Supermarket to the World – The ADM FCPA Enforcement Action

Last week, it was announced by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that it had settled an enforcement action with Archer-Daniels-Midland Company (ADM). The DOJ resolved a criminal action when, according to the DOJ Press Release, a subsidiary of ADM pled guilty and agreed to pay more than $17 million in criminal fines to resolve charges that it paid bribes through vendors to Ukrainian government officials to obtain value-added tax (VAT) refunds, in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). In a parallel civil FCPA action settled with the SEC and the SEC Press Release noted that “The payments were then concealed by improperly recording the transactions in accounting records as insurance premiums and other purported business expenses. ADM had insufficient anti-bribery compliance controls and made approximately $33 million in illegal profits as a result of the bribery by its subsidiaries.” In addition to the DOJ fine of $17.8MM, ADM agreed to pay “disgorgement of $33,342,012 plus prejudgment interest of $3,125,354.”

At this point, the Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA), Plea Agreement between the company and the DOJ and the Criminal Information is not available. However the SEC Civil Complaint is available, as are Press Releases from both the DOJ and SEC. In today’s blog I will review the underlying facts as set out in the SEC Civil Complaint. In a subsequent blog post, I will review the NPA, Plea Agreement and Criminal Information.

The underlying facts centered on ADM’s ongoing issues related to the receipt of VAT refunds in Ukraine. The company had many years of slow and no response to its application for refunds where goods purchased in Ukraine were then exported. From 2002 to 2010, the company’s Ukrainian subsidiary rolled up VAT receivables of up to $46MM. The company employed three different bribery schemes to help them get this money that they were owed out of the country. ADM’s two entities which were directly involved in the bribery scheme were Alfred C. Toepfer, International GmbH (“the German subsidiary”) and its affiliate, Alfred C. Toepfer International (Ukraine) Ltd. (“the Ukrainian subsidiary”).

Charitable Donation Scheme

According to the SEC Complaint, “an ADM executive in the tax department sent an e- mail to the head of an international tax organization and stated, “One of our affiliates operates in the Ukraine. In order to recover 100% of their input VAT they have to pay 30% of the amount to local charities.” While recognizing that this requirement was not illegal and that there were avenues for appeal and assistance with this issue through the US government and trade groups, the SEC Complaint noted that “Given ADM’s insufficient anti-bribery compliance policies and procedures at the time, it did not prevent or detect the improper payments made by” the German subsidiary or the Ukrainian subsidiary.

Use of Third Parties

A second bribery scheme entailed the German and Ukrainian subsidiaries making “payments to a stevedoring company in the port of Odessa (the “Shipping Company”) so that it could pass on nearly all of those payments to Ukrainian officials in order to obtain VAT refunds on behalf of ACTI Ukraine.” The Shipping Company would present inflated invoices to the German subsidiary and this inflated amount “represented a sum that was available for the Shipping Company to pass to Ukraine government officials.” Further, when the German subsidiary would receive an invoice from the Shipping Company, “it withheld payment of a portion of the amount in the invoice, and then upon receiving the relevant VAT refund, ACTI Hamburg released the funds to the Shipping Company.”

Mischaracterization of Write-offs

In yet another bribery scheme, the German subsidiary reported to the US parent that it would negotiate with the Ukrainian government over the amount of the VAT refund and if there was a negotiated settlement it would be less than the full refund due the company. The German subsidiary would then write-off 18% of the total amount of any VAT refund due to it from the Ukrainian government. However when the VAT refund was actually made it would be at 100% of the total due. As the German subsidiary would have taken a write off of 18% of this total, the corresponding amount of money would be funneled to “third-party vendors so that nearly all of those monies could be provided to Ukrainian government officials.”

Fake Insurance Premiums

In an inventive bribery scheme, the Ukrainian subsidiary General Manager “organized a scheme through which ACTI Ukraine used a Ukrainian insurance company (the “Insurance Company”) to funnel improper payments to Ukrainian government officials. ACTI Ukraine arranged for the Insurance Company to falsely bill it for crop insurance, which the Insurance Company never intended to honor, adjusting the premiums to be roughly 20% of the VAT refund.” This bribery scheme succeeded in the face of email reports from the Ukrainian subsidiary to the German subsidiary that said “The contracts completed here, either sporadically or ad hoc, include no kind of insurance protection, but serve the purpose only of generating a commission for the VAT repayment in this manner. Regardless of the wording of the contract, the content is completely different. That means that in case of conflict, claims could not be made successfully.”

Discussion

The problems that ADM subsidiaries faced in the VAT refund issue is one faced by many companies in many countries. Governments usually have little incentive to timely or otherwise process tax refunds, especially in the amounts which ADM was seeking. From the SEC Compliant it does appear there is not any issue that ADM was seeking or did obtain VAT refunds that it was not entitled to receive, only that the Ukrainian tax authorities were sitting on these refunds. In other words, it may be construed that ADM was involved in a situation where it was paying bribes for something it was otherwise entitled to receive but as noted in the SEC Civil Complaint it that the company received VAT refunds “earlier than they otherwise would have.”

