Distributors under the FCPA

If there was ever a question that distributors were covered under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), in 2012, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) made it emphatically clear that this class of entities in a company’s sales chain would be treated that same as any other sales agent, reseller or any other entity which sells a US company’s products outside the United States. While the terms agent, reseller and distributor have distinct definitions in the legal world, they no longer do for FCPA purposes.

The three enforcement actions which made clear that there were no distinctions between agents and distributors in 2012 were the Smith & Nephew, Inc., (S&N) Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) for criminal FCPA violations, the Oracle SEC Complaint for books and records violations and the Eli Lilly and Company (Lilly) SEC Compliant for books and records violations. Each of these enforcement actions had different FCPA violations and they each revealed separate steps which a company should take to both prevent and detect FCPA violations in their company.

Smith & Nephew

On February 1, 2012, the DOJ announced that it entered into a DPA with Smith & Nephew, Inc., a medical equipment manufacturer, for violations of the FCPA. The violations revolved around Greek distributors of S&N who paid bribes to Greek doctors so that they would purchase and use S&N products. According to the Criminal Information, “S&N, certain of its executives, employees, and affiliates agreed to sell to [the] Greek Distributor at full list price, then pay the amount of the distributor discount – between 25 and 40 percent of the sales made by [the] Greek Distributor – to an off-shore shell company controlled by [the] Greek Distributor, in order to provide off-the-books funds for [the] Greek Distributor to pay cash incentives and other things of value to publicly-employed Greek HCPs to induce the purchase of S&N products, while concealing the payments.” Additionally, S&N “falsely recorded or otherwise accounted for the payments to the shell companies on its books and records as ‘marketing services’ in order to conceal the true nature of the payments in the consolidated books and records of S&N and GmbH.”

Oracle

Oracle got into FCPA hot water because its Indian subsidiary directed its distributor to set up a separate slush fund of monies which could be, and were, used to pay monies to persons unknown. As specified in the SEC Compliant, “certain Oracle India employees created extra margins between the end user and distributor price and directed the distributors to hold the extra margin in side funds. Oracle India’s employees made these margins large enough to ensure a side fund existed to pay third parties. “At the direction of the Oracle India employees, the distributor then made payments out of the side funds to third parties, purportedly for marketing and development expenses.” The SEC Compliant noted that “about $2.2 million in funds were improperly “parked” with the Company’s distributors.” To compound this problem, employees of Oracle India concealed the existence of this side fund from Oracle in the US and hence there was an incorrect accounting in Oracle’s books and records.

Lilly

In Brazil, Lilly used the distributor model to market its drugs through third-party distributors who then resold these products to public and private entities. As noted by Matt Ellis, in his post entitled “Eli Lilly’s Distributor in Brazil: The Non-Obvious FCPA Risk”, the discounts that distributors typically receive from manufacturers such as Lilly can be problematic under the FCPA because “enforcement officials can see these discounts as potential “loose money” that can be used for bribe payments. This is especially the case when the distributor is engaging in other activities on behalf of the producer, like marketing, licensing, and customs clearance.”

This was the situation that Lilly found itself in in Brazil, where Lilly sold drugs to distributors who then resold the products to both public and private entities. It was the classic distributor model where Lilly sold the drugs to the distributors at a discount and then the distributors would resell the products “at a higher price and then took their discount as compensation.” There was a fairly standard discount given to the distributors which generally ranged “between 6.5% and 15%, with the majority of distributors in Brazil receiving a 10% discount.”

However, in early 2007, at the request of a Lilly sales manager, the company awarded an unusually high discount of between 17% and 19% to a distributor for the sale of a Lilly drug to the government of one of the states of Brazil. The distributor used approximately 6% of this additional discount to create a fund to pay Brazilian government representatives to purchase the Lilly drugs from him. Further, the Lilly sales manager who requested this unusual discount was aware of the bribery scheme. Moreover, this increase in the discount was approved by the company with no further inquiry as to the reason for the request or to substantiate the basis for such an unusually high discount. If there were any internal controls they were not followed.

Prevention and Detection

These three separate bribery schemes call for three different but overlapping responses. In the case with Lilly, the SEC Complaint noted the following “Lilly-Brazil’s pricing committee approved the discounts without further inquiry. The policies and procedures in place to flag unusual distributor discounts were deficient.” Lastly, as stated by Ellis, “It noted that the company relied on representations of the sales and marketing manager without adequate verification and analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the transactions.”

The Lilly enforcement action also makes clear the need for internal audit to follow up with ongoing monitoring and auditing. Internal audit can be used to help determine the reasonableness of a commission rate outside the accepted corporate norm. As noted by Jon Rydberg, of Orchid Advisors, in an article entitled “Eli Lilly’s Remedial Efforts for FCPA Compliance – After the Fact”, the company should be “implementing compliance monitoring and corporate auditing specifically tailored to anti-corruption” for the distributor sales model.

The Oracle enforcement action demonstrates that Oracle needed to institute the proper controls to prevent its employees at Oracle India from creating and misusing the parked funds in the distributor’s account. The Company needed to audit and compare the distributor’s margin against the end user price to ensure excess margins were not being built into the pricing structure. Oracle should have sought to either (1) seek transparency in its dealing with the distributor or (2) audit third party payments made by the distributors on Oracle’s behalf, both of which would have enabled the Company to check that payments were made to appropriate recipients.

What are some of the factors that demonstrate the distributors used by S&N were fraudulent and did not have a legitimate business purpose? It was clear that S&N did not perform sufficient due diligence on these distributors nor did they document any. I would note that the distributor was domiciled in a location separate and apart, the UK, from the sole location it was designed to deliver products or services into, Greece. This clearly demonstrated that the entities were used for a purpose that the company wished to hide from Greek authorities. While it is true that a distributor might sell products into a country different than its domicile, if the products are going into a single country, this should have raised several Red Flags.

However, the biggest indicium of corruption was the amount of the commission paid. The traditional sales model for a distributor has been to purchase a product, take the title, and therefore the risk, and then sell it to an end user. Based upon this sales model, there has been a commission structure more generous than those usually accorded a reseller or sales agent, who is usually only a negotiator between the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and the end user. This difference in taking title, and risk of loss, have led to a cost structure which has provided a deeper discount of pricing for distributors than commission rates paid to resellers or sales agents. The sales structure used by S&N had pricing discounts of between 26-40% off the list price. Further, this money was used precisely to pay bribes to Greek Doctors to use S&N products.

These three enforcement actions make clear that distributors will be treated like any other representative in the sales chain. This means that distributors need to go through the same rigorous due diligence and review, contracts and management going forward as agents or resellers.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

From China to Poland and Brazil-The Lilly FCPA Enforcement Action- Part II

In Parts II and III of my review of the Eli Lilly and Company (Lilly) Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement action brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), I will discuss some the processes and procedures which you can use in your Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) or UK Bribery Act compliance program which should enable you to prevent or detect FPCA violations, similar to those Lilly sustained, as discussed in Part I of these blog posts on the Lilly enforcement action. Today, in Part II, I will discuss the FCPA issues that Lilly faced in China, Brazil and Poland.

