FCPA Compliance and Ethics Blog

October 27, 2014

Critiquing FCPA Enforcement and the GSK Domestic Corruption Conviction

Lady Scales of JusticeRecently the FCPA Professor posted a blog, entitled “Look in the Mirror Moments, in which he used written commentary by the US Secretary of the Treasury to the Chinese government about the Chinese governments anti-trust investigations as a mechanism to explore critiques of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement. In this post, he compared certain aspects of FCPA enforcement to the Chinese corruption enforcement action against GlaxoSmithKline PLC (GSK). Leaving aside the differences in anti-trust enforcement (price-fixing, monopolistic behavior and illegal collusion) and anti-corruption enforcement (bribery), I wanted to review his critiques through the prism of the known facts of the GSK enforcement action.

The FCPA Professor had the following comments about FCPA enforcement, in comparison with the Chinese corruption enforcement action against GSK. He said,

Without in any way trying to comprehensively compare the overall U.S. legal system to the overall Chinese legal system, the following attributes of FCPA enforcement must at least be acknowledged. 

The vast majority of corporate FCPA enforcement actions lack transparency and the resolution documents (whether a non-prosecution agreement, deferred prosecution agreement or civil administrative order) are the result of an opaque process ultimately controlled by the same office prosecuting or bringing the action. 

As to the swiftness of FCPA enforcement actions, one can only assume that the majority of general counsels and board of directors of companies under FCPA scrutiny would be jumping for joy if the scrutiny – from start to finish – would resolve itself in 15 months rather than the typical 3-5 years (and in some instances more) of FCPA scrutiny lingering.”

The difficulty I have with both of these points is that one cannot separate the Chinese enforcement action against GSK from the Chinese legal system that produced it. Let’s start with the ‘jumping for joy’ prong. The initial difference to note is that the Chinese enforcement action was a domestic prosecution based upon Chinese domestic law for bribery and corruption of Chinese. It was not a US (or UK) company violating US (or UK) laws. This means that the relevant documents and witness were in the locality where the investigation was performed. Even when a key witness, GSK China Country Manager Mark Reilly was in the UK, he voluntarily returned to China to give evidence but was prevented from leaving the country without being charged with a crime. So as far as is known, there were no government-to-government requests for information, no Letters Rogatory or use of any other international discovery mechanism to obtain evidence.

Moreover, the procedural protections in place under US (and UK) criminal procedure simply do not exist in China. There is no right to counsel, no right against self-incrimination, no right to confront witness and not even a right to know what the charges against you might be. These lack of rights were certainly borne out in the speed in which the Chinese investigative authorities were able to obtain evidence and public confessions from GSK principals involved in the bribery and corruption. The first 30-day timeline of the GSK investigation went as follows:

  • June 28, 2013 – Local Police announced they have place GSK officials under investigation for economic crimes.
  • July 11, 2013 – Public Security Ministry issued statement accusing GSK of bribery.
  • July 15 , 2013 – Four senior company execs ‘detained’. Finance chief barred from leaving country.
  • July 16, 2013 – GSK General Counsel (GC) placed under ‘house arrest’ along with 30 other employees. One of the four GSK China executives who were detained, admited to bribery allegations on Chinese state television.
  • July 22, 2013 – GSK formally apologized for breaking Chinese law regarding domestic bribery and corruption.
  • July 26, 2013 – Peter Humphrey, a UK citizen and his wife, a naturalized US citizen, both hired by GSK in an ancillary matter related to the GSK corruption scandal were arrested but not told of the charges against them.

A little over one year later, in July, 2014 the trial of Humphrey and his wife was announced. Orignially it was to be held in secret with both Humphrey and his wife still not told of the formal charges against them. However after diplomatic protests by both the US and UK governments, Humphrey and his wife were both convicted and sentenced in an open trial, albeit lasting only one day, on August 8, 2014. The charges against them were announced at trial. Thereafter, GSK pled guilty in a secret one-day trial GSK was fined approximately $491MM and China Country Manager Mark Reilly and four other GSK China business unit executives were found gulity. They were all sentenced to jail but given suspended sentences.