While I might disagree that by speeding up the process, the company obtained some unfair business advantage, I do believe that the payments can in any way be considered legal or otherwise in compliance with the FCPA. Simply considering the amounts of money involved and the false accounting entries are enough to show a FCPA violation. In many ways, I found the most interesting sentence in the SEC Civil Complaint to be the following, “ADM violated Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act by failing to maintain an adequate system of internal controls to detect and prevent the illicit payments.” The SEC Complaint expanded on this when it stated, “ADM failed to implement sufficient anti-bribery compliance policies and procedures, including oversight of third-party vendor transactions, to prevent these payments” at the German and Ukrainian subsidiaries. The message from the SEC Civil Complaint is that your compliance program must have both a prevent and detect component and if it does not, you are susceptible to a books and records violation, with a fine and profit disgorgement assessment.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

More Compliance Lessons from the Asiana/SFO Crash Investigation

I have long been interested in the intersection in the changes in attitude regarding safety in the workplace by corporations and the changing attitudes on doing business through bribery and corruption. As a trial lawyer defending corporations in catastrophic accident lawsuits, I saw a sea change in the corporate attitude regarding safety, beginning in the 1980s through the 1990s. Many of the arguments used against safety during that era are used now. Some of my favorites are: (the financial excuse) it costs too much and doesn’t contribute to the bottom line; (the traditional excuse) we’ve always done it that way; and (my personal favorite) you can’t stop humans from screwing up and trying to injure themselves. But the reality is that safety at the work place did improve and now most companies not only say that safety is job No. 1 but they live and breathe that motto. Does this sea change mean that serious accidents do not happen at the workplace? Of course not, but it does not mean that companies have or even should give up the quest for zero accidents at work.

Part of the ongoing debate about compliance is whether the Department of Justice (DOJ) approach of corporate enforcement actions and the use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) help or hurt compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Some commentators remark that the simple fact that there are enforcement actions is indicia itself that the DOJ approach is not working. Mike Volkov took on this topic in his post, entitled “The Sky is the Limit: Escalating Fines, DPA/NPAs and Deterrence”, by asking if “it is important to ask the question whether the current enforcement scheme adequately punishes and deters corporations”? In his discussion he points to some who want more prosecution of individuals as a greater deterrent and others, notably the FCPA Professor, who want greater corporate protections against prosecution through the addition of a compliance defense as a mechanism to give corporations more incentive to do business in compliance with the law. Volkov ends by observing the DOJ’s current enforcement focus “will not change unless and until there is a good reason to do so – so far no one has pointed to any significant reason for the Department of Justice to change its practices.”

I thought about all of the above in the context of the hearings in Washington in front of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) surrounding the crash of the Asiana jet at San Francisco’s airport last summer. Earlier this week I wrote about one of the lessons from the hearings which was the need for enhanced training by Asiana pilots on not only the specific planes they pilot but also training that they can speak up when they see something that they believe is not right.

This need for training was made even more acute when the story about the testimony given by the Captain on board the flight in question in a New York Times (NYT) article, entitled “Pilots in Crash Were Confused About Control Systems, Experts Say”, where Captain Lee said that he told investigators that any of the three pilots on the plane could have decided to break off the approach, but he said it was “very hard” for him to do so because he was a “low-level” person being supervised by an instructor pilot. But more than even the failure to raise his hand and speak up, Lee did not heed the warning of a junior officer. As reported in an article by the Associated Press, entitled “Pilot who crashed at SFO was worried about landing”, after the accident, Lee told NTSB investigators that neither he nor the instructor pilot onboard the flight said anything when the first officer raised concerns four times about the plane’s rapid descent. Further, he was very concerned about his ability to make a visual landing. So not only was Lee afraid to speak the truth to a superior, he didn’t listen when questioned by a junior. In the world of workplace or airline safety, this is a recipe for disaster.

I think the key to overcoming these problems is training, which has long been recognized as a cornerstone of any best practices ethics and compliance program. I thought it might be an appropriate time to review the training statements made regarding the FCPA. The US Sentencing Guidelines list “Conducting effective training programs” as one of the factors the DOJ will take into account when a company accused of a FCPA violation is being evaluated for a sentence reduction. The Sentencing Guidelines mandate:

(4) (A) The organization shall take reasonable steps to communicate periodically and in a practical manner its standards and procedures, and other aspects of the compliance and ethics program, to the individuals referred to in subdivision (B) by conducting effective training programs and otherwise disseminating information appropriate to such individuals’ respective roles and responsibilities. 

After the promulgation of the Sentencing Guidelines, the DOJ and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) gave their views on training in the 2012 FCPA Guidance. Their Ten Hallmarks of an Effective Compliance Program listed Training and Communication as one of the key elements. In this section they said that anti-corruption and anti-bribery compliance policies cannot work unless effectively communicated throughout a company. They advised that “a company has taken steps to ensure that relevant policies and procedures have been communicated throughout the organization, including through periodic training and certification for all directors, officers, relevant employees, and, where appropriate, agents and business partners.” But more than a simple dyadic promulgation of a rule, a company should tailor its training to its needs and its risks. This means that any “information should be presented in a manner appropriate for the targeted audience, including providing training and training materials in the local language.”

In addition to the FCPA Guidance, the UK Ministry of Justice (MOJ) has stated that training is one of the Six Principles of an effective compliance program. Under Principle V, it states that “The business seeks to ensure that its bribery prevention policies and procedures are embedded and understood throughout the company through internal and external communication, including training, that is proportionate to the risks it faces.” The Guidance recognizes that communication and training deters bribery by companies, their employees and those persons associated with it, by enhancing awareness and understanding anti-corruption policies and procedures and the company’s commitment to their proper application. It therefore follows that making information available on legal requirements, obligations and policies and procedures for implementation of the same assists in more effective monitoring, evaluation and review of bribery prevention procedures. Anti-bribery training should provide, to company employees and those persons and entities associated with the company, the knowledge and skills needed to implement and utilize the anti-bribery procedures and handle in a satisfactory manner any bribery related problems or issues that may arise.

