Senn Interview, Part III – Post Incident Remediation

I conclude my three-part series based upon my podcast interview of noted white-collar defense lawyer and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) practitioner Mara Senn, a partner at Arnold & Porter LLP. In Part I, I considered Senn’s thoughts on conducting internal investigations. In Part II, I looked at Senn’s decision-making calculus around the decision to self-disclose if you have determined that a potential FCPA violation existed. Today, I consider her thoughts on what steps a company should take if it comes to the decision not to self-report a potential FCPA violation. These include the remediation of potential or actual conduct that might arguably violate the FCPA and the actions you should take on an ongoing basis.

One of the things Senn made clear is that whether you decide to self-disclose or not, your company must fully remediate the issue which led to that. She suggested that a company should act as if they will draw government scrutiny. She said, “the best way to go about it is to assume, act as if, the government is breathing down their necks on this very issue and fully remediate. The nice thing is they can decide what that means, fully remediate.”

I inquired as to whether that meant a systemic look at the company’s operations on a global, worldwide basis, particularly in view of Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell’s recent admonition not to ‘boil the ocean’ in the context of your FCPA internal investigation. Senn replied, “It used to be that in the government’s view, fully remediating meant go to 10 different countries, even if there’s no suspicion of any activity going on, just to make sure that everything’s okay. They’re now backing away from that, and in fact, they’re saying that the private sector is the one who started that whole trend, which is not quite consistent with history.”

Recognizing that there is always a risk that the government will come knocking, either via a whistleblower or other mechanism, Senn replied, “you want to be squeaky clean, so that when the government comes to you, if in the future, like a year down the line, you have another problem or the government has a whistleblower or whatever, that you can say, look, in our opinion, we did an analysis, and we thought it was not necessary to self-disclose. On the other hand, we were horrified and very upset by the fact that this potential infraction happened on our watch, and we’ve done the following 5 things, and we’ve remediated.”

She went on to explain, “What you want to do is show to the government, “We understand the problems that caused this, and we got to the root of it. Either it’s a bad apple, and we got rid of that bad apple, or it was really a failure of compliance structures, and we’ve fixed that part of the compliance structures. In fact, we’ve added more, just to double check and make sure that in this particular area or similar areas, depending on what it is, we will detect, prevent, and if we detect something, we will remediate.” They, the government, can feel comfortable that you did what they would have asked you to do anyways. That doesn’t always have to be onerous, sometimes it is depending on the scope of the issue, but that’s what I would say about that.”

Senn listed several actions that a company could engage in to demonstrate that it had taken solid remediation steps. Obviously, a company can “bulk up its compliance program.” But she added that it is important that a company demonstrate action taken against the nefarious party or parties. A company can discipline up to and including discharge. But do not forget lesser forms of discipline including docking pay or suspension without pay or other steps short of termination. I would add that you should consider the FCPA Guidance on this final point where it notes, “A compliance program should apply from the board room to the supply room—no one should be beyond its reach. DOJ and SEC will thus consider whether, when enforcing a compliance program, a company has appropriate and clear disciplinary procedures, whether those procedures are applied reliably and promptly, and whether they are commensurate with the violation.” [emphasis supplied]

Yet more than simply remediating an issue or even violation, Senn believes that a company should work to stay on top of its program thereafter. Certainly if you agree to a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) or Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA), your company will either have an external monitor or reporting obligation to the Department of Justice (DOJ) going forward.

I asked her about ongoing monitoring of your compliance program; both the enhancements you might put in place to remedy generally and the specific issues that caused the problem initially. Senn agreed that is an important step going forward, she stated, “Absolutely, but I think that the monitoring requirement has now essentially expanded to the whole program. The government really expects you now to be having ongoing improvement and ongoing monitoring, so it’s not like you put in a policy 3 years ago and don’t do anything and then assume it’s okay. I think maybe you would put in a special extra audit or something like that on that particular situation, but really you should have in your compliance program an overall monitoring function that allows you to do that for all of your programs to various levels and various degrees. Yes, I think so, but it may not be as intensive as your typical external monitor, because you’re going to be integrating that into a program that’s really more holistic than just checking on that one thing. You’re going to be checking on a system-wide basis.”

Clearly this position was articulated in the FCPA Guidance as Hallmark Nine of an Effective Compliance Program. The Guidance states, “An organization should take the time to review and test its controls, and it should think critically about its potential weaknesses and risk areas.” The Guidance ended this Hallmark by stating, “Although the nature and the frequency of proactive evaluations may vary depending on the size and complexity of an organization, the idea behind such efforts is the same: continuous improvement and sustainability.”

To listen to the full Mara Senn interview, go to the FCPA Compliance and Ethics Report, by clicking here, or download it from iTunes.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2015

Who is Responsible for Complying with the FCPA?

The Department of Justice (DOJ) still faces criticism over its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement strategy. Some decry that it is too aggressive, that the DOJ has moved into waters Congress never intended the DOJ to navigate into regarding the FCPA. Others worry that the DOJ, through its use of settlement mechanisms such as Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements (DPAs and NPAs), let corporations off to easily with fines and other monetary penalties being the equivalent of a slap on the wrist. Yet another school of thought says that it is up to the DOJ to tell companies how not to engage in bribery and corruption by specifying precisely what type of anti-corruption compliance program to put into effect.

One thing these commentariat all have in common is that they generally do not look to those responsible for obeying the law, i.e. companies and persons who are subject to the FCPA, for their responsibility of complying with the law. Such failure seems to me to be sadly misplaced. But it is not simply Mike Volkov’s FCPA Paparazzi who fail to assess a corporation’s role in their failure to comply with the law; unfortunately it is also company leaders themselves.

We recently were treated to another such display of ‘What Me Worry?’ mentality by HSBC Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Stuart Gulliver when he said, “Can I know what every one of 257,000 people is doing?” Leaving aside the issue of whether a corporate CEO who has signed one of the largest DPAs in the history of the world (for money-laundering, not FCPA violations); should admit he (1) he doesn’t care or (2) his company is too unwieldy for it to obey the laws that you and I follow everyday; Gulliver inadvertently hit upon one of the key concepts of a best practices compliance program. That concept is a well-rounded program that assures compliance, not some all knowing, all seeing narcissist at the top.

In a Financial Times (FT) article entitled “Too big to manage”, Andrew Hill blasted Gulliver’s statement as “disingenuous” but went on to state, “Knowing what every employee is doing is not the leader’s responsibility. But by using a combination of the right structure, the latest technology and, above all, by imbuing a company with the correct culture and reinforcing regular communication with visits to the shop floor, he or she should be able to limit the chance of a major scandal.” Hill quoted management thinker Henry Mintzberg for the following, ““You can’t excuse [scandals] by saying we have so many employees. You . . . have got to be on the ground to have a sense of what your organisation is all about.””

