The War of 1812 and the IAP Worldwide Services Non-Prosecution Agreement

On this day, 203 years ago, President James Madison signed a Declaration of War against Great Britain inaugurating the War of 1812. The cause of the war was multi-faceted; the formal reason given was the British impressment of American sailors and the economic blockade of Europe. But the real reason may have simply been the warmongers who had been agitating for war against Britain for several years as an excuse to attack (and hopefully take over) Canada. For those of you who did not study geography too closely, that latter hope was forlorn as Canadians twice repulsed American invasions during the war.

That does not mean the War of 1812 was ultimately unsuccessful for the ‘War Hawks’. America got two great songs out of the war. The first was our National Anthem, the Star Spangled Banner, which celebrated victory over the British at Baltimore. The second was the top hit single of 1959, The Battle of New Orleans, which celebrated Andrew Jackson’s defeat of the British in the Battle of New Orleans, which was fought after the signing of the peace treaty that ended the war. Also that peace treaty, which America and Great Britain signed has remained unbroken to this day.

I thought about this view of the results of the War of 1812 when I read the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement action involving IAP Worldwide Services, Inc. (“IAP” or “the company”) and its former Vice President (VP), James Rama. The company received a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) as a result of the enforcement action but agreed to a fine of $7.1MM. Rama pled guilty to a single count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and is awaiting sentencing but his sentence will be capped out at “five years of imprisonment, a fine of the greater of $250,000 or twice the gross gain or loss, full restitution, a special assessment, and three years of supervised release” according to his Plea Agreement.

What it is difficult to determine from the company NPA and Rama Plea Agreement is what conduct the company engaged in which led to the NPA because clearly both the company and Rama engaged in conduct that violated the FCPA. In its Press Release the Department of Justice (DOJ) said, “Based on a variety of factors, including but not limited to IAP’s cooperation, the Criminal Division entered into a non-prosecution agreement with the company.” In the NPA these factors were given some meat with the following boilerplate language, “(a) the Company has cooperated with the Offices, including conducting an extensive internal investigation, voluntarily making U.S. and foreign employees available for interviews, and collecting, analyzing, and organizing voluminous evidence and information for the Offices; (b) the Company has engaged in remediation, including disciplining the officers and employees responsible for the corrupt payments or terminating their employment, enhancing its due diligence protocol for third-party agents and consultants, and instituting heightened review of proposals and other transactional documents for relevant Company contracts; (c) the Company has committed to continue to enhance its compliance program and internal controls, including ensuring that its compliance program satisfies the minimum elements set forth in Attachment C to this Agreement; and (d) the Company has agreed to continue to cooperate with the Offices in any ongoing investigation of the conduct of the Company and its officers, directors, employees, agents, and consultants relating to possible violations under investigation by the Offices.”

Since I cannot determine from beyond the above description what the company did to achieve its NPA, I will use the same analysis that I did in ascertaining what we Americans got out of the War of 1812. For the NPA did go into detail about the bribery scheme used by the company and Rama, which were clearly violative of the FCPA. Rama was a VP of the company until he signed and became an independent contractor to the organization, through his consulting entity, Ramaco. Ramaco was created, in part, to hide the involvement of IAP in the bidding process with the Kuwaiti Ministry of the Interior to provide nationwide surveillance for the country.

The bid for this project had two phases. In Phase I, a consultant would assist the Kuwaiti government to select the final contractor who would implement the nationwide surveillance for the country in Phase II. By hiding its involvement through Ramaco, IAP could reap the benefits of winning both phases, which it did. However the illegals acts of IAP and Ramaco did not end with this subterfuge but were in fact just beginning.

The Phase I contract awarded to Ramaco was worth $4MM. IAP and Ramaco agreed to rebate one-half of the amount, through a Kuwaiti third party agent back to certain representatives of the Kuwaiti government as bribe payments. In addition to this 50% figure of the contract price, IAP and Ramaco understood that this Kuwaiti third party contractor would “inflate its invoices to IAP by charging IAP for the total amount of both the legitimate services that Kuwaiti Company was providing and the payments that Kuwaiti Company was funneling to Kuwaiti Consultant without listing or otherwise disclosing the payments that were funneled to Kuwaiti Consultant.” According to the NPA, these monies were specifically “provided as bribes to Kuwaiti government officials to assist IAP in obtaining and retaining the KSP Phase I contract and to obtain the Phase II contract.”

The NPA also specified meetings which were held in the company’s headquarters in Arlington VA and that monies to be paid as bribes were wired out of a company bank account in the US to Kuwait.

All of these facts would lead me to opine that this case was egregious. There was a US company, setting up a scheme to pay bribes through both a US person, who was a former employee, and a foreign third party agent. Meetings to facilitate the scheme were held in the US and monies to fund bribes were wired out of a US bank account. There was nothing reported in the NPA which indicated that the company self-disclosed this FCPA violation. While there were statements of cooperation and remediation going forward, there was nothing other than the standard boilerplate language generally seen in NPAs.

So while the NPA does provide the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) or compliance practitioner a good set of facts to test against in their organization, that would appear to be about it. Other than, of course, it is always better to cooperate than not. So much like what we Americans got out of the War of 1812, not much substance can be ascertained from the company’s NPA and Rama’s Plea Agreement.

For a YouTube clip of Johnny Horton singing The Battle of New Orleans, on the Ed Sullivan Show, click here.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2015

Senn Interview, Part III – Post Incident Remediation

I conclude my three-part series based upon my podcast interview of noted white-collar defense lawyer and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) practitioner Mara Senn, a partner at Arnold & Porter LLP. In Part I, I considered Senn’s thoughts on conducting internal investigations. In Part II, I looked at Senn’s decision-making calculus around the decision to self-disclose if you have determined that a potential FCPA violation existed. Today, I consider her thoughts on what steps a company should take if it comes to the decision not to self-report a potential FCPA violation. These include the remediation of potential or actual conduct that might arguably violate the FCPA and the actions you should take on an ongoing basis.

One of the things Senn made clear is that whether you decide to self-disclose or not, your company must fully remediate the issue which led to that. She suggested that a company should act as if they will draw government scrutiny. She said, “the best way to go about it is to assume, act as if, the government is breathing down their necks on this very issue and fully remediate. The nice thing is they can decide what that means, fully remediate.”

I inquired as to whether that meant a systemic look at the company’s operations on a global, worldwide basis, particularly in view of Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell’s recent admonition not to ‘boil the ocean’ in the context of your FCPA internal investigation. Senn replied, “It used to be that in the government’s view, fully remediating meant go to 10 different countries, even if there’s no suspicion of any activity going on, just to make sure that everything’s okay. They’re now backing away from that, and in fact, they’re saying that the private sector is the one who started that whole trend, which is not quite consistent with history.”

Recognizing that there is always a risk that the government will come knocking, either via a whistleblower or other mechanism, Senn replied, “you want to be squeaky clean, so that when the government comes to you, if in the future, like a year down the line, you have another problem or the government has a whistleblower or whatever, that you can say, look, in our opinion, we did an analysis, and we thought it was not necessary to self-disclose. On the other hand, we were horrified and very upset by the fact that this potential infraction happened on our watch, and we’ve done the following 5 things, and we’ve remediated.”