Fortunately violations of the FCPA rarely result in loss of life or limb. But that does not diminish the responsibility of companies to comply with the law. And just as corporate attitudes around safety changed dramatically, corporate attitudes about following the FCPA can change as well. Indeed they could even take the basic approach suggested by (the then) DOJ representative Greg Anders in testimony about attempts to amend the FCPA before the House Judiciary Committee, don’t pay bribes.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

Edison, the Phonograph and Supply Chain Audits

Today we celebrate Thomas Edison. It is not his birthday but the 127^th anniversary of Edison announcing his first recording invention, the phonograph. According to This Day in History “Edison stumbled on one of his great inventions–the phonograph– while working on a way to record telephone communication at his laboratory in Menlo Park, New Jersey. His work led him to experiment with a stylus on a tinfoil cylinder, which, to his surprise, played back the short song he had recorded, “MARY HAD A LITTLE LAMB”. Public demonstrations of the phonograph made the Yankee inventor world famous, and he was dubbed the “Wizard of Menlo Park.”” For any audiophile, the phonograph was one of the greatest inventions of all-time.

I thought about Edison and the evolution of his invention in the context of how the audit requirement has been viewed under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). In my last corporate position, my company was at the cutting edge because we required compliance related audits for vendors in the supply chain. This was cutting edge in 2007-08. However, now an audit for adherence to FCPA compliance requirements has become a standard best practice in the management of business relationships with third party vendors which work with a company through the supply chain. In several settlements of enforcement actions through both Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPA) and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPA and, in last year’s FCPA Guidance, the Department of Justice (DOJ) made it clear that a best practices FCPA compliance program includes the right to conduct audits of the books and records of the agents, business partners and supplier or contractors to ensure compliance with the foregoing. Many companies have yet to begin their audit process for FCPA compliance on vendors in their supply chain. I thought this might be a good time to review some of the items you should consider in this area.

I.                   Right to Audit

Initially it should be noted that a company must obtain the right to audit for FCPA compliance in its contract with any third party vendor in the supply chain. Such an audit right should be a part of a company’s standard terms and conditions. A sample clause could include language such as the following:

The vendor shall permit, upon the request of and at sole discretion of the Company, audits by independent auditors acceptable to Company, and agree that such auditors shall have full and unrestricted access to, and to conduct reviews of, all records related to the work performed for, or services or equipment provided to, Company, and to report any violation of any of the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, UK Bribery Act or any other applicable laws and regulations, with respect to:

a.                  the effectiveness of existing compliance programs and codes of conduct;

b.                  the origin and legitimacy of any funds paid to Company;

c.                   its books, records and accounts, or those of any of its subsidiaries, joint ventures or affiliates, related to work performed for, or services or equipment provided to, Company;

d.                  all disbursements made for or on behalf of Company; and

e.                   all funds received from Company in connection with work performed for, or services or equipment provided to, Company.

II.                Structure of the Audit

 In the December 2010 issue of the Industrial Engineer Magazine, authors Aldowaisan and Ashkanai discussed the audit program utilized by the Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC) for its supply chain vendors. Although the focus of these audits is not to review FCPA compliance, the referenced audits are designed to detect and report incidents of non-compliance, which would also be the goal of a FCPA compliance audit. Utilizing ISO 19011 as the basis to set the parameters of an audit, the authors define an audit as a “systematic, independent and documented process for obtaining audit evidence and evaluating it objectively to determine the extent to which the audit criteria are fulfilled.” The authors list three factors, which they believe contribute to a successful audit: (1) an effective audit program which specifies all necessary activities for the audit; (2) having competent auditors in place; and (3) an organization that is committed to being audited. In a webinar hosted by Securities Docket, entitled “Follow the Money: Using Technology to Find Fraud or Defend Financial Investigations”, noted fraud examiner expert Tracy Coenen described the process as one to (1) capture the data; (2) analyze the data; and (3) report on the data.

There is no one specific list of transactions or other items which should be audited, however some of the audit best practices would suggest the following:

•  Review of contracts with supply chain vendors to confirm that the appropriate FCPA compliance terms and conditions are in place.
• Determine that actual due diligence took place on the third party vendor.
• Review FCPA compliance training program; both the substance of the program and attendance records.
• Does the third party vendor have a hotline or any other reporting mechanism for allegations of compliance violations? If so how are such reports maintained. Review any reports of compliance violations or issues that arose through anonymous, hotline or any other reporting mechanism.
• Does the third party vendor have written employee discipline procedures? If so have any employees been disciplined for any compliance violations? If yes review all relevant files relating to any such violations to determine the process used and the outcome reached.
• Review expense reports for employees in high risk positions or high risk countries.
• Testing for gifts, travel and entertainment which were provided to, or for, foreign governmental officials.
• Review the overall structure of the third party vendor’s compliance program. If the company has a designated compliance officer to whom, and how, does that compliance officer report? How is the third party vendor’s compliance program designed to identify risks and what has been the result of any so identified.
• Review a sample of employee commission payments and determine if they follow the internal policy and procedure of the third party vendor.
• With regard to any petty cash activity in foreign locations, review a sample of activity and apply analytical procedures and testing. Analyze the general ledger for high-risk transactions and cash advances and apply analytical procedures and testing.