This means a CEO is not required to know everything but he does need to have an overall sense of whether his company is moving in a direction to do things such as follow the law. I would say this is even truer when you have promised (yet again) in a DPA that your company will follow the law. It also means that the leader sets the tone. If your leader takes the position that he or she cannot know what everyone is doing; that tone will be communicated down to the field troops but the message will be that said maximum leader does not care what the middle and lower levels are doing. Hence the DOJ would say that it all starts with Tone at the Top. Sadly Gulliver does not seem to acknowledge, let alone understand, that issue.

But more than simply having a leader that cares and is engaged; Gulliver’s statement belies other aspects of a best practices compliance program. Technology provides a mechanism for oversight of a compliance regime. Under the FCPA Ten Hallmarks of an Effective Compliance Program, monitor is recognized as a key element so your company should establish a regular monitoring system to spot issues and address them. Effective monitoring means applying a consistent set of protocols, checks and controls tailored to your company’s risks to detect and remediate compliance problems on an ongoing basis. To address this, your compliance team should be checking in routinely with the finance departments in your foreign offices to ask if they’ve noticed recent accounting irregularities. Regional directors should be required to keep tabs on potential improper activity in the countries they manage. Additionally, the global compliance committee should meet or communicate as often as every month to discuss issues as they arise. These ongoing efforts demonstrate your company is serious about compliance.

In addition to monitoring, structural controls are recognized as an important element. Hill said that large companies “must use structural means to maintain control.” One of the best explanations of the use of internal controls as a structural component of any best practices compliance program comes from Aaron Murphy, a partner at Foley and Lardner in San Francisco, in his book entitled “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act”, where he said, “Internal controls are policies, procedures, monitoring and training that are designed to ensure that company assets are used properly, with proper approval and that transactions are properly recorded in the books and records. While it is theoretically possible to have good controls but bad books and records (and vice versa), the two generally go hand in hand – where there are record-keeping violations, an internal controls failure is almost presumed because the records would have been accurate had the controls been adequate.”

I would advocate that it is the interplay of the right message, tools in place to communicate and enforce the message and then oversight to ensure compliance with the message that allows a 250,000 plus employee base company to have a chance to operate in compliance with their legal obligations. Echoing this maxim, Hill quoted Rick Goings, Chairman and CEO of Tupperware Brands Corporation, for the following, “Wars are won not by generals, but by non-commissioned officers. If you have the right kind of structure…and behind that a value system, I think you can do it.”

HSBC continues to be the poster child for compliance lessons learned, whether intentional or not. Hill concluded his piece with the following, “The lesson may be that, irrespective of the size of the company, executives who lose touch with how their staff are using the culture they preach are courting embarrassment and scandal. The trend towards large companies operating through smaller units, with more autonomy and accountability for their actions, does not absolve leaders from meeting their traditional responsibilities to know what is happening on the frontline. As Prof Fischer suggests, they should manage according to the old Russian proverb that Ronald Reagan adopted when dealing with the Soviet Union in the 1980s: trust, but verify.”

There is a plethora of compliance regimes that companies can look to in order to create a best practices compliance program. Simply put, it is a relatively straightforward exercise; perhaps not easy but certainly there are well-articulated compliance programs that companies can follow. To continue to criticize the DOJ (and Securities and Exchange Commission) for failing to communicate what they wish to see in a best practices compliance program, simply fails to take into account the responsibility that corporations have in complying with US laws. The information is out there in abundance. Even a weekend article in the FT lays it out for you.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2015

Byzantium and the Alstom FCPA Settlement – Part III

Porphyry is a type of stone that was much favored in the Roman world. In a review of several books in the New York Review of Books, entitled “The Purple Stone of Emperors”, Peter Brown looked into the history of the lithic in the context of Byzantium as the true heir of the Roman Empire. He theorized that if “porphyry was the blood of ancient empire, then it must be to Constantinople that we should look (and not to Western Europe) if we wish to understand the heritage of Rome in the Middle Ages.” I found that an appropriate way to think about an apparent anomaly in the recent Alstom Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement action. In Part III of my series on the Alstom natter I consider the accounting records violations that the French parent, Alstom SA, agreed to in this enforcement action.

The FCPA Professor noted in his second blog post on this matter, entitled “Issues to Consider from the Alstom Action”, “The charges against Alstom S.A. are a real head-scratcher. The conventional wisdom for why the Alstom action involved only a DOJ (and not SEC) component is that Alstom ceased being an issuer in 2004 (in other words 10 years prior to the enforcement action). Yet, the actual criminal charges Alstom pleaded guilty to – violations of the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions – were based on Alstom’s status as an issuer (as only issuers are subject to these substantive provisions). In other words, Alstom pleaded guilty to substantive legal provisions in 2014 that last applied to the company in 2004.”

The Professor had also raised this issue in his first blog post on the resolution, entitled “All About the Alstom Enforcement Action”. After considering his thoughts on this issue, I decided to look into it a bit more deeply. Alstom SA was charged with several different FCPA violations including the following, 15 U.S.C. 78m(b)(2)(A), 15 USC §78m(b)(2)(B) and 78m(b)(5) which read in whole,

15 U.S.C. § 78m [Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] 

(b) Form of report; books, records, and internal accounting; directives…

(2) Every issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 78l of this title and every issuer which is required to file reports pursuant to section 78o(d) of this title shall—

(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer;

(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient

to provide reasonable assurances that—…

(5) No person shall knowingly circumvent or knowingly fail to imple­ment a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsify any book, record, or account described in paragraph (2).

These provisions are generally referred to as the ‘accounting provisions’ of the FCPA. As stated in the FCPA Guidance, “In addition to the anti-bribery provisions, the FCPA contains accounting provisions applicable to public companies. The FCPA’s accounting provisions operate in tandem with the anti-bribery provisions and prohibit off-the-books accounting. Company management and investors rely on a company’s financial statements and internal accounting controls to ensure transparency in the financial health of the business, the risks undertaken, and the transactions between the company and its customers and business partners. The accounting provisions are designed to “strengthen the accuracy of the corporate books and records and the reliability of the audit process which constitute the foundations of our system of corporate disclosure.””

Moreover, these accounting provisions, including both the books and records and internal control provisions, are defined to apply to “issuers”. As set out in the FCPA Guidance, “The FCPA’s accounting provisions apply to every issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act or that is required to file annual or other periodic reports pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act.244 These provisions apply to any issuer whose securities trade on a national securities exchange in the United States, including foreign issuers with exchange traded American Depository Receipts. They also apply to companies whose stock trades in the over-the-counter market in the United States and which file periodic reports with the Commission, such as annual and quarterly reports. Unlike the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, the accounting provisions do not apply to private companies.”