As it is a New Year, I would like to start out with listing Paul McNulty’s Three Maxims regarding the effectiveness of a FCPA compliance program. I have been privileged to hear Paul speak many times for several years. These Maxims were the questions he posed to companies when he was in his role as the United States Deputy Attorney General. First, what did you do to prevent it? Second, what did you do to detect it? Third, what did you do to remedy it?

With the McNulty Maxims in mind, Lilly got into FCPA hot water for using four different styles of bribery schemes in four separate countries. In China, the corruption involved employees and bribery payments which were falsely labeled as reimbursement of expenses. In Brazil, the corruption involved a distributor which received a larger than normal discount for Lilly products. The additional revenues generated from this discount were used to pay a bribe. In Poland, the corruption involved charitable donations which were falsely labeled in Lilly’s books and records. These charitable donations were used to induce a Polish government official to approve the purchase of Lilly products; and, finally, Lilly’s subsidiary in Russia, paid bribes to Offshore Agents who were domiciled outside Russia and who performed no services for the compensation they received.

I.                   China

According to the SEC Complaint, in China the FCPA violations centered around various sales representatives who submitted false expense reports to cover bribes which were paid or their supervisors who instructed them to do so. The SEC Complaint noted that although the dollar amounts for the gifts provided to Chinese officials “generally small, the improper payments were wide-spread throughout the [Chinese] subsidiary.” To prevent such actions, a company must train its employees about the requirements of the FCPA, or any other relevant anti-corruption law, regarding what is and is not allowed under such laws. A company must then follow up to monitor and audit such activities. In a sales model which is employee based, internal audit must review the expense reports of its sales representatives as they represent the highest risk of corruption.

II.                Brazil

In Brazil, Lilly used the distributor model to market its drugs through third-party distributors who then resold these products to public and private entities. As noted by Matt Ellis, in his post entitled “Eli Lilly’s Distributor in Brazil: The Non-Obvious FCPA Risk”, the discounts that distributors typically receive from manufacturers such as Lilly can be problematic under the FCPA because “enforcement officials can see these discounts as potential “loose money” that can be used for bribe payments. This is especially the case when the distributor is engaging in other activities on behalf of the producer, like marketing, licensing, and customs clearance.” This was the situation that Lilly found itself in as the standard range of discounts given to distributors was “between 6.5% and 15%, with the majority of distributors in Brazil receiving a 10% discount” but in early 2007, at the request of a Lilly sales manager, the company awarded an unusually high discount of between 17% and 19% to a distributor for the sale of a Lilly drug to the government of one of the states of Brazil. The distributor used approximately 6% of this additional discount to create a fund to pay Brazilian government representatives to purchase the Lilly drugs from him.

a.      Prevent

In the area of prevent, the SEC Complaint noted the following “Lilly-Brazil’s pricing committee approved the discounts without further inquiry. The policies and procedures in place to flag unusual distributor discounts were deficient.” Lastly, as stated by Ellis, “It noted that the company relied on representations of the sales and marketing manager without adequate verification and analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the transactions.” Indeed Kara Brockmeyer, the SEC’s chief FCPA enforcer, stated in the SEC Press Release announcing the matter:

Eli Lilly and its subsidiaries possessed a “check the box” mentality when it came to third-party due diligence. Companies can’t simply rely on paper-thin assurances by employees, distributors, or customers. They need to look at the surrounding circumstances of any payment to adequately assess whether it could wind up in a government official’s pocket.

All of this means that if a discount is outside the normal range typically given to a distributor, a red flag is raised as to why the increased discount was allowed. Simply basing a management decision on the representations of a sales manager is not a sufficient mechanism to clear such a red flag.

b.         Detect

From the detect prong, internal audit needs to follow up with ongoing monitoring and auditing. Internal audit can be used to help determine the reasonableness of a commission rate outside the accepted corporate norm. Further, as noted by Jon Rydberg, of Orchid Advisors, in an article entitled “Eli Lilly’s Remedial Efforts for FCPA Compliance – After the Fact”, the company should be “implementing compliance monitoring and corporate auditing specifically tailored to anti-corruption” for the distributor sales model.

III.             Poland

Here Lilly used charitable donations to a charitable foundation which was, as stated in the SEC Complaint, “founded and administered by the head of one of the regional government health authorities at the same time that the subsidiary was seeking the official’s support for placing Lilly drugs on the government reimbursement list.” There were a total of eight payments made to the charitable foundation. In addition to the charitable donations made, Lilly “falsely characterized the proposed payments”. Lilly had a group which reviewed the request for such donations called the “Medical Grant Committee [MGC]” which approved the payments “largely based on the justification and description in the submitted paperwork.”

a.      Prevent

From the prevent prong, it is clear that if the MGC had adequately reviewed the donation request, it would have determined that the charitable foundation was administered by the same person making the decision over the sale of Lilly products. Indeed, the largest request was made just two days after the government decision maker authorized a large purchase of Lilly products. The SEC Complaint also noted that of there were different corporate justifications for the eight requests for the charitable donations made. So, as noted by Rydberg, there was a failure of corporate governance and financial controls. In its FCPA Guidance, the Department of Justice (DOJ) lists five questions which a company should ask when considering a charitable donation. They are: (1) What is the purpose of the payment? (2) Is the payment consistent with the company’s internal guidelines on charitable giving? (3) Is the payment at the request of a foreign official? (4) Is a foreign official associated with the charity and, if so, can the foreign official make decisions regarding your business in that country? (5) Is the payment conditioned upon receiving business or other benefits?

b.      Detect

From the detect prong, there are several things which can be incorporated into a FCPA compliance program regarding charitable donations. The DOJ has issued several Opinion Releases on charitable donations and based on Opinion Release 10-02, some of the protections a company can do to comply with the FCPA regarding charitable donations are as follows:

1)      Certifications by the recipient that it will comply with the requirements of the FCPA;

2)       Due diligence to confirm that none of the recipient’s officers or directors are affiliated with the foreign government at issue;

3)      A requirement that the recipient provide audited financial statements;

4)      A written agreement with the recipient restricting the use of funds to humanitarian or charitable purposes only;

5)      Steps to ensure that the funds were transferred to a valid bank account;

6)      Confirmation that contemplated activities had occurred before funds were disbursed; and

7)      Ongoing auditing and monitoring of the efficacy of the program.

These protections allow an audit trail which can be monitored or audited by the company’s audit team.

Tomorrow I will take a look at Lilly’s FCPA violations in Russia and use that information to set forth some minimum best practices which you can use in your compliance program to help you both prevent, detect and then FCPA compliance violations.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

The Lilly FCPA Enforcement Action Part I – Key Lessons Learned on Sportsmanlike Conduct

As you see from today’s picture I am enthusiastically wearing a New England Patriots (classic) shirt. You may ask yourself why am I wearing this shirt? The reason is because of a rather rash wager I made with Jay Rosen, Vice President of Merrill Brink, earlier this month on the Patriots/Texans football game. (I also made the same wager with Matt Kelly, Editor of Compliance Week, who says he will use the photo for marketing Compliance Week 2013, good luck with that!) I can’t quite seem to remember the final score but I do recall that it was what we in Texas might call a full ‘butt-whoopin’. Up until that game, the Patriots were 19-1 at home in the month of December over the past ten years, after beating the Texans, they became 20-1. The key lesson I learned from this experience is to evaluate your risk and then manage that risk accordingly.

