Who Had the Worse Day – Peyton Manning or Banks and Investment Funds?

The Seattle Seahawks gave the Denver Broncos an old-fashioned tail-whoopin’ in Super Bowl history on Sunday. I admit that I was pulling for the old guy, Peyton Manning to pull out another one but I did like Seattle, particularly getting +2.5 points. Not that they needed them and I certainly did not see such a beat down coming. Manning’s reaction was about what you might assume from a professional at this stage of his career, measured yet clearly disappointed. Yes he had a very bad day and one that he will probably rue the day for some time down the road.

But there was some other news on Monday that may cause other groups to do more than ‘rue the day’. You know when you are on the front page of the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) in an article about the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) it has the distinct possibility to be unpleasant. The said WSJ, entitled “Probe Widens Into Dealings Between Financial Firms, Libya” by Joe Palazzolo, Michael Rothfield and Justin Baer, reported that the Justice Department has joined an ongoing Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) probe into “banks, private equity funds and hedge funds that may have violated anti-bribery laws (IE. FCPA) in their dealings with Libya’s government-run investment fund.” Ominously the WSJ noted that the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) participation had not been previously reported. As the DOJ generally investigates potential criminal violations of the FCPA and the SEC generally investigates the civil side of things this could be quite ominous indeed.

The firms named in the WSJ article included the following: Credit Suisse Group AG, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Société Générale SA, the private-equity firm Blackstone Group LP and hedge-fund operator Och-Ziff Capital Management Group. This is in addition to the previous announcement that Goldman-Sachs was being investigated. All of the claims relate to “investment deals made around the time of the financial crisis and afterward, these people said. In the years leading up to Libya’s 2011 revolution, Western firms—encouraged by the U.S. government—raced to attract investment money from the North African nation, which was benefiting from oil sales and recently had opened to foreign investment.”

The WSJ reported that the investigation is centering on certain third parties involved in the transactions, “At the center of the probe is a group of middlemen, known as “fixers,” operating in the Middle East, London and elsewhere, people familiar with the matter said. The fixers established connections between investment firms and individuals with ties to leaders in developing markets, including those in the Gadhafi regime.” The government is looking into these third party’s “roles in arranging deals between financial firms and Libyan officials, people familiar with the matter said. The fixers acted as placement agents, similar to those in the U.S. who have come under scrutiny for steering investments to large public retirement funds. In some cases, the sovereign-wealth-fund fixers collected a “finder’s fee”.”  It was reported that “Some of the fixers had connections to at least two of Gadhafi’s sons—primarily his second son, Seif al-Islam Gadhafi, who was most involved with the sovereign-investment fund, according to people familiar with the matter. Seif al-Islam Gadhafi was captured by rebels.” Interestingly, many of the underlying facts now being investigated came to light only after the overthrow of the Gadhafi Regime.

Further north, another group may have an occasion to rue the day. As reported in the FCPA Blog, in a post entitled “More SNC-Lavaline execs face charges in ongoing corruption probe”, two former SNC-Lavalin officials were charged by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) last Friday. The two men charged were Stephane Roy, a former vice-president at SNC-Lavalin, who was charged with fraud, bribing a foreign public official, and contravening a United Nations economic measures act related to Libya. Also charged was former executive vice-president Sami Abdallah Bebawi with fraud, two counts of laundering the proceeds of a crime, four counts of possession of property obtained by crime, and one count of bribing a foreign public official. These charge, added to prior charges bring the number of former SNC-Lavalin executives to four for their conduct regarding allegations of bribery and corruption in Libya. This is in addition to another two company executives who were charged for bribery and corruption regarding a company project in Bangladesh.

And finally are our friendly bankers and their continuing anti-money laundering (AML) woes. Just last week, UBS Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Sergio Ermotti, said at the World Economic Forum in Davos that it was not right to criticize bankers for criminal acts “most of the bad behavior that has landed UBS and others in hot water was caused by small groups of rogue employees and doesn’t reflect broader cultural problems in the industry.” Criticism could not come from interested stakeholders, such as stockholders, or those who had money in his bank. Indeed criticism could not even come from regulators.