Charging Box Score

Alstom Entity	Charges	Time of Criminal Conduct	Issuer Status
Alstom SA	15 USC §78m(b)(2)(A)15 USC §78m(b)(2)(B)15 USC §78m(b)(5) 15 USC §78ff(a) 18 USC §2	1998-2004	Issuer until 2004
Alstom Power Inc.	18 USC §371-conspiracy to violate the FCPA	2002-2009	Subsidiary of Issuer until 2004
Alstom Grid Inc.	18 USC §371-conspiracy to violate the FCPA	2000-2010	Subsidiary of Issuer until 2004
Alstom Network Schweiz AG	18 USC §371-conspiracy to violate the FCPA	2000-2011	Subsidiary of Issuer until 2004

While I agree with the above, I do disagree with the Professor’s final statement that “This free-for-all, anything goes, as long as the enforcement agencies collect the money nature of FCPA enforcement undermines the legitimacy and credibility of FCPA enforcement.” The reason I disagree is that this was a negotiated settlement, not a dictat or court proceeding. With no doubt excellent FCPA defense counsel involved, Alstom must have had its own reasons for agreeing to such a settlement. Without any further comment by the company, we will have to speculate as to some of the reasons for this component of the resolution.

First and foremost is that clearly Alstom did engage in conduct which substantially violated the FCPA. It would further appear that the conduct reached right up into the corporate home offices in France. By agreeing to the books and records and internal control violations, Alstom may have avoided any direct admission of guilt under French law, which we now know from the Total FCPA enforcement action is significant for a French company, because what is illegal bribery and corruption under US law is not necessarily illegal under French law.

Other than the anomalous French law issue, there may be another important consideration going on here. Alstom is under acquisition by General Electric (GE). Not only does GE pride itself and very publicly inform about its anti-corruption compliance program, GE has a large number of contracts with the US and other governments which might looks askance at doing business with a business unit that admitted to substantive FCPA violations of bribery and corruption. While I do not think that GE would be in danger of being debarred, it might well be that certain governments might not want to do business with a new subsidiary which made such a court admission. I find this to be more than simply a distinction without a difference. Consider the trouble that Hewlett-Packard (HP) is in north of the border in Canada regarding potential debarment by the Canadian government for its FCPA violations as set forth in its FCPA resolution of last April. So perhaps from Alstom’s perspective, the company believed it received benefits from settling based upon accounting violations.

But whatever the reason, it is clear that Alstom did engage in substantive FCPA violations. It’s settlement is that, a settlement of outstanding issues, which the company was a willing participant. It may not have been what the company wanted but I do not find that by charging Alstom for books and records and internal controls violations for the time frame it was clearly liable in any way demeans, degrades or lessens FCPA enforcement going forward. But just as we need to look to Byzantium to determine the heritage of Rome through the Middle Ages, by looking at the facts and circumstances around Alstom’s FCPA from the Alstom perspective and what it hoped to obtain in the settlement, we might be able to glean some insights.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2015

The Alstom FCPA Enforcement Action – Part I

As the first blog post of 2015, I thought it appropriate to highlight two outstanding confluences. The first is that this year is the centenary of the birth of Orson Welles. While not occurring in 2015, near the end of 2014 we had the settlement of the long-standing Alstom Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement action announced. Both are worthy on note this second day of our mid-decade mark. First Welles. Many consider him one of the most talented directors ever to come through the American film industry. Almost any cinema-goer will recognize the names of Citizen Kane and The Magnificent Ambersons as two of greatest films of all-time. But I found The Lady from Shanghai, Macbeth and most particularly Touch of Evil all to be excellent films for their respective genres. And do not forget his acting; not only in the aforementioned Citizen Kane and Touch of Evil but also as Harry Lime in The Third Man. Welles could also be a philosopher. Kristin M. Jones, writing in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), in an article entitled “Welles at 100”, quoted him for the following, “Art is the lie that makes us realize the truth.” She ended her piece with the observations that “Searching for the truth beyond Welles’s beautiful lies is still a journey worth taking.”

All of which brings us to Alstom and the resolution of its FCPA enforcement action. Over the next couple of posts, I will be looking the enforcement action for it is certainly ‘a journey worth taking’ to try and glean nuggets for the compliance practitioner. Today I will review the amounts of money involved and some of the larger concepts that I see at play in this matter. Next I will review the specifics of the Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and see what lessons we may draw from them. Beyond that, we will have to see where the journey takes us.

First, and foremost, is how did Alstom find itself in the position that it now occupies as Number 2 on the all-time hit parade of FCPA enforcement actions? Particularly, as noted by the FCPA Professor in his post, entitled “All About the Alstom Enforcement Action”, that “Alstom employed approximately 110,000 employees in over 70 countries. The information contains specific allegations as to 9 individuals associated with Alstom and 9 consultants associated with Alstom.”

Usually when someone comes in at Number 2, the ranking comes with some ignominy. Though for Alstom it is not because they did not win but because they now have the second highest total FCPA monetary fine in the history of the world at a stunning $772,290,000. I say total because the current Number 1, Siemens, is at $800MM and included both a Department of Justice (DOJ) component of $450MM and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) component of $350MM. However with the Alstom fine, the entire amount was paid to DOJ as a fine and no monies were paid to the SEC because at the time of the resolution, Alstom was not an ‘issuer’ under the FCPA and the SEC had no jurisdiction. This makes Alstom the largest criminal FCPA fine of all-time. One interesting note is that two other French companies, Total SA and Technip SA, join Alstom on the all-time Top 10 list. Somewhere I am sure Mr. French is shaking his very well coiffured head in shame in the great TV Land in the sky.

I would say the amounts paid out and benefits received by Alstom were stunning but it might do a disservice to the word stunning. So below I have laid out information below.

Alstom Bribery Box Score

Country	Bribe Amount Paid	Benefit Received
Indonesia	(not listed)	$378MM
Saudi Arabia	$51.2MM	$3bn
Egypt	‘Millions and millions’	$175MM
Bahamas	$1MM	(not listed)
Taiwan	(not listed)	$15MM
Total	$75MM	$4bn in contracts with $296MM in profits

The FCPA Professor also noted, “at its core, the Alstom enforcement action involved inadequate controls concerning the engagement, monitoring and supervision of the consultants.” However it is most difficult to believe that Alstom suffered from a corporate culture which was at best make your numbers or at worst something much more nefarious. The amounts paid were simply so large and the bribery schemes so pervasive that there had to be much more than simply 9 persons lying, cheating and stealing all while merrily skipping home to Grandmother’s house in the woods. Indeed, as noted by WSJ reporters Joel Schechtman and Brent Kendall, in their article entitled “Alstom to Pay $772 Million to Settle Bribery Charges”, “The record criminal bribery penalty comes after more than six years of investigations into Alstom from law enforcement in 10 countries. The company and its subsidiaries’ schemes lasted for more than a decade, into at least 2011”.

Also of note is that the Alstom enforcement action was the first in 2014 where the fine was not at either the low range or even lower than calculations the Sentencing Guidelines would have suggested. The range for the fine was calculated to be between $592MM and $1.184bn. This range was a direct result of the failure of Alstom to take the investigation seriously, to cooperate with the DOJ or to even put anything like a positive step forward in the way of remedial actions during a large part of the investigative process. The DOJ Press Release quoted Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell that “This case is emblematic of how the Department of Justice will investigate and prosecute FCPA cases – and other corporate crimes. We encourage companies to maintain robust compliance programs, to voluntarily disclose and eradicate misconduct when it is detected, and to cooperate in the government’s investigation. But we will not wait for companies to act responsibly. With cooperation or without it, the department will identify criminal activity at corporations and investigate the conduct ourselves, using all of our resources, employing every law enforcement tool, and considering all possible actions, including charges against both corporations and individuals.”