Earlier this month, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced the settlement of the Eli Lilly and Company’s (Lilly) violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The enforcement action details a number of bribery schemes that Lilly had engaged in for many years in multiple countries. Indeed Lilly used four different styles of bribery schemes in four separate countries; all of which violated the FCPA. In China, corrupt payments were falsely called reimbursement of expenses; in Brazil, money that was characterized as a discount for distributor was used to pay a bribe; in Poland, charitable donations were falsely labeled and used to induce a Polish government official to approve the purchase of Lilly products; and, finally, Lilly’s subsidiary in Russia, paid bribes to Offshore Agents who were domiciled outside Russia and who performed no services for which they were compensated.

I think the most noteworthy information found in this enforcement action is that it provides significant guidance to the compliance practitioner on not only the different types of bribery schemes used, but more importantly, by reading into the types of conduct the DOJ and SEC finds violates the FCPA, it is valuable as a lesson on how to structure tools to manage FCPA risks going forward. In this post I will detail the bribery schemes that Lilly engaged in and in Part II, I will discuss how the Lilly enforcement action should inform your FCPA compliance program.

I.                   China – Use of False Expense Reports to Cover Improper Gifts and Cash Payments

In China, Lilly employees used the classic system of submitting inflated expense reports and using the excess reimbursements to pay bribes. More ominously, not only did the sales representatives engage in this tactic but their supervisors did and also instructed subordinates to do so as well. The list of gifts that were provided to Chinese government officials was as wide ranging as it was creative. There were gifts consisting of specialty foods, wines and a jade bracelet. There were paid trips to bath houses, karaoke bars and spas. There was money paid to purchase “door prizes and publication fees to government employed physicians.” It was even noted that bribes were paid consisting of cigarettes. In the SEC complaint it stated that “Although the dollar amount of each gift was generally small, the improper payments were wide-spread across the [China] subsidiary.”

II.                Brazil – Use of Distributor Discounts to Fund Bribes

In Brazil, Lilly sold drugs to distributors who then resold the products to both public and private entities. It was the classic distributor model where Lilly sold the drugs to the distributors at a discount and then the distributors would resell the products “at a higher price and then took their discount as compensation.” There was a fairly standard discount given to the distributors which generally ranged “between 6.5% and 15%, with the majority of distributors in Brazil receiving a 10% discount.”

However in early 2007, at the request of a Lilly sales manager, the company awarded an unusually high discount of between 17% and 19% to a distributor for the sale of a Lilly drug to the government of one of the states of Brazil. The distributor used approximately 6% of this additional discount to create a fund to pay Brazilian government representatives to purchase the Lilly drugs from him. Further, the Lilly sales manager who requested this unusual discount was aware of the bribery scheme. Moreover, this increase in the discount was approved by the company with no further inquiry as to the reason for the request or to substantiate the basis for such an unusually high discount. If there were any internal controls they were not followed.

III.             Poland – Use of Charitable Donations to Obtain Sales of Drugs

In Poland we see our old friend the Chudow Castle Foundation (Foundation). You may remember this charity as it was the subject of a prior SEC enforcement action involving Schering-Plough Corporation. The thing that got both Lilly and Schering-Plough into trouble was that the Foundation was controlled by the Director of the Silesian Health Fund (Director) and with this position he was able to exercise “considerable influence over the pharmaceutical products local hospitals and other health care providers in the region purchased.”

Just how did this bribery scheme camouflaged as a charitable donation work? Initially it started while Lilly was in negotiations with the Director for the purchase of one of Lilly’s cancer drugs for public hospitals and other health care providers in the region. The Director actually made a request for a donation directly to representatives of Lilly. Thereafter, the Foundation itself made “subsequent requests” for donations.

In addition to this obvious red flag, Lilly did no due diligence on the Foundation and falsely described the nature of the payments not once but three separate times with three separate descriptions. Lilly turned some of the monies over not to the Foundation, but to the Director for use at his “discretion”. Interestingly, the donations were not only made at or near the time of a contract execution, with one donation being made two days after the Director authorized the purchase of the drugs from Lilly.  Internally Lilly even discussed the size of a donation, calling it a “rebate” and said “it will depend on the purchases of medicines.”

IV.              Russia – Use of Offshore Agents Who Performed No Services

As with Brazil, Lilly used a distributor sales model in Russia. However, there was a further twist which got Lilly into FCPA hot water. Lilly would enter into an agreement with a third party other than the distributor who was selected by the government official making decisions on the purchase of Lilly products. The other third parties were usually not domiciled in Russia, nor did they have bank accounts in Russia. In other words, they were Offshore Agents who were paid a flat fee or percentage of the total sales with no discernible work or services performed.

There was little to no due diligence performed on these Offshore Agents. In one instance, detailed in the SEC Complaint, Lilly ran a Dun and Bradstreet report on a third party agent, coupled with an internet search on a third party domiciled in Cyprus. There was no determination of the beneficial ownership of this Offshore Agent nor was there any determination of the business services which this Offshore Agent would provide, subsequently this . This Offshore Agent was paid approximately $3.8MM. An additional  Offshore Agent, again in Cyprus, which Lilly conducted little to no due diligence on, received a $5.2MM commission. Under another such agreement, yet another Cypriot Offshore Agent received a commission rate of 30% of the total sale.

What about the services that these Offshore Agents provided to Lilly? First and foremost, they all had their own special “Marketing Agreement” which was actually a template contract prepared by Lilly. The services allegedly provided by these Offshore Agents included “immediate customs clearance” or “immediate delivery” of the product. There were other equally broad and vague descriptions such as “promotion of the products” and “marketing research”. But not only was there little if no actual evidence that these Offshore Agents provided such services; Lilly, or its regular in-country distributors, actually performed these services.

Unlike their experience in Poland, officials from Lilly simply inquired directly from government officials with whom it was negotiating if it could “donate or otherwise support various initiatives that were affiliated with public or private institutions headed by the government officials or otherwise important to the government officials.” As noted in the SEC Complaint, Lilly had neither the internal controls in place nor performed any vetting to determine whether it “was offering something of value to a government official for the purpose of influencing or inducing him or her to assist Lilly-Vostok in obtaining or retaining business.”

In my next post I will discuss how the compliance practitioner can use the information and facts presented in the Lilly enforcement action as teaching points to evaluate and enhance a company’s compliance program.

Although I rarely agree with Peggy Noone, I always read her Saturday column in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and would like to end my blogging year with the closing paragraph, which I quote in full, from her article entitled “About Those 2012 Political Predictions”:

Lesson? For writers it’s always the same. Do your best, call it as you see it, keep the past in mind but keep your eyes open for the new things of the future. And say what you’re saying with as much verve as you can. Life shouldn’t be tepid and dull. It’s interesting—try to reflect the aliveness in your work. If you’re right about something, good. If you’re wrong, try to see what you misjudged and figure out why. And, always, “Wait ’til next year.”