She went on to explain, “What you want to do is show to the government, “We understand the problems that caused this, and we got to the root of it. Either it’s a bad apple, and we got rid of that bad apple, or it was really a failure of compliance structures, and we’ve fixed that part of the compliance structures. In fact, we’ve added more, just to double check and make sure that in this particular area or similar areas, depending on what it is, we will detect, prevent, and if we detect something, we will remediate.” They, the government, can feel comfortable that you did what they would have asked you to do anyways. That doesn’t always have to be onerous, sometimes it is depending on the scope of the issue, but that’s what I would say about that.”

Senn listed several actions that a company could engage in to demonstrate that it had taken solid remediation steps. Obviously, a company can “bulk up its compliance program.” But she added that it is important that a company demonstrate action taken against the nefarious party or parties. A company can discipline up to and including discharge. But do not forget lesser forms of discipline including docking pay or suspension without pay or other steps short of termination. I would add that you should consider the FCPA Guidance on this final point where it notes, “A compliance program should apply from the board room to the supply room—no one should be beyond its reach. DOJ and SEC will thus consider whether, when enforcing a compliance program, a company has appropriate and clear disciplinary procedures, whether those procedures are applied reliably and promptly, and whether they are commensurate with the violation.” [emphasis supplied]

Yet more than simply remediating an issue or even violation, Senn believes that a company should work to stay on top of its program thereafter. Certainly if you agree to a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) or Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA), your company will either have an external monitor or reporting obligation to the Department of Justice (DOJ) going forward.

I asked her about ongoing monitoring of your compliance program; both the enhancements you might put in place to remedy generally and the specific issues that caused the problem initially. Senn agreed that is an important step going forward, she stated, “Absolutely, but I think that the monitoring requirement has now essentially expanded to the whole program. The government really expects you now to be having ongoing improvement and ongoing monitoring, so it’s not like you put in a policy 3 years ago and don’t do anything and then assume it’s okay. I think maybe you would put in a special extra audit or something like that on that particular situation, but really you should have in your compliance program an overall monitoring function that allows you to do that for all of your programs to various levels and various degrees. Yes, I think so, but it may not be as intensive as your typical external monitor, because you’re going to be integrating that into a program that’s really more holistic than just checking on that one thing. You’re going to be checking on a system-wide basis.”

Clearly this position was articulated in the FCPA Guidance as Hallmark Nine of an Effective Compliance Program. The Guidance states, “An organization should take the time to review and test its controls, and it should think critically about its potential weaknesses and risk areas.” The Guidance ended this Hallmark by stating, “Although the nature and the frequency of proactive evaluations may vary depending on the size and complexity of an organization, the idea behind such efforts is the same: continuous improvement and sustainability.”

To listen to the full Mara Senn interview, go to the FCPA Compliance and Ethics Report, by clicking here, or download it from iTunes.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2015

Who is Responsible for Complying with the FCPA?

The Department of Justice (DOJ) still faces criticism over its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement strategy. Some decry that it is too aggressive, that the DOJ has moved into waters Congress never intended the DOJ to navigate into regarding the FCPA. Others worry that the DOJ, through its use of settlement mechanisms such as Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements (DPAs and NPAs), let corporations off to easily with fines and other monetary penalties being the equivalent of a slap on the wrist. Yet another school of thought says that it is up to the DOJ to tell companies how not to engage in bribery and corruption by specifying precisely what type of anti-corruption compliance program to put into effect.

One thing these commentariat all have in common is that they generally do not look to those responsible for obeying the law, i.e. companies and persons who are subject to the FCPA, for their responsibility of complying with the law. Such failure seems to me to be sadly misplaced. But it is not simply Mike Volkov’s FCPA Paparazzi who fail to assess a corporation’s role in their failure to comply with the law; unfortunately it is also company leaders themselves.

We recently were treated to another such display of ‘What Me Worry?’ mentality by HSBC Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Stuart Gulliver when he said, “Can I know what every one of 257,000 people is doing?” Leaving aside the issue of whether a corporate CEO who has signed one of the largest DPAs in the history of the world (for money-laundering, not FCPA violations); should admit he (1) he doesn’t care or (2) his company is too unwieldy for it to obey the laws that you and I follow everyday; Gulliver inadvertently hit upon one of the key concepts of a best practices compliance program. That concept is a well-rounded program that assures compliance, not some all knowing, all seeing narcissist at the top.

In a Financial Times (FT) article entitled “Too big to manage”, Andrew Hill blasted Gulliver’s statement as “disingenuous” but went on to state, “Knowing what every employee is doing is not the leader’s responsibility. But by using a combination of the right structure, the latest technology and, above all, by imbuing a company with the correct culture and reinforcing regular communication with visits to the shop floor, he or she should be able to limit the chance of a major scandal.” Hill quoted management thinker Henry Mintzberg for the following, ““You can’t excuse [scandals] by saying we have so many employees. You . . . have got to be on the ground to have a sense of what your organisation is all about.””

This means a CEO is not required to know everything but he does need to have an overall sense of whether his company is moving in a direction to do things such as follow the law. I would say this is even truer when you have promised (yet again) in a DPA that your company will follow the law. It also means that the leader sets the tone. If your leader takes the position that he or she cannot know what everyone is doing; that tone will be communicated down to the field troops but the message will be that said maximum leader does not care what the middle and lower levels are doing. Hence the DOJ would say that it all starts with Tone at the Top. Sadly Gulliver does not seem to acknowledge, let alone understand, that issue.

But more than simply having a leader that cares and is engaged; Gulliver’s statement belies other aspects of a best practices compliance program. Technology provides a mechanism for oversight of a compliance regime. Under the FCPA Ten Hallmarks of an Effective Compliance Program, monitor is recognized as a key element so your company should establish a regular monitoring system to spot issues and address them. Effective monitoring means applying a consistent set of protocols, checks and controls tailored to your company’s risks to detect and remediate compliance problems on an ongoing basis. To address this, your compliance team should be checking in routinely with the finance departments in your foreign offices to ask if they’ve noticed recent accounting irregularities. Regional directors should be required to keep tabs on potential improper activity in the countries they manage. Additionally, the global compliance committee should meet or communicate as often as every month to discuss issues as they arise. These ongoing efforts demonstrate your company is serious about compliance.

In addition to monitoring, structural controls are recognized as an important element. Hill said that large companies “must use structural means to maintain control.” One of the best explanations of the use of internal controls as a structural component of any best practices compliance program comes from Aaron Murphy, a partner at Foley and Lardner in San Francisco, in his book entitled “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act”, where he said, “Internal controls are policies, procedures, monitoring and training that are designed to ensure that company assets are used properly, with proper approval and that transactions are properly recorded in the books and records. While it is theoretically possible to have good controls but bad books and records (and vice versa), the two generally go hand in hand – where there are record-keeping violations, an internal controls failure is almost presumed because the records would have been accurate had the controls been adequate.”

I would advocate that it is the interplay of the right message, tools in place to communicate and enforce the message and then oversight to ensure compliance with the message that allows a 250,000 plus employee base company to have a chance to operate in compliance with their legal obligations. Echoing this maxim, Hill quoted Rick Goings, Chairman and CEO of Tupperware Brands Corporation, for the following, “Wars are won not by generals, but by non-commissioned officers. If you have the right kind of structure…and behind that a value system, I think you can do it.”

HSBC continues to be the poster child for compliance lessons learned, whether intentional or not. Hill concluded his piece with the following, “The lesson may be that, irrespective of the size of the company, executives who lose touch with how their staff are using the culture they preach are courting embarrassment and scandal. The trend towards large companies operating through smaller units, with more autonomy and accountability for their actions, does not absolve leaders from meeting their traditional responsibilities to know what is happening on the frontline. As Prof Fischer suggests, they should manage according to the old Russian proverb that Ronald Reagan adopted when dealing with the Soviet Union in the 1980s: trust, but verify.”