Finally, from a big picture perspective was the international scope of the investigation. In the DOJ Press Release, FBI Executive Assistant Director Robert Anderson Jr. said that “This investigation spanned years and crossed continents, as agents from the FBI Washington and New Haven field offices conducted interviews and collected evidence in every corner of the globe.” Further, the DOJ acknowledged significant cooperation from “the law enforcement colleagues in Indonesia at the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Corruption Eradication Commission), the Office of the Attorney General in Switzerland, the Serious Fraud Office in the United Kingdom, as well as authorities in Germany, Italy, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus and Taiwan.” Truly worldwide in scope.

Next, I will look at some of the specifics in the various Alstom DPAs to determine where best practices compliance program may be headed.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2015

 

 

Scrooge and Corporate Settlement Agreements

Although there seems to be a difference in the precise publication date between the online reference sites This Day in History and Wikipedia, today we celebrate the Charles Dickens’ work A Christmas Carol, which both sites acknowledge was published in 1843. This story has become well known and omnipresent in the Christmas season; in film, theater, radio, television, cartoon, opera and about every other form of media known to mankind. A Christmas Carol tells the story of a bitter old miser, Ebenezer Scrooge and his transformation into a gentler, kindlier man after visitations by the ghost of his former business partner Jacob Marley and the Ghosts of Christmases Past, Present and Yet to Come.

The book was written at a time when the English were examining and exploring Christmas traditions from the past as well as new customs such as Christmas cards and Christmas trees. Dickens’ source materials for the tale appear to be many and varied, but are principally, the humiliating experiences of his childhood, his sympathy for the poor and various Christmas stories and fairy tales. A Christmas Carol has been credited as one of the greatest influences in rejuvenating the old Christmas traditions of England. Scrooge himself is the embodiment of winter, and, just as winter is followed by spring and the renewal of life, so too Scrooge’s cold, pinched heart is restored to the innocent goodwill he had known in his childhood and youth. It is hardy tale that should be retold and remembered each holiday season as one of the true spirits for celebration.

I considered this work by Dickens when I read a recently released article entitled “Improving Corporate Settlement Agreements” by The Fraud Guy, John Hanson. In this piece Hanson considers some shortcomings in a variety of corporate misconduct settlement agreements, where he believes “the Terms of most Agreements lack a full and practical appreciation for what constitutes an effective Program within a particular organization.” He articulates that “A key reason for this is because the parties to the Agreement miss the forest for the trees in that they too narrowly focus on Program sub-components (that piece of a Program associated with a particular risk, such as Anti-Corruption, Anti-Trust, False Claims, Organizational Conflicts of Interest, etc.…), the failure of which is only symptomatic of a higher level and overall Program failure.” Although Hanson’s critique of Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs), corporate monitors and settlement agreements was broader than simply those issues in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement, I found his comments provided some useful insights into how both companies and the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) might help to make the process more robust in helping companies create a culture of compliance and ethics as result of a resolved enforcement action.

Ethical Tone

Here Hanson says that DPAs do not tie the relationship of compliance and ethics together going forward. He believes that one cannot exist without the other. He thinks many compliance program overseers focus too much on the sub-parts and institute too much of “A piecemeal approach that overly focuses on Program sub-components and neglects ethical tone almost completely is doomed to failure. It is like placing a Band-Aid on an arterial wound.”

While many external monitors will drill down into the detailed specifics of a certain issue or even sub-issue under compliance, such a mechanism can be a useful exercise. For example if there is a particular compliance problem being faced such a detailed approach may be warranted. For instance, if the company got into FCPA trouble for its use of third parties that came into a business relationship with the company through the Supply Chain, an extreme deep dive into the Supply Chain and management of those relationships from the compliance perspective may be important. However what such an approach may cost is losing a greater focus of the overall picture.

Time

A second critique is that many DPAs are simply too short in time length to “effectively implement remediation.” While this criticism is largely for DPAs outside the FCPA context, it bears some discussion. Hanson believes that “A Program is a process, not a one-time event. Moreover, it is a process that perpetuates and improves continuously. Generally speaking, for organizations without a robust and effective Program, it realistically takes at least three years to stand up this process to the point where it is effective and begins annually repeating.” A compliance program design and implementation can take up to 18-months and it can often take another year to assess the implementation results and fine tune the compliance regime going forward.

While most DPAs in the FCPA context are for three years, there have been examples of where either a company was released early from a DPA or a monitorship ended at the 18-month mark rather than the full three years. An example of this is Pride International (now ENSCO) who were rewarded by being released early for its superior enhanced compliance efforts. In the latter category is Weatherford, among others, whose external monitorship can end at 18-months after the execution of the DPA, if sufficient progress is met.

External Monitors

Hanson had some very interesting thoughts about the use of corporate monitors. He has long championed more professionalism for monitors, specifically regarding their training in implementing compliance programs, not simply as very good white-collar defense lawyers or internal investigators. However, in his paper Hanson notes that other concerns have lessened both the effectiveness of external monitors or even their use; when he writes, “Due to past negative publicity arising from problems resulting from poor/immature government agency Monitor selection policies and/or inexperienced and/or ineffective Monitors, government agencies and organizations alike have developed some misperceptions that have led to Monitors being underutilized, even avoided. While some government agencies are still developing or improving Monitor selection policies, many have already adopted policies that addressed past concerns.”

Hanson champions his concerns for monitors with the experience issue. He believes that “many Monitors come from the ranks of whitecollar defense attorneys, who, as noted above, frequently lack the requisite level of compliance and ethics training and knowledge, as well as practical Program experience, to serve in that role most effectively. Additionally, most persons selected to be a Monitor have never been a Monitor before and are unaware of the nuances associated with such a specialized role.” To rectify this issue, Hanson advocates greater monitor training from organizations such as the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics (SCCE) or others. Finally, as Hanson notes, “it is of much greater importance to engage a Monitor who is an expert in compliance and ethics rather than one who is an expert on the substantive underlying criminal and/or regulatory violations.”

As usual when John Hanson writes something relating to the compliance field, you should definitely read it. Hanson’s unique background as a forensic auditor, FBI agent and four-time corporate monitor provide valuable insights to any compliance related issue. His current article is no different. You can use many of his insights directly in your compliance program through engaging an outside expert, called monitor or something else, to help move your compliance and ethics program forward on a number of fronts.

