The Weatherford FCPA Settlement, Part III

Yesterday, I reviewed the conduct which Weatherford International Limited (Weatherford) engaged in over a period from 2002-2011 in connection with its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) investigation, noted the deficiencies in its compliance program and its internal controls and even how the company intentionally impeded the investigations of both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Today, I want to look at how the company changed course in mid-stream during the investigation, brought in a top-notch and well respected lawyer as its Chief Compliance Officer (CCO), created a best-in-class compliance program; all of which saved the company millions of dollars in potential fines and penalties.

1. I.                    DOJ Fine Calculation

To resolve the criminal aspects of this case, Weatherford agreed to pay an $87.2 million criminal penalty as part of a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with the DOJ. There was also another $65.6 million paid to the SEC. However the figure paid to the DOJ was at the very bottom range of a potential criminal penalty. The range listed in the DPA was from $87.2 to $174.3 million. In coming up with this range under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, it is significant for the actions that Weatherford did not receive credit for during the pendency of the investigation. The company did not receive a credit for self-reporting. The company only received a -2 for its cooperation because prior to 2008 the company engaged in activities to impede the regulators’ investigation.

So the fine range could have been more favorable to the company. But the key is that Weatherford received the low end of the range. How did they do this?

A.     New Sheriff in Town

One of the key things Weatherford did was bring in Billy Jacobson as its CCO and give him a seat at the table of the company’s Executive Board. He was a Federal Prosecutor in the Fraud Section, Criminal Division, US Department of Justice. He also served as an Assistant Chief for FCPA Enforcement Department so we can assume he understood the FCPA and how prosecutors think through issues. (Jacobson also worked as a State Prosecutor in New York City, with my former This Week in FCPA co-host Howard Sklar, so shout out to Howard.) Jacobson was not hired directly from the DOJ but after he had left the DOJ and had gone into private practice. There is nothing that shows credibility like bringing in a respected subject matter expert and giving that person the tools and resources to turn things around.

But more than simply bringing in a new sheriff, Weatherford turned this talk into action by substantially increasing its cooperation with the government, thoroughly investigating all issues, turning over the results to the DOJ and SEC and providing literally millions of pages of documents to the regulators. The company also cleaned house by terminating officers and employees who were responsible for the illegal conduct.

B.     Increase in Compliance Function

In addition to establishing Jacobson in the high level CCO position, the company significantly increased the size of its compliance department by hiring 38 compliance professionals and conducted 30 anti-corruption compliance reviews in the countries in which Weatherford operates. This included the hiring of outside consultants to assess and review the company’s compliance program and beefing up due diligence on all third parties, including those in the sales and supply chain, joint venture (JV) partners and merger or acquisition (M&A) candidates. The company also agreed to continue to enhance its internal controls and books and records to prevent and/or detect future suspect conduct.

If you have ever heard any of the current Weatherford compliance professionals speak at FCPA conferences, you can appreciate that they are first rate; that they know their stuff and the company supports their efforts on an ongoing basis.

C.     Best in Class Compliance Program

During the pendency of the investigation, Weatherford moved to create a best practices compliance program. They appear to have done so and agreed in the DPA to continue to maintain such a compliance program. Under Schedule C to the DPA, it set out the compliance program which the company had implemented and continued to keep in place, at least during the length of the DPA. It included the following components.

1. High level commitment from company officials and senior management to do business in compliance with the FCPA.
2. A substantive written anti-corruption compliance code of conduct.
3. Written policies and procedures to implement this code of conduct.
4. A robust system of internal controls, including accounting and financial controls.
5. Risk assessments and risk reviews of its ongoing business.
6. No less than annual assessments of its overall compliance program.
7. Appropriate oversight and responsibility of a Chief Compliance Officer.
8. Effective training for all employees and relevant third parties.
9. An effective compliance function which can provide guidance to company employees.
10. A robust internal reporting system.
11. Effective investigations of any reported compliance issue.
12. Appropriate incentives for employees to do business ethically and in compliance.
13. Enforced discipline for any employee who violates the company’s compliance program.
14. Suitable due diligence and management of third parties and business partners.
15. A correct level of pre-acquisition due diligence for any merger or acquisition candidate, including a risk assessment and reporting to the DOJ if the company uncovers and FCPA-violative conduct during this pre-acquisition phase.
16. As soon as practicable, Weatherford will integrate any newly acquired entity into its compliance regime, including training of all relevant new employees, a FCPA forensic audit and reporting of any ongoing violations.
17. Ongoing monitoring, testing and auditing of the company’s compliance function, taking into account any “relevant developments in the field and the evolving international and industry standards.”

D.    Monitor

Weatherford also agreed to an external monitor. However, the term of the monitor is not the entire length of the three-year DPA; the term of the monitor is only 18 months. The monitor’s primary function is to assess the company’s compliance with the terms of the DPA and report the results to the DOJ at least twice during the terms of the monitorship. After this 18 month term the DOJ will allow the company to self-report to the regulators. It should be noted that the term of the external monitor can be extended by the DOJ.

II.                Conclusion

It certainly has been a long, strange journey for Weatherford. I should note that I have not discussed at all the Oil-For-Food aspect of this settlement, which was an additional $100MM penalty to the company. However, with regard to the FCPA aspects of the matter, there are some very solid and telling lessons to be drawn from this case. First and foremost is that cooperation is always the key. But more than simply cooperating in the investigation is that a company should take a pro-active approach to putting a best-in-class compliance program in place during, rather than after the investigation concludes. Also, a company cannot simply ‘talk-the-talk’ but must come through and do the work to gain the credit. The bribery schemes that the company had engaged in and the systemic failures of its compliance program and internal controls, should serve as a good set of examples for the compliance practitioner to use in assessing a compliance program.

The settlement also sends a clear message from both the DOJ and SEC on not only what type of conduct will be rewarded under the US Sentencing Guidelines, but what they expect as a compliance program. One does not have read tea leaves or attempt to divine what might be an appropriate commitment to compliance to see what the regulators expect these day.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

The Weatherford FCPA Settlement, Part I

Last week Weatherford International Limited (Weatherford) concluded one of the longest running open Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) investigations when it agreed to the ninth largest FCPA fine of all-time and one of its subsidiaries, Weatherford Services Limited (WSL), agreed to plead guilty to violating the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. The total amount of fines and penalties for the FCPA violations was $152.6 million. The company was also hit with another $100 million in fines and penalties for trade sanctions bringing its total amount paid to $252.6 million.

The bribery schemes that Weatherford used were varied but stunning in their brazen nature. Further, early on in the investigation, the company thumbed its nose at the Department of Justice (DOJ) by refusing to cooperate in any meaningful way and actually destroying documents and computer hard drives rather than turn over relevant documents. There were also examples of internal company whistleblowers, who were either ignored or, worse, terminated when they internally reported illegal conduct which violated the FCPA. Lastly, the company did not self-disclose their conduct so things started out badly, badly, did I say badly, for the company. But in spite of how things began, Weatherford was able to make a turnaround and substantially improve its position by reversing this initial nose-thumbing at US regulators. Over the next three blog posts I will explore the bribery schemes involved, how the company’s new-found attitude led to lower fines that might otherwise have been expected and what the lessons are for the compliance practitioner going forward.