Apparently some regulators take their jobs a bit more seriously than Ermotti might like. Reuters reported, in an article entitled “Bankers anxious over anti-money-laundering push to go after individuals”, that at the Securities Industry Financial Markets Association conference, John Davidson, E*Trade Financial’s global head of AML, said that the “new push by regulators and lawmakers to hold individuals, rather than just institutions, accountable for regulatory violations involving money laundering is spooking members of the U.S. financial industry.” He further said that this aggressive trend and a new vigorous AML bill, introduced in Congress by Representative Maxine Waters, entitled “Holding Individuals Accountable and Deterring Money Laundering Act”, were all “a little scary.” He found the trend towards more AML enforcement against individuals “an incredibly disturbing trend.” The reason it is so scary, an un-named top level compliance officer said, is “that compliance officers at the largest Wall Street institutions were feeling especially nervous because the power structures in those institutions sometimes did not give compliance officers enough authority to act.”

But more than compliance officers may rue the day. Jordan’s reported that the Board of Directors at financial institutions are also concerned. In article entitled “Money laundering tops boardroom concerns amid threat of criminal prosecution” it reported “concerns in boardrooms are now at an all-time high” and corporate boardrooms in some of the country’s leading banks are now sitting up and taking notice of money laundering as a concern, after the threat of criminal prosecution became something of a reality. The recently released KPMG Global Anti-Money Laundering Survey noted that 88 per cent of executives have now placed money laundering back at the head of a list of concerns addressed in their boardrooms. Brian Dilley, global head of the AML Practice at KPMG, was quoted as saying “Anti-money laundering has never been higher on senior management’s agenda, with regulatory fines now running into billions, regulatory action becoming genuinely license threatening, and criminal prosecutions of firms and individuals becoming a reality.”

So who do you think had the worse day or even couple of days?

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

The SFO Speaks in the Mabey & Johnson Case: Private Equity – Are You Listening?

As reported by thebriberyact.com, on January 13, 2012, the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) announced the final piece of the Mabey & Johnson (M&J) case, in which the company’s sole shareholder Mabey Engineering (Holdings) Limited agreed to pay back dividends gained as a result of corruption of  M&J obtain Iraqi bridge-building contracts. SFO Director Richard Alderman lauded it as “the final act in an exemplary model of corporate self-reporting and co-operative resolution”. I hope that every compliance officer of a private equity company read the report by the Bribery Act guys because this is a remedy which may soon be aimed directly at your company.

To recap this case, as reported in the SFO Press Release, entitled “Shareholder agrees civil recovery by SFO in Mabey & Johnson”, said that M&J has worked with the SFO since the beginning of 2008 when M&J self-reported certain instances of corruption it had identified as a result of an internal investigation. Following the self-disclosure and subsequent co-operation with the SFO’s investigations, the company pled guilty to charges of corruption and breaches of United Nations sanctions and was convicted at Southwark Crown Court in September 2009. Since the self-disclosure, the company has introduced new management, implemented anti-bribery and corruption procedures and appointed an independent monitor. The SFO noted that “the company is viewed by the SFO as having conducted itself in an exemplary way through its self-referral, extensive co-operation with the authorities and the transformation of the company.”

However, there is now one additional remedy that the SFO used against M&J. The sole shareholder of M&J, Mabey Engineering, agreed to pay a penalty of £131,201 under the Proceeds of Crime Act. The sum represents the dividends which the parent company collected from the contracts at the center of the UN Sanctions prosecutions. The company will also pay costs in the amount of £2,440.

Director Alderman is quoted as saying:

“There are two key messages I would like to highlight.  First, shareholders who receive the proceeds of crime can expect civil action against them to recover the money.  The SFO will pursue this approach vigorously.  In this particular case, however, the shareholder was totally unaware of any inappropriate behaviour.  The company and the various stakeholders across the group have worked very constructively with the SFO to resolve the situation, and we are very happy to acknowledge this.