How did the Chinese government develop its evidence so quickly? One of the defendant’s, admitted, on state run televison, his involvement in the bribery scheme only 18 days after the investigation was announced by Chinese authorities. Indeed, GSK itself made a public apology only 24 days after the announcement by the Chinese authorities it was under investigation. We now know that GSK was informed by a whistleblower of allegations of bribery and corruption as early as January 2013 yet in June GSK announced it had not found anything to substantiate these allegations.

I believe the answer is found in the differences in the Chinese and US legal systems. It all starts with the following: in China you are presumed guilty while in the US (and the UK), you are presumed innocent until proven guilty. In an article in the New York Times (NYT), entitled “Presumed Guilty in China’s War on Corruption”, Andrew Jacobs and Chris Buckley wrote that the “war on corruption often operates beyond the law in a secret realm of party-run agencies”. The process “Known as Shuanggui, it is a secretive, extralegal process that leaves detainees cutoff from lawyers, associates and relatives.” Moreover, even as a case moves through the Chinese criminal justice system, defendants’ counsel “have limited access to evidence, witnesses, and their clients.” It does not get any better when a defendant actually goes to court because “Lawyers say Chinese courts rarely allow them to call defense witnesses, while prosecutors frequently withhold cruical evidence.” Finally, of the 8,110 officials charged with corruption “in the first half of this year, 99.8 percent were convicted”. To this rather amazing trial court conviction rate, I would add the the prosecution does even better on appeal, never losing to a convicted defendant.

Does that sound like a system in which you would jump for joy if you were caught up in, even knowing that the time from announcment of investigation until 99.8% chance of conviction awaited you? Even if the government investigation only took 14 months? In the US, corporations have the same rights as individuals at trial; to cross-examine witness, to be made aware of the charges against it, those charges must be brought with specficity, right to counsel, right to an open trial and right to appeal. These rights are all enshrined in the US Constitution. Those rights are not present for individuals or corporations under Chinese law or jurisprudence.

But the FCPA Professor also critiqued the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in FCPA enforcements with the following observation: The vast majority of corporate FCPA enforcement actions lack transparency and the resolution documents (whether a non-prosecution agreement, deferred prosecution agreement or civil administrative order) are the result of an opaque process ultimately controlled by the same office prosecuting or bringing the action.When a company enters into negotiation with the DOJ and SEC it is with legal counsel in tow. Even if we in the general public are not privy to these negotiations over the terms and conditions of enforcement actions I am confident that there is some give and take. Further, while I only have personal knowledge of one negotiation for the specific terms of a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA), the lawyer representing the company made clear it was a negotiation. It was not a Diktat with sentencing simply pronounced by the DOJ. Does the office which handles the investigation also handle the settlement negotiation? Yes but that is what prosecutors do each and every day in every city, county, town, hamlet, state and federal jurisdiction in this country.

Just as it takes two to tango, it takes two to negotiate. The DOJ does not negotiate with itself. Another party is sitting across the table and that other party is the company involved in the FCPA investigation. Why is that company there in the room negotiating? Because the company has assessed its interest and determined that it would be better off settling than going to trial. This is in the face of DOJ failures in the trial court in the Gun Sting cases, the O’Shea trial and the trial court overturning the verdict in the Lindsey Manufacturing conviction. Simply because there is a negotiation between the DOJ and a private party does not make it some nefarious process, even if the prosecutors hold the upper hand.

As far as the fines and penalites, there has been nothing to suggest the basis of the $491MM fine assessed against GSK. That amount is a bit less than the amounts initially reported that GSK China paid out as bribes, somewhere over $500MM. At least in the US, there are the Sentence Guidelines which form some basis of the calculation. Of course there is always some prosecutorial discretion to lessen a fine or penalty below the suggested amount. We have seen that occur this year with the HP enforcement action and recently Asst. Attorney General Leslie Caldwell suggested that Alcoa could have been fined over $1bn for its conduct, while the actual fine was $384MM. It is appropriate for prosecutors to have such discretion.