DOJ Criminal Information and Deferred Prosecution Agreement

To resolve the criminal aspects of this case, Weatherford agreed to pay an $87.2 million criminal penalty as part of a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with the DOJ.

In the Information filed as a part of the resolution reveals that company employees established and operated a joint venture (JV) in Africa with two local entities controlled by foreign officials and their relatives from 2004 through at least 2008. These foreign officials selected the entities with which WSL would partner and the company knew that the members of the local entities included foreign officials’ relatives and associates. The sole purpose of those local entities was to serve as conduits through which WSL pay bribes to the foreign officials controlling them as neither of the JV partners contributed capital, expertise or labor to the JV. In exchange for the illegal payments they received, through the JV, lucrative contracts, gave WSL inside information about competitors’ pricing, and took contracts away from WSL’s competitors and awarded them to the JV.

The Information also noted that Weatherford knowingly failed to establish an effective system of internal accounting controls designed to detect and prevent corruption, including FCPA violations. The company failed to implement these internal controls despite operating in an industry with a substantial corruption risk profile and despite growing its global footprint in large part by purchasing existing companies, often themselves in countries with high corruption risks.   As a result, a permissive and uncontrolled environment existed within which employees of certain Weatherford’s wholly owned subsidiaries in Africa and the Middle East were able to engage in corrupt conduct over the course of many years, including the bribery of foreign officials.

In yet another scheme detailed in the Information, a Weatherford employee in the Middle East, gave improper “volume discounts” to a distributor who supplied company products to a government-owned National  Oil Company (NOC), believing that those discounts were being used to create a slush fund with which to make bribe payments to decision-makers at the NOC. Between 2005 and 2011, Weatherford Oil Tools Middle East Limited (WOTME) paid approximately $15 million in “volume discounts” to the distributor.

In its Press Release the DOJ also spoke to the nefarious conduct of the company. Acting Assistant Attorney General Raman was quoted as saying “This case demonstrates how loose controls and an anemic compliance environment can foster foreign bribery and fraud by a company’s subsidiaries around the globe. Although Weatherford’s extensive remediation and its efforts to improve its compliance functions are positive signs, the corrupt conduct of Weatherford International’s subsidiaries allowed it to earn millions of dollars in illicit profits, for which it is now paying a significant price.” He also said that “Effective internal accounting controls are not only good policy, they are required by law for publicly traded companies – and for good reason.” The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) chimed in when Assistant Director in Charge Parlave said that “The FBI is committed to investigating corrupt backroom deals that influence contract procurement and threaten our global commerce.”

SEC Compliant

In its civil Complaint, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) alleged that Weatherford and its subsidiaries falsified its books and records to conceal not only these illicit payments, but also commercial transactions with Cuba, Iran, Syria, and Sudan that violated US sanctions and export control laws. Further, the company failed to establish an effective system of internal accounting controls to monitor risks of improper payments and prevent or detect misconduct. The company obtained more than $59.3 million in profits from business obtained through improper payments, and more than $30 million in profits from its improper sales to sanctioned countries. This conduct lasted from 2002 up until 2011 and included the lack of internal controls plus the affirmative falsification of its books and records to facilitate the bribe payments. The payment of disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and civil penalties to the SEC was in the amount of $65,612,360.34.

As you would expect, the SEC focused on the company’s books and records violations. Andrew Ceresney, co-director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division, was quoted in the SEC’s Press Release that “The nonexistence of internal controls at Weatherford fostered an environment where employees across the globe engaged in bribery and failed to maintain accurate books and records,” said  “They used code names like ‘Dubai across the water’ to conceal references to Iran in internal correspondence, placed key transaction documents in mislabeled binders, and created whatever bogus accounting and inventory records were necessary to hide illegal transactions.” Kara Brockmeyer, Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s FCPA Unit, said, “Whether the money went to tax auditors in Albania or officials at the state-owned oil company in Angola, bribes and improper payments were an accustomed way for Weatherford to conduct business. While the profits may have seemed bountiful at the time, the costs far outweigh the benefits in the end as coordinated law enforcement efforts have unraveled the widespread schemes and heavily sanctioned the misconduct.”

All of the settlement documents are chocked full of information about bribery schemes Weatherford engaged in for many years. For the compliance practitioner, they provide a list that can be used a check and balance to see if your company may be engaging in any of these practices. Additionally, both the DOJ and SEC listed out the internal controls and books and records failures of the company. Tomorrow, I will review the specific bribery scheme and failures of the Weatherford compliance program.

For a copy of the DOJ Information, click here.

For a copy of the DOJ Deferred Prosecution Agreement, click here.

For a copy of the SEC Civil Compliant, click here.

For a copy of the Plea Agreement, click here.

For a copy of the DOJ Press Release, click here.

For a copy of the SEC Press Release, click here.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

Welcome Back My Friends To The Show That Never Ends

Welcome back my friends, to the show that never end;

We’re so glad you could attend, come inside, come inside;

There behind the glass stands a real blade of grass;

Be careful as you pass, move along, move along.

 

Those lines come from the Emerson, Lake & Palmer (ELP) song, Karn Evil No. 9: First Impression, Part 2. I was introduced to the progressive rock trio, through the album Welcome Back, My Friends, to the Show That Never Ends…Ladies and Gentlemen, Emerson, Lake & Palmer, which was released on this date 39 years ago. I still think that this is the greatest live 3 disc album release by a single group ever. To say that the album blew me away would be an understatement. I was not exposed to too much prog rock in my podunk little hometown and even the signals of decent FM radio stations were fleeting, so this album was a revelation. I had been a rocker for some time but the musicianship of Keith Emerson, Greg Lake and Carl Palmer was simply unbelievable. For me the centerpiece was the epic three song trilogy of Karn Evil No. 9. So here’s to you lads, and I hope that you will do a full US reunion tour one day.

“Welcome back my friends” would certainly seem to be an excellent way to introduce today’s topic; that being the stunning report in the Sunday New York Times (NYT), that JP Morgan is under Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) scrutiny in China for its hiring practices. In an article, entitled “Hiring in China By JPMorgan Under Scrutiny”, reporters Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Ben Protess and David Barboza broke the story that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is investigating JP Morgan Chase to determine “whether JPMorgan Chase hired the children of powerful Chinese officials to help the bank win lucrative business in the booming nation.” The article is based upon “a confidential United States government document”.

The article details several situations where JPMorgan hired the children of Chinese government officials and sometime thereafter the bank was able to secure work from the business or industry of a parent of a hired employee. The examples included the hiring of a “son of a former Chinese banking regulator who is now the chairman of the China Everbright Group, a state-controlled financial conglomerate, according to the document, which was reviewed by The New York Times, as well as public records. After the chairman’s son came on board, JPMorgan secured multiple coveted assignments from the Chinese conglomerate, including advising a subsidiary of the company on a stock offering, records show.” In another instance, the bank hired the daughter of a Chinese railway official. After hiring the daughter, JP Morgan was hired to assist the company to go public.