Hanson’s article is available through JDSupra by clicking here.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

DPAs and NPAs – Powerful Tools in the Fight Against Corruption

As readers of this blog know the FCPA Professor and I usually look at the same Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement action, item or remark and see different things. Sometimes we even hear the same thing and come away with different interpretations. Last week, we experienced yet another instance of the former where we both looked at the same article, that being one in Global Investigations Review entitled “Caldwell: settlement a “more powerful tool” than convictions” by Rahul Rose, yet came away with different interpretations. After some to-ing and fro-ing, we decided that we would both post our interpretations on the same day. So with a nod to Dan Fogelberg and Tim Weisberg, today we have the first twin posts from different bloggers dual- blog posts. Since we agreed to write our respective posts without seeing the other’s post and hence could not comment on each other’s post, I urge that after you finish reading my blog today, you click on over to the FCPA Professor’s site and see what his thoughts on Caldwell’s remarks might be.

The specific remarks we want to focus on were apparently made by during the Q&A session of Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell who spoke at the Launch of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Foreign Bribery Report, note these remarks were not found in the printed remarks of the speech on the Department of Justice (DOJ) website. In her Q&A, Rose reported the following, “Caldwell told the audience in Paris: “Companies cannot be sent to jail, so all a court can do is say you will pay ‘x’. We can say: ‘you will also have a monitor and will do all sorts of other things for the next five years, and if you don’t do them for the next five years then you can still be prosecuted’.” [And for the money shot] “In the United States system at least it is a more powerful tool than actually going to trial,” she said.”

It turns out that I have been thinking along these lines as well. The debate over the usefulness of Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPAs) and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) has been long attended. Yet there are a couple of key reasons that DPAs and NPAs are such powerful tools in the fight against anti-corruption and anti-bribery which I do not believe have been fully articulated or explored. The first is that by settling, the DOJ (and Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC]) will have the ability to monitor the company going forward. This process began under the practice of formally appointing a corporate monitor nominated by the company in the throes of the enforcement action and who would be agreed to by the DOJ. This practice is generally referred to as a company having mandatory monitor.

While this specific practice received a fair amount of criticism from a variety of sources, the basic concept was sound. That concept was that a neutral third party would review a company’s compliance with the terms and conditions of a DPA or NPA and report to the DOJ at intervals generally no shorter than annually. This would give the DOJ eyes and ears into a company to oversee its adherence to the terms of the settlement. But what information did Caldwell convey in her statement as to why she thinks settlements are such a powerful tool? I read three pieces of information her statement about why FCPA settlements are such powerful tools.

‘Do All Sorts of Other Things’

Under this prong a settling defendant is required to do “all sorts of other things.” We know from the DPAs and NPAs relating to FCPA enforcement over the past several years, the minimum that a company will be required to institute is a best practices anti-corruption compliance program. While the FCPA Guidance specifies ten hallmarks of an effective compliance program, the DPAs and NPAs have had between 9 to 16 items listed in the best practices anti-corruption compliance programs that settling companies’ have agreed to institute. If the DOJ went to trial and secured a conviction the company would not have to put such a compliance program in place but only pay a fine or some other monetary penalty. Further, by requiring such a best practices anti-corruption compliance program in such a public manner, through a publicly filed DPA or NPA, the DOJ can communicate its current thinking on what it believes constitutes such a program. This provides valuable information to the compliance practitioner going forward and I believe completely disabuses the argument that companies cannot know what their obligations might be to comply with the FCPA or that companies do not know what the DOJ expects from them in the area of a FCPA compliance regime.

‘You will also have a monitor’

David E. Matyas and Lynn Shapiro Snyder
from the law firm of Epstein Becker & Green P.C., described the duties of a corporate monitor in their article entitled, “Monitoring the Monitor? The Need for Further Guidance Governing Corporate Monitors Under Pre-Trial Diversion Agreements”. The monitor would meet with “the company’s board and employees. A monitor then develops a work plan which defines the scope, access, and power the monitor will have over the company. The monitor’s work involves frequent visits to the company (including possible on-site accommodations) and broad access to company documents and meetings. The monitor should be knowledgeable about the regulatory aspects of the company’s operations, but that is not necessarily a criterion for selection of the monitor. Indeed, a monitor can hire others to assist in his or her responsibilities at the company’s expense. The monitor files periodic reports with the U.S. Attorney’s Office and makes visits with that office as well as with the company. At the conclusion of a monitor’s term – often 24-36 months – the monitor files a final report that details the activities accomplished and whether the company complied with all the terms of the agreement.”

So the monitor provides the DOJ with continued insight into what the company is doing to satisfy its settlement obligations around the implementation of its compliance program. If the DOJ has high confidence that the company has and will continue to put significant resources and efforts into its compliance program, it may agree to a voluntary monitor, as we have seen with the Parker Drilling and Hewlett-Packard (HP) DPAs. If the DOJ does not have such confidence, it may require a monitor for the length of the DPA, such as we saw in the Total DPA, which was three years. The DOJ may also take an interim position on the mandatory or voluntary nature of the monitor by allowing a company to end a mandatory monitorship half-way through the pendency of a DPA as it did with the Weatherford DPA, which allowed the mandatory monitorship to end at the 18 month mark of a three year DPA, if certain criteria were met.

‘You can still be prosecuted’ 

This final point is not to be underestimated. Once again if a company is found guilty at trial, a fine and/or penalty will be assessed and payment is the end of it. While it still may be under enhanced scrutiny, it will not have the affirmative obligation to report any FCPA violations going forward, nor will it bear potential liability and prosecution for failure to implement the terms and conditions of the DPA or NPA. Indeed, the company will agree to be prosecuted if there is another violation or it fails to implement as agreed to.

So by using DPAs and NPAs as settlement tools, I believe that the DOJ is able to impact on an ongoing basis, for two to three years, the compliance program of a settling company. This continued oversight usually translates into greater enthusiasm by a settling company to get compliance right so that it does not have to go through the full FCPA investigation and enforcement process. Of course there will always be recalcitrant companies such as Marubeni Corporation, which do not take the agreed to compliance obligations seriously going forward. When they get into trouble as recidivists, the second penalty is usually much higher. But there is also benefit to the compliance practitioner and greater compliance community because the DOJ communicates its expectations in these DPAs and NPAs. So they also work as powerful communication tools. Finally, by requiring a third party to act as the monitor, whether voluntary or mandatory, the DOJ can get some independent insight into what a company is doing compliance-wise.

Not knowing what the Professor has said, I have not tried to anticipate his arguments or rebut them directly. Nonetheless, I have tried to articulate why I agree with Ms. Caldwell’s remarks and why I continue to find the DOJ’s use of DPAs and NPAs as settlement tools a powerful weapon in the fight against bribery and corruption. I also hope that you will find favor with this exercise that the FCPA Professor and I have engaged in because we both believe that ongoing debate over FCPA enforcement is worthwhile for the compliance practitioner and necessary for the long-term success of compliance moving forward.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

Critiquing FCPA Enforcement and the GSK Domestic Corruption Conviction

Recently the FCPA Professor posted a blog, entitled “Look in the Mirror Moments”, in which he used written commentary by the US Secretary of the Treasury to the Chinese government about the Chinese governments anti-trust investigations as a mechanism to explore critiques of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement. In this post, he compared certain aspects of FCPA enforcement to the Chinese corruption enforcement action against GlaxoSmithKline PLC (GSK). Leaving aside the differences in anti-trust enforcement (price-fixing, monopolistic behavior and illegal collusion) and anti-corruption enforcement (bribery), I wanted to review his critiques through the prism of the known facts of the GSK enforcement action.