There is a plethora of compliance regimes that companies can look to in order to create a best practices compliance program. Simply put, it is a relatively straightforward exercise; perhaps not easy but certainly there are well-articulated compliance programs that companies can follow. To continue to criticize the DOJ (and Securities and Exchange Commission) for failing to communicate what they wish to see in a best practices compliance program, simply fails to take into account the responsibility that corporations have in complying with US laws. The information is out there in abundance. Even a weekend article in the FT lays it out for you.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2015

DPAs and NPAs – Powerful Tools in the Fight Against Corruption

As readers of this blog know the FCPA Professor and I usually look at the same Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement action, item or remark and see different things. Sometimes we even hear the same thing and come away with different interpretations. Last week, we experienced yet another instance of the former where we both looked at the same article, that being one in Global Investigations Review entitled “Caldwell: settlement a “more powerful tool” than convictions” by Rahul Rose, yet came away with different interpretations. After some to-ing and fro-ing, we decided that we would both post our interpretations on the same day. So with a nod to Dan Fogelberg and Tim Weisberg, today we have the first twin posts from different bloggers dual- blog posts. Since we agreed to write our respective posts without seeing the other’s post and hence could not comment on each other’s post, I urge that after you finish reading my blog today, you click on over to the FCPA Professor’s site and see what his thoughts on Caldwell’s remarks might be.

The specific remarks we want to focus on were apparently made by during the Q&A session of Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell who spoke at the Launch of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Foreign Bribery Report, note these remarks were not found in the printed remarks of the speech on the Department of Justice (DOJ) website. In her Q&A, Rose reported the following, “Caldwell told the audience in Paris: “Companies cannot be sent to jail, so all a court can do is say you will pay ‘x’. We can say: ‘you will also have a monitor and will do all sorts of other things for the next five years, and if you don’t do them for the next five years then you can still be prosecuted’.” [And for the money shot] “In the United States system at least it is a more powerful tool than actually going to trial,” she said.”

It turns out that I have been thinking along these lines as well. The debate over the usefulness of Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPAs) and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) has been long attended. Yet there are a couple of key reasons that DPAs and NPAs are such powerful tools in the fight against anti-corruption and anti-bribery which I do not believe have been fully articulated or explored. The first is that by settling, the DOJ (and Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC]) will have the ability to monitor the company going forward. This process began under the practice of formally appointing a corporate monitor nominated by the company in the throes of the enforcement action and who would be agreed to by the DOJ. This practice is generally referred to as a company having mandatory monitor.

While this specific practice received a fair amount of criticism from a variety of sources, the basic concept was sound. That concept was that a neutral third party would review a company’s compliance with the terms and conditions of a DPA or NPA and report to the DOJ at intervals generally no shorter than annually. This would give the DOJ eyes and ears into a company to oversee its adherence to the terms of the settlement. But what information did Caldwell convey in her statement as to why she thinks settlements are such a powerful tool? I read three pieces of information her statement about why FCPA settlements are such powerful tools.

‘Do All Sorts of Other Things’

Under this prong a settling defendant is required to do “all sorts of other things.” We know from the DPAs and NPAs relating to FCPA enforcement over the past several years, the minimum that a company will be required to institute is a best practices anti-corruption compliance program. While the FCPA Guidance specifies ten hallmarks of an effective compliance program, the DPAs and NPAs have had between 9 to 16 items listed in the best practices anti-corruption compliance programs that settling companies’ have agreed to institute. If the DOJ went to trial and secured a conviction the company would not have to put such a compliance program in place but only pay a fine or some other monetary penalty. Further, by requiring such a best practices anti-corruption compliance program in such a public manner, through a publicly filed DPA or NPA, the DOJ can communicate its current thinking on what it believes constitutes such a program. This provides valuable information to the compliance practitioner going forward and I believe completely disabuses the argument that companies cannot know what their obligations might be to comply with the FCPA or that companies do not know what the DOJ expects from them in the area of a FCPA compliance regime.

‘You will also have a monitor’

David E. Matyas and Lynn Shapiro Snyder
from the law firm of Epstein Becker & Green P.C., described the duties of a corporate monitor in their article entitled, “Monitoring the Monitor? The Need for Further Guidance Governing Corporate Monitors Under Pre-Trial Diversion Agreements”. The monitor would meet with “the company’s board and employees. A monitor then develops a work plan which defines the scope, access, and power the monitor will have over the company. The monitor’s work involves frequent visits to the company (including possible on-site accommodations) and broad access to company documents and meetings. The monitor should be knowledgeable about the regulatory aspects of the company’s operations, but that is not necessarily a criterion for selection of the monitor. Indeed, a monitor can hire others to assist in his or her responsibilities at the company’s expense. The monitor files periodic reports with the U.S. Attorney’s Office and makes visits with that office as well as with the company. At the conclusion of a monitor’s term – often 24-36 months – the monitor files a final report that details the activities accomplished and whether the company complied with all the terms of the agreement.”

So the monitor provides the DOJ with continued insight into what the company is doing to satisfy its settlement obligations around the implementation of its compliance program. If the DOJ has high confidence that the company has and will continue to put significant resources and efforts into its compliance program, it may agree to a voluntary monitor, as we have seen with the Parker Drilling and Hewlett-Packard (HP) DPAs. If the DOJ does not have such confidence, it may require a monitor for the length of the DPA, such as we saw in the Total DPA, which was three years. The DOJ may also take an interim position on the mandatory or voluntary nature of the monitor by allowing a company to end a mandatory monitorship half-way through the pendency of a DPA as it did with the Weatherford DPA, which allowed the mandatory monitorship to end at the 18 month mark of a three year DPA, if certain criteria were met.

‘You can still be prosecuted’ 

This final point is not to be underestimated. Once again if a company is found guilty at trial, a fine and/or penalty will be assessed and payment is the end of it. While it still may be under enhanced scrutiny, it will not have the affirmative obligation to report any FCPA violations going forward, nor will it bear potential liability and prosecution for failure to implement the terms and conditions of the DPA or NPA. Indeed, the company will agree to be prosecuted if there is another violation or it fails to implement as agreed to.

So by using DPAs and NPAs as settlement tools, I believe that the DOJ is able to impact on an ongoing basis, for two to three years, the compliance program of a settling company. This continued oversight usually translates into greater enthusiasm by a settling company to get compliance right so that it does not have to go through the full FCPA investigation and enforcement process. Of course there will always be recalcitrant companies such as Marubeni Corporation, which do not take the agreed to compliance obligations seriously going forward. When they get into trouble as recidivists, the second penalty is usually much higher. But there is also benefit to the compliance practitioner and greater compliance community because the DOJ communicates its expectations in these DPAs and NPAs. So they also work as powerful communication tools. Finally, by requiring a third party to act as the monitor, whether voluntary or mandatory, the DOJ can get some independent insight into what a company is doing compliance-wise.