A safe and Happy New Year to all.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2012

Oracle India Parks Monies While the Astros Move on Down to AAA

The Houston Astros announced today that are now officially a Triple-A (AAA) ball club. How do we know this? Because last night they fired their major league Manager Brad Mills and replaced him with their current (and apparently still) AAA Manager, Tony DeFrancesco. When reached for comment, Astros owner Jim Crane, fresh from his redesign of the Astros jerseys, said “We are either (a) playing AAA players or (b) playing like AAA players so I thought it would make the guys more comfortable.” [OK, I confess I made up the quote.] However, I did not make up the letter that General Manager Jeff Luhnow sent to season ticket holders last week apologizing for the terrible play of the team this year but he hopes we will all continue to buy tickets this year and next to “support the team”. No word on whether refunds will be given with all the money the Astros are saving as a AAA club playing in the National League or even that the Astros will reduce their prices to AAA rates.

As reported by the FCPA Professor last week, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced the settlement of an action against Oracle for violations of the books and records provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Unlike the Astros, who publicly announced their move to AAA status, Oracle got into FCPA hot water because its Indian subsidiary directed its distributor to set up a separate slush fund of monies which could be and were used to pay monies to persons unknown. According to the SEC Complaint, the scheme worked as follows: Oracle India would identify and work with the end user customers in selling products and services to them and negotiating the final price. However, the purchase order would be placed by the customer with Oracle India’s distributor. This distributor would then purchase the licenses and services directly from Oracle, and resell them to the customer at the higher price than had been negotiated by Oracle India. The difference between what the government end user paid the distributor and what the distributor paid Oracle typically is referred to as “margin” which the distributor generally retains as payment for its services. That description sounds like most distributor relationships but this was not what got Oracle into trouble.

The Scheme

As further specified in the Compliant, “certain Oracle India employees created extra margins between the end user and distributor price and directed the distributors to hold the extra margin in side funds. Oracle India’s employees made these margins large enough to ensure a side fund existed to pay third parties. “At the direction of the Oracle India employees, the distributor then made payments out of the side funds to third parties, purportedly for marketing and development expenses.” The SEC Compliant noted that “about $2.2 million in funds were improperly “parked” with the Company’s distributors.” To compound this problem, employees of Oracle India concealed the existence of this side fund from Oracle in the US and hence there was an incorrect accounting in Oracle’s books and records.

The Complaint further noted that “Oracle India’s parked funds created a risk that they potentially could be used for illicit means, such as bribery or embezzlement” and then went on to highlight such an instance which occurred in May 2006, where Oracle India secured a $3.9 million deal with India’s Ministry of Information Technology and Communications. Oracle’s distributor accepted payment from the end user for the full $3.9 million. Under the direction of Oracle India’s then Sales Director, the distributor sent approximately $2.1 million to Oracle, which Oracle booked as revenue on the transaction. Oracle India employees then directed the distributor to keep approximately $151,000 as payment for the distributor’s services. The Oracle India employees further instructed the distributor to “park” the remaining approximately $1.7 million to be used for disbursement towards “marketing development purposes.” Some two months later, an Oracle India employee provided the distributor with eight invoices for payments to third party vendors, in amounts ranging from approximately $110,000 to $396,000. These invoices were later determined to be false. Further none of these third parties, which were just storefronts and provided no services on the deal, were on Oracle’s approved vendor list.

Failure of Internal Audit

All of the above were in violation of Oracle’s internal policies, however the Compliant specified that “Oracle lacked the proper controls to prevent its employees at Oracle India from creating and misusing the parked funds” and prior to 2009 “the Company failed to audit and compare the distributor’s margin against the end user price to ensure excess margins were not being built into the pricing structure.” Oracle failed to either (1) seek transparency in its dealing with the distributor and (2) audit third party payments made by the distributors on Oracle’s behalf” both of which would have enabled the Company to check that payments were made to appropriate recipients. Indeed the scheme only came to Oracle’s attention during an unrelated “local tax inquiry to Oracle’s India distributor”. This sounds reminiscent of HP Germany where a routine Bavarian Provincial tax audit picked up the suspicious payments which lead to a FCPA investigation.

What Did They Do To Remedy It?

However, even with the above listed failures of Oracle’s compliance program, the Company did take Maxim Three of McNulty’s Maxim’s to heart: What did you do to remedy it? The Complaint indicated that the person in charge of Oracle’s Supply Chain at its Indian subsidiary resigned and left the company. An internal investigation was undertaken and four employees of the Indian subsidiary who had actual knowledge of the scheme were terminated. Additionally, “Oracle took other remedial measures to address the risk and controls related to parked funds, including: conducting additional due diligence in its partner transactions in India so that Oracle had greater transparency into end user pricing in government contracts; terminating its relationship with the distributor involved in the transactions at issue; directing its distributors not to allow the creation of side funds; requiring additional representations and warranties from distributors to include the fact that no side funds exist; and enhancing training for its partners and employees to address anti-corruption policies.”

So what does this mean for the compliance practitioner? This is the second matter, the first being the Smith and Nephew enforcement action, which focused on distributors. If your company uses this model to handle or supplement its sales channels, you should immediately review the entire process, from business purpose, to due diligence, to contract terms and post-contract management, to make sure that your company is following minimum best practices with regards to this sales mechanism. You should also put selective distributors on your company’s internal audit schedule for the next cycle.

And if you are an Astros fan…You think the Astros will reduce prices to AAA rates?

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2012

2012 First Half FCPA Enforcement Round-Up: Part I

The first half of 2012 is reaching to a close and we have had several significant enforcement actions so far this year. So to commemorate all those June Bride and Bride-Grooms out there, including my parents who celebrate their 56^th wedding anniversary on June 30, I have put together a couple of posts reviewing my top 6 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement actions for the first 6 months of 2012. At this point I cannot see any clear trends but there are some key points that provide solid advice for the compliance practitioner going forward. In today’s blog, we take up the first three, in chronological order.

I.                   Aon

We begin with a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) issued in the last week of 2011 where the insurance giant Aon received a NPA from the Department of Justice (DOJ) in settling enforcement actions against it by the DOJ and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Aon agreed to total fines and penalties in an amount of $16.3 MM. This is in addition to a fine previously paid to the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) in January, 2009, of £5.25 MM (approximately $8.2 MM at today’s exchange rate).

A.     Aon’s Remedial Actions Which Led to the NPA

The DOJ stated that it entered into the NPA based “in part, on the following factors: (a) Aon’s extraordinary cooperation with the Department and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”); (b) Aon’s timely and complete disclosure of the facts described in Appendix A as well as facts relating to Aon’s improper payments in Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Egypt, Indonesia, Myanmar, Panama, the United Arab Emirates and Vietnam that it discovered during its thorough investigation of its global operations; (c) the early and extensive remedial efforts undertaken by Aon, including the substantial improvements the company has made to its anti-corruption compliance procedures; (d) the prior financial penalty of £5.25 million paid to the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) by Aon Limited, a U.K. subsidiary of Aon, in 2009, covering the conduct in, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Indonesia, Myanmar, the United Arab Emirates and Vietnam; and (e) the FSA’s close and continuous supervisory oversight over Aon Limited.”