The FCPA Professor had the following comments about FCPA enforcement, in comparison with the Chinese corruption enforcement action against GSK. He said,

“Without in any way trying to comprehensively compare the overall U.S. legal system to the overall Chinese legal system, the following attributes of FCPA enforcement must at least be acknowledged. 

The vast majority of corporate FCPA enforcement actions lack transparency and the resolution documents (whether a non-prosecution agreement, deferred prosecution agreement or civil administrative order) are the result of an opaque process ultimately controlled by the same office prosecuting or bringing the action. 

As to the swiftness of FCPA enforcement actions, one can only assume that the majority of general counsels and board of directors of companies under FCPA scrutiny would be jumping for joy if the scrutiny – from start to finish – would resolve itself in 15 months rather than the typical 3-5 years (and in some instances more) of FCPA scrutiny lingering.”

The difficulty I have with both of these points is that one cannot separate the Chinese enforcement action against GSK from the Chinese legal system that produced it. Let’s start with the ‘jumping for joy’ prong. The initial difference to note is that the Chinese enforcement action was a domestic prosecution based upon Chinese domestic law for bribery and corruption of Chinese. It was not a US (or UK) company violating US (or UK) laws. This means that the relevant documents and witness were in the locality where the investigation was performed. Even when a key witness, GSK China Country Manager Mark Reilly was in the UK, he voluntarily returned to China to give evidence but was prevented from leaving the country without being charged with a crime. So as far as is known, there were no government-to-government requests for information, no Letters Rogatory or use of any other international discovery mechanism to obtain evidence.

Moreover, the procedural protections in place under US (and UK) criminal procedure simply do not exist in China. There is no right to counsel, no right against self-incrimination, no right to confront witness and not even a right to know what the charges against you might be. These lack of rights were certainly borne out in the speed in which the Chinese investigative authorities were able to obtain evidence and public confessions from GSK principals involved in the bribery and corruption. The first 30-day timeline of the GSK investigation went as follows:

• June 28, 2013 – Local Police announced they have place GSK officials under investigation for economic crimes.
• July 11, 2013 – Public Security Ministry issued statement accusing GSK of bribery.
• July 15 , 2013 – Four senior company execs ‘detained’. Finance chief barred from leaving country.
• July 16, 2013 – GSK General Counsel (GC) placed under ‘house arrest’ along with 30 other employees. One of the four GSK China executives who were detained, admited to bribery allegations on Chinese state television.
• July 22, 2013 – GSK formally apologized for breaking Chinese law regarding domestic bribery and corruption.
• July 26, 2013 – Peter Humphrey, a UK citizen and his wife, a naturalized US citizen, both hired by GSK in an ancillary matter related to the GSK corruption scandal were arrested but not told of the charges against them.

A little over one year later, in July, 2014 the trial of Humphrey and his wife was announced. Orignially it was to be held in secret with both Humphrey and his wife still not told of the formal charges against them. However after diplomatic protests by both the US and UK governments, Humphrey and his wife were both convicted and sentenced in an open trial, albeit lasting only one day, on August 8, 2014. The charges against them were announced at trial. Thereafter, GSK pled guilty in a secret one-day trial GSK was fined approximately $491MM and China Country Manager Mark Reilly and four other GSK China business unit executives were found gulity. They were all sentenced to jail but given suspended sentences.

How did the Chinese government develop its evidence so quickly? One of the defendant’s, admitted, on state run televison, his involvement in the bribery scheme only 18 days after the investigation was announced by Chinese authorities. Indeed, GSK itself made a public apology only 24 days after the announcement by the Chinese authorities it was under investigation. We now know that GSK was informed by a whistleblower of allegations of bribery and corruption as early as January 2013 yet in June GSK announced it had not found anything to substantiate these allegations.

I believe the answer is found in the differences in the Chinese and US legal systems. It all starts with the following: in China you are presumed guilty while in the US (and the UK), you are presumed innocent until proven guilty. In an article in the New York Times (NYT), entitled “Presumed Guilty in China’s War on Corruption”, Andrew Jacobs and Chris Buckley wrote that the “war on corruption often operates beyond the law in a secret realm of party-run agencies”. The process “Known as Shuanggui, it is a secretive, extralegal process that leaves detainees cutoff from lawyers, associates and relatives.” Moreover, even as a case moves through the Chinese criminal justice system, defendants’ counsel “have limited access to evidence, witnesses, and their clients.” It does not get any better when a defendant actually goes to court because “Lawyers say Chinese courts rarely allow them to call defense witnesses, while prosecutors frequently withhold cruical evidence.” Finally, of the 8,110 officials charged with corruption “in the first half of this year, 99.8 percent were convicted”. To this rather amazing trial court conviction rate, I would add the the prosecution does even better on appeal, never losing to a convicted defendant.

Does that sound like a system in which you would jump for joy if you were caught up in, even knowing that the time from announcment of investigation until 99.8% chance of conviction awaited you? Even if the government investigation only took 14 months? In the US, corporations have the same rights as individuals at trial; to cross-examine witness, to be made aware of the charges against it, those charges must be brought with specficity, right to counsel, right to an open trial and right to appeal. These rights are all enshrined in the US Constitution. Those rights are not present for individuals or corporations under Chinese law or jurisprudence.

But the FCPA Professor also critiqued the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in FCPA enforcements with the following observation: The vast majority of corporate FCPA enforcement actions lack transparency and the resolution documents (whether a non-prosecution agreement, deferred prosecution agreement or civil administrative order) are the result of an opaque process ultimately controlled by the same office prosecuting or bringing the action.When a company enters into negotiation with the DOJ and SEC it is with legal counsel in tow. Even if we in the general public are not privy to these negotiations over the terms and conditions of enforcement actions I am confident that there is some give and take. Further, while I only have personal knowledge of one negotiation for the specific terms of a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA), the lawyer representing the company made clear it was a negotiation. It was not a Diktat with sentencing simply pronounced by the DOJ. Does the office which handles the investigation also handle the settlement negotiation? Yes but that is what prosecutors do each and every day in every city, county, town, hamlet, state and federal jurisdiction in this country.

Just as it takes two to tango, it takes two to negotiate. The DOJ does not negotiate with itself. Another party is sitting across the table and that other party is the company involved in the FCPA investigation. Why is that company there in the room negotiating? Because the company has assessed its interest and determined that it would be better off settling than going to trial. This is in the face of DOJ failures in the trial court in the Gun Sting cases, the O’Shea trial and the trial court overturning the verdict in the Lindsey Manufacturing conviction. Simply because there is a negotiation between the DOJ and a private party does not make it some nefarious process, even if the prosecutors hold the upper hand.

