad thing — it saves us time and rules out the possibility that these people could win an appeal and stick around.” Plus, he said, their records reflect that they were targeted for termination. “They can’t just go get a job at another agency,” Mr. McDonald said. “There will be nowhere to hide.”

The third article was in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and entitled, “GM Says Top Lawyer to Step Down”. In this piece, reporters John D. Stroll and Joseph B. White, with contributions from Chris Matthews and Joann Lublin, reported that General Motors (GM) General Counsel (GC) Michael Millikin will retire early next year. Milliken is famously the GC who claimed not to know what was going on in his own legal department around the group’s settlements of product liability claims of faulty ignition switches. Milliken claimed he was kept “in the dark” by his own lieutenants about the safety issues involved with this group of litigation. Does Milliken have any responsibility for the failures of GM around this safety issue? What does his apparent graceful retirement say about the corporate culture of GM and its desire to actually change anything in the light of its ongoing travails? Of course one might cynically point to GM’s failure to even have a Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer as evidence of the company’s attitude towards compliance and ethics. (I wonder how that might look to the DOJ/Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) if GM goes under any FCPA scrutiny?)

With Citigroup, the Department of Veterans Affairs and GM, we have three separate excuses for companies (and a Cabinet level department) not disciplining top employees for ethical and/or compliance failures. At Citigroup, the excuse is apparently that it does not want to rock the boat from a top producing foreign subsidiary by terminating the head of the subsidiary under investigation. At the Department of Veterans Affairs, the excuse seems to be they can go ahead and resign because we prefer to get rid of them that way. At GM, it is not clear why the GC who claimed not to know what was going on in even his own law department can ride off into the sunset with nary a contrary word in sight. Millikin’s conduct would seem to be the product of a larger cultural issue at GM.

I thought about how the DOJ might look at these situations for companies if a FCPA claim were involved. Even with McDonald’s observations about what happened when he was with Procter & Gamble; does a company show something less than commitment to having a culture of compliance if it allows an employee to retire? What does it say about Citigroup and its culture given the current dance it is having with its head of the Mexico unit? What about GM and its Sgt. Schultz of a GC and his ‘I was in the dark posture’? As stated by Mike Volkov, in his post entitled “Goodbye Mr. Millikin: GM’s Continuing Culture Challenges”, GM does under appear to understand the situation it finds itself in currently over its failures. He wrote, “GM still does not understand the significance of its governance failure…GM should have taken dramatic and affirmative steps to create a new culture – resources and new initiatives should be launched to rid GM of its current culture and replace it with a new speak up culture. It is a daunting task in such a large company but it has to be done. Until GM wakes up, missteps and failures will continue.” One might say the same for Citigroup and the Department of Veterans Affairs as well.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

Citibank: Multiple Failure of Compliance as the Hammer Drops

What is the cost of the failure to perform appropriate due diligence on a regular basis? What red flags should you look for when considering doing business with a customer, party in the sales channel or entity in the supply chain? All of these questions and more continue to swirl around Citigroup and its Mexican subsidiary Banamex over the ongoing investigation into allegations of fraud at Citi’s Mexico bank unit.

Citi had come to grief when there was a reported $400MM loss in Banamex involving the Mexican marine energy services company Oceanografía SA de CV. The problems arose after Banamex had extended $585MM in short-term credit to a company that Citi itself had warned its own bond investors was “from time to time subject to various accusations, including accusations of corrupt practices.” Oceanografía provided construction, maintenance and vessel-chartering services to the Mexican national energy company, Pemex’s exploration and production subsidiary. But Oceanografía’s fortunes, changed sharply in February of this year after it became the subject of a new government review that resulted in a suspension of Pemex contracts to Oceanografía for the next 20 months. Banamex had previously advanced as much $585 million to Oceanografía through an accounts receivable program, which would advance money to Oceanografía to provide services to Pemex. Pemex would then pay back Banamex, verifying invoices provided by Oceanografía to confirm that the work had been completed. In other words, Banamex was relying on Pemex’s ability to pay back the bank. But all of this ended when Pemex suspended its contracts with Oceanografía.

In a Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article, entitled “Citi Says Signs of Mexico Fraud Weren’t Escalated”, Christina Rexrode reported that Citi Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Michael Corbat told investors that employees “missed signs of trouble they should have recognized and elevated to superiors.” In a talk to investors Corbat was quoted as saying “There were telltales along the way” and he promised that “the bank would work on motivating and encouraging employees to raise their concerns when they notice potential problems.” But the problems ran deeper and were perhaps more systemic than simply the failure to escalate. Rexrode reported “People inside the bank have said the unit was allowed to operate as its own fiefdom, with New York employees struggling to get information about how the unit operated.” However, “A Citigroup spokesman said in a statement that “Banamex is absolutely subject to the same risk, control, anti-money-laundering and technology standards and oversight which are required throughout the company.””