Not knowing what the Professor has said, I have not tried to anticipate his arguments or rebut them directly. Nonetheless, I have tried to articulate why I agree with Ms. Caldwell’s remarks and why I continue to find the DOJ’s use of DPAs and NPAs as settlement tools a powerful weapon in the fight against bribery and corruption. I also hope that you will find favor with this exercise that the FCPA Professor and I have engaged in because we both believe that ongoing debate over FCPA enforcement is worthwhile for the compliance practitioner and necessary for the long-term success of compliance moving forward.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

Gordon Lightfoot, the Edmund Fitzgerald and the Bio-Rad FCPA Settlement, Part I

This month there are two dates that are forever tied together in the annuals of maritime tragedies and great songwriters. November 10 is the 39^th anniversary of the sinking of the Great Lakes freighter the SS Edmund Fitzgerald, who sank 17 miles from the entrance to Whitefish Bay on Lake Superior taking all 29 crewmembers to the bottom with her. Next Monday, November 17, is the 76^th birthday of the Canadian singer-songwriter Gordon Lightfoot, who memorialized the tragedy in the song The Wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald, which he released on the album Summertime Dream in 1976. The song went all the way to Number 2 on the charts. I can still hear Lightfoot’s haunting tale in my head to this day and for me, it was his greatest single.

Earlier this month, Bio-Rad Laboratories Inc. (Bio-Rad) concluded a multi-year Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) investigation and enforcement action. It was notable for many reasons. First and foremost was the stunning bribery and corruption scheme that the company engaged in; multiple bribery schemes in multiple countries. Also notable were the results that the company achieved. While we do not yet know if there will be any individual prosecutions of this matter, the company received a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and a relatively small fine of $14.35MM for what clearly would appear to be criminal violations of the FCPA. Perhaps equally stunning is the amount of profit disgorgement that the company agreed to with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), that amount being $40.7MM.

As with the Layne Christensen FCPA enforcement action from October, both settlement documents provide a wealth of very useful information for the compliance practitioner to use to not only help create a best practices compliance program, but also review your company’s compliance program to see if there might be areas of risk which need to be assessed or have greater compliance scrutiny. Over the next couple of blog posts I want to explore the Bio-Rad FCPA settlement, discuss some of the lessons learned for the compliance practitioner and explore what this settlement may unveil for future FCPA enforcement actions.

With his usual thoroughness, the FCPA Professor went into deep dive mode to lay out the underlying facts involved in this matter, in a post entitled “Bio-Rad Laboratories Agrees To Pay $55 Million To Resolve FCPA Enforcement Action”. According to the NPA, Bio-Rad had bribery schemes running in the following countries: Russia, Vietnam and Thailand. In Russia, persons identified as ‘Manager-1’ who was a high-level manager of the company’s Emerging Markets sales region and ‘Manager-2’ who worked for Manager-1 and was described as a high-level accounting manager of the company’s Emerging Markets sales region, engaged with ‘Agent-1’ paying him “a commission of 15-30% purportedly in exchange for various services outlined in the agency contracts, including acquiring new business by creating and disseminating promotional materials to prospective customers, installing Bio-Rad products and related equipment, training customers on the installation and the use of Bio-Rad products, and delivering Bio-Rad products.”

The commission rates were approved by Manager 1 and 2 even though they were both aware that Agent 1 did not and indeed could not perform the contracted services. Payments were made to a level of $200,000 or less because that was the spending authority of the managers, which did not require a higher level of company review. Both managers communicated with Agent 1 through multiple fraudulent email addresses to avoid detection by the company. Finally, Agent 1 had a 100% success rate in obtaining sales into Russia.

In Vietnam, the system was much simpler and even more directly corrupt. The Bio-Rad country manager was authorized to approve contracts up the amount of $100,000 and to pay sales commissions up to $20,000 without further review. This un-named country manager simply authorized cash payments to officials at state-owned hospitals to obtain or retain business for the company. When the country manager was finally challenged on this direct bribery scheme, he simply “proposed a solution that entailed employing a middleman to pay the bribes to the Vietnamese government officials as a means of insulating Bio-Rad from liability.” The bribery funds were created by giving these middlemen, named distributors, deep discounts “which the distributor would then resell to government customers at full price, and pass through a portion of it as bribes.” These bribes were recorded on the company’s books and records as “commissions”, “advertising fees” and “training fees”.

In Thailand, the company acquired a 49% interest in a joint venture (JV) through acquisition. Initially I would note that there is no record that Bio-Rad either performed pre-acquisition due diligence or engaged in any post acquisition integration or remediation so that an ongoing bribery scheme which began under a previous company’s ownership continued after Bio-Rad took control of the Thailand JV. The bribery scheme involved paying an agent “an inflated 13% commission, of which it retained 4%, and paid 9% to Thai government officials in exchange for profitable business contracts.” Just to top it all off, the agent involved in the bribery scheme was Bio-Rad’s JV partner.

I would say that all of the above is very bad conduct. Yet, Bio-Rad was able to garner a NPA from the DOJ and a civil Cease and Desist Order from the SEC. How did they accomplish this? In the DOJ Press Release, it stated, “The department entered into a non-prosecution agreement with the company due, in large part, to Bio-Rad’s self-disclosure of the misconduct and full cooperation with the department’s investigation…In addition, Bio-Rad has engaged in significant remedial actions, including enhancing its anti-corruption compliance programs globally, improving internal controls and compliance functions, developing and implementing additional due diligence and contracting procedures for intermediaries, and conducting extensive anti-corruption training throughout the organization.”

For the compliance practitioner, yet once again the DOJ and SEC are sounding a LOUD and CLEAR message that even with very bad conduct, the systemic failure of internal controls and having a culture that turned a very blind eye at best to what was going on; you can make a comeback. Moreover, you can make such a spectacular comeback that does not even sustain a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) let alone have to accept a guilty plea. It all starts with putting a best practices compliance program in place and the DPA lists the steps that any company should consider in its compliance regime.

1. High level commitment by providing visible support by senior management.
2. An appropriate corporate policy around anti-corruption.
3. Specific policies and procedures in the following areas: (a) gifts, (b) hospitality, entertainment and travel, (c) customer travel, (d) political contributions, (e) charitable donations and sponsorship, (f) facilitation payments and (g) solicitation and extortion.
4. Appropriate internal controls to ensure transactions are authorized and properly recorded.
5. A periodic risk-based review. In other words, a risk assessment. Policies and procedures need to be reviewed no less than annually and updated as appropriate.
6. The compliance function should have proper Board oversight, independence to act and support within the organization.
7. Compliance shall provide training on and guidance to the business units on its anti-corruption compliance program.
8. There should be mechanisms for employees to report internally compliance issues of concern with no fear of retaliation.
9. A company must maintain and provide “effective and reliable” processes and resources to responding to any raised issues.
10. A company must use both incentives to encourage behavior and discipline of those employees who violate its compliance program.
11. Third parties must be subjected to an appropriate due diligence based vetting process, have an appropriate contract and thereafter be managed going forward after the contract is signed.
12. There should be a protocol for evaluation of any potential acquisitions or merger candidates and then appropriate review and remediation after any acquisition is complete.
13. There should be ongoing monitoring and testing of the compliance program going forward.

At the conclusion of its NPA, Bio-Rad agreed to ongoing compliance reporting, at annual anniversaries of the date of the NPA by reporting to the DOJ the results of its remediation efforts over the past year. This is one of the most significantly overlooked positive aspects of any FCPA resolution. This allows the DOJ to have a continued view into the company’s compliance function. It is not an ongoing monitor but it does give the DOJ a transparent view into the company’s work towards the overall goal of putting a best practices compliance program in place and not simply stopping work when the settlement is signed. It keeps the company on its toes and allows the DOJ to continue to assess the company’s actions around anti-corruption compliance.

In the next blog post on Bio-Rad, I will review some of the specific bribery schemes that the company used and discuss how a compliance practitioner might use them for some lessons learned.