III.             Conclusion

 As noted the above list is not exhaustive. For instance, there could be an audit focus on internal controls or segregation of duties (SODs). Any organization which audits a business partner in its supply chain should consult with legal, audit, financial and supply chain professionals to determine the full scope of the audit and a thorough and complete work plan should be created based upon all these professional inputs. At the conclusion of an audit, an audit report should be issued. This audit report should detail incidents of non-compliance with the FCPA compliance program and recommendations for improvements. Any reported incidents of non-compliance should reference the basis of any incidents of non-compliance such as contractual clauses, legal requirement or company policies.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

Why a Compliance Defense Will Not Make a Compliance Program Effective

Ed. Note – this week, I am pleased to join my colleagues David Simon, partner at Foley & Lardner LLP, and William ‘Bill’ C. Athanas, partner at Waller Lansden Dortch & Davis, LLP, in a tripartite debate on the efficacy of the affirmative defense of a compliance program to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Today, I will present my views, from the perspective of a former in-house counsel, on why a compliance defense would not help to create greater compliance with the FCPA. Tomorrow, David will discuss his views, from the perspective a white collar defense practitioner, on why a compliance defense under the FCPA would foster greater compliance with the Act. And finally, on Friday, Bill will present his views as a former Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecutor. I hope that you will enjoy our debate.

My starting position is that I do not believe a compliance defense would be effective in giving companies additional clarity or comfort in the design or implementation of their anti-corruption compliance program.  I also think that a compliance defense could lead to unintended and adverse consequences that could seriously downgrade the effectiveness of anti-corruption programs.

I.                   Current Credit in Place

Currently there is credit for an effective compliance, as set out in the DOJ’s prosecution guidelines; the “Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations”, which is the DOJ’s policy on the factors it considers when instigating a prosecution of a company, it includes a requirement that prosecutors consider “the existence and effectiveness of the corporation’s pre-existing compliance program.” These factors have been borne out in the numerous Declinations to Prosecute granted over the years. While only one of these Declinations, the Morgan Stanley Declination, has been publicly announced, there were six Declinations listed in last year’s FCPA Guidance, with the company identifiers removed. All of this information makes clear that the DOJ currently takes the state and effectiveness of a compliance program into account when making a decision.

II.                Trial Lawyers v. Corporations

Both of the two gents I am debating with this week are trial lawyers and I am a recovering trial lawyer. A trial lawyer’s job is to try cases. If you do not want to go to the courthouse, you should not consider yourself to be a trial lawyer. I grew up in a litigation system where there was one lawyer per side at trail. Mano-y-Mano; the two gunslingers on Main Street at High Noon, the King’s Champion – single combat warriors sent out to do battle in the courtroom for their clients. Such is the job of the trial lawyer. Trial lawyers are risk takers and will to push the envelope in front of a judge or jury. If you claim to be a trial lawyer and never go to court it will not instill any fear or much respect from your opposition. You may even turn into a laughingstock. It does not matter how big a jerk you can be in discovery and pre-trial pleading practice, if you are afraid to go to trial, you are useless as a trail lawyer.

Just as trial lawyers are made for trials corporations are not. Corporations do not and will not go to trial in FCPA cases because it is not in their interest to do so. So if a corporation will not go to trial, a compliance defense has as much use as a trail lawyer afraid of the courtroom, in other words it is useless. There are a myriad of reasons that it is not the job of a company to go to trial but I will focus on two: (1) certainty; and (2) the “Arthur Anderson” effect.

A.     Certainty

The primary reason for a company, which violates the FCPA, entering into a settlement via a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA), Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) or other vehicle, is certainty. The one thing I learned in almost 20 years of trying cases in the US (civil side only) is that nothing is certain when you leave the final decision to an ultimate trier of fact who is not yourself, whether that trier of fact be a jury, judge or arbitrator. The most important thing for a company is certainty and that is even more paramount when a potential criminal conviction looms over its corporate head. Certainty is equally critical for the prosecution. No matter how ‘slam dunk’ the facts are, or appear to be, once a prosecutor turns over the final decision to another trier of fact; the prosecution has also lost certainty in the final decision. Every corporate defendant that goes to trial can, and should, raise all procedural and factual defenses available to it. No prosecutor can ever be 100% certain that it will win every court ruling or that a guilty conviction will be upheld on appeal. However, a settlement brings certainty and for a company that certainty is in its rights and obligations and for the prosecution the same is true.

B.     The Arthur Anderson Effect

Arthur Anderson was the auditor for Enron Corporation (Enron). Neither Enron nor Arthur Anderson exists today. The reason that Enron no longer exists is that it was guilty of unsustainable fraud. The reason Arthur Anderson no longer exists is that it destroyed documents relating to its auditing services for that unsustainable fraud – Enron; primarily for countenancing in and/or not detecting the fraud. Arthur Anderson was convicted for these actions. It is of no matter that the verdict was overturned on appeal.

My former This Week in FCPA podcast partner, Howard Sklar, wrote in a piece for forbes.com entitled “Against a FCPA Compliance Defense”, that “Corporations cannot afford to fight these cases through to the stage where an affirmative defense becomes relevant.” He quoted Doug Bain, the former General Counsel (GC) of Boeing Co., for the effect on Boeing if it were to be indicted:

So what’s the impact if we get indicted or convicted?