While the DOJ is also critiqued that DPAs (and Non-Prosecution Agreement [NPAs]) are essentially the same as going to trial with a near 100% success rate, I think this belies the number of declinations that the DOJs gives out. Unfortunately (and here the FCPA Professor and I do agree); there is not enough information given out about declinations; either regarding the raw numbers or the specific reasons for a declination. Only if a company agrees or is required to make such information public does it become known. Nevertheless, there is the recent example of Layne Christensen, which received a declination. In an article in Compliance Week, entitled “How Two Companies Got Regulators to Drop FCPA Charges”, Jaclyn Jaeger reported on the reasons the company sustained this result of receiving a declination through interviews with Christensen GC, Steve Crooke, its Chief Compliance Officer (CCO), Jennafer Watson and its outside counsel Russ Berland. Jaeger detailed the specific steps the company took and we can all see the effect it had upon the DOJ, through the declination to prosecute the company.

The debate about the costs of FCPA enforcement actions, the proper role of DPAs/NPAs and length of time of investigations is a healthy one and living in the open society that we have in the US, one that we will continue to have. Since I am not a prosecutor (or ex-prosecutor), I cannot look in the mirror at FCPA enforcement but I can review the facts of the DOJ and SEC’s FCPA enforcement, contrasted with the Chinese domestic bribery and corruption proseuction of GSK and believe that there is no basis for comparing the two systems, as they are so different in too many fundamental aspects.

I can however say one thing with absolute certainly; wherever you do want to be, a Chinese jail is not high on the list.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

October 22, 2014

Right to Retire Or Termination: Remediation of Leadership To Foster Compliance

Fall of RomeMany historians have long given 476 AD as the date of the fall of the Roman Empire. Further, it was from this date forward that Europe began its long slide into the abyss, which came to be known as the Dark Age. However, this view was challenged in 1971 by Peter Brown, with the publication of his seminal work “The World of Late Antiquity”. One of the precepts of Brown’s work was to reinterpret the 3rd to 8th centuries not as simply a decline of the greatness that had been achieved in the heydays of the Roman Empire, but more on their own terms. It was in the year of 476 AD that the last Roman Emperor, Romulus Augustulus, left the capital of Rome in disgrace. However as Brown noted, he was not murdered or even thrown out but allowed to retire to his country estates, sent there by the conquers of the western half of the Roman Empire, the Goths. Not much conquering going on if a ruler is allowed to ‘retire’, it was certainly a replacement but not quite the picture of marauding barbarians at the gate.

I thought about this anomaly of retirement by a leader in the context where a company or other entity might be going through investigations for corruption and non-compliance with such laws as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) or UK Bribery Act. Yesterday I wrote about three recent articles and what they showed about a company’s oversight of its foreign subsidiaries. Today I want to use these same articles to explore what a company’s response and even responsibility should be to remediate leadership under which the corruption occurs. The first was an article in the New York Times (NYT), entitled, “Another Scandal Hits Citigroup’s Moneymaking Mexican Division” by Michael Corkery and Jessica Silver-Greenberg. Their article spoke about the continuing travails of Citigroup’s Mexican subsidiary Banamex. Back in February, the company reported “a $400 million fraud involving the politically connected, but financially troubled, oil services firm Oceanografía.”

This has led Citigroup to ever so delicately try to oust the leader of its Mexico operations, Mr. Medina-Mora, by encouraging him to retire. While Citigroup did terminate 12 individuals around the Oceanografía scandal earlier in the year, it has not changed the employment status of the head of the Mexico business unit. This may be changing as the article said, “In a delicate dance, Citigroup is encouraging its Mexico chairman, Manuel Medina-Mora, 64, to retire, according to four people briefed on the matter. The bank has been quietly laying the groundwork for his departure, which could come by early next year, the people said. Still, Mr. Medina-Mora’s business acumen and connections to the country’s ruling elite have made him critical to the bank’s success in Mexico. Citigroup and its chairman, Michael E. O’Neill, cannot afford to alienate Mr. Medina-Mora and risk jeopardizing those relationships, these people said.”

Should Mr. Medina-Mora be allowed to retire? Should he even be required to retire? What about the ‘mints money’ aspect of the Mexican operations for Citigroup? Was any of that money minted through violations of the FCPA or other laws? What will the Department of Justice (DOJ) think of Citigroup’s response or perhaps even its attitude towards this very profitable business unit and Citigroup’s oversight, lax or other?