For a YouTube version of Gordon Lightfoot signing The Wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald, click here.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

Critiquing FCPA Enforcement and the GSK Domestic Corruption Conviction

Recently the FCPA Professor posted a blog, entitled “Look in the Mirror Moments”, in which he used written commentary by the US Secretary of the Treasury to the Chinese government about the Chinese governments anti-trust investigations as a mechanism to explore critiques of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement. In this post, he compared certain aspects of FCPA enforcement to the Chinese corruption enforcement action against GlaxoSmithKline PLC (GSK). Leaving aside the differences in anti-trust enforcement (price-fixing, monopolistic behavior and illegal collusion) and anti-corruption enforcement (bribery), I wanted to review his critiques through the prism of the known facts of the GSK enforcement action.

The FCPA Professor had the following comments about FCPA enforcement, in comparison with the Chinese corruption enforcement action against GSK. He said,

“Without in any way trying to comprehensively compare the overall U.S. legal system to the overall Chinese legal system, the following attributes of FCPA enforcement must at least be acknowledged. 

The vast majority of corporate FCPA enforcement actions lack transparency and the resolution documents (whether a non-prosecution agreement, deferred prosecution agreement or civil administrative order) are the result of an opaque process ultimately controlled by the same office prosecuting or bringing the action. 

As to the swiftness of FCPA enforcement actions, one can only assume that the majority of general counsels and board of directors of companies under FCPA scrutiny would be jumping for joy if the scrutiny – from start to finish – would resolve itself in 15 months rather than the typical 3-5 years (and in some instances more) of FCPA scrutiny lingering.”

The difficulty I have with both of these points is that one cannot separate the Chinese enforcement action against GSK from the Chinese legal system that produced it. Let’s start with the ‘jumping for joy’ prong. The initial difference to note is that the Chinese enforcement action was a domestic prosecution based upon Chinese domestic law for bribery and corruption of Chinese. It was not a US (or UK) company violating US (or UK) laws. This means that the relevant documents and witness were in the locality where the investigation was performed. Even when a key witness, GSK China Country Manager Mark Reilly was in the UK, he voluntarily returned to China to give evidence but was prevented from leaving the country without being charged with a crime. So as far as is known, there were no government-to-government requests for information, no Letters Rogatory or use of any other international discovery mechanism to obtain evidence.

Moreover, the procedural protections in place under US (and UK) criminal procedure simply do not exist in China. There is no right to counsel, no right against self-incrimination, no right to confront witness and not even a right to know what the charges against you might be. These lack of rights were certainly borne out in the speed in which the Chinese investigative authorities were able to obtain evidence and public confessions from GSK principals involved in the bribery and corruption. The first 30-day timeline of the GSK investigation went as follows:

• June 28, 2013 – Local Police announced they have place GSK officials under investigation for economic crimes.
• July 11, 2013 – Public Security Ministry issued statement accusing GSK of bribery.
• July 15 , 2013 – Four senior company execs ‘detained’. Finance chief barred from leaving country.
• July 16, 2013 – GSK General Counsel (GC) placed under ‘house arrest’ along with 30 other employees. One of the four GSK China executives who were detained, admited to bribery allegations on Chinese state television.
• July 22, 2013 – GSK formally apologized for breaking Chinese law regarding domestic bribery and corruption.
• July 26, 2013 – Peter Humphrey, a UK citizen and his wife, a naturalized US citizen, both hired by GSK in an ancillary matter related to the GSK corruption scandal were arrested but not told of the charges against them.

A little over one year later, in July, 2014 the trial of Humphrey and his wife was announced. Orignially it was to be held in secret with both Humphrey and his wife still not told of the formal charges against them. However after diplomatic protests by both the US and UK governments, Humphrey and his wife were both convicted and sentenced in an open trial, albeit lasting only one day, on August 8, 2014. The charges against them were announced at trial. Thereafter, GSK pled guilty in a secret one-day trial GSK was fined approximately $491MM and China Country Manager Mark Reilly and four other GSK China business unit executives were found gulity. They were all sentenced to jail but given suspended sentences.

How did the Chinese government develop its evidence so quickly? One of the defendant’s, admitted, on state run televison, his involvement in the bribery scheme only 18 days after the investigation was announced by Chinese authorities. Indeed, GSK itself made a public apology only 24 days after the announcement by the Chinese authorities it was under investigation. We now know that GSK was informed by a whistleblower of allegations of bribery and corruption as early as January 2013 yet in June GSK announced it had not found anything to substantiate these allegations.

I believe the answer is found in the differences in the Chinese and US legal systems. It all starts with the following: in China you are presumed guilty while in the US (and the UK), you are presumed innocent until proven guilty. In an article in the New York Times (NYT), entitled “Presumed Guilty in China’s War on Corruption”, Andrew Jacobs and Chris Buckley wrote that the “war on corruption often operates beyond the law in a secret realm of party-run agencies”. The process “Known as Shuanggui, it is a secretive, extralegal process that leaves detainees cutoff from lawyers, associates and relatives.” Moreover, even as a case moves through the Chinese criminal justice system, defendants’ counsel “have limited access to evidence, witnesses, and their clients.” It does not get any better when a defendant actually goes to court because “Lawyers say Chinese courts rarely allow them to call defense witnesses, while prosecutors frequently withhold cruical evidence.” Finally, of the 8,110 officials charged with corruption “in the first half of this year, 99.8 percent were convicted”. To this rather amazing trial court conviction rate, I would add the the prosecution does even better on appeal, never losing to a convicted defendant.

Does that sound like a system in which you would jump for joy if you were caught up in, even knowing that the time from announcment of investigation until 99.8% chance of conviction awaited you? Even if the government investigation only took 14 months? In the US, corporations have the same rights as individuals at trial; to cross-examine witness, to be made aware of the charges against it, those charges must be brought with specficity, right to counsel, right to an open trial and right to appeal. These rights are all enshrined in the US Constitution. Those rights are not present for individuals or corporations under Chinese law or jurisprudence.

But the FCPA Professor also critiqued the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in FCPA enforcements with the following observation: The vast majority of corporate FCPA enforcement actions lack transparency and the resolution documents (whether a non-prosecution agreement, deferred prosecution agreement or civil administrative order) are the result of an opaque process ultimately controlled by the same office prosecuting or bringing the action.When a company enters into negotiation with the DOJ and SEC it is with legal counsel in tow. Even if we in the general public are not privy to these negotiations over the terms and conditions of enforcement actions I am confident that there is some give and take. Further, while I only have personal knowledge of one negotiation for the specific terms of a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA), the lawyer representing the company made clear it was a negotiation. It was not a Diktat with sentencing simply pronounced by the DOJ. Does the office which handles the investigation also handle the settlement negotiation? Yes but that is what prosecutors do each and every day in every city, county, town, hamlet, state and federal jurisdiction in this country.

Just as it takes two to tango, it takes two to negotiate. The DOJ does not negotiate with itself. Another party is sitting across the table and that other party is the company involved in the FCPA investigation. Why is that company there in the room negotiating? Because the company has assessed its interest and determined that it would be better off settling than going to trial. This is in the face of DOJ failures in the trial court in the Gun Sting cases, the O’Shea trial and the trial court overturning the verdict in the Lindsey Manufacturing conviction. Simply because there is a negotiation between the DOJ and a private party does not make it some nefarious process, even if the prosecutors hold the upper hand.