Besides the normal fines and that kind of stuff, there’s a presumed denial of export licenses, and that would be both on the commercial and the government side. In a moment, I’ll give you an idea of why we are concerned about that one.

We can get re-suspended or all of IDS (Integrated Defense Systems) can be debarred.

We can lose our security clearances.

And one nasty little thing is that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, which has an almost explicit prohibition on possessing explosives. For those of you who are at BCA [Boeing Commercial Airplanes], you might remember that every single door on an airplane has actuators that are triggered by explosives.

Other commentators have attempted to demonstrate quantitatively that the Arthur Anderson effect is not correct. While I do not agree with their analysis, even if I did, simply running the numbers misses the point. Corporate counsel are not trial lawyers, they are in-house corporate counsel. Their job is not to be gunslingers but to protect and preserve the corporation for its stakeholders. So, by their nature, they tend to be less of a risk-taker than trial lawyers and can be more conservative. This difference in philosophy plays out in the following question: Do you want to be the first GC to go to trial and find that the Arthur Anderson effect is real? Or do you want to settle and play it safe? And, of course, as Sklar notes “Even if a company wins eventually, oftentimes the damage is done: see, e.g., Arthur Andersen.”

The value of a compliance defense is suggested in the name, ‘defense’. It is only useful if it is raised as an affirmative defense at trial. If a company says, ‘we have a compliance defense, you cannot get to us’ a rational response from the prosecutors might be, ‘OK, let’s go to trial.’ There would be no credit for an effective compliance program in any settlement discussion because there would not be any settlement. More pointedly, it might make the DOJ even more aggressive in negotiations because they could simply take the position that a company must now prove it had a compliance program and that the compliance program was effective. How many compliance programs could stand the detailed scrutiny which would occur in a criminal case or in civil pretrial discovery? Every company has documents which discuss the areas in which the program is not fully effective. They would certainly be found in discovery. Lastly, no honest compliance officer could ever say that a program is fully “effective.”

Moreover, how would a company prove to a jury that it had an effective compliance program? Bring in an expert to say that simply because a rogue employee, group of rogue employees or entire country sales team paid out multi-million dollars in bribes that we did not detect, we still have an effective compliance program. Remember, both GlaxoSmithKline PLC (GSK) and Wal-Mart claimed to have world class, best practices compliance programs.

III.             Two Recent Examples – GSK and Wal-Mart

 A.     GSK

Consider the following about GSK, a little over one year ago, in July of 2012; GSK pled guilty and paid $3 billion to resolve fraud allegations and failure to report safety data in what the DOJ called the “largest health care fraud settlement in U.S. history”. You would think that any company which has paid $3 billion in fines and penalties for fraudulent actions would take all steps possible not to engage in bribery and corruption. Indeed, as part of the settlement GSK agreed to a Corporate Integrity Agreement (CIA). This CIA not only applied to the specific pharmaceutical regulations that GSK violated but all of the GSK compliance obligations, including the FCPA.

In addition to requiring a full and complete compliance program, the CIA specified that the company would have a Compliance Committee, inclusive of the Compliance Officer and other members of senior management necessary to meet the requirements of this CIA, whose job was to oversee full implementation of the CIA and all compliance functions at the company. These additional functions required Deputy Compliance Officers for each commercial business unit, Integrity Champions within each business unit and management accountability and certifications from each business unit. Training of GSK employees was specified. Further, there was detail down to specifically state that all compliance obligations applied to “contractors, subcontractors, agents and other persons (including, but not limited to, third party vendors)”. How would you say all of the above helped GSK make its anti-corruption compliance program effective?

B.    Wal-Mart

Wal-Mart prided itself on its world-wide FCPA anti-corruption compliance program. Its ethics policy offered this clear direction, “Never cover up or ignore an ethics problem”.  What do you think a compliance defense would do for Wal-Mart about now? Do these facts seem like a rogue employee or even junta of rogue Mexican employees going off on their own? And what if Wal-Mart’s corporate headquarters in Bentonville AR was not involved in any illegal conduct or even kept in the dark by Wal-Mart de Mexico? What does that say about having an effective compliance program?

How do these two investigations portend the end of efforts to add a compliance defense to the FCPA? As stated in its Code of Conduct, “The GSK attitude towards corruption in all its forms is simple: it is one of zero tolerance.” and Wal-Mart stated “Never cover up or ignore an ethics problem.” What do you think a compliance defense would do for these two companies in trial? The claim that companies would act more ethically and in compliance if they could rely on a compliance defense would seem to be negated by facts reported about GSK and Wal-Mart. It certainly appears that having a best practice compliance program did not lead to either company doing business more ethically.

IV.              False Sense of Security

I also think that the compliance defense would give companies a false sense of security that, combined with other recent regulations, can seriously degrade internal risk management. In an article in the summer 2013 issue of the MIT Sloan Management Review, entitled “Designing Trustworthy Organizations”, by the quartet of authors: Robert F. Hurley, Nicole Gillespie, Donald L. Ferrin and Graham Dietz; they addressed this issue. Their comments seem directly on point for our debate when they intone that that external government regulation, such as a as compliance program required under the FCPA, could be a helpful starting point; but it is not the complete answer in the construction of an ethical organization and one which does business in compliance with relevant anti-corruption legislation, such as the FCPA. That is because such legal requirements can only set a minimum standard. Further, such a reliance on a paper program of compliance could well give organizations “a false sense of security that can lull them and their stakeholders into complacency.” This is the current position of the DOJ in giving credit to companies which have an effective compliance program, rather than simply a paper compliance program.