The FCPA Professor was quoted in the NYT article for the following, “While the hire of a son or daughter itself is not illegal, red flags would be raised if the person hired was not qualified for the position, or, for example, if a firm never received business before and then lo and behold, the hire brought in business.” In blog post, entitled “JPMorgan’s Hiring Practices In China Under Scrutiny”, the FCPA Professor reviewed some enforcement actions “where the conduct at issue involved the hiring of children or spouses of alleged “foreign officials.”” He pointed to the “Tyson Foods enforcement action, part of the FCPA conspiracy alleged was “to place the wives of the [Mexican government] veterinarians on [a subsidiary company’s] payroll, providing them with a salary and benefits, knowing that the wives did not actually perform any services…”. According to the Department of Justice (DOJ), approximately $260,000 “in improper payments were made to the … veterinarians, both indirectly and directly, including through payments to wives of [the] veterinarians.” Next, in the UTStarcom enforcement action, the FCPA Professor noted that the “SEC’s allegations included that the company provided foreign government customers or their family members with work visas and purportedly hired them to work for [the company] in the U.S., when in reality they did no work for the company.” Finally, the Houston-based company Paradigm, got into FCPA hot water “during the same time frame as [a business deal was being discussed with an alleged Mexican “foreign official”], the same [alleged “foreign official”] requested that Paradigm Mexico hire his brother.” The DOJ stated: “Paradigm Mexico acquiesced to that demand and hired the decision maker’s brother as a driver. While employed at Paradigm Mexico, the brother did perform some work as a driver.”

The NYT notes that “there is nothing inherently illicit about hiring well-connected people. To run afoul of the law, a company must act with “corrupt” intent, or with the expectation of offering a job in exchange for government business.” However a company needs to be very careful when hiring such a family member. Indeed, I advise clients that the following definition should be used for a government official”

A “Foreign Official” for purposes of the FCPA and UK Bribery Act mean any:

• non-U.S. government official (includes municipal, provincial, central, federal or any other level of government);
• officer or employee of a foreign government, or any department, agency, ministry or instrumentality thereof (includes executive, legislative, judicial or regulatory);
• person acting in an official capacity on behalf of a foreign government or any department, agency, ministry or instrumentality thereof;
• officer or employee of a company or business owned or controlled in whole or in part by a foreign (non-U.S.) government (“state owned enterprise”);
• officer or employee of a public international organization such as the United Nations or World Bank;
• member of a royal family;
• foreign political party, member, or official thereof;
• candidate for foreign political office; and
• elected officials of foreign countries, civil servants and military personnel.

The term also includes the children, spouse or other close relatives of Foreign Officials. If a child, spouse or other close relative is hired there should be close scrutiny of how the request for the hire was made, who made the request and what are the qualifications of the child, spouse or other close relative for the job in question? There should also be a close look at the work of the proposed candidate to ascertain if anything they might do for the prospective employer would in any way touch upon the business relationship with the government official.

JP Morgan has come under quite a bit of regulatory scrutiny lately. The NYT notes that is the “focus of investigations in the United States by at least eight federal agencies, a state regulator and two foreign nations.” Most of these investigations revolve around the financial crisis and its aftermath or the London Whale incident. Even if one discount’s the ‘too big to manage’ moniker, the NYT does note that a FCPA investigation and any enforcement action can be quite different. “The agency’s bribery inquiry could pose an even steeper challenge to JPMorgan. Although banks are prone to the occasional trading blunder — JPMorgan produced record quarterly profits despite the losses in London last year — a corruption inquiry could leave a more lasting mark on its reputation. It might also spur the Justice Department to open a criminal investigation.”

So after the GlaxoSmithKline PLC (GSK) bribery and corruption investigation has quieted down and settled in for the long haul, the NYT breaks this story about yet another avenue for potential corruption in China. As ELP might say “Welcome back my friends, to the show that never ends.”

For a video clip of ELP playing Karn Evil No. 9, First Impression, Pt. 2 at the 1974 California Jam, click here.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

Dog Bite Defense No. 4 and the Defense of an FCPA Claim

As most readers of this blog know, I am a recovering trial lawyer. I almost always acted as defense counsel for corporations in my trial lawyer career. In the trial lawyer world, there are four recognized defenses to any claim which are known as the “Dog Bite Defenses”. They are:

1. My dog didn’t bite you.
2. Even if my dog did bite you, it’s because you provoked him.
3. Even if my dog did bite you, you really aren’t injured.
4. My dog didn’t bite you because I don’t have a dog.

The fourth version of the Dog Bite defense is certainly an ‘all-in’ move. You had either (1) better be right or (2) have some big kahunas to make that argument to a jury with a straight face.

I recently saw a couple of examples of the ‘Dog Bite’ defense which caught my eye. The first was in an article in the most recent issue of The New Yorker, entitled “Buried Secrets”, by Patrick Radden Keefe. His article discussed the ongoing situation involving the Beny Steinmetz Group Resources Group (BSGR), its mining concession in the country of Guinea and its representative Frederic Cilins, who is in jail in New York, denied bail and awaiting jail for obstruction of justice charges. In an exhaustively reported article, Keefe wrote about his interviews with many of the principal players in this saga including BSRG founder Beny Steinmetz, its representative Cilins and the current President of Guinea, Alpha Condé.

As reported in two Financial Times (FT) articles, entitled “Contracts link BSGR to alleged bribes” (the “mine rights article”) and “FBI sting says that ‘agent’ sought to have mining contracts destroyed” (the “FBI sting article”), by the same triumvirate of FT reporters Tom Burgis, Misha Glenny and Cynthia O’Murchu; there are allegations that “The resources arm of Beny Steinmetz Group agreed to pay $2m to the wife of an African president to help it secure rights to one of the world’s richest untapped mineral deposits, according to documents seen by the Financial Times”. These payments were allegedly memorialized in “Copies of two contracts from 2007 and 2008, apparently signed by BSGR’s representatives in the mineral-rich west African nation of Guinea, set out agreements for the company to make payments and transfer shares to Mamadie Touré, wife of the then president Lansana Conté.”

The FBI sting article reported that on Sunday April 14, 2013, “Frederic Cilins held the last of a series of meetings with the widow of an African dictator to discuss what she was going to do with some sensitive documents.” Unfortunately for Cilins he “did not realise that the woman he was talking to was wearing a wire and that FBI agents were watching. As he left the meeting, the agents arrested him carrying envelopes filled with $20,000 in cash, the indictment says. That was a pittance compared with the $5m he was taped offering the dictator’s widow during what US authorities say was a two-month campaign to tamper with a witness and destroy records.”