As far as the fines and penalites, there has been nothing to suggest the basis of the $491MM fine assessed against GSK. That amount is a bit less than the amounts initially reported that GSK China paid out as bribes, somewhere over $500MM. At least in the US, there are the Sentence Guidelines which form some basis of the calculation. Of course there is always some prosecutorial discretion to lessen a fine or penalty below the suggested amount. We have seen that occur this year with the HP enforcement action and recently Asst. Attorney General Leslie Caldwell suggested that Alcoa could have been fined over $1bn for its conduct, while the actual fine was $384MM. It is appropriate for prosecutors to have such discretion.

While the DOJ is also critiqued that DPAs (and Non-Prosecution Agreement [NPAs]) are essentially the same as going to trial with a near 100% success rate, I think this belies the number of declinations that the DOJs gives out. Unfortunately (and here the FCPA Professor and I do agree); there is not enough information given out about declinations; either regarding the raw numbers or the specific reasons for a declination. Only if a company agrees or is required to make such information public does it become known. Nevertheless, there is the recent example of Layne Christensen, which received a declination. In an article in Compliance Week, entitled “How Two Companies Got Regulators to Drop FCPA Charges”, Jaclyn Jaeger reported on the reasons the company sustained this result of receiving a declination through interviews with Christensen GC, Steve Crooke, its Chief Compliance Officer (CCO), Jennafer Watson and its outside counsel Russ Berland. Jaeger detailed the specific steps the company took and we can all see the effect it had upon the DOJ, through the declination to prosecute the company.

The debate about the costs of FCPA enforcement actions, the proper role of DPAs/NPAs and length of time of investigations is a healthy one and living in the open society that we have in the US, one that we will continue to have. Since I am not a prosecutor (or ex-prosecutor), I cannot look in the mirror at FCPA enforcement but I can review the facts of the DOJ and SEC’s FCPA enforcement, contrasted with the Chinese domestic bribery and corruption proseuction of GSK and believe that there is no basis for comparing the two systems, as they are so different in too many fundamental aspects.

I can however say one thing with absolute certainly; wherever you do want to be, a Chinese jail is not high on the list.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

The Positive Effects of DPAs and NPAs in FCPA Enforcement

One of the oft-made criticisms regarding the Department of Justice (DOJ) around its enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is its the use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) somehow pervert the course of justice. Some of the criticisms include: DPAs and NPAs are either too harsh or too lenient; DPAs and NPAs let corporations off too easily or they are too unfair to corporations; DPAs and NPAs are inherently unfair as they give the DOJ too much leverage in any negotiation or that the DOJ uses them as a way to simply seek bigger fines and to not go after the real culprits, i.e. rogue employees; the fines levied under DPAs and NPAs are too great or too small, but whichever it is, there is not appropriate judicial oversight; and my personal favorite, the DOJ needs to ‘trial-lawyer up’ and go to trial against big bad corporations which violate the FCPA to really show ‘em they mean business.

Speaking from the perspective of a former in-house type, I have argued that corporations desire DPAs and NPAs because they bring certainty. Not only in ending an enforcement action but also in knowing your obligations going forward; and they bring certainty in setting the fines and penalties to be paid for a FCPA violation. And, of course, if you enter into a DPA or NPA you bring your corporate client the certainty that you will not ‘Arthur Anderson’ your organization out of existence.

However there are other reasons why the use of DPAs and NPAs has been positive and that is the effect on companies. In a recent paper, entitled, “The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance: Evidence from 1993-2013 “”, authors Wulf A. Kaal and Timothy Lacine looked precisely at that issue. In an exhaustive study they reviewed all publicly available DPAs and NPAs from 1993 to 2013. The authors found that in a wide variety of categories 97.41% of the publicly available DPAs and NPAs “mandated substantive governance improvements” in the corporations that entered into them. Any time you have 97% improvement in anything, I would say someone must have been doing something right, somewhere, somehow. From the thesis of their article, it would appear that what the DOJ is doing right is using DPAs and NPAs to positively impact corporate governance.

What were some of the changes brought about through the use of DPAs and NPAs? In the area of Board governance there were provisions including mandating changes requiring additional reporting obligations for the Board; required changes to existing Board committee structure of the entity, often creating new board committees. Other changes included increased Board monitoring obligations, the addition of independent director(s) and changes pertaining to management of the entity. In addition to more Board involvement, under a number of DPAs and NPAs, a settling company’s senior management was required to provide additional oversight and involvement with the compliance function. Similarly monitoring obligations have generally increased with many DPAs and NPAs containing specific provisions that related to ongoing monitoring requirements.

Both the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) position and the compliance function were significantly impacted by many of the DPAs and NPAs. Many contained provisions relating to a new, improved or expanded compliance program. Additionally, many DPAs and NPAs contained provisions pertaining to improved compliance communications and training requirements in the compliance function. Internal controls and required improvements pertaining to books and records were also noted. Of course, if a company did not have a Code of Conduct or CCO, they were required.

The authors have also identified additional and continuing oversight factors. They note that DOJ “involvement suggest that prosecutors can promote an ethical corporate culture through enhanced compliance measures in N/DPAs. Under this theory, the DOJ’s expansionary tendencies in N/DPAs are a mere extension of legally mandated compliance requirements. In fact, corporate governance of the respective entity plays a major role in federal prosecutors’ charging decisions. The increased role of independent private sector oversight may help address the increased complexity of corporate crime and dwindling public funds. Given their education and experience as well as their ability to fill a void left by the system, prosecutors may be uniquely qualified to institute corporate governance changes.”

I think this ongoing DOJ oversight is not to be underestimated as a positive effect for compliance. Clearly if an external monitor is required there will be at least annual reporting to the DOJ on the company’s implementation of the terms and conditions of its settlement. But even if the DOJ does not require an external monitor there is always a requirement that the settling company report to the DOJ on the extent of its compliance efforts. The best practice would suggest that an independent third party make this assessment but even if it is not accomplished in such a manner, there is still DOJ oversight.

While the DOJ has pronounced that they are not involved in industry sweeps, the reality is that some industries have been hit with more FCPA enforcement actions than others. If there are a large number of FCPA settlements using DPAs and NPAs in one industry, it can have the effect of increasing both the knowledge of compliance and sophistication of compliance programs within that industry. I have personally witnessed this in the energy industry in Houston where compliance is now driven as a business solution to the legal problem of FCPA compliance. Scott Killingsworth calls this Private-to-Private compliance solutions. I call it business solutions to legal problems. Whatever you might wish to name it, these FCPA enforcement actions have increased the prevalence of compliance programs in the energy industry.

The authors also believe that through the use of DPAs and NPAs, the DOJ is better able to communicate its expectations of what it expects in the way of a best practices compliance program. They state that Boards, “management and corporate counsel may see these preexisting measures as a roadmap for preparing for future investigations and handling the eventual investigation.”

Finally, the authors provide a very interesting insight as to the power of DPAs and NPAs, which is not often discussed in the FCPA context. They contend that use of DPAs and NPAs, as corporate governance tools, “may be preferable to changes to federal law.” They explain, “Compared with more meaningful congressional governance reform, N/DPA-related governance reform is relatively “cheap” for corporations because comparatively few board and management positions are adversely affected. Furthermore, N/DPA-related governance reform is a measure supported by most corporate insiders as it is seen as beneficial for investors. Until regulators belatedly realize the threat posed by particular industry practices, as identified in N/DPAs, and consider acting upon it, N/DPA-related governance reform is entity specific and increases the availability of relevant, decentralized, and institution specific information for regulatory action. Preemptive remedial measures preceding the execution of N/DPAs and associated N/DPA feedback effects can create the framework for anticipatory dynamic regulation as a regulatory supplement.”