I think that the DOJ gives credit when a compliance program is effective. While the best practices have clearly evolved, it is not difficult to fully understand what the DOJ considers best practices. But, at the end of the day, the compliance defense will not help a company because no company will go to trial and face a fraud finding from a jury. It is always better to settle and obtain certainty than to risk everything.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

Significant FCPA Enforcement Actions in 2013 – Corporate

Last week I used the 150^th anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg as a prism to look at present day compliance issues. Today I want to go in a different direction to introduce today’s topic. Jim Hudson died last week. Hudson was perhaps the lesser known of three football players whose lives intersected in an unusual arc. Hudson played professional football for the New York Jets and is best remembered for intercepting a pass by Earl Morral near the end of the first half of Super Bowl III, where the Jets upset the heavily favored Baltimore Colts. But here in Texas, Hudson is remembered for two things. The first is as a starting defensive back on the first NCAA national football championship team for the Texas Longhorns in 1963. The second is that he came off the bench to throw the winning touchdown pass to receiver George Sauer, when the Longhorns beat the Number 1 ranked, and previously undefeated, University of Alabama, on January 1, 1965 in the Orange Bowl. The quarterback of the Crimson Tide was Joe Namath. Hudson joined Namath and Sauer on the Super Bowl winning Jets team against the Colts.

So today I want to begin looking at some of the lessons learned from the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement actions through the first half of 2013, I will start with reviewing the significant corporate enforcement actions and tomorrow I will  review individual prosecutions and arrests to date in 2013.

I.                   Corporate

A.     Total

As reported by both the FCPA Blog and the FCPA Professor, Total SA engaged in a nearly decade long, breathtaking bribery scheme. In this scheme, Total paid approximately $60MM to an un-named Iranian Official of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), who steered two major projects Total’s way. According to the FCPA Professor, in a post entitled “Total Agrees To Pay $398 Million To Resolve Its FCPA Scrutiny”, the Iranian Official in question was described in the Information as “the Chairman of an Iranian engineering company that was more than 90% owned by the Government of Iran and substantially controlled by the Government of Iran.” The projects for which Total paid the bribes were the Sirri A and E oil and gas fields and South Pars gas field.

In a blog post entitled “Total SA pays $398 million to settle U.S. bribe charges” the FCPA Blog reported that “In the fourth biggest FCPA case ever, French oil giant Total S.A. agreed Wednesday to pay $398 million in penalties and disgorgement for bribing an Iran official to gain access to oil and gas fields. Total will pay a criminal penalty to the Department of Justice (DOJ) of $245.2 million. In its settlement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Total will disgorge profits of $153 million.” For those of you keeping score at home that is Number 4 on the list of greatest FCPA fines in the history of the world and Number 2 on the list of the biggest profit disgorgements in FCPA history. Total also received a three-year Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) that requires appointment of an independent compliance monitor. A separate requirement for a monitor was set out in Total’s settlement with the SEC.

B.     Parker Drilling

The company was involved in a bribery scheme to pay-off judges in a Nigerian Tax Court to allow Parker Drilling to pay lower than warranted tax assessments for its drilling rigs in the country. This bribery scheme was alleged to have involved the following persons employed at or associated with Parker Drilling: (1) a U.S. citizen based in Nigeria who, during the relevant time period, was the General Manager of Parker Drilling’s operations in Nigeria; (b) a U.S. citizen based in Nigeria who also was a General Manager of Parker Drilling’s Operations in Nigeria; (c) a Houston based executive of the company, who performed financial and compliance functions for Parker Drilling between 2002 through 2005; (d) another Houston based executive of the company who performed a legal function for Parker Drilling; and (e) the company’s outside counsel.

Due to its efforts to create a gold standard compliance program all the while undergoing its own internal investigation, Parker Drilling’s conduct earned it an “approximately 20 percent reduction off the bottom of the fine range” which suggested a fine of between $14.7MM to $29.4MM. The final DOJ fine was $11,760,000. The company also agreed to pay disgorgement of $3,050MM plus pre-judgment interest of $1,040,818, to the SEC. According to its DPA, “the Company has engaged in extensive remediation, including ending its business relationships with officers, employees, or agents primarily responsible for the corrupt payments, enhancing its due diligence protocol for third-party agents and consultants, increasing training and testing requirements, and instituting heightened review of proposals and other transactional documents for all the Company’s contracts.” Parker Drilling also hired “a fulltime Chief Compliance Officer and Counsel who reports to the Chief Executive Officer and Audit Committee, as well as staff to assist the Chief Compliance Officer and Counsel.” Lastly, the Company worked to strengthen its internal controls.

The underlying facts of Parker Drilling are about as bad as it can get. The company had corporate head office involvement in the bribery scheme. Further, the company did not self-disclose to the DOJ, yet, they were able to obtain a significant reduction in the overall fine and penalties from the sentencing range. Additionally the company was not required to have an external monitor. The message here is that a strong effort during the pendency of an investigation does pay off with the final result.