The second, broader point is that shareholders and investors in companies are obliged to satisfy themselves with the business practices of the companies they invest in.  This is very important and we cannot emphasise it enough.  It is particularly so for institutional investors who have the knowledge and expertise to do it. The SFO intends to use the civil recovery process to pursue investors who have benefitted from illegal activity.  Where issues arise, we will be much less sympathetic to institutional investors whose due diligence has clearly been lax in this respect.”

Commenting on these statements, thebriberyact.com said, that with these remarks, Director Alderman “took the opportunity to fire a warning a shot across the bows of institutional shareholders and the higher standards the SFO will expect of them”. I usually do not disagree with thebriberyact.com guys. However, here I think they were way too subtle, because even if a shareholder did not know about illegal conduct, the SFO will go after the proceeds of the criminal activity. This is not the situation where a recalcitrant company agrees to disgorge profits, which is a standard Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) remedy. This is a situation where a shareholder who received dividends was required to return its money.

Director Alderman goes on to imply that institutional shareholders will be held to a higher standard. The “broader point is that shareholders and investors in companies are obliged to satisfy themselves with the business practices of the companies they invest in. This is very important and we cannot emphasise it enough.” Think about that statement for a minute. If you are a private US equity company, with a UK portfolio company which sustains a Bribery Act violation and prosecution, you may well have to return profits, even where you did not have knowledge of the violative conduct.

More importantly for private US equity companies, how long do you think it will take for the Department of Justice (DOJ) to incorporate this form of remedy into a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement action? I can give you the answer; NOT LONG. The SEC enforces the books and records component of the FCPA against publicly listed companies. Most equity companies are privately held so profit disgorgement may not be available in an enforcement action against a portfolio company. Nevertheless, based on the Mabey case, the DOJ may well seek return of dividends, profits or other monies which went from a portfolio company to its private equity owner.

Over the past week, there has been intense media discussion regarding private equity due to the GOP primary. These discussions have even reached the FCPA compliance commentariati with an article by Matt Ellis, writing in his blog FCPAméricas, entitled “Mitt Romney, Private Equity, and the FCPA.” The lawyers at the DOJ read the papers like everyone else and they see this increased scrutiny and this scrutiny, coupled with this new development by the SFO, will put this type of enforcement remedy squarely in front of US regulators. If you are a private equity company, you need to heed Director Alderman’s warning that “This is very important and we cannot emphasise it enough”; you will be “obligated to satisfy [yourself] with the business practices of the companies [you] invest in.” It does not get any more straight forward than that.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2012

Private Equity and the Highest Common Denominator

Most folks learn in elementary school the concept of the ‘lowest common denominator’. A non-mathematical definition might be something along the lines of meaning the most basic or lowest of something among a group. Conversely, there exists the concept of ‘highest common denominator” which might have the opposite definition of the uppermost or maximum of something among a group. The concept of highest common denominator may now by applicable to Private Equity companies and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).

What are some of the ways liability can attach itself to a Private Equity company for the actions of a Portfolio Company? Although not yet tested in this context, the Nature’s Sunshine case and the theory of ‘control person liability’ could certainly be one way. Under this theory, if a person has the “power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies to a person whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract or otherwise.” It certainly would not take much expansion to get to a Private Equity owner of a Portfolio Company under that theory.

However, there may be a more direct route which is through one or more of the following: actual knowledge, willful blindness, conscious disregard or deliberate ignorance. It is through one of these mechanisms that the ‘highest common denominator’ comes into play. Typically Private Equity entities have a variety of Portfolio Companies. This variety can reach across several industries and equal a large number of Portfolio Companies. The Private Equity owners may reach down to exercise a large amount of control over each Portfolio Company. This could lead to actual knowledge of each Portfolio Company’s compliance program.