So how does the Dog Bite defense come into play here? As reported by Keefe during his interview with Beny Steinmetz, Steinmetz said “the documents that were discussed in Jacksonville did not prove anything, he said-they were forgeries”, these were the ‘alleged documents’ that Cilins was so keen to get back from Mamadie Touré. Keefe also reported that the BSGR representative, Asher Avidan, when presented with a photograph of a signature told Keefe that the signature “was identical to his own but dismissed it as “a simple Photoshop.”

While it might not be anything new to claim that a signature on a contract is a forgery, especially if you do not want to acknowledge that you signed the document in question, the next line of defense is certainly an ‘all-in’ play. During the interview with Avidan, he said that Mamadie Touré was “not his [the deceased President’s] wife. Not even sleeping with him. Then he added, “She is a lobbyist. Like a thousand others.” What this means for a defense under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is if the payments were made but they were not to a foreign government official or spouse, it might not be covered under the FCPA. The problem with this defense is that you do have to admit that (1) the contracts exist and (2) the payments were made or promised. So you had better hope that the jury believes it when you claim the counter-party to the contract was not the wife of the President.

And that ladies and gentlemen is Dog Bite defense No. 4.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

Using Bribery and Corruption to Steal Business – A Thyestean Feast?

Not much beats the ancient Greek House of Atreus for dramatic gore: infanticide, patricide, fratricide, filicide, matricide, cannibalism, incest and about every other horror which can befall one family occurs in the various stories of this, the ruling family of Mycenae. One of the most horrific stories involves the brothers Atreus and Thyestes. After Atreus steals the throne from Thyestes, Thyestes seeks his revenge by sleeping with Atreus’ wife Aerope. Atreus then invites Thyestes to a reconciliation banquet where he serves the roasted heads of Atreus’ two sons on platters as the main course. Atreus then puts a curse on Atreus and all his offspring, which lasted throughout Greek antiquity (i.e. longer than the Curse of the Bambino or Curse of the Billy Goat). To this day a Thyestean Feast is synonymous as cannibalistic feast. In other words, at what cost did you really prevail?

I thought about the above myth in the context of the arrest of two articles I wrote about yesterday which appeared in the Weekend Edition of the Financial Times (FT) about the arrest of Frederic Cilins, a French citizen, for seeking to obstruct a federal grand jury investigation about alleged Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violations. The two articles were “Contracts link BSGR to alleged bribes” (mine rights article) and “FBI sting says that ‘agent’ sought to have mining contracts destroyed” (FBI sting article). Both articles were by the same triumvirate of FT reporters, Tom Burgis, Misha Glenny and Cynthia O’Murchu.

To recap, the articles revolved around allegations that “The resources arm of Beny Steinmetz Group agreed to pay $2m to the wife of an African president to help it secure rights to one of the world’s richest untapped mineral deposits, according to documents seen by the Financial Times”. These payments were allegedly memorialized in “Copies of two contracts from 2007 and 2008, apparently signed by BSGR’s representatives in the mineral-rich west African nation of Guinea, set out agreements for the company to make payments and transfer shares to Mamadie Touré, wife of the then president Lansana Conté.”

The FBI sting article also revealed a bit more of the history of the underlying mining rights at issue. The Australian company Rio Tinto “held the rights to the whole of Simandou, a mountain range groaning with iron ore in Guinea’s remote interior, for a decade.” But in August, 2008, the Conté government withdrew the mining group’s concession, “saying it had taken too long to develop a mine.” In December 2008, just days before the dictator’s death, the then Guinean government assigned over half the rights of Simandou to BSGR. The FT also reported that “One African mining veteran described BSGR’s sale as the “best private mining deal of our generation.”” After spending $160m developing its assets in Guinea, 18 months later, in April 2010, BSGR sold a 51% stake of its Guinean venture to Vale of Brazil for $2.5bn.

The FT also reported that after the transfer of mining rights from Rio Tinto to BSGR, another mining entity, “Vale of Brazil, the world’s biggest iron ore miner, bought a 51 per cent in BSR’s Guinea assets in April 2010. Late last year, as a Guinean government committee levelled corruption allegations against BSGR, Vale put the Simandou project on hold. Earlier this month, it suspended payments on the $2.5bn it agreed to pay for its stake.”

Now all of the above are only allegations at this point and BSGR has clearly stated that it believes the allegations have no merit. As the mining rights article noted, “BSGR said in a statement to the FT on Friday: “Allegations of fraud in obtaining our mining rights in Guinea are entirely baseless. We are confident that BSGR’s position in Guinea will be fully vindicated.””

But under such a scenario, what might be the cost to be to a company which engages in such conduct. Fortunately we have somewhat evolved past the blood feuds that the ancients Greeks engaged in were they wronged. We have developed the litigation system to help redress violations of law. In an interesting note, even this was foreshadowed in the Greek myths where the final play about the House of Atreus involved a trial rather than blood revenge.

In the above scenario, what might be some of the legal rights of the parties listed? In an article entitled “Use of the FCPA in State-Law Unfair Competition Cases”, Edward Little, Jr. explored the question of whether the FCPA can serve as the basis as a predicate act for civil liability under state unfair competition laws. He makes a powerful case that such lawsuits may be the next frontier for FCPA cases.

Little next noted that the violation of the FCPA may provide a basis for civil liability under federal or state anti-trust laws, “especially when it is proved that the foreign bribery had an anti-competitive effect within the United States.” Little pointed to the example of two Phillip Morris subsidiaries that bribed officials in several South American countries “to obtain price controls on tobacco.” There was also a recent FCPA/anti-trust enforcement action against Bridgestone which may provide such a trigger.

Little turned to state unfair competition laws which, if based on the Revised Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, can “provide severe penalties for violations of federal and state laws when committed in trade or commerce.” These penalties can include treble damages and attorneys’ fees. He pointed to a currently pending litigation matter styled “Newmarket Corp. v. Innospec, Inc. Civil Action No. 10-503-HEH (E.D Va.)” in which Newmarket has brought claims under the Sherman Act, the Robinson-Patman Act and the state of Virginia Business Conspiracy Act. This state law makes illegal “combinations of two or more persons for the purpose of willfully and maliciously injuring another in his…business…”

Most states have some type of law which broadly declares that “unfair methods of competition are…unlawful.” If a company admits to guilt under the FCPA the facts of liability are laid out in a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA). There is some discussion of the amount of bribes paid, usually referencing both the monetary value of the contract or other business obtained through the conduct, which laid the predicate for the FCPA violation. Lastly, there is often a specific amount of money identified as profit disgorgement that is remitted to the government. Doesn’t this sound something like “Did the defendant engage in illegal conduct which impacted the plaintiff?” and “If so, what are the plaintiff’s damages?”

As a recovering trial lawyer, I was proud to engage in a profession which can trace its roots back to ancient Greece. As a lawyer, who specializes in the FCPA, I wonder if a company which uses corruption and bribery to steal or even procure a contract or business might find that the cost of obtaining such business is too high if they are forced to defend themselves in a civil trial and pay out the amount of damages that their conduct caused. Indeed, might it even be the modern day equivalent to a Thyestean Feast?

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

Election Day – Just Who is a Foreign Government Official?