These statements come on the heels of the dramatic firing of 11 Banamex employees just two weeks earlier. After meeting with the Citi Board of Directors, Corbat flew to Mexico City and terminated 11 employees. In an article in the New York Times (NYT), entitled “Citi Fires 11 More in Mexico Over Fraud”, Michael Corkery and Elisabeth Malkin reported that “Among those fired were four of the bank’s top executives in Mexico: its head of corporate banking, head institutional risk officer, head of trade finance and head of trade and treasury solutions. Some of the employees had worked at Banamex for as long as two decades and were not involved in the fraud directly. The bank fired many because they had not taken steps to detect the fraud or had ignored warning signs about the client.”

But apparently Citi expects there to be more disciplinary actions stemming form the matter. In an article in the Financial Times (FT), entitled “Citi fires 11 staff in Mexico unit”, Jude Webber, Camilla Hall and Kara Scannell reported that Corbat said in a memo to staff “Before our investigation concludes, we expect that several other employees, both inside and outside of Mexico, may receive forms of disciplinary action as well.” Two persons who may yet face such disciplinary action are “Manuel Medina-Mora, a Citi executive who oversees the Mexican operations and had his pay docked by $1.1m in March, or Javier Arrigunaga, Banamex chief executive.” Additionally, and perhaps more ominously for Citi, both the F.B.I. and prosecutors from the United States attorney’s office in Manhattan are investigating “Whether Citigroup willfully ignored possible warning signs”.

What red flags did Citi miss and for how long? One clue was reported in the NYT article, which noted that Oceanografía “is known among Mexican investors as politically connected but financially troubled. Credit rating firms in the United States, corporate bond investors and Mexican lawmakers have raised concerns about Oceanografía. In 2009, United States ratings firm Fitch warned about Oceanografía’s high leverage and poor cash flow generation. Fitch eventually withdrew its ratings because the company was not supplying enough information. In 2008, Standard & Poor’s noted that Mexico’s congress had investigated accusations of improper deals between Oceanografía and Pemex, though no wrongdoing was proved. Still, Oceanografía grew to become one of Banamex’s 10 largest corporate clients. The fraud erased 19 percent of the unit’s banking profits last year.”

These troubles were seemingly magnified in Mexico when the CEO of Oceanografía, Amado Yáñez Osuna, was arrested and charged with violating Mexican banking laws. In a WSJ article, entitled “Oil-Tinged Graft Scandal Roils Mexico”, Laurence Iliff and Amy Gutherie reported “The arrest deepens a scandal that has sent shock waves across Mexico’s political landscape. That put a spotlight on long-simmering allegations that the country’s former ruling National Action Party, known as PAN, used Pemex to favor Oceanografía and other contractors during the party’s 12 years in power, which ended with the 2012 election of President Enrique Peña Nieto of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).” Further, during those “12 years, Oceanografía’s contracts with the oil monopoly swelled from a few million dollars a year to hundreds of millions of dollars, according to a review of the contracts by The Wall Street Journal. Most of the contracts were obtained in public bids, although some were assigned directly without bids, including one contract for about $65 million in the final months of the Calderón administration.”

The case took a far more ominous turn when authorities when Mexican authorities announced last week that they had issued arrest warrants for multiple Banamex executives. In an article in the FT entitled, “Mexico issues fresh set of Banamex arrest warrants” Jude Webber reported that “Mexico has issues more arrest warrants – including an unspecified number for staff at Citigroup’s Banamex unit – a day after detaining the owner of the oil services company at the centre of a $400m alleged fraud scandal that has rocked the bank since its disclosure there months ago.” In an article in the NYT entitled, “Mexico Authorizes Arrests In Fraud at Citigroup Unit” Elisabeth Malkin and Michael Corkery reported, “Attorney General Jesús Murillo Karam of Mexico confirmed on Friday that the authorities were seeking the former executives. He declined to say how many were involved.” Yes, there are warrants, but I won’t say who,” Mr. Murillo Karam told reporters.” Apparently not even Citigroup knows whose arrests may be imminent.

What are the lessons for the compliance practitioner? Three keys points are controls, escalation and oversight. What type of internal controls, or lack thereof, allowed one company to obtain such credit on what were basically receivables financing? What about allowing the Banamex unit to basically run its own show with little to no oversight from the corporate headquarters? Corkery and Malkin reported, “Citigroup is keen to demonstrate to regulators and investigators in the United States and in Mexico that it is cracking down on its employees for not catching the fraud. But the breadth of the punishment could also suggest that the bank, despite assurances that the fraud is confined this case, has had widespread problems with controls and oversight across its Mexican unit.” Moreover, in his memo to staff, Corbat said, ““we are reviewing our controls and processes in Mexico and strengthening any area we think falls short of our global standards or best practices.”” Corbat also noted Citi was looking at ways to encourage employees to increase escalation of issues earlier.

Moreover with these now imminent arrests of Banamex executives, Citi may be facing more serious charges in the US. Leaving aside the inane argument of a ‘rogue business unit’ it may be that the US parent choose not to look too closely at its high-flying and very profitable Mexican subsidiary. If, as it seems from the newspaper accounts, that Oceanografía was well known for the business tactic of under-bidding for contract and then making up the differences in cost overruns, this may not bode well for the Banamex executives or Citigroup. Likewise if there was one company that Banamex did business with, which engaged in such behavior, there may other similarly situated companies once a detailed investigation of the Citigroup unit is concluded.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014