Does a company have to terminate employees who engage in corruption? Or can it allow senior executives to gracefully retire into the night with full pension and other golden parachute benefits intact? What if a company official “purposely manipulated appointment data, covered up problems, retaliated against whistle-blowers or who was involved in malfeasance that harmed veterans must be fired, rather than allowed to slip out the back door with a pension.” Or engaged in the following conduct, “had steered business toward her lover and to a favored contractor, then tried to “assassinate” the character of a colleague who attempted to stop the practice.” Finally, what if yet another company official directed company employees to “delete hundreds of appointments from records” during the pendency of an investigation?

All of the above quotes came from a second NYT article about a very different subject. In the piece, entitled “After Hospital Scandal, V.A. Official Jump Ship”, Dave Phillips reported that two of the four VA Administration executives who engaged in the above conduct and were selected for termination, had resigned before they could be formally terminated. The article reported that the VA “had no legal authority to stop” the employees from resigning. Current VA Secretary Robert McDonald was quoted in the article as saying, “It’s also very common in the private sector. When I was head of Procter & Gamble, it happened all the time, and it’s not a bad thing — it saves us time and rules out the possibility that these people could win an appeal and stick around.” Plus, he said, their records reflect that they were targeted for termination. “They can’t just go get a job at another agency,” Mr. McDonald said. “There will be nowhere to hide.”

The third article was in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and entitled, “GM Says Top Lawyer to Step Down”. In this piece, reporters John D. Stroll and Joseph B. White, with contributions from Chris Matthews and Joann Lublin, reported that General Motors (GM) General Counsel (GC) Michael Millikin will retire early next year. Milliken is famously the GC who claimed not to know what was going on in his own legal department around the group’s settlements of product liability claims of faulty ignition switches. Milliken claimed he was kept “in the dark” by his own lieutenants about the safety issues involved with this group of litigation. Does Milliken have any responsibility for the failures of GM around this safety issue? What does his apparent graceful retirement say about the corporate culture of GM and its desire to actually change anything in the light of its ongoing travails? Of course one might cynically point to GM’s failure to even have a Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer as evidence of the company’s attitude towards compliance and ethics. (I wonder how that might look to the DOJ/Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) if GM goes under any FCPA scrutiny?)

With Citigroup, the Department of Veterans Affairs and GM, we have three separate excuses for companies (and a Cabinet level department) not disciplining top employees for ethical and/or compliance failures. At Citigroup, the excuse is apparently that it does not want to rock the boat from a top producing foreign subsidiary by terminating the head of the subsidiary under investigation. At the Department of Veterans Affairs, the excuse seems to be they can go ahead and resign because we prefer to get rid of them that way. At GM, it is not clear why the GC who claimed not to know what was going on in even his own law department can ride off into the sunset with nary a contrary word in sight. Millikin’s conduct would seem to be the product of a larger cultural issue at GM.

I thought about how the DOJ might look at these situations for companies if a FCPA claim were involved. Even with McDonald’s observations about what happened when he was with Procter & Gamble; does a company show something less than commitment to having a culture of compliance if it allows an employee to retire? What does it say about Citigroup and its culture given the current dance it is having with its head of the Mexico unit? What about GM and its Sgt. Schultz of a GC and his ‘I was in the dark posture’? As stated by Mike Volkov, in his post entitled “Goodbye Mr. Millikin: GM’s Continuing Culture Challenges”, GM does under appear to understand the situation it finds itself in currently over its failures. He wrote, “GM still does not understand the significance of its governance failure…GM should have taken dramatic and affirmative steps to create a new culture – resources and new initiatives should be launched to rid GM of its current culture and replace it with a new speak up culture. It is a daunting task in such a large company but it has to be done. Until GM wakes up, missteps and failures will continue.” One might say the same for Citigroup and the Department of Veterans Affairs as well.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

October 21, 2014

Carlton Fisk, The Homer and Oversight of a Profitable Subsidiary

Fisk HomerToday we celebrate one of the great moments in World Series history. At approximately at 12:34 AM on this date in 1975, Carlton Fisk came to bat at the bottom of the 12th, in Game 6 of the World Series between the Boston Red Sox and Cincinnati Reds. He hit a pitch down the left field line. He stood at the plate, bouncing up and down and flailing at the ball as though he was helping an airplane land on a dark runway. “I was just wishing and hoping,” he said at a ceremony some years later. “Maybe, by doing it, you know, you ask something of somebody with a higher power. I like to think that if I didn’t wave, it would have gone foul.” Whether or not the waving was responsible, the ball bounced off of the bright-yellow foul pole above the Green Monster for a home run. Fenway’s organist played the Hallelujah Chorus from Handel’s Messiah while Fisk rounded the bases. One for the ages indeed as it appeared the Baseball Gods might finally be smiling on the Red Sox nation. Alas, they lost the next game and it was not to be for another 30 years.