B.     Non-Bona Fide Travel and Educational Expenses

The primary activity for which Aon was sanctioned was a travel and education fund, initially designed to provide funds for foreign government employees involved with insurance to travel to educational conferences. However, the funds evolved into personal use for entertainment of the officials, their wives and families. In one instance, involving a fund in Costa Rica, travel was booked through a travel agency which was owned or managed by the Costa Rican officials who were entertained with monies from the educational and training funds.

C.     Books and Records

The largest portion of the Aon fine involved violations of the FCPA’s books and records requirements. The NPA noted, “With respect to the Costa Rican training funds, although Aon Limited maintained accounting records for the payments that it made from both the Brokerage Fund and the 3% Fund, these records did not accurately and fairly reflect, in reasonable detail, the purpose for which the expenses were incurred. A significant portion of the records associated with payments made through tourist agencies gave the name of the tourist agency with only generic descriptions such as “various airfares and hotel.” Additionally, to the extent that the accounting records did provide the location or purported educational seminar associated with travel expenses, in many instances they did not disclose or itemize the disproportionate amount of leisure and non-business related activities that were also included in the costs. In short, there was either no bona fide educational expense or not one which could be documented from Aon’s internal records.

Key Takeaway: You must completely document, document and document the basis of your expenditures. If there is no explanation, the assumption will be the payments are made for corrupt purposes.

II.                Smith & Nephew

The landscape of the FCPA world is littered with cases involving both agents and resellers, who are most clearly acting as representatives of the companies whose goods or services they sell in foreign countries. Many US businesses believe that the legal differences between agents/resellers and distributors insulate them from FCPA liability should the conduct of the distributor violate the Act. Under this same analysis, many US companies believe that the FCPA risk has also shifted from the US company to the foreign distributor. However, such belief is sorely miss-placed as was shown in the Smith & Nephew (SNN) enforcement action.

The FCPA violations revolved around a Greek distributor of SNN who paid bribes to Greek doctors so that they would purchase and use SNN products. SNN paid a monetary penalty of $16.8MM to the DOJ and $5.4MM to the SEC as a civil penalty, all for a total of $22.2MM in fines and penalties.

Entity Designation	Domicile of Entity	Commission Rate	Services Provided	Actual Services
Shell Company A	UK	40% of sales of Greek distributor	Marketing	Did not perform any services
Shell Company B	UK	26% of sales of Greek distributor	Marketing	None listed
Shell Company C	UK	35% of sales of Greek distributor	Marketing	Did not perform any true services

A quick review of the above chart shows the FCPA problems; very high commissions were paid with no actual services provided. Or as stated by the FCPA Professor, SNN “falsely recorded or otherwise accounted for the payments to the shell companies on its books and records as ‘marketing services’ in order to conceal the true nature of the payments in the consolidated books and records of S&N.”

Key Takeaway: If your company uses a distributor model in its sales chain, I would suggest that you review and reassess your pricing structure in light of this enforcement action.

III.             BizJet

In the bribery and corruption world, the facts of this enforcement action are about as bad as it can get. It was reported the senior company personnel had actual knowledge or approved of the payment of cash to bribe foreign governmental officials to obtain or retain business. There was also a deliberate attempt to hide the true nature of the payments. But even with these damaging facts, the company was able to receive a significant reduction on the low end of the fine range as suggested under the US Sentencing Guidelines. So how did the company achieve this?

A.     Bribery Scheme

In this case, the company made a number of corrupt payments which were characterized as “commission payments” and “referral fees” on their books and records. Payments were made from both international and bank accounts here in the United States. In other words, this was as clear a case of a pattern and practice of bribery, authorized by the highest levels of the company, paid through US banks and attempts to hide all of the above by mis-characterizing them in their books and records.

BizJet Bribery Box Score

BizJet Executive or Employee Named	Payment Made To	Amount of Payment	Others Involved
Sales Manager  A	Official 6	Cell Phone and $10K	Executive B and C
Sales Manager A	Official 3	$2K	Executive  B
Executive B, C and Sales Manager A	Official 2	$20K
Executive C	Official 2	$30K	Sales Manager A
Executive B	Mexican Federal Police Chief	$10K	Executive C and Sales Manager. A
Executive C	Official 5	$18K	Sales Manager A
Sales Manager A	Official 4	$50K
Sales Manager A	Mexican Federal Police	$176	Executive C
Sales Manager A	Official 4	$40K
Sales Manager A	Mexican Federal Police	$210K	Executive C
Sales Manager A	Official 5	$6K	Executive C
Executive C	Official 5	$22K

B. Reduction in Monetary Fine

I set out these facts in some detail to show the serious nature of enforcement action. However, the clear import is that a company can make a comeback in the face of very bad facts. The calculation of the fine, based upon the factors set out in the US Sentencing Guidelines, ranged between a low of $17.1MM to a high of $34.2MM. The final agreed upon monetary penalty was $11.8MM. This is obviously a significant reduction from the suggested low or high end, or as was noted by the FCPA Blog “BizJet’s reduction was 30% off the bottom of the fine range, and a whopping 65% off the top of the fine range.”

How did BizJet achieve this reduction and avoid an external monitor? As reported by the FCPA Professor, the following were factors:

(a) following discovery of the FCPA violations during the course of an internal audit of the implementation of enhanced compliance related to third-party consultants, BizJet initiated an internal investigation and voluntarily disclosed to the DOJ the misconduct …;

(b) BizJet’s cooperation has been extraordinary, including conducting an extensive internal investigation, voluntarily making US and foreign employees available for interviews, and collecting, analyzing, and organizing voluminous evidence and information for the DOJ;

(c) BizJet has engaged in extensive remediation, including terminating the officers and employees responsible for the corrupt payments, enhancing its due diligence protocol for third-party agents and consultants, and instituting heightened review of proposals and other transactional documents for all BizJet contracts;

(d) BizJet has committed to continue to enhance its compliance program and internal controls, including ensuring that its compliance program satisfies the minimum elements set forth in the” corporate compliance program set forth in an attachment to the DPA; and

(e) “BizJet has agreed to continue to cooperate with the DOJ in any ongoing investigation of the conduct of BizJet and its officers, directors, employees, agents, and consultants relating to violations of the FCPA.

C.        Reports to the DOJ

The company avoided an external monitor. However, it agreed that it would report “at no less that twelve-month intervals during the three year term” [of the DPA] to the DOJ on “remediation and implementation of the compliance program and internal controls, policies and procedures” which were listed in Attachment C to the DPA (the DOJ guidelines for a minimum best practices compliance program). The initial report was required to be delivered one year from the date of the DPA and would also include BizJet’s proposals “reasonably designed to improve BizJet’s internal controls, policies and procedures for ensuring compliance with the FCPA and other applicable anti-corruption laws.”