Ed. Note-we continue our series of guest posts from our colleague Mary Shaddock Jones, who today looks at the issue of foreign government officials under the FCPA. Both she and I urge you to exercise that most important right of all Americans–to vote for the candidate of your choice.

Today is a monumental day for the United States – Election 2012.  I am writing this blog on Monday, October 22, and as such, have no idea who will actually be elected as the next president of the United States.  However, regardless of whom you voted for or whether they won or lost – it is always important to keep in mind that we as a nation are blessed to be a democracy.  Let us never lose sight of the importance of freedom of speech, and the concomitant duty that freedom imposes upon us all, to speak up for what we believe is right or wrong.  Speaking of which, this leads me to today’s topic – the Haiti Telecom case.

In 2009 the Department of Justice charged Juan Diaz with conspiracy to make corrupt payments to Haitian officials for the purpose of securing business advantages from Haiti’s state-owned telecommunications company.  In October 2011, Joel Esquenazi and Carlos Rodriquez, the former president and vice president of Terra Telecommunications, were sentenced for their roles in a scheme to bribe officials in Haiti’s state-owned telecom company.  Esquenazi received 15 years, the longest sentence imposed in the history of the FCPA and Rodriquez received 7 years behind bars.

Both men have appealed their convictions, and one of the key  issues on appeal is “Whether Esquenazi (Rodriquez) is entitled to an acquittal because employees of Haiti Teleco were not “foreign officials” within the  meaning of FCPA simply because the National Bank of Haiti owned shares of Haiti Teleco and the Haitian government appoints board members and directors”.

The Brief filed by Appellant, United States v. Joel Esquenazi, No 11-15331 (7th Cir, May 9, 2010) poses the following argument “ Esquenazi is also entitled to an acquittal on all FCPA-based counts because the term “instrumentality” in the FCPA should be construed to encompass only foreign entities performing governmental functions similar to departments or agencies.  Here, the Government failed to establish that Haiti Teleco performed a governmental function.  Despite the Government’s continued reliance on the premise that state-ownership or state-control of a business entity makes that entity and “instrumentality” of the government under the FCPA, that theory was explicitly considered by the drafters of the FCPA, but not included in the statute, and is inconsistent with the language of the statute as drafted.  Because so many individuals and companies prosecuted by the Government prefer to resolve their cases prior to trial, the validity of the Government’s theory has seldom been tested in court, and never before by a United States Court of Appeals.  This case presents an opportunity to review the Government’s aggressive enforcement of a less-than-clear federal statute and properly limit its scope to corrupt payments made to “foreign officials,” including employees of “instrumentalities” that perform governmental functions similar to governmental departments and agencies”.   I have no reason to doubt that all of the above is absolutely true – but do you want to spend millions of dollars defending your actions and trying to keep your CEO out of jail based upon the meaning of the term “instrumentality”?

The practical pointer for today’s blog is this – doesn’t it make more sense for companies to prohibit all forms of bribery both commercial bribery (improper payment made with the corrupt intent to a private, rather than a governmental, person, company, or other entity in order to receive a business advantage) and governmental bribery?  The U.K. Bribery Act takes this stance by prohibiting bribery in the private sector.  Furthermore, the U.K. Act doesn’t just limit the criminal offense to bribing foreign officials, but also prohibits both the offer and the acceptance of a bribe.  I am not advocating that the United States expand the reach of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to include international bribery of private entities or individuals.  However, from a practical perspective – doesn’t it make sense, and send a more unified message to your employees when you say “We do not permit bribes in any way, shape or form. Period, Full Stop”?

Consider the following Policy Statement:

It is Company policy to comply with all applicable anti-bribery laws, including but not limited to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the U.K. Bribery Act, and all applicable local laws where Company operates, and to accurately reflect all transactions on Company’s books and records.  It is also Company’s policy to require those agents, consultants and business partners who work on Company’s behalf to comply with these same laws and practices.  Bribery is a criminal offense in most countries in which we operate and corrupt acts expose the Company and our employees to the risk of prosecution, fines and imprisonment as well as endangering the Company’s reputation. Fines assessed against individuals may and will not be reimbursed by the Company.

This policy prohibits all forms of bribery.  As such, all Company employees, and all those acting for or on the Company’s behalf, are strictly prohibited from offering, paying, soliciting or accepting bribes or kick-backs, including facilitation payments to any person or entity for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business or gaining any improper business advantage, regardless of whether or not the person or entity is governmental or private. Third parties, contractors, agents, representatives and intermediaries who act on behalf of the foundation must comply with these anti-bribery provisions. This policy also requires due diligence of Business Partners, internal approvals, books and records entries, and it imposes records retention requirements in key risk areas related to Government Officials and Business Partners.  It requires audits to help ensure compliance, as well as appropriate scrutiny of acquisition and joint venture target companies for compliance with this policy, particularly where the target companies have had government sales and other significant governmental interaction.

Like other facets of a Company’s operations, its  anti-corruption policy and/or Code of Conduct  should  be tailored to meet its particular business needs, policies, and procedures.  However, when drafting your code of conduct you should ask yourself:  What do you want your company to stand for?

In 1919, King George the V dedicated November 7^th as a day of remembrance for members of the armed forces who were killed during World War I.  The joint venture by the U.S. and Great Britain to defeat the enemy in both World Wars is an excellent segue to discuss the risks and rewards of Foreign Joint Ventures.  Stay tuned.

  Mary Shaddock Jones has practiced law for 25 years in Texas and Louisiana primarily in the international marine and oil service industries.  She was of the first individuals in the United States to earn TRACE Anti-bribery Specialist Accreditation (TASA).  She can be reached at msjones@msjllc.com or 337-513-0335. Her associate, Miller M. Flynt, assisted in the preparation of this series.  He can be reached at mmflynt@msjllc.com.

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This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication.

Wal-Mart and the Death Knell for Amending the FCPA

In a development that can only be called stunning, the New York Times (NYT) on Sunday, April 22, 2012, reported, in an article entitled “Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level Struggle”, on an alleged multi-year bribery and corruption scheme advanced by Wal-Mart in its Mexico operations. The alleged bribery scheme was truly breath-taking in its scope and operation. I am certain others will write about it extensively, beginning as soon as today, and I certainly will review the article in greater depth in upcoming blog posts, the first thing that struck me is that this case will sound the death knell for any efforts to amend the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Whether you believe such efforts constitute badly needed reform because the Department of Justice (DOJ) has gone too far in enforcement; that any amendments would water down the FCPA and simply make bribery easier; or perhaps some minor clarification of certain terms and definitions is needed; I think you can kiss all of that good-bye.

Allegations

As reported in the NYT article, Wal-Mart executives at its Mexico subsidiary, Wal-Mart de Mexico, “had orchestrated a campaign of bribery to win market dominance. In its rush to build stores, he said, the company had paid bribes to obtain permits in virtually every corner of the country.” This alleged bribery scheme included routine payments to Mexican governmental officials for “every conceivable type of permit, license, piece of paper, or any other type of approval needed or required to plan, build and operate a Wal-Mart in Mexico. Literally, millions of peso was paid out for everything from routine approvals to extraordinary consents.”