Nevertheless, a Private Equity company may allow its individual Portfolio Companies to develop their own compliance programs. This could lead, through the ‘highest common denominator’, to a charge of willful blindness, conscious disregard or deliberate ignorance. How would it work? Along the following lines: If a Private Equity entity had 10 Portfolio Companies and one had a best practices compliance program and the others had something less than best practices, I believe that the Private Equity entity would be held to the standard of the highest or best compliance program of any entity in its portfolio. This would put the Private Equity entity on actual knowledge of a best practices compliance program and then the Private Equity owner would be consciously disregarding or deliberately ignoring such best practices for the remainder of its portfolio.

This does not mean that if the Private Equity had one multi-billion dollar entity and several others in the range of $250 to $750 MM in value, that it would be held to the standard of the compliance program in the multi-billion entity but if there are several in the lesser range, it could well be held to the highest standard of the companies in that lesser range. That means that if the Private Equity entity is allowing the Portfolio Companies to implement their own compliance solutions, it may be setting itself up for liability.

So what is the answer? The first thing that the Private Equity owner must do is have an assessment of each Portfolio Company’s compliance program. If one has a best practices compliance program such a program may well need to be implemented across the spectrum of Portfolio Companies. If not, there may be an action based upon the highest common denominator.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2011

The FCPA, Financial Institutions and a Rude Awakening

As reported in today’s FCPA Blog, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is investigating “whether bank and private equity firms violated the [FCPA] in their dealings with sovereign wealth funds.” The WSJ article noted that banks, such as Citigroup, and private equity firms, such as Blackstone Group Ltd., had received letters from the SEC requesting that they retain documents relating to such activities. At this point, the SEC letters did not state any specific allegations of bribery but indicated that such investigation was in “the early stages”.

The WSJ article noted that several sovereign wealth funds had invested in banks or private equity firms in the past few years and “in some cases, the sovereign funds helped stave off the firms collapse.” The FCPA Blog quoted from itself by noting that in a 2008 post it had said:

We’ve never seen empirical studies on the subject, but we’ve noticed that FCPA cases generally spring from industries that deal in scarce commodities — whatever those happen to be at any moment in history. It could be energy, telecommunications licenses, access to hospital patients, metals, food, cash and so on. . . .

These days, a commodity in short supply is cash. Sovereign wealth funds have it and banks need it. Will the financial institutions succumb to market pressures? Will they abandon FCPA compliance to save their balance sheets? Some might . . . And if that happens, pin-striped tragedies are sure to follow.

However, the issue which struck us was just how omnipotent two of our colleagues have been regarding the possible Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) exposure of entities which deal with sovereign wealth funds. We recently posted an article entitled “Private Equity and the FCPA”. In one of the comments to this post, Howard Sklar wrote,

“One potential flip side of this—to my knowledge not yet the subject of any enforcement action—is whether ownership by a sovereign equity fund would turn someone into a “foreign official.” For example, Temasek Holdings is a Singapore government-owned fund. If it purchases a majority interest in a company, does that transform the employees of that company into “foreign officials?” It’s an open question.

It sounds like he nailed it.

In two posts in 2010, the FCPA Professor discussed the issue of sovereign wealth funds in the context of the FCPA. In one posting entitled, “Sovereign Wealth Funds and the FCPA” he stated:

While no FCPA enforcement action has yet involved a sovereign wealth fund, such funds and the investments these funds make in private companies, are clearly on the radar screen of the enforcement agencies as both DOJ and SEC officials have in the past publicly stated that sovereign wealth funds pose FCPA risks because the funds are government owned. The next frontier of the enforcement agencies’ dubious “foreign official” interpretation may thus be application to the investments made by sovereign wealth funds.

It sounds like he nailed it too.

The FCPA journey that these banks and private equity firms have embarked upon may well be long and costly. We can only conclude by citing back to the WSJ article, which quoted our colleague Simeon Kriesberg, a FCPA lawyer in Mayer Brown’s Washington DC office, who told the WSJ, “Those [Financial Institutions] that do not have effective compliance programs in place may get a rude awakening.”

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2011