C.     Ralph Lauren

The Ralph Lauren Company received Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPA) granted by the SEC and DOJ. The illegal conduct at issue related to its Argentinian subsidiary and efforts by the General Manager of that operation, who conspired with a customs clearance agency to make payments “to assist in improperly obtaining paperwork necessary for goods to clear customs, to permit clearance of items without the necessary paperwork, to permit the clearance of prohibited items, and to avoid inspection.” For its conduct, Ralph Lauren agreed to pay $882K to the DOJ and $593K in disgorgement and $141K in pre-judgment interest to the SEC.

The DOJ detailed the company’s conduct by stating that “the Company’s extensive, thorough, and real-time cooperation with the Department, including conducting an internal investigation, voluntarily making employees available for interviews, making voluntary document disclosures, conducting a world-wide risk assessment, and making multiple presentations to the Department on the status and findings of the internal investigation and the risk assessment”.

This past spring I was on a panel with representatives from both the DOJ and SEC who discussed the Ralph Lauren enforcement action. They indicated that the company uncovered the bribery scheme during its first round of training, after the company’s initial implementation of its FCPA compliance program. This fact points out two key lessons to be learned. The first is that a company can discover many things about its compliance with the FCPA during live training. The second is that early detection and remediation can lead to a significant reduction in fines and penalties.

I believe that these corporate enforcement actions make clear that a company’s actions during the pendency of the investigation, in addition to the underlying FCPA violations, will be evaluated and assessed to determine the final penalty. The DOJ and SEC continue to communicate not only what they believe constitutes a best practices compliance program but equally importantly what actions a company can engage in which will significantly reduce a company’s overall fine and penalty. Both the DOJ and SEC continue to communicate, through their enforcement actions, to the compliance practitioner what they expect from companies in the way of a best practices compliance program and what a company should do if they discover a potential FCPA violation. These communications, through enforcement actions, DPAs, NPAs and Declinations, are consistent with the information provided by the DOJ/SEC in the FCPA Guidance. These enforcement actions demonstrate that if a company gets ahead of the curve, it can significantly lessen its overall penalty and pain.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

DPAs and NPAs – Useful Tools to Achieve Compliance

The debate on whether the use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) has become lively again over the past couple of weeks. Last week, there was a panel hosted by the Corporate Crime Reporter conference at the National Press Club. The panel was moderated by Steven Fagell, a partner at Covington & Burling LLP, and the panelists included Denis McInerney, the Criminal Division’s Deputy Assistant Attorney General, David Uhlmann, the former chief of the Environmental Crimes Section at the Department of Justice (DOJ), and currently a Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, the FCPA Professor, Michael Koehler, Kathleen Harris, a partner at Arnold & Porter LLP in London, and Anthony Barkow, a partner at Jenner & Block in New York.

The FCPA Professor wrote about the conference in two posts this week. The second post, entitled “Seeing the Light from the ‘Dark Ages’”, reported on the panel discussion. In this post, the Professor flatly says that DPAs and NPAs should be abolished in the context of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement and that a compliance defense should be added to the FCPA. In the other corner stands Mike Volkov, who said in a recent post, entitled “The Continuing Controversy Over DPAs and NPAs”, that DPAs and NPAs are part of the growing arsenal of prosecutorial tools that can be brought to bear by the DOJ and now the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

The Professor previously articulated his views against DPAs and NPAs last fall in a post entitled “Assistant Attorney General Breuer’s Unconvincing Defense Of DPAs / NPAs”. In that post he said that the “use of NPAs or DPAs allow “under-prosecution” of egregious instance of corporate conduct while at the same time facilitate the “over-prosecution” of business conduct.” The ‘under-prosecution’ comes “because they [DPAs and NPAs] do not result in any actual charges filed against a company, and thus do not require the company to plead to any charges, allow egregious instances of corporate conduct to be resolved too lightly without adequate sanctions and without achieving maximum deterrence.” The ‘over-prosecution’ comes “because of the “carrots” and “sticks’ relevant to resolving a DOJ enforcement action often nudge companies to agree to these vehicles for reasons of risk-aversion and efficiency and not necessarily because the conduct at issue actually violates the law.” Volkov, being a former prosecutor, says that “Prosecutors like to have a variety of tools. An up or down decision system – indict or decline to indict – does not give prosecutors any ability to address the hard cases, where they are more inclined to decline prosecution rather than indict.”

However, I am neither a former prosecutor, like Volkov, nor a former white collar defense lawyer, like the Professor. I am a recovering trial lawyer who then went in-house. From this background I think that there is another line of reasoning as to why DPAs and NPAs are useful FCPA compliance enforcement tools and that line of reasoning is certainty. The primary reason for the prosecution and a company entering into a DPA/NPA is certainty. The one thing I learned in almost 20 years of trying cases is that nothing is certain when you leave the final decision to an ultimate trier of fact who is not yourself, whether that trier of fact be a jury, judge or arbitrator. The most important thing for a company is certainty and that is even more paramount when a potential criminal conviction looms over its corporate head. Certainty is equally critical for the prosecution. No matter how ‘slam dunk’ the facts are, or appear to be, once a prosecutor turns over the final decision in a case to another trier of fact; the prosecution has lost certainty in the final decision. Every corporate defendant who goes to trial can and should raise all procedural and factual defenses available to it. No prosecutor can ever be 100% certain that it will win every court ruling or that a guilty conviction will be upheld on appeal. However, a DPA/NPA can bring certainty. For a company, certainty in its rights and obligations, for the prosecution the same is true.