I thought about Fisk’s homer and the ultimate heartbreak of Red Sox nation once again in 1975 when I read about several recent issues involving corruption and corporate responsibility for oversight, or perhaps more appropriately, the lack thereof. The first was an article in the New York Times (NYT), entitled “Another Scandal Hits Citigroup’s Moneymaking Mexican Division”, by Michael Corkery and Jessica Silver-Greenberg. Their article spoke about the continuing travails of Citigroup’s Mexican subsidiary Banamex. Back in February, the company revealed “a $400 million fraud involving the politically connected, but financially troubled, oil services firm Oceanografía.”

However, company investigators have unearthed another problem at the Mexico unit. The article reported “An internal investigation, begun by Citigroup in July, found evidence that the security unit was overcharging vendors and may have been taking kickbacks, a person briefed on the investigation said. The internal inquiry also found shell companies that had been set up to look like vendors and receive payments from the Banamex unit.” In a statement reported in the piece, Citigroup’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Michael L. Corbat “called the conduct of the individuals in the security unit ‘appalling’”.

What I found most interesting in the article was the response of Citigroup and what its implications might mean for the compliance practitioner, particularly one whose company is under scrutiny for a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violation by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The NYT piece made clear that the Mexico unit is so profitable that it figuratively “mints money” for the company. Moreover, “despite the latest headline-grabbing turmoil at Banamex, Citigroup does not want to cede any ground in Mexico where it dominates a large portion of the retail market.”

What is the responsibility for a US corporate parent when a foreign subsidiary ‘mints money’ for the company? Should the corporate parent pay closer attention to make sure the subsidiary is doing business in compliance with the FCPA and other relevant laws? In the past few posts, I have discussed some of the specific internal controls a compliance practitioner might consider for a company’s international operations. One of the problems Citigroup is facing with the conduct of its Mexico subsidiary is the company’s concern of “lax controls and oversight”. Moreover, there is concern that some part of the ongoing troubles in the Mexico unit relates to its head, Manuel Medina-Mora. Citigroup Chairman Michael O’Neill, was said to have “privately expressed concerns to board members that Mr. Medina-Mora, who is also co-president of the parent company, has not always relayed problems in the region to executives at the bank’s headquarters on Park Avenue, according to the people briefed on the matter. Instead of looping in executives in New York, Mr. Medina-Mora has at times chosen to handle the issues himself.”

How much oversight should a parent corporation have over a subsidiary? At a basic level it would seem that oversight should be enough to prevent and detect illegal conduct. Clearly, a Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) should be considering the entity-wide internal controls for a company. Under the FCPA accounting provisions, issuers can be held liable for the conduct of their foreign subsidiaries, even though the improper conduct occurred outside of the US. The scope of liability is based on the issuer’s incorporation of the subsidiary’s financial statements in its own records and SEC filings.

While a CCO should expect (and the DOJ & SEC for that matter) that internal controls at locations outside the US are of the same effectiveness as internal controls in US business units and at the US corporate office; unfortunately, that might not always be the case. It is often the case that corporate level internal controls are stronger than those in foreign business units. The Citigroup situation with its Mexican subsidiary would seem to be a clear example of the oft-cited reason that many companies were built through acquisitions, resulting in many business units (both in and outside the US) having completely different accounting and internal control systems than US corporate office. There is often a tendency to leave acquired companies in the state in which they were acquired, rather than trying to integrate their controls and conform them to those of current business units. After all, the reason for the acquisition was the profitability of the acquired company and nobody wants to be accused of negatively impacting profitability, especially one that ‘mints money’.