Key Takeaway: What you do after you discover the bribery and corruption will go a long way towards determining your penalty. No matter how bad the facts are, if you provide ‘extraordinary cooperation’ to the enforcement agencies, you can significantly reduce your final monetary penalty.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2012

Smith & Nephew DPA: Lessons Learned in Using Distributors

A distributor can be generally defined as a company or individual who purchases a product from an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and then independently sells that product to an end user. A distributor takes title, physical possession and owns the products. The distributor then sells the product again to an end-using purchaser. The distributor usually receives the product at some discount from the OEM and then is free to set the resell price at any amount above what was originally paid for the product. A distributor is often used by the US manufacturing industry to act as a sales force outside of the US.

The landscape of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is littered with cases involving both agents and resellers, who are most clearly acting as representatives of the companies whose goods or services they sell for in foreign countries. However, many US businesses believe that the legal differences between agents/resellers and distributors insulate them from FCPA liability should the conduct of the distributor violate the Act. They believe that as the distributor takes title and physical possession of the product, the legal risk of ownership has shifted to the distributor. If the goods are damaged or destroyed, the loss will be the distributor’s not the US business which manufactured the product. Under this same analysis, many US companies believe that the FCPA risk has also shifted from the US company to the foreign distributor. However, such belief is sorely miss-placed.

As reported by the FCPA Professor and FCPA Blog, on February 1, 2012, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that it entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with Smith & Nephew, Inc., a medical equipment manufacturer, for violations of the FCPA.  Smith & Nephew paid a monetary penalty of $16.8MM to the DOJ and $5.4MM to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a civil penalty, all for a total of $22.2MM in fines and penalties. The violations revolved around a Greek distributor of Smith & Nephew who paid bribes to Greek doctors so that they would purchase and use Smith & Nephew products. According to the FCPA Professor, in a post entitled “Next Up – Smith & Nephew”, Smith and Nephew and its German subsidiary, would sell products to the entities “at a discount to the ‘list’ price and the Greek Distributor would re-sell to Greek HCPs and government hospitals at a profit.”

Further, as noted by the Professor, the purpose in setting up these entities “was to secure lucrative business with hospitals in the Greek public health care system by making and promising to make corrupt payments of money and things of value to publicly-employed Greek HCPs.”  According to the information, “S&N, certain of its executives, employees, and affiliates agreed to sell to [the] Greek Distributor at full list price, then pay the amount of the distributor discount – between 25 and 40 percent of the sales made by [the] Greek Distributor – to an off-shore shell company controlled by [the] Greek Distributor, in order to provide off-the-books funds for [the] Greek Distributor to pay cash incentives and other things of value to publicly-employed Greek HCPs to induce the purchase of S&N products, while concealing the payments.”  According to the information, S&N “falsely recorded or otherwise accounted for the payments to the shell companies on its books and records as ‘marketing services’ in order to conceal the true nature of the payments in the consolidated books and records of S&N and GmbH.”

In honor of the commencement of Spring Training next week, I put together a handy Box Score of the entities which Smith & Nephew set up for this FCPA conspiracy.

Entity Designation	Domicile of Entity	Commission Rate	Services Provided	Actual Services
Shell Company A	UK	40% of sales of Greek distributor	Marketing	Did not perform any services
Shell Company B	UK	26% of sales of Greek distributor	Marketing	None listed
Shell Company C	UK	35% of sales of Greek distributor	Marketing	Did not perform any true services

Indicia of Bribery and Corruption

What are some of the factors that demonstrate the distributors used by Smith & Nephew were fraudulent and did not have a legitimate business purpose? Initially I would note that the distributor was domiciled in a location separate, the UK, and apart from the sole location it was designed to deliver products or services into, Greece. This clearly demonstrated that the entities were used for a purpose that the company wished to hide from Greek authorities. While it is true that a distributor might sell products into a country different than its domicile, if the products are going into a single country, this should raise a Red Flag.

However, the biggest indicium of corruption was the amount of the commission paid. The traditional sales model for a distributor has been to purchase a product, take the title, and therefore the risk, and then resell it to an end user. Based upon this sales model, there has been a commission structure more generous than those usually accorded a reseller or sales agent, who is usually only a negotiator between the OEM and the end user. This difference in taking title, and risk of loss, have led to a cost structure which has provided a deeper discount of pricing for distributors than commission rates paid to resellers or sales agents. The sales structure used by Smith & Nephew had pricing discounts of between 26-40% off the list price. Further, this money was used precisely to pay bribes to Greek doctors to use Smith & Nephew products. If your company uses a distributor model, I would suggest that you review and reassess your pricing structure in light of this enforcement action.

Monitorship

A very interesting feature of the Smith & Nephew DPA is that the company agreed to an external Monitor. This is not something we saw in most DPAs from 2011. The Monitor’s primary purpose is to “assess and monitor Smith & Nephews compliance with the terms of this Agreement so as to specifically address and reduce the risk of any recurrence of Smith & Nephew’s conduct.” The Monitor is to be retained by Smith & Nephew “for a period of not less than eighteen (18) months.” The DPA specifies that the Monitor is to perform at a minimum two reviews and corresponding reports. The Monitor shall provide to Smith & Nephew a written work plan no less than 60 days before commencing either review. The Monitor is to formulate conclusions based upon “among other things (a) inspection of relevant documents, including Smith & Nephew’s current anti-corruption policies and procedures; (b) onsite observation of selected systems and procedures of Smith & Nephew at sample sites, including internal controls and record-keeping and internal audit procedures; (c) meetings with, and interviews of, relevant employees officers, directors and other persons at mutually convenient times and places; and (d) analyses, studies and testing of Smith & Nephew’s compliance program with respect to the anticorruption laws.”

The Smith & Nephew DPA provides the compliance practitioner with specific guidance regarding how not to use a distributor. While this post did not focus on the conduct of Smith & Nephew during the pendency of the investigation, suffice to say that its conduct after self-disclosure led to a fine which was 20% below the minimum suggested by the Sentencing Guidelines. This fact clearly points to the value of self-disclosure and cooperation with the DOJ, as a key, if not THE key component during any enforcement action.

Lessons Learned on Compliance and Ethics is available for purchase on amazon.com by clicking here.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

Maintaining a Relationship with a Foreign Business Partner under the FCPA after the Contract is Signed – Monitor, Monitor, and then, Monitor

In previous blogs postings, we have shared our thoughts on other aspect of the Foreign Business Partner (foreign agents, reseller, distributors or any person/entity representing the company overseas) relationship including how to evaluate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) compliance risk; how to perform due diligence on prospective Foreign Business Partners; how to internally evaluate the information obtained through such due diligence; and what compliance contract terms and conditions you should set for the Foreign Business Partners. In this posting, we will discuss the steps a US company must follow to implement a procedure to monitor the actions of a Foreign Business Partner going forward.