As far as the fines and penalites, there has been nothing to suggest the basis of the $491MM fine assessed against GSK. That amount is a bit less than the amounts initially reported that GSK China paid out as bribes, somewhere over $500MM. At least in the US, there are the Sentence Guidelines which form some basis of the calculation. Of course there is always some prosecutorial discretion to lessen a fine or penalty below the suggested amount. We have seen that occur this year with the HP enforcement action and recently Asst. Attorney General Leslie Caldwell suggested that Alcoa could have been fined over $1bn for its conduct, while the actual fine was $384MM. It is appropriate for prosecutors to have such discretion.

While the DOJ is also critiqued that DPAs (and Non-Prosecution Agreement [NPAs]) are essentially the same as going to trial with a near 100% success rate, I think this belies the number of declinations that the DOJs gives out. Unfortunately (and here the FCPA Professor and I do agree); there is not enough information given out about declinations; either regarding the raw numbers or the specific reasons for a declination. Only if a company agrees or is required to make such information public does it become known. Nevertheless, there is the recent example of Layne Christensen, which received a declination. In an article in Compliance Week, entitled “How Two Companies Got Regulators to Drop FCPA Charges”, Jaclyn Jaeger reported on the reasons the company sustained this result of receiving a declination through interviews with Christensen GC, Steve Crooke, its Chief Compliance Officer (CCO), Jennafer Watson and its outside counsel Russ Berland. Jaeger detailed the specific steps the company took and we can all see the effect it had upon the DOJ, through the declination to prosecute the company.

The debate about the costs of FCPA enforcement actions, the proper role of DPAs/NPAs and length of time of investigations is a healthy one and living in the open society that we have in the US, one that we will continue to have. Since I am not a prosecutor (or ex-prosecutor), I cannot look in the mirror at FCPA enforcement but I can review the facts of the DOJ and SEC’s FCPA enforcement, contrasted with the Chinese domestic bribery and corruption proseuction of GSK and believe that there is no basis for comparing the two systems, as they are so different in too many fundamental aspects.

I can however say one thing with absolute certainly; wherever you do want to be, a Chinese jail is not high on the list.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

The Positive Effects of DPAs and NPAs in FCPA Enforcement

One of the oft-made criticisms regarding the Department of Justice (DOJ) around its enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is its the use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) somehow pervert the course of justice. Some of the criticisms include: DPAs and NPAs are either too harsh or too lenient; DPAs and NPAs let corporations off too easily or they are too unfair to corporations; DPAs and NPAs are inherently unfair as they give the DOJ too much leverage in any negotiation or that the DOJ uses them as a way to simply seek bigger fines and to not go after the real culprits, i.e. rogue employees; the fines levied under DPAs and NPAs are too great or too small, but whichever it is, there is not appropriate judicial oversight; and my personal favorite, the DOJ needs to ‘trial-lawyer up’ and go to trial against big bad corporations which violate the FCPA to really show ‘em they mean business.

Speaking from the perspective of a former in-house type, I have argued that corporations desire DPAs and NPAs because they bring certainty. Not only in ending an enforcement action but also in knowing your obligations going forward; and they bring certainty in setting the fines and penalties to be paid for a FCPA violation. And, of course, if you enter into a DPA or NPA you bring your corporate client the certainty that you will not ‘Arthur Anderson’ your organization out of existence.

However there are other reasons why the use of DPAs and NPAs has been positive and that is the effect on companies. In a recent paper, entitled, “The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance: Evidence from 1993-2013 “”, authors Wulf A. Kaal and Timothy Lacine looked precisely at that issue. In an exhaustive study they reviewed all publicly available DPAs and NPAs from 1993 to 2013. The authors found that in a wide variety of categories 97.41% of the publicly available DPAs and NPAs “mandated substantive governance improvements” in the corporations that entered into them. Any time you have 97% improvement in anything, I would say someone must have been doing something right, somewhere, somehow. From the thesis of their article, it would appear that what the DOJ is doing right is using DPAs and NPAs to positively impact corporate governance.

What were some of the changes brought about through the use of DPAs and NPAs? In the area of Board governance there were provisions including mandating changes requiring additional reporting obligations for the Board; required changes to existing Board committee structure of the entity, often creating new board committees. Other changes included increased Board monitoring obligations, the addition of independent director(s) and changes pertaining to management of the entity. In addition to more Board involvement, under a number of DPAs and NPAs, a settling company’s senior management was required to provide additional oversight and involvement with the compliance function. Similarly monitoring obligations have generally increased with many DPAs and NPAs containing specific provisions that related to ongoing monitoring requirements.

Both the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) position and the compliance function were significantly impacted by many of the DPAs and NPAs. Many contained provisions relating to a new, improved or expanded compliance program. Additionally, many DPAs and NPAs contained provisions pertaining to improved compliance communications and training requirements in the compliance function. Internal controls and required improvements pertaining to books and records were also noted. Of course, if a company did not have a Code of Conduct or CCO, they were required.

The authors have also identified additional and continuing oversight factors. They note that DOJ “involvement suggest that prosecutors can promote an ethical corporate culture through enhanced compliance measures in N/DPAs. Under this theory, the DOJ’s expansionary tendencies in N/DPAs are a mere extension of legally mandated compliance requirements. In fact, corporate governance of the respective entity plays a major role in federal prosecutors’ charging decisions. The increased role of independent private sector oversight may help address the increased complexity of corporate crime and dwindling public funds. Given their education and experience as well as their ability to fill a void left by the system, prosecutors may be uniquely qualified to institute corporate governance changes.”

I think this ongoing DOJ oversight is not to be underestimated as a positive effect for compliance. Clearly if an external monitor is required there will be at least annual reporting to the DOJ on the company’s implementation of the terms and conditions of its settlement. But even if the DOJ does not require an external monitor there is always a requirement that the settling company report to the DOJ on the extent of its compliance efforts. The best practice would suggest that an independent third party make this assessment but even if it is not accomplished in such a manner, there is still DOJ oversight.

While the DOJ has pronounced that they are not involved in industry sweeps, the reality is that some industries have been hit with more FCPA enforcement actions than others. If there are a large number of FCPA settlements using DPAs and NPAs in one industry, it can have the effect of increasing both the knowledge of compliance and sophistication of compliance programs within that industry. I have personally witnessed this in the energy industry in Houston where compliance is now driven as a business solution to the legal problem of FCPA compliance. Scott Killingsworth calls this Private-to-Private compliance solutions. I call it business solutions to legal problems. Whatever you might wish to name it, these FCPA enforcement actions have increased the prevalence of compliance programs in the energy industry.

The authors also believe that through the use of DPAs and NPAs, the DOJ is better able to communicate its expectations of what it expects in the way of a best practices compliance program. They state that Boards, “management and corporate counsel may see these preexisting measures as a roadmap for preparing for future investigations and handling the eventual investigation.”