The second example is one a bit closer to home and it is that of the General Motors (GM) legal department. In an article in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) entitled “GM Says Top Lawyer to Step Down”, John D. Stroll and Joseph B. White, with contributions from Christopher Matthews and Joann S. Lublin, reported that GM General Counsel (GC) Michael Millikin will retire early next year. Millikin was criticized after the GM internal investigation found that he ran the GM legal department in such a hands off manner that he did not know about his legal department’s own settlements for product liability claims involving faulty ignition switches until February of this year. His defense was that his own lawyers “left him in the dark” even though there was evidence that he had been repeatedly warned, “GM could face punitive damage awards related to its failure to address the safety defect.” Missouri Senator Claire McCaskill summed up sentiment about Milliken with her statement “This is either gross negligence or gross incompetence.” In other words if you are a GC or CCO you had better know what is going on in your own department. What would it say about a CCO who did not know that compliance department members were dealing with violations of the FCPA without informing him or her? It would say that the CCO failed to exercise leadership and oversight.

And while you are watching things closely, you may want to check out a clip of Carlton Fisk’s famous homer by clicking here.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

September 8, 2014

Board of Directors and FCPA Oversight – An Internal Control Under SOX, Part II

Circle DiagramIn Part I of this two-part post regarding a Board of Director’s Role in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) oversight from the internal controls perspective, I reviewed how a Board might have independent liability for its failure to act as an appropriate internal control as required by Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX). Today I will review what internal controls are and what a Board’s role is within the context of internal controls.

Beginning on Tuesday, in conjunction with this two-part blog, my colleague Henry Mixon, Principal of Mixon Consulting, and myself are recording a podcast series on internal controls, which can be found on FCPA Compliance and Ethics Report. We are discussing the following areas: what are internal controls; how a company might use them and how they can be implemented? In the first of the podcast series I asked Mixon what are internal controls? He began with the textbook definition, which he said was “Internal controls are systematic measures (such as reviews, checks and balances, methods and procedures) instituted by an organization to:

  • conduct its business in an orderly and efficient manner,
  • safeguard its assets and resources,
  • deter and detect errors, fraud, and theft,
  • ensure accuracy and completeness of its accounting data,
  • produce reliable and timely financial and management information, and
  • Ensure adherence to its policies and plans.

Mixon noted that internal controls should be instituted entity wide, not simply limited to those functions used or reviewed by accountants and auditors. For an anti-corruption compliance regime such as the FCPA or UK Bribery Act, internal controls are measures to provide reasonable assurances that any assets or resources of a company (not limited to cash) cannot be used to pay a bribe. This definition includes diversion of company assets (such as by unauthorized sales discounts or receivables write-offs) as well as the distribution of assets.

Mixon noted that the basic framework for internal controls is derived from the COSO Model developed by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission in 1992 (COSO). This model has become the standard for an internal control framework and provides a structure to ensure companies address the key elements that should result in an effective system of internal controls. Using the COSO Model, as modified in 2013, provides a very supportable approach when adversarial third parties challenge whether a company has effective internal controls. The COSO Model defines internal controls in a pyramid, from bottom to top, as follows: (a) Control environment, (b) Risk assessment, (c) Control activities, (d) Information and communication, and (e) Monitoring.

In the 2013 update the basic framework was retained with substantial support from user companies, and 3 specific objectives were added: (I) Operations Objectives – effectiveness and efficiency of operations, including safeguarding assets against loss; (II) Reporting objectives – internal and external financial reporting; and (III) Compliance objectives – adherence to laws and regulations to which the entity is subject. According to the guidance in the 2013 update, the system of internal controls can be considered effective only if it provides reasonable assurance the organization, among other things, complies with applicable laws, rules, regulations and external standards. With the addition of those specific objectives, the COSO framework now specifically includes the need for controls to address compliance with laws and regulations.

We then turned to the question of which internal controls does a company need to institute? Mixon said that each company defines its internal controls to fit its business by determining what the Company wishes to protect and what type of control environment does it want to have in place. This means that they can be less formal in smaller companies but still effective if the focus is on the right risks. Based upon FCPA guidance, the most common control needs have been identified as follows: (i) Dealings with third parties; (ii) Gifts and entertainment, and (iii) Charitable donations. Yet even within those categories, a wide range of risks exists, depending on a company’s business practices. Mixon emphasized that a Top Down ‘Check-the-box’ generic set of policies will not likely result in effective controls.