DPA Guidance

In its Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with the Monsanto Company for their FCPA violations, the Department of Justice (DOJ) provided some guidance on the continuing obligation to monitor Foreign Business Partners. In the Monsanto DPA, the DOJ agreed, after the initial due diligence and appropriate review were completed on Foreign Business Partners, for Monsanto to implement certain post contract procedures. These requirements to Monsanto can be used as guidelines as to what the DOJ will look for from other US companies who have entered into relationships with Foreign Business Partners; especially in the area of monitoring the foreign business partner.

A US company should, on a periodic basis of not less than every three years, conduct rigorous compliance audits of its operations with the foreign business partners. This monitoring would include, but not be limited to, detailed audits of the foreign business partner unit’s books and records, with specific attention to payments and commissions to agents, consultants, contractors, and subcontractors with responsibilities that include interactions with foreign officials and contributions to joint ventures. The compliance audit should include interviews with employees, consultants, agents, contractors, subcontractors and joint venture partners. Lastly, a review of the FCPA compliance training provided to the foreign business partner should be included.

Ongoing Oversight

In addition to the DOJ guidance provided in the Monsanto DPA, it is recommended that there be substantial involvement not only by the business unit most closely involved with the Foreign Business Partner, but also by Legal; Compliance and other departments which would assist in completing the functions as outlined by the Monsanto DPA. The most significant reason for maintaining a post-contract relationship is to ensure the business units remain engaged in the Foreign Business Partner process. This involvement can also include some of the following participation, the senior business Vice President for the region where the Foreign Business Partner operates should annually call upon the Foreign Business Partner, in-person, to review all of the prospective business proposals and concluded business transactions that the Foreign Business Partner has engaged in. This annual VP review must not take the place of a legal or compliance review but should focus on the relationship from the business perspective.

Managing the risk of a relationship with a foreign business partner is one of the most critical aspects of a FCPA compliance program. The documented risk for the potential violation of the FCPA by a foreign business partner to a US company is quite high. To engage a foreign business partner, in a manner that properly assesses and manages the risk to, and for, a US company, requires a committee of time, money and substantial effort. However, with a compliance based risk management procedure in place, the risk can be properly managed and a foreign business relationship can be successful for all parties.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the Author. The Author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The Author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the Author. The Author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2010

Internal Review of a Proposed Foreign Business Partner

In prior blogs, we explored how to rank Foreign Business Partners so that you can begin an appropriate due diligence process. We also explored what you might wish to investigate during the due diligence process. A Foreign Business Partner Review Committee should be established which is tasked with reviewing all the investigative due diligence and the Business Unit’s case for partnering with the person or entity. The next area of review should of the proposed Foreign Business Partner’s ethics and compliance program. Such a program should have, at a minimum, the following elements of a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)-style compliance program in place.

• Your Foreign Business Partner should…
o have a restriction on facilitation payments, gifts, entertainment and travel;
o require proper accounting and invoicing;
o have policies that flow down to any sub-vendors under the Foreign Business Partner

If the Foreign Business Partner’s program does not meet your Company’s, or the FCPA, standards you should require the implementation of a program that will meet those suggested in the US Sentencing Guidelines so that it will meet Department of Justice (DOJ) approval.

The next area of review by the Foreign Business Partner Review Committee is the proposed contract with the Foreign Business Partner. The contract must have compliance obligations stated in the formation documents, whether it is a simple agency or consulting agreement or a joint venture with several formation documents. All formation agreements should include representations that in all undertakings the Foreign Business Partner will make no payments of money, or anything of value, nor will such be offered, promised or paid, directly or indirectly, to any foreign officials, political parties, party officials, or candidates for public or political party office, to influence the acts of such officials, political parties, party officials, or candidates in their official capacity, to induce them to use their influence with a government to obtain or retain business or gain an improper advantage in connection with any business venture or contract in which the Company is a participant.

In addition to the above affirmative statement regarding conduct, you should have the following contractual clauses in your Foreign Business Partner contract.

• Indemnification: Full indemnification for any FCPA violation, including all costs for the underlying investigation.
• Cooperation: Require full cooperation with any ethics and compliance investigation, specifically including the review of Foreign Business Partner emails and bank accounts relating to your Company’s use of the Foreign Business Partner.
• Material Breach of Contract: Any FCPA violation is made a material breach of contract, with no notice and opportunity to cure. Further such a finding will be the grounds for immediate cessation of all payments.
• No Sub-Vendors (without approval): The Foreign Business Partner must agree that it will not hire an agent, subcontractor or consultant without the Company’s prior written consent (to be based on adequate due diligence).
• Audit Rights: An additional key element of a contract between a US Company and a Foreign Business Partner should include the retention of audit rights. These audit rights must exceed the simple audit rights associated with the financial relationship between the parties and must allow a full review of all FCPA related compliance procedures such as those for meeting with foreign governmental officials and compliance related training.
• Acknowledgment: The Foreign Business Partner should specifically acknowledge the applicability of the FCPA to the business relationship as well as any country or regional anti-corruption or anti-bribery laws which apply to either the Foreign Business Partner or business relationship.
• On-going Training: Require that the top management of the Foreign Business Partner and all persons performing services on your behalf shall receive FCPA compliance training.
• Annual Certification: Require an annual certification stating that the Foreign Business Partner has not engaged in any conduct that violates the FCPA or any applicable laws, nor is it aware of any such conduct.
• Re-qualification: Require the Foreign Business Partner re-qualify as a business partner at a regular interval of no greater than every three years.

Engaging in due diligence of a proposed Foreign Business Partner is but one of the many steps required to approve a person or entity who will represent your Company overseas, thereby creating a FCPA exposure. However, there are additional steps which you should employ internally in the Foreign Business Partner review process, some of which have been discussed above. Strong compliance terms and conditions are critical for the management of the relationship going forward. The Foreign Business Partner Review Committee must certify that the appropriate terms and conditions are in place to protect against a FCPA compliance violation and, should one occur, your Company can extricate itself immediately from doing business with such a a Foreign Business Partner instead of vendor.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2010

Establishing Relationships with Foreign Business Partners—Due Diligence, Due Diligence and then Due Diligence

There are several critical components in the selection, use and retention of any Foreign Business Partner, such as agents, resellers, joint venture partners or distributors. In view of the critical risks a US Company must manage when entering into a relationship with a Foreign Business Partner, the US Company should, prior to establishing the relationship, kick off the risk management process by initiating thorough due diligence on the proposed Foreign Business Partner. The due diligence process should contain, at a minimum, inquiries into the following areas:

• Need for the relationship with a Foreign Business Partner: The Company Business Team or Business Person should articulate the business case for the proposed Foreign Business Partner relationship. This must be approved by management before it goes to legal or compliance for review.

• Credentials: List the critical reasons for selection of the proposed Foreign Business Partner. This should include a discussion of the business partner’s background and experience.

• Ownership Structure: Describe whether the proposed Foreign Business Partner is a government or state-owned entity, and the nature of its relationship(s) with local, regional and governmental bodies. Are there any members of the business partner related, by blood, to governmental officials?

• Financial Qualifications: Describe the financial stability of, and all capital to be provided by, the proposed Foreign Business Partner. Obtain financial records, audited for 3 to 5 years, if available.