To facilitate this alleged bribery scheme Wal-Mart de Mexico kept two sets of books on the illegal payments through third party agents, which were made to Mexican governmental officials. As reported, Wal-Mart de Mexico “targeted mayors and city council members, obscure urban planners, low-level bureaucrats who issued permits  – anyone with the power to thwart Wal-Mart’s growth. The bribes, he said, bought zoning approvals, reductions in environmental impact fees and the allegiance of neighborhood leaders.” These payments were coded in a manner which hid their true basis. Later, reporting sent to the home office, in Bentonville, AR, were scrubbed so that the illegal payments were moniked as “legal fees”.

The time frames of the events reported were from the 1990’s to 2006. It is unclear if any alleged bribes were paid after this time. The purpose of the alleged bribes “was to build hundreds of new stores so fast that competitors would not have time to react. Bribes, he explained, accelerated growth. They got zoning maps changed. They made environmental objections vanish. Permits that typically took months to process magically materialized in days. What we were buying was time”. The article also reported that “Wal-Mart de Mexico was the company’s brightest success story, pitched to investors as a model for future growth. (Today, one in five Wal-Mart stores is in Mexico.)”

The End of FCPA Amendment

So how does all of this portend the end of efforts to amend the FCPA? As reported, “Wal-Mart’s ethics policy offered clear direction. “Never cover up or ignore an ethics problem,” the policy states.” What do you think a compliance defense would do for Wal-Mart about now? Wal-Mart prided itself on its world-wide FCPA anti-corruption compliance program. The claim that companies would act more ethically and in compliance if they could rely on a compliance defense would seem to be negated by facts reported about Wal-Mart. Do these facts seem like a rogue employee or even junta of rogue Mexican employees going off on their own? Whatever your thoughts on that question may be, it certainly appears that having a best practices compliance program did not lead to Wal-Mart doing business more ethically. And what if Wal-Mart’s corporate headquarters in Bentonville AR was not involved in any illegal conduct or even kept in the dark by Wal-Mart de Mexico? What does that say about having a robust compliance program?

Amending the FCPA to protect corporate headquarters in the US from liability under the doctrine of Respondeat Superior? You can forget about that happening in a heartbeat. No one can argue with anything close to a straight face that this problem was exclusive to Mexico. The corporate parent received the benefits from any profits made due to the bribery so it is difficult to imagine why a corporation should not be a part of any enforcement action. And as the FCPA Professor recently noted in a blog post, entitled “A Q&A with Claudius Sokenu on Where Else?””, that question may be close to someone’s thoughts at the DOJ about now.

How about that grace period for those companies which have a compliance program and self-reporting violations? Wal-Mart corporate was made aware of the allegations set forth in the NYT article in 2004 and chose not to self-report. As noted in the article “Neither American nor Mexican law enforcement officials were notified. None of Wal-Mart de Mexico’s leaders were disciplined. Indeed, its chief executive, Eduardo Castro-Wright, identified by the former executive as the driving force behind years of bribery, was promoted to vice chairman of Wal-Mart in 2008.” Indeed Wal-Mart did not report (I cannot say self-disclose) any FCPA investigation to the DOJ and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) until after the NYT notified those agencies that it was investigating these allegations back in 2011. As stated in the article, “Until this article, the allegations and Wal-Mart’s investigation had never been publicly disclosed.” How’s that for transparency in a publicly held US company? If a company as ethical as Wal-Mart will not self-disclose, what does that say about the rest of corporate America and its thinking on self-disclosure?

How about those claims that US companies were being unfairly prosecuted because they did not know their counter-parties were employees of state owned enterprises or that the person they were lavishly entertaining was an official of a foreign government? You mean those “targeted mayors and city council members, obscure urban planners, low-level bureaucrats who issued permits – anyone with the power to thwart Wal-Mart’s growth”? Whatever the merits of those companies who said “it’s not fair – we didn’t know” they were a government official – waive that proposed amendment bye-bye, with both arms over your head.

So whether you were pro or anti-FCPA amendment, I think that you have Wal-Mart to thank for the fact that any such thoughts now will Rest in Peace as this new saga in FCPA enforcement moves forward.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2012

Wynn Casinos and Charitable Donations under the FCPA

The recent events surrounding Wynn Casinos and its now former director, Kazuo Okada, have almost been breath-taking in their family feud nature. Indeed in an article in the March 2, 2012 edition of the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), entitled “The Family Feud That Could Cost Combatants Billions”, reporter John Bussey called it the “slug-it-out-divorce” by Steve Wynn from his former partner, Okada. Wynn provided the opening salvo in this battle of titans by summarily booting Okada off the Wynn Casino Board of Directors and “forcibly cashed out” his stake in the company, all for alleged violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).

However, Okada appears to have fired back a FCPA-based salvo of his own. In the same edition of the WSJ, another article reported on Wynn Casinos and another potential FCPA violation. It involved a gift of $135 Million by Wynn Casinos to a foundation which supports the University of Macau. The article on this donation was entitled “Macau School Ties Roil Wynn Resorts” and was co-authored by Kate O’Keefe and Alexandra Berzon. They reported that Okada had gone to a Nevada state court to request an order that Wynn Casinos “give him access to documents tied to the donations.” One of the reasons Okada detailed in his court request was to determine if the gift by Wynn Casinos to the University of Macau was “an appropriate use of corporate funds.”

I would also ask whether the gift was proper under the FCPA. There is not much definitive guidance for charitable donations under the FCPA. I have summarized the available information as follows.

I.                   Opinion Releases

There have been four Opinion Releases in the area of charitable donations under the FCPA. In each Opinion Release, the Department of Justice (DOJ) indicated that it would not initiate prosecutions based upon the fact scenarios presented to it.

A. 95-01

This request was from a US based energy company that planned to operate a plant in

South Asia, in an area where was no medical facility. The energy company planned to donate $10 million for equipment and other costs to a medical complex that was under construction nearby. The donation would be made through a US charitable organization and a South Asian LLC.

The energy company stated it would do three things with respect to this donation.

1. Before releasing funds, the energy company said it would require certifications from the officers of all entities involved that none of the funds would be used in violation of the FCPA.
2. It would ensure that none of the persons employed by the charity or the LLC were affiliated with the foreign government.
3. The energy company would require audited financial reports detailing the disposition of the funds.

B.   97-02

This request was from a US based utility company that planned to operate a plant in

Asia, in an area where there was no primary-level school. The utility company planned to donate $100,000 for construction and other costs to a government entity that proposed to build an elementary school nearby. Before releasing funds, the utility company said it would require certain guarantees from the government entity regarding the project, including that the funds would be used exclusively for the school.

C.   06-01

This request was from a Delaware company doing business in Africa. The company desired to initiate a pilot project under which it would contribute $25,000 to the Ministry of Finance in the country to improve local enforcement of anti-counterfeiting laws. The contribution would fund incentive awards to local customs officials, which is needed because this African country is a major transit point for illicit trade and the local customs officials have no incentive to prevent the contraband.