This last concept speaks to the transactional cost of changing not only laws surrounding corporate governance but the reform of a corporation for itself. The key stakeholder unit of investors certainly profits by having more and better corporate governance, as does the corporation itself. I found the authors’ work to be a welcome addition to the ongoing debate on DPAs and NPAs.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

The FCPA Year in Reivew-the eBook

I am pleased to announce the release of my eBook, “2013-the FCPA Year in Review” available through amazon.com. The past year saw the highest number of U.S. prosecutions of corporate bribery overseas since the banner year of 2010.  Some of the key corporate cases were Parker Drilling, Total and Weatherford. 2013 also saw 13 individuals prosecuted for FCPA or related criminal or civil violations. This jump in prosecutions illustrates the government’s commitment to aggressively pursuing these cases.

In this book, I review the underlying facts which led to the FCPA enforcement actions and the key lessons to be learned by the compliance practitioner going forward. I am certain that you will find this book useful in assessing your compliance program for 2014 and beyond.

It is a great value at $4.99. You can purchase a copy of the eBook, “2013-the FCPA Year in Review” by clicking here.

The 2013 FCPA Year in Review-Corporate Enforcement Actions

In my final post of 2013, I reviewed all of the individual Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement actions which occurred in the past year. In this first post of 2014, I review all the corporate enforcement actions in 2013. If you would like to have a handy reference on all of the 2013 FCPA enforcement actions, I am pleased to announce the publication of my latest book, entitled, “2013-the FCPA Year in Review”. It is available in an eBook format on Amazon.com.

A.     Total

Total SA engaged in a nearly decade long, breathtaking bribery scheme. In this scheme, Total paid approximately $60MM to an un-named Iranian Official of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), who steered two major projects Total’s way. The projects for which Total paid the bribes were the Sirri A and E oil and gas fields and South Pars gas field. Total paid a criminal penalty to the DOJ of $245.2 million and civil penalty of $153 to the SEC.” Total’s agreed monetary penalty of $398MM was the fourth biggest FCPA resolution.

B.     Parker Drilling

The company was involved in a bribery scheme to pay-off judges in a Nigerian Tax Court to allow Parker Drilling to pay lower than warranted tax assessments for its drilling rigs in the country. Due to its efforts to create a gold standard compliance program all the while undergoing its own internal investigation, Parker Drilling’s conduct earned it an “approximately 20 percent reduction off the bottom of the fine range” which suggested a fine of between $14.7MM to $29.4MM. The final DOJ fine was $11,760,000. The company also agreed to pay disgorgement of $3,050MM plus pre-judgment interest of $1,040,818, to the SEC.

C.     Ralph Lauren

The Ralph Lauren Company received Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPA) granted by the SEC and DOJ. The illegal conduct at issue related to its Argentinian subsidiary and efforts by the General Manager of that operation, who conspired with a customs clearance agency to make payments “to assist in improperly obtaining paperwork necessary for goods to clear customs, to permit clearance of items without the necessary paperwork, to permit the clearance of prohibited items, and to avoid inspection.” For its conduct, Ralph Lauren agreed to pay $882K to the DOJ and $593K in disgorgement and $141K in pre-judgment interest to the SEC.

D.    Weatherford

In late November, Weatherford International Limited (Weatherford) concluded one of the longest running open FCPA investigations when it agreed to the ninth largest FCPA fine of all-time and one of its subsidiaries, Weatherford Services Limited (WSL), agreed to plead guilty to violating the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. The total amount of fines and penalties for the FCPA violations was $152.6 million. The company was also hit with another $100 million in fines and penalties for trade sanctions bringing its total amount paid to $252.6 million. The bribery schemes that Weatherford used were varied but stunning in their brazen nature. But in spite of how things began, Weatherford was able to make a turnaround and substantially improve its position by reversing this initial nose-thumbing at US regulators.

E.     Stryker

In an interesting FCPA enforcement action resolved in October, the Stryker Corporation agreed to settle with the SEC via an Administrative Order, not a criminal action filed by the DOJ. According to the FCPA Blog, “The SEC said Stryker Corporation will pay $13.2 million to resolve FCPA violations. The bribes totaled about $2 million and were ‘incorrectly described as legitimate expenses in the company’s books and records,’ according to the SEC. Stryker will disgorge to the SEC $7.5 million and prejudgment interest of $2.28 million. It is also paying a penalty of $3.5 million.” SEC Complaint. There was not even a civil Complaint filed by the SEC and Stryker is not required to have a Corporate Monitor to assess its ongoing compliance efforts or its commitment to having a compliance program.

F.     Diebold

In late October, Diebold, an Ohio company which makes ATM machines, agreed to pay a criminal fine of $25.2 million to the DOJ and $23 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest to the SEC to resolve allegations it violated the FCPA by covering up bribes to bank officials in China, Indonesia and Russia. The total fine of just over $48MM. The DOJ charged it in a two-count information with conspiring to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery and books and records provisions and a substantive books and records offense. There were no charges under the anti-bribery provisions, which apply only to corrupt payments to foreign officials. The Diebold resolution took the form of a DPA with the DOJ, along with a fines and a Corporate Monitor. From its resolution with the SEC in addition to the profit disgorgement and prejudgment interest paid the company agreed to an agreed injunction to stop, once again, violating the FCPA.

G.    Bilfinger SE

In early December, DOJ announced it had resolved an ongoing FCPA with German entity Bilfinger SE (Bilfinger). This case involved the same background facts and events as the Willbros corporate FCPA enforcement action and the related individual enforcement actions with some of its former employees. The facts in this case were bad, bad, bad. The Bilfinger enforcement action moves towards the ending of one of the sorriest examples of corporate malfeasance in the FCPA world. While it took a long time, justice has certainly been a long time coming. With the continued flight from justice of former Willbros employee James Tillery who renounce his US citizenship to try and escape prosecution by taking refuge in Nigeria; perhaps things are coming to an end. But with the conclusion of this corporate enforcement action against Bilfinger, perhaps there may be additional individual enforcement actions.

H.    Archer-Daniels-Midland

In late December, it was announced by the DOJ and SEC that they had settled both a criminal and civil enforcement action with Archer-Daniels-Midland Company. The DOJ resolved the criminal action when a subsidiary of ADM pled guilty and agreed to pay more than $17 million in criminal fines to resolve charges that it paid bribes through vendors to Ukrainian government officials to obtain value-added tax (VAT) refunds, in violation of the FCPA. In a parallel civil FCPA action settled with the SEC and the SEC Press Release noted that “The payments were then concealed by improperly recording the transactions in accounting records as insurance premiums and other purported business expenses. ADM had insufficient anti-bribery compliance controls and made approximately $33 million in illegal profits as a result of the bribery by its subsidiaries.” In addition to the DOJ fine of $17.8MM, ADM agreed to pay “disgorgement of $33,342,012 plus prejudgment interest of $3,125,354.”

What Did It All Mean?