Finally, the authors provide a very interesting insight as to the power of DPAs and NPAs, which is not often discussed in the FCPA context. They contend that use of DPAs and NPAs, as corporate governance tools, “may be preferable to changes to federal law.” They explain, “Compared with more meaningful congressional governance reform, N/DPA-related governance reform is relatively “cheap” for corporations because comparatively few board and management positions are adversely affected. Furthermore, N/DPA-related governance reform is a measure supported by most corporate insiders as it is seen as beneficial for investors. Until regulators belatedly realize the threat posed by particular industry practices, as identified in N/DPAs, and consider acting upon it, N/DPA-related governance reform is entity specific and increases the availability of relevant, decentralized, and institution specific information for regulatory action. Preemptive remedial measures preceding the execution of N/DPAs and associated N/DPA feedback effects can create the framework for anticipatory dynamic regulation as a regulatory supplement.”

This last concept speaks to the transactional cost of changing not only laws surrounding corporate governance but the reform of a corporation for itself. The key stakeholder unit of investors certainly profits by having more and better corporate governance, as does the corporation itself. I found the authors’ work to be a welcome addition to the ongoing debate on DPAs and NPAs.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

The Destruction of Arthur Andersen and the Use of DPAs in FCPA Enforcement

The debate over the efficiencies of Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) continued this week with additional criticism of their use. I have argued that DPAs are in a corporation’s interest because they can bring certainty to the conclusion of an enforcement action and allow it to make remedial changes and move forward. However yesterday I came across an article by Larry Katzen, a former partner at Arthur Andersen and author of “And You Thought Accountants were Boring – My Life Inside Arthur Andersen.” Katzen’s piece is entitled “A Business World Massacre – What Can Happen 
When Government Needs a Scapegoat” and it details the destruction of the firm after it’s guilty verdict surrounding the Enron scandal. Katzen articulates the human costs for the total wipeout of the firm and sets out clearly what can happen when a company goes to trial and sustains a guilty verdict. I received permission to reprint his article in full, which is below:

==============================================================================================================================================================================================================================

A Business World Massacre – What Can Happen 
When Government Needs a Scapegoat 

It remains one of the greatest travesties in the history of American business: In 2001, the 85,000 employees of one of the world’s largest accounting firms began losing their jobs in droves. Their employer had become tainted by its loose association with Enron Corp., a financial house of cards that was imploding and taking with it billions of dollars in employee pensions and shareholder investments.

In 2002, accounting firm Arthur Andersen was convicted of charges related to Enron’s fraudulent practices. The charges had nothing to do with the quality of their auditing – or any of Enron’s illicit practices. The conviction was appealed, and in 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court struck it down in a unanimous vote. But the damage had already been done.

To date, despite millions of records being subpoenaed, there is no evidence Arthur Andersen ever did anything wrong. Still, perceptions are everything: Most people are not aware that the accounting firm, which led the industry in establishing strict, high standards, became a government scapegoat.

When I speak to groups across the country, I ask the following questions. Below are the typical responses I receive – and the actual facts.

1.     What do you remember about Arthur Andersen? 

Typical Response: They were the ones that helped facilitate the Enron fraud. They deserved what they got.

Fact: Arthur Andersen was the largest and most prestigious firm in the country. It was considered the gold standard of the accounting profession by the business community.

2.     For what was Arthur Andersen indicted? 

Typical Response: They messed up the audit of Enron and signed off on false financial statements.

Fact: They were indicted for shredding documents. These documents were drafts and other items that do not support the final product. All accounting firms establish policies for routinely shredding such documents.

3.     How long was it between the Enron blowup and when Arthur Andersen went out of business? 

Typical Response: One to three years.

Fact: The largest accounting firm in the world was gone in 90 days.

4.     Was the indictment upheld? 

Typical Response: Yes, that is why they went out of business.

Fact: No. The Supreme Court overruled the lower court in a 9-0 decision, and came to the conclusion within weeks, making it one of their quickest decisions ever.

5.     How many people lost their jobs as a result of the false accusations? 

Typical Response: Have no idea, but the partners got what they deserved.

Fact: Eighty-five thousand people lost their jobs and only a few thousand were partners. Most were staff people and clericals who made modest sums of money.

6.     Who benefited from Arthur Andersen going out of business? 

Typical Response: Everyone – we finally got rid of those crooks and made a statement to the rest of business to operate ethically.

Facts: It was not the Arthur Andersen people; they lost their jobs. It was not the clients; they had to go through the stress and expense of finding a new auditing firm. It was not the business world in general: It now has fewer firms from which to choose and rates increased. It was their competitors who benefited – they got Andersen’s best people and clients and were able to increase their rates and profitability.

7.     What accounting firms now have ex Arthur Andersen partners playing leadership roles in their firms? 

Typical Response: None

Facts: The “big four,” all the large middle-tier firms and many small firms have former Arthur Andersen partners in leadership positions. Finally, many members of the new Public Accounting oversight Board (PCAOB), which oversees these firms, now have former Arthur Andersen people involved in reviewing the quality of these firms.

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Was Arthur Andersen guilty of a crime? The jury said yes but the US Supreme Court said no. Were they a part of one of the biggest corporate frauds of all-time? Perhaps. Did Arthur Andersen make mistakes? Yes. Did the firm deserve to get wiped out as a result of document shredding? Are you kidding?

The destruction of Arthur Andersen is foremost on the mind of every General Counsel (GC), Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Board of Director whose company is facing the decision of whether or not to fight in court any charges related to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violations. Some have argued that DPAs pervert the course of justice but from where I sit, having seen Arthur Andersen destroyed before our collective eyes, the better practice is to enter into a DPA. Was it really in the interest of the Department of Justice (DOJ), or even the People of the United States, who after all the DOJ represent, to throw 85,000 people out of work for the document shredding engaged in by the firm’s Houston office?

Some commentators seem to argue that if a company violates the FCPA, they should get what they justly deserve. But does it serve any interest to wipeout an entire company? Finally, for those who want to tell company management to man up and go to trial, GCs, Chief Compliance Officer (CCO), Board members and others need to remember their legal obligations to their companies and shareholders and not be cowboys going to the last gunfight. Put another way, do you want to be the first GC, CCO, Board member or CEO who tells the DOJ that you are over-reaching and we are going to trial and lose everything like Arthur Andersen did?

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

The FCPA Year in Reivew-the eBook

I am pleased to announce the release of my eBook, “2013-the FCPA Year in Review” available through amazon.com. The past year saw the highest number of U.S. prosecutions of corporate bribery overseas since the banner year of 2010.  Some of the key corporate cases were Parker Drilling, Total and Weatherford. 2013 also saw 13 individuals prosecuted for FCPA or related criminal or civil violations. This jump in prosecutions illustrates the government’s commitment to aggressively pursuing these cases.

In this book, I review the underlying facts which led to the FCPA enforcement actions and the key lessons to be learned by the compliance practitioner going forward. I am certain that you will find this book useful in assessing your compliance program for 2014 and beyond.

It is a great value at $4.99. You can purchase a copy of the eBook, “2013-the FCPA Year in Review” by clicking here.