The company said that along with the contribution, it would execute an agreement with the Ministry to encourage exchange of information and establish procedures and criteria for incentive awards. The company said that if the program is successful, the awards would continue to be funded as needed, and the company will seek the participation of its competitors in this program.

The company would implement at least five safeguards to ensure the funds would be used as intended, including:

1. Payments to a valid government account, subject to internal audits.
2. Payments only upon the confirmation that goods seized were in fact counterfeit.
3. The Ministry would identify award candidates without input from the company and would provide evidence that funds were used properly.
4. The company would monitor the program’s effectiveness.
5. Records will be required to be kept and be available for inspection for a period of time.

D.   10-02

A US Company desired to move from a charitable entity model to a for profit model in the area of micro-financing. To do so it was required to make a large cash donation to a charity in the country in question. The company engaged in three rounds of due diligence in which it determined that the most favorable candidate had a government official on its Board of Directors but that under the laws of the country in question, the government official could not receive compensation to sit as a Board member. After initially listing the 3 levels of due diligence in which the company had engaged prior to finalizing its choice of local entity to receive the donation in question; the DOJ noted that the donation ‘requested’ of the US Company would be subject to the following controls:

1. Payments of the donations would be staggered over a period of eight quarters rather than in one lump sum.
2. Ongoing monitoring and auditing of the funds use for a period of five years.
3. The donations would be specifically utilized for the building of infrastructure.
4. The funds could not be transferred to either the charities parent or any other affiliated entity.
5. The funds would not be paid to the parent of the organization receiving the grant and there was an absolute prohibition on compensating Board Members.
6. The proposed grant agreement under which the funds would be donated had significant anti-corruption provisions which included a requirement that the local organization receiving the funds adopt an anti-corruption policy and that company making the donation shall receive full access to the local organization’s books and records.
7. Right to terminate the agreement and recall the funds if evidence was found that “reasonably suggests” a breach of compliance provisions.

II.                Sole Enforcement Action

There appears to be only one FCPA enforcement action based entirely upon charitable giving. It is the case of Schering-Plough Poland which paid a $500,000 civil penalty assessed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2008. (For a copy of the SEC Compliant, click here.) As reported in the FCPA Blog, the Company’s Polish subsidiary made improper payments to a charitable organization named the Chudow Castle Foundation, which was headed by an individual who was the Director of the Silesian Health Fund during the time period in question. Schering-Plough is a pharmaceutical company and the Director of the Health Fund provided money for the purchase of products manufactured by Schering-Plough as well as influencing medical institutions, such as hospitals, in their purchase of pharmaceutical products through the allocation of health fund resources. In addition to the above, the SEC found that Schering-Plough did not accurately record these charitable donations on the company’s books and records.

III.              Mendelsohn Guidance

The FCPA Blog reported, in a posting entitled “When is Charity a Bribe?”, that when asked about the guidelines regarding requests for charitable giving and the FCPA, then Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section at the DOJ Mark Mendelsohn, said that any such request must be evaluated on its own merits. He advocated a “common sense” approach in identifying and clearing Red Flags. Some of the areas of inquiry would include answers to the following questions.

1. Is there a nexus between the charity and any government entity from which the company is seeking a decision?
2. If the governmental decision-maker holds a position at the charity, that’s a red flag.
3. Is the donation consistent with the company’s overall pattern of charitable contributions?
4. If one donation or a series of them is more than the company has made to any other charity in the past five years, that’s a red flag too.
5. Who made the request for the donation and how was that request made?

So what of Wynn Casinos and its $135 Million donation? Did Wynn perform the types of analysis suggested by the Opinion Releases? The WSJ article reports that the Chairman of Wynn’s Committee “told analysts last month that the donation was vetted in advance by outside experts,” relative to the FCPA. The donation is apparently not for construction or other infrastructure projects but “the gift will support academic activities.” The WSJ article also reports that the Board of the University foundation includes “current and former government officials” and “a member of the committee to elect Macau’s chief executive”, who is the chancellor of the university. Lastly the article reports that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has “begun an inquiry into the donation.”

We may reasonably conclude from both of these WSJ articles that Wynn Casinos will be in for a long, long road of FCPA investigations.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2012

The Mercury 7, Chuck Duross and Continuous Improvement to Your Compliance Program

Next Monday, February 20, 2012 is the 50^th anniversary of the first American manned orbital space flight. It made John Glenn a national hero and heralded America’s move into direct competition with the (then) Soviet Union for the race to put the first man on the moon. In an article in the New York Times, entitled, “At 90, John Glenn Looks Back” reporter John Noble Wilford wrote about this flight, the Mercury program and Glenn based upon two interviews with the ex-astronaut and former Senator from Ohio. This coming Saturday, Glenn will be honored at Cape Canaveral at a celebration of the remaining members of the Mercury space team.

These original seven astronauts, known as the “Mercury 7” were true American heroes. Anyone interested in science in the slightest bit in the 60s knew who these men were. They were featured in Life Magazine with their families and each of their space flights were covered on live television by all three networks. Glenn is one of two of the original Mercury astronauts still alive, the other being Scott Carpenter, who will also be honored on Saturday. The remaining astronauts of the Mercury 7 were Deke Slayton, Gus Grissom, Alan Sheppard, Gordon Cooper and Wally Schirra. They were immortalized for a later generation by Tom Wolfe, in his book, “The Right Stuff”.

So what is the compliance angle here? It is that NASA created an entire system, consisting of processes and procedures to put a man on the moon. Were there setbacks? Yes, the Apollo 1 tragedy still resonates at NASA today. However NASA moved forward and fulfilled President Kennedy’s vow to put a man on the moon by the end of the decade. NASA did this largely by continuous improvement of its system.

I thought about this article while reading the tweets coming from my “This Week in FCPA” co-host Howard Sklar last night. Howard is in Hong Kong, chairing the Anti-Corruption Asia Congress this week. Yesterday, Chuck Duross, Deputy Chief, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) Unit, United States Department of Justice (DOJ) spoke to the event and Howard tweeted some of the highlights of Chuck’s remarks. They included:

• To combat anti-corruption, there needs to be political will, as it requires prosecution of bribe takers as well as bribe payers.
• Do not assume that your company is immune from FCPA liability just because you are not a US company. Here you should note that 9 out of the 10 FCPA settlements of all-time are with non-US based companies.
• Charging individuals leading to more trials. Last year the DOJ tried 3,000 cases last year and there were 4 FCPA trials. In Chuck’s words, (as tweeted by Howard) “Let’s all take a breath”.
• There was a FCPA trial first: a Foreign official, charged with money laundering, testified against the business bribe-payer. Here it is important to note that the DOJ can and will be charge foreign government offices.
• Turning to some specifics of compliance programs, Duross remarked that companies using half-measures to prevent bribery are at risk.
• Companies will receive a significant benefit for having robust compliance programs: lower fines, DPA/NPA, even not having a monitor. He gave some examples; Noble got an NPA, paid $2.6 MM, no monitor. Pride which sustained substantial cooperation with the DOJ, received below-the-guideline range penalty of 55%.
• Turning to the facilitation payment exception, Duross said that it is a narrow one: it’s usually illegal locally where it is paid, discouraged in US, illegal internationally.
• He emphasized that third party agents need to be properly vetted.
• He noted that other violations of US law often accompany FCPA violations, such as anti-competitive behavior, trade violations, embezzlement, and money laundering.
• He emphasized that your company should do what it can do regarding your compliance program. If necessary, at first, change the tone at the top. Make it clear that illegal acts will not be tolerated. But you must mean it. Vocal support is necessary, but management’s commitment cannot end there. Compliance is a cost center: management must back up vocal support of compliance with budget and resources.
• Next Duross suggested that companies reevaluate internal controls. They should take the time to review and test, think critically about risk.
• The DOJ looks at proactive compliance efforts when deciding how and whether to prosecute. He also suggested that your company might consider joining an integrity pact.
• Howard’s tweets ended with this suggestion; that it is important to TEST your compliance program. You can run a fake invoice through your system which has information which should raise has red flags. You can run information through the hotline and see what happens. That impresses the DOJ.

The last few points raised by Duross emphasized to me the process of compliance. But as important as putting the program in place is testing the program and using the lessons learned to upgrade and update your compliance program. While we celebrate John Glenn, the Mercury 7 and NASA for what they achieved, we should remember that NASA used continuous improvement in its space program. These same techniques can be brought to bear in your compliance program. Based upon the remarks of Chuck Duross, such monitoring, improvement and upgrades will be counted in a positive light by the DOJ if you are involved in a FCPA enforcement action.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2012

Reading a Crystal Ball? Guidance on Instrumentality under the FCPA-Part II

In Part I of Reading a Crystal Ball? Guidance on Instrumentality under the FCPA, we listed the factors which the three federal district courts have set forth for the determination of whether an entity is an instrumentality under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). In Part II, we will review these factors to see if there is any pattern which we can suggest to the compliance practitioner or indeed the US Chamber of Commerce, which desires to bring some ‘clarity’ to this question, all of which might help an understanding of when the FCPA applies to a transaction or business partner. The chart below consolidates the factors raised by the courts and are set out for reference:

Factor	Lindsey	Carson	Esquenazi
1	Entity provides services to citizens, in many cases all in country	Foreign states characterization of the entity and its employees	Does the entity provides services to citizens and inhabitants of country
2	Are key officers/directors government employees or appointed by government employees	Foreign State’s control over the entity	Are key officers/directors government employees or appointed by government  employees
3	Is entity financed by or in large measure by government appropriations or through government mandates	Purpose of the entity’s activities	Extent of government ownership or does government provide financial support
4	Is entity vested with or does it exercise exclusive/controlling power to administer its designated functions	The Entity’s obligations and privileges under country’s laws, including whether it exercises exclusive/controlling power to administer its designated functions	Extent of obligations and privileges under its country’s laws, including whether it exercises exclusive/controlling power to administer its designated functions
5	Is entity widely perceived and understood to be providing official functions	Circumstances around the entities creation	Is entity widely perceived and understood to be providing official functions
6		The foreign state’s extent of ownership of the entity, including the level offinancial support by the state

I.                   Overlap?

There is clear overlap in the Lindsey and Esquenazi factors.

Identical – does the government appoint the officers/directors and is the entity understood to be owned by or an agency of the government in the home country? In Lindsey and Esquenazi, the courts agree on factors (2) Are key officers/directors government employees or appointed by government employees; and (5) Is the entity widely perceived and understood to be providing official functions?

Similar – are the services provided by the entity available to all citizens of the home country? In Lindsey and Esquenazi, the similar factors are (1) Does the entity provide services to the inhabitants of the country?

Related – does the government finance the entity in question and does it own the entity? Does it exercise exclusive/controlling power to administer its designated functions and the extent of obligations and privileges under its country’s laws? In Lindsey and Esquenazi, two courts had nearly similar factors, but the Esquenazi court added an additional component. In factor (3) The Lindsey court inquired ‘is the entity financed by or in large measure by government appropriations or through government mandates’ and the Esquenazi court added to this inquiry ‘the extent of government ownership.’ In factor (4) the Lindsey court inquired, ‘Is entity vested with or does it exercise exclusive/controlling power to administer its designated functions’ and the Esquenazi court added the factor of ‘Extent of obligations and privileges under its country’s laws’.

II.      Compare and Contrast

At first blush it may appear that the Carson court takes a slightly different approach. If one examines the Carson factors in detail they are not significantly different from Lindsey and Esquenazi. One clear factor that Carson has in common with Lindsey and Esquenazi is the factor of the entity’s obligations and privileges under its country’s laws, including whether it exercises exclusive/controlling power to administer its designated functions. Carson combines two of the Esquenazi factor of the extent of government ownership and financial support by said government. While Lindsey does not speak to financial ownership it does have the factor of government financing and government appointment of officers and directors. Carson speaks to the entity’s purpose while Lindsey and Esquenazi list the factor of providing services to the country’s citizens. Indeed the only factor included in Carson and not found in Lindsey and Esquenazi is the following: the circumstances around the entity’s creation. It is incumbent to note that both the Lindsey and Carson court opinions and the Esquenazi jury instructions all have language that indicates these factors are not exclusive, and no single factor will determine whether an entity is an instrumentality of a foreign government.

III.             Reading the Crystal Ball

With all this information in mind what inferences can be drawn by a compliance officer, or indeed the US Chamber of Commerce, for guidance on whether a business is an instrumentality under the FCPA? Reviewing the foregoing, the factors can be distilled down to a manageable list, which I believe is as follows:

1. Ownership/Financial Control – There is no percentage amount listed but the inclusion of financial control would clearly indicate that anything over 50% would be a significant factor.
2. Actual control is key in all three court decisions. In Lindsey and Esquenazi, it is characterized as the government’s right to appoint key officers and directors. In Carson, it is called government control. But this means that if actual control is exercised by the government in question, it may trump the 50% guidance stated above.
3. Privileges and Obligations are also mentioned in all three. Does the entity have the right to control its own functions?
4. Financing – Is the entity a for-profit entity, financed through its own revenues or does it depend on financing by its government?
5. Perception is Reality – André Agassi’s immortal words appear again. If it is widely perceived to be providing an official function, then it is an instrumentality under the FCPA.

That leaves Carson factor 5, the circumstances around the entity’s creation. While I believe this could well be the last factor in your analysis, it can be one which is ascertained. Most government entities will disclose how they were formed; this information can be found on their website or within their company history. If you cannot determine how a business was formed perhaps you need to think hard about doing business with them.

So that is my reading of the Crystal Ball. You may have a different reading but for my money the information is out there to be read and indeed it may not be all that difficult.

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This Week in FCPA is back. Howard Sklar and I continue our conversation on all things FCPA and global anti-corruption. The audio is up. Click here.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2011