The clear message from these corporate enforcement actions is that early detection and remediation can lead to a significant reduction in fines and penalties. I believe that these corporate enforcement actions make clear that a company’s actions during the pendency of the investigation, in addition to the underlying FCPA violations, will be evaluated and assessed to determine the final penalty. The DOJ and SEC continue to communicate not only what they believe constitutes a best practices compliance program but equally importantly what actions a company can engage in which will significantly reduce a company’s overall fine and penalty. Both the DOJ and SEC continue to communicate, through their enforcement actions, to the compliance practitioner what they expect from companies in the way of a best practices compliance program and what a company should do if they discover a potential FCPA violation. These communications, through enforcement actions, DPAs, NPAs and Declinations, are consistent with the information provided by the DOJ/SEC in the FCPA Guidance. These enforcement actions demonstrate that if a company gets ahead of the curve, it can significantly lessen its overall penalty and pain.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

More on the ADM FCPA Settlement

Last week, in a post entitled “Supermarket to the World – The ADM FCPA Enforcement Action”, I reviewed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Compliant brought in connection with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) investigation of Archer-Daniels-Midland Company (ADM). There was also a criminal Plea Agreement entered into by the ADM subsidiary, Alfred C. Toepfer International (Ukraine) Ltd. (the Ukraine subsidiary) with the Department of Justice (DOJ), who was the defendant in this criminal action. In addition to the SEC Complaint, ADM entered into a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) with the DOJ. This post will review some of the requirements found in the NPA and other information found in the Plea Agreement which the company entered into to resolve the FCPA investigation.

I.                   The Fine

As set out in the Plea Agreement, the base fine which the defendant was looking at receiving was $45MM based upon the US Sentencing Guidelines. The culpability score had a -5 based upon some or all of the following factors: “The organization, prior to imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation and within a reasonably prompt time after becoming aware of the offense, reported the offense to appropriate governmental authorities, fully cooperated in the investigation, and clearly demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct.” Based upon the culpability score the fine range was listed from a low of $27.3MM to a high of $54.6MM. However the company paid only a fine of $17.7MM, which was noted to be approximately a 33% reduction from the low end of the fine range, with an additional reduction of “of $1,338,387 commensurate with the fine imposed by German authorities on Alfred C. Toepfer International G.m.b.H”; ADM’s German subsidiary which pled guilty and was involved in the bribery scheme. Additional factors in the reduction of the fine were “(a) the Defendant’s timely, voluntary, and thorough disclosure of the conduct; (b) the Defendant’s extensive cooperation with the Department; and (c) the Defendant’s early, extensive, and unsolicited remedial efforts already undertaken and those still to be undertaken.”

II.                The NPA

ADM entered into a three year NPA regarding the resolution of this matter. In a letter to ADM confirming the NPA, the DOJ stated that it was entering into the agreement with the ADM because of its conduct in self-disclosing the FCPA violations and the company’s conduct thereafter. The letter set out the following: “(a) the Company’s timely, voluntary, and thorough disclosure of the conduct; (b) the Company’s extensive cooperation with the Department, including conducting a world-wide risk assessment and corresponding global internal investigation, expanding the scope of the investigation where necessary to ensure the review was effective and thorough, making numerous presentations to the Department on the status and findings of the internal investigation, voluntarily making current and former employees available for interviews, voluntarily producing documents to the Department, and compiling relevant documents by category for the Department; (c) the Company’s early and extensive remedial efforts already undertaken at its own volition, and the agreement to undertake further enhancements to its compliance program as described in Attachment B (Corporate Compliance Program); and (d) the Company’s agreement to provide annual, written reports to the Department on its progress and experience in monitoring and enhancing its compliance policies.”

III.             Best in Class Compliance Program

Under Attachment B of the NPA, the company agreed to maintain a best practices compliance program which it had created during the pendency of the investigation. ADM agreed to maintain this compliance program at least during the length of the NPA. It included the following components.

1. High level commitment from company officials and senior management to do business in compliance with the FCPA.
2. A substantive written anti-corruption compliance code of conduct.
3. Written policies and procedures to implement this code of conduct.
4. A robust system of internal controls, including accounting and financial controls.
5. Risk assessments and risk reviews of its ongoing business.
6. No less than annual assessments of its overall compliance program.
7. Appropriate oversight and responsibility of a Chief Compliance Officer.
8. Effective training for all employees and relevant third parties.
9. An effective compliance function which can provide guidance to company employees.
10. A robust internal reporting system.
11. Effective investigations of any reported compliance issue.
12. Appropriate incentives for employees to do business ethically and in compliance.
13. Enforced discipline for any employee who violates the company’s compliance program.
14. Suitable due diligence and management of third parties and business partners.
15. A correct level of pre-acquisition due diligence for any merger or acquisition candidate, including a risk assessment and reporting to the DOJ if the company uncovers and FCPA-violative conduct during this pre-acquisition phase.
16. As soon as practicable, ADM will integrate any newly acquired entity into its compliance regime, including training of all relevant new employees, a FCPA forensic audit and reporting of any ongoing violations.
17. Ongoing monitoring, testing and auditing of the company’s compliance function, taking into account any “relevant developments in the field and the evolving international and industry standards.”

IV.              Ongoing Reporting

Under the NPA, ADM was not required to sustain an external corporate monitor. However the company did agree that it would report to the DOJ on no less than an annual basis during the pendency of the NPA, specified as “an initial review and submit an initial report, and (2) conduct and prepare at least two (2) follow-up reviews and reports.” Further, the company is required to “submit to the Department a written report setting forth a complete description of its remediation efforts to date, its proposals reasonably designed to improve the Company’s internal controls, policies, and procedures for ensuring compliance with the FCPA and other applicable anti -corruption laws, and the proposed scope of the subsequent reviews.”

V.                 Facilitation Payments

I engaged with a colleague on whether the payments made by the ADM subsidiaries were simply facilitation payments because they were made to simply speed up the tax refund process. Whatever the payments were, they were not in any way, shape or form, facilitation payments. Initially, it should be noted that the FCPA says that the anti-bribery provisions “shall not apply to any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official, political party, or party official the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action . . .” The statute itself provided a list of examples of facilitation payments in the definition of routine governmental actions. It included the following:

• Obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents;
• Processing governmental papers such as visas and work orders;
• Providing police protection, mail services, scheduling inspections;
• Providing utilities, cargo handling; or
• Actions of a similar nature.

In addition to this language, the payments must be properly recorded on a company’s books and records; not disguised as payments for insurance premiums or other false entries that the ADM subsidiaries used in connection with the Ukraine tax authorities. When does a facilitation payment become a bribe? There is no clear monetary line of demarcation. The test seems to turn on the amount of money involved, to whom it is paid and the frequency of the payments. In the ADM matter, there were payments of approximately $22MM to receive tax refunds of $33MM. Whatever you might call the payments made by the ADM subsidiaries, they were certainly not facilitation payments.

The ADM FCPA settlement is extremely useful for the compliance practitioner for several reasons. The first is that it sets out some sophisticated mechanisms which are used to fund bribes. In addition to bribery schemes I discussed in the post entitled “Supermarket to the World – The ADM FCPA Enforcement Action” the NPA discussed another bribery scheme used ADM in Venezuela. All of the bribery schemes that the company’s subsidiaries engaged in were discussed or uncovered by the corporate office at some time before it began an official internal investigation. This once again shows the claim of the ‘rogue employee(s)’ is not something that stands up in criminal FCPA enforcement actions.

Equally important is that ADM received clear and very substantive credit for the actions that it took after it began its internal investigation. It self-disclosed, it cooperated extensively, it remediated thoroughly to put together a best practices compliance program. Lest anyone think these actions are for naught, or that the DOJ does not take such actions into account, note the 33% reduction in fine that ADM received, the NPA it received for the corporate parent and the lack of an external corporate monitor. These are clear signs from the DOJ as to the types of conduct and actions that it not only approves of but will be taken into account in the calculation of any fines and penalties. In other words, self-disclose, extensively cooperate, and remediate if your company finds itself in this situation.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013