• Personnel: Determine whether the Foreign Business Partner will be providing personnel, particularly whether any of the employees are government officials. Obtain the names and titles of those who will provide services to the US Company.

• Physical Facilities: Describe what physical facilities will be provided by the Foreign Business Partner. Who will provide the necessary capital for their upkeep?

• Reputation: Describe the business reputation of the proposed Foreign Business Partner in its geographic and industry-sector markets.

These due diligence inquiries are required under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the guidance offered by the Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion Releases and the publicly released Plea Agreements and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPA) entered into by US companies who admit to violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). This due diligence should be recorded and maintained by the US Company for review, if required, by a governmental agency. Some of the due diligence can be handled by the US Company’s in-house legal and/or compliance groups. However, it is recommended that for any high risk Foreign Business Partner, an outside forensic auditing firm and outside legal counsel be retained to conduct the due diligence investigations. This brings a level of expertise usually not available within a corporation plus an outside perspective less susceptible to in-company business pressures.

After this initial inquiry is concluded the US Company should move forward to perform a background check on a prospective Foreign Business Partner by using the following resources:

• References: Obtain and contact a list of business references.

• Embassy Check: Obtain information regarding the intended business partner from the local US Embassy, including an International Company Profile Report.

• Compliance Verification: Determine if the Foreign Business Partner, and those person within the Foreign Business Partner who will be providing services to the US Company, have reviewed or received FCPA training.

• Foreign Country Check: Have an independent third party, such as a law firm; investigate the business partner in its home country to determine compliance with its home country’s laws, licensing requirements and regulations.

• Cooperation and Attitude: One of the most important inquiries is not legal but based upon the response and cooperation of the Foreign Business Partner. Did the business partner object to any portion of the due diligence process? Did it object to the scope, coverage or purpose of the FCPA? In short, is the business partner a person or entity that the US Company is willing to stand up with under the FCPA?

After a company completes these due diligence steps, there should be a thorough review by the Board, or other dedicated Management Committee, on the qualifications of the proposed foreign business relationship partner. It is critical that the reviewing Committee is not subordinate to the US company’s business unit which is responsible for the business transactions with the Foreign Business Partner. This review should examine the adequacy of due diligence performed in connection with the selection of overseas partners, as well as the Foreign Business Partner’s selection of agents, subcontractors and consultants which will be used for business development on behalf of the US Company.

The steps listed herein do not include the use of, or continued management of, a Foreign Business Partner. These steps need to be taken by all US Companies entering into, or already engaged in, a relationship with Foreign Business Partners as the FCPA applies to all US Companies, whether public or private. Remember, due diligence, due diligence and once that has been completed; more due diligence.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2010

What’s in a Name: Agents, Resellers and Distributors under the FCPA

What is in a name? The terms agent, reseller and distributor are sometimes used interchangeably in the business world. However in the legal world they usually have distinct definitions. An agent can be generally defined as is a person who is authorized to act on behalf of another to create a legal relationship with a Third Party. An agent can also be a person who makes introductions and generally facilitates relationships between the seller of goods or services and end-using buyer. Such an agent usually receives some type of percentage of the final sale as his commission. An in-country national agent is often required in most Middle East and Far East countries. A reseller can be generally defined as a company or individual that sells goods to an end-using buyer. A reseller does not take title and thereby own the goods; the reseller is usually a conduit from the seller to the end-using buyer. A reseller usually receives a flat commission for his services, usually between 5-10% of the final purchase price. This format is often used in the software and hardware industries. A distributor can be generally defined as a company or individual which purchases a product from an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and then independently sells that product to an end user. A distributor takes title, physical possession and owns the products. The distributor then sells the product again to an end-using purchaser. The distributor usually receives the product at some discount from the OEM and then is free to set his price at any amount above what he paid for the product. A distributor is often used by the US manufacturing industry to act as a sales force outside the US.

The landscape of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is littered with cases involving both agents and resellers are they are the most clearly acting as representatives of the companies whose goods or services they sell for in foreign countries. However many US businesses believe that the legal differences between agents/resellers and distributors insulate them from FCPA liability should the conduct of the distributor violate the Act. They believe that as the distributor takes title and physical possession of the product, the legal risk of ownership has shifted to the distributor. If the goods are damaged or destroyed, the loss will be the distributor’s not the US business which manufactured the product. Under this same analysis, many US companies believe that the FCPA risk has also shifted from the US company to the foreign distributor. However such belief is sorely miss-placed.

As almost everyone knows, the FCPA prohibits payments to foreign officials to obtain or retain business or secure an improper business advantage. But many US companies view distributors as different from other types of sales representatives such as company sales representatives, agents, resellers or even joint venture partners, for the purposes of FCPA liability. However the Department of Justice (DOJ) takes the position that a US company’s FCPA responsibilities extend to the conduct of a wide range of third parties, including the aforementioned company sales representatives, agents, resellers, joint venture partners but also distributors. No U.S. company can ignore signs that its distributors may be violating the FCPA. Company management cannot engage in conscious avoidance to the activities of a distributor that the company has put into a business position favorable to engaging in FCPA violations. Court interpretation of the FCPA has held that it is applicable where conduct violative of the Act is used to “to obtain or retain business or secure an improper business advantage” which can cover almost any kind of advantage, including indirect monetary advantage even as nebulous as reputational advantage.

This scenario played out in China from 1997 to 2005 through AGA Medical Corporation. The Minnesota-based firm manufactured products used to treat congenital heart defects. To boost is China sales, AGA worked through its Chinese distributor. AGA sold products at a discounted rate to its Chinese distributor. This distributor then took some of the difference between his price from the equipment manufacturer AGA and the price he sold the equipment to Chinese hospitals to and paid corrupt payments to Chinese doctors to have them direct their government-owned hospitals to purchase AGA’s products. Its sales in China for the period were about $13.5 million. The Chinese distributor was found to have paid bribes in China of at least $460,000 to doctors in government-owned hospitals and patent-office officials. In 2008, AGA agreed to pay a $2 million criminal penalty and enter into a deferred prosecution agreement with the Department of Justice to settle Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations.

The same game was played by a Volvo subsidiary, Volvo Construction Equipment International (“VCEI”) when it used a Tunisian distributor to facilitate additional sales of its products to Iraq. VCEI reduced its prices to enable the distributor to make the illegal payments based on bogus after-sales service fees. Volvo’s 2008 settlement with the SEC included an agreement permanently enjoining it from future violations of Sections, ordering it to disgorge $7,299,208 in profits plus $1,303,441 in pre-judgment interest, and to pay a civil penalty of $4,000,000. In addition to this fine imposed by the SEC, Volvo also paid a $7,000,000 penalty pursuant to a deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ.

So what is in a name? Do we simply look to Shakespeare and his immortal words, “”What’s in a name? That which we call a rose; By any other name would smell as sweet.” Unfortunately I do not think the answer is quite so ethereal. It is more down to earth. If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it probably is a duck. If you have a distributor, it must be subjected to the same FCPA scrutiny and management as an agent, reseller or joint venture partner.

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This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

 

© Thomas R. Fox, 2010