There was another article which considered the panel discussion held at the Corporate Crime Reporter conference entitled “McInerney Defends Deferred and Non Prosecution Agreements”. This article included quotes from David Uhlmann, who said that he believes, “This is about a profound ambivalence in parts of the Department about the very notion of corporate criminality.” Uhlmann believes that it this ambivalence which has driven the use of DPAs. He believes that the DOJ should make an “up or down” decision on whether a corporation should be prosecuted or not. He was quoted as saying “There is no more important role that the Justice Department plays than its role investigating and prosecuting crime. And if the Justice Department believes that a particular case warrants criminal prosecution, it should bring criminal charges. It should not sacrifice criminal prosecution to a private agreement never entered in court, never overseen by a judge in any meaningful way that doesn’t involve any public hearing, that doesn’t involve any corporate officials coming into the courtroom admitting guilt. On the other hand, if the Justice Department doesn’t believe that a criminal prosecution is necessary or warranted, then they should decline. They should decline prosecution in favor of — in most cases they have the option of civil or administrative enforcement.”

The Professor had a slightly different take on the use of DPAs in the context of criminal prosecutions of corporations. He was quoted as saying, “The Department has become so uncomfortable with the traditional notions of corporate criminal liability that they have constructed and indeed championed this alternative reality that is equally problematic.” Further, “These resolutions have had a troubling, distortive and toxic effect on this one area of law,” Koehler concluded. “There is no judicial scrutiny of most fcpa enforcement theories.” And, lastly, “Of course, the Justice Department is in favor of these because it makes their job easier. Of course, the FCPA bar and FCPA Inc. is in favor of these it expands the market for legal services.”

Criminal Division Deputy Assistant Attorney General McInerney made clear that he is not ambivalent at all about corporate criminal liability and specifically stated this. So let me speak from the perspective of a lawyer from Houston, who has represented companies in the energy space for quite some time. The frustration that boiled over from the lack of prosecutions regarding the financial troubles of the recent years should not obscure the fact that the DOJ has and will continue to pursue criminal cases against corporations.

But to paraphrase Joe Jackson, something else is going on ‘round here with prosecutions of corporate criminal conduct and the use of DPAs/NPAs. While one role of the DOJ is to prosecute law breakers; I believe that another role of the DOJ is to increase and encourage compliance with laws. The DPA/NPA debate does not stand in a vacuum. I believe that by offering incentives for companies to self-disclose and cooperate, the DOJ is increasing compliance with the FCPA. If there is no incentive to cooperate, there will be none. Period. If a company will face a criminal indictment or charge if it investigates a matter and self-discloses to the DOJ, how many companies will do so? McInerney was quoted as saying, “You are disincentivizing companies in terms of doing the right thing. You are not crediting companies for doing the right thing.”

Now let me take the flip side; Arthur Anderson. For all the howls that there is no empirical evidence that indicting and convicting companies puts them out of business; I am certainly not persuaded. I saw it happen, here in Houston. Was it in the interest of the US government to put Arthur Anderson out of business? Did it further the policies of this country to go from the Big Four to the Big Three? What about all the Arthur Anderson employees who did not work on the Enron account, what policy did it further to have them lose everything they invested in their professional life? If DPAs/NPAs are less draconian in their effect than destruction of a corporation’s existence, does that make them somehow less useful? If the DOJ wants to put such a factor into their decision making, I find that to be an appropriate calculus.

As to the charge that the FCPA Bar/FCPA Inc. used DPAs/NPAs to expand their market for work? [Full disclosure – I am a member of the FCPA Bar and ergo, FCPA Inc.] I think that it is the job of a lawyer to advise his or her clients on their legal obligations and to assist in fulfilling those obligations. Is it in my own myopic self-interest to advocate compliance with the FCPA? Or am I a part of the FCPA Bar and Inc. which assists companies to comply with a now 35 year old law? Whichever answer you prefer, I believe that there is more compliance now and that the use of DPAs/NPAs is a contributing factor to this increased compliance.

Another panelist, Anthony Barkow posited yet another angle. He said “one the primary policy justifications — or certainly a significant policy justification — is — getting DPAs and NPAs is easy. “It’s a lot easier than charging a company,”” Barkow said. “And it’s a lot easier than charging it and to try to get a plea.” While I do not pretend to know the intricacies of obtaining an indictment or going before a grand jury, it is always easier to settle something rather than try a case. But that does not mean any less work goes on, either from the corporate side or especially from the government side. FCPA enforcement actions are huge, document intensive cases and from what little I know of the process, the DOJ works quite hard to craft an appropriate resolution for each case. Further, there are multiple levels of review in the DOJ so many sets of eyes look at these matters. So while it may be easier to reach a resolution rather than charging and criminally trying a corporation, that does not mean in any way, shape or form that this work is easy. The work is hard, time intensive and takes literally thousands of man-hours by all parties involved to reach any resolution. Simply because a new enforcement tool is available, which is short of a criminal indictment and trial, does not mean that it is not a useful tool and should not be used.

Mike Volkov ended his post with the following, “The debate will continue – I have no doubt of that.” I would certainly second that notion. But from where I sit the use of DPAs/NPAs has improved compliance with the FCPA because their use has given corporations a real incentive to thoroughly investigate allegations of bribery and corruption and then work with the government to appropriately remediate the situation.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013