The process to determine which internal controls are needed will be of some familiarity to the compliance professional. It all starts with a risk assessment to establish the corporate policies which are applicable, tailored to the company, and sufficiently specific. The risk assessment will also help to identify the types of transactions across the company which should be addressed (gifts and entertainment, maintenance of bank accounts and movement of cash, dealings with third parties, etc.). The next step is to prepare a set of documents which define the control objectives to be in place for each type of transaction – example: “Controls will be in place to ensure no vendor has been added to the vendor master file until complete due diligence has been completed and the vendor has been approved in accordance with Corporate policies. Thereafter, you will need to document how the controls will be performed and how they will be evidenced and then incorporate the control procedures into applicable work instructions and job descriptions.” Mixon cautioned that for each business location, determine the specific controls needed to accomplish each control objective. In many companies, a disparity of operating practices and accounting systems will result in different controls being needed. He ended by emphasizing that while this assignment may seem overwhelming it can be done in reasonable stages, pursuant to a specific implementation plan – it does not have to be done all at once for the entire company.

As you will recall from Part I, I believe, as gleaned from Jim Doty’s remarks, that a Board must not only have a corporate compliance program in place it must also actively oversee that function. This led me to conclude that failure to perform these functions may lead to independent liability of a Board for its failure to perform its allotted tasks in an effective compliance program. Doty’s remarks drove home one of the roles that a Board performs, which fulfills those tasks. Internal controls work together with compliance policies and procedures as stated by Aaron Murphy, a partner at Akin Gump, in his book “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act”, as “an interrelated set of compliance mechanisms.” Murphy went on to say that, “Internal controls are policies, procedures, monitoring and training that are designed to ensure that company assets are used properly, with proper approval and that transactions are properly recorded in the books and records. While it is theoretically possible to have good controls but bad books and records (and vice versa), the two generally go hand in hand – where there are record-keeping violations, an internal controls failure is almost presumed because the records would have been accurate had the controls been adequate.”

Murphy breaks down internal controls into five concepts, which I have adapted for a Board or Board subcommittee role for compliance:

  1. Corporate Compliance Policy and Code of Conduct – A Board should have an overall governance document which will inform the company, its employees, stakeholders and third parties of the conduct the company expects from an employee. If the company is global/multi-national, this document should be translated into the relevant languages as appropriate.
  2. Risk Assessment – A Board should assess the compliance risks associated with its business.
  3. Implementing Procedures – A Board should determine if the company has a written set of procedures in place that instructs employees on the details of how to comply with the company’s compliance policy.
  4. Training – There are two levels of Board training. The first should be that the Board has a general understanding of what the FCPA is and it should also understand its role in an effective compliance program.
  5. Monitor Compliance – A Board should independently test, assess and audit to determine if its compliance policies and procedures are a ‘living and breathing program’ and not just a paper tiger.

There have been several FCPA enforcement actions where the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) discuss the failure of internal controls as a basis for FCPA liability. The Smith & Wesson enforcement action is but the latest. With the questions about the Walmart Board of Directors and their failure to act in the face of allegations of bribery and corruption in the company’s Mexico subsidiary, or contrasting failing to even be aware of the allegations; there may soon be an independent basis for an FCPA violation for a Board’s failure to perform its internal controls function in a best practices compliance program.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

August 26, 2014

Risk Assessments-the Cornerstone of Your Compliance Program, Part I

7K0A0079Yesterday, I blogged about the Desktop Risk Assessment. I received so many comments and views about the post, I was inspired to put together a longer post on the topic of risk assessments more generally. Of course I got carried away so today, I will begin a three-part series on risk assessments. In today’s post I will review the legal and conceptual underpinnings of a risk assessment. Over the next couple of days, I will review the techniques you can use to perform a risk assessment and end with a discussion of what to do with the information that you have gleaned in a risk assessment for your compliance program going forward.

One cannot really say enough about risk assessments in the context of anti-corruption programs. Since at least 1999, in the Metcalf & Eddy enforcement action, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) has said that risk assessments that measure the likelihood and severity of possible Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violations identifies how you should direct your resources to manage these risks. The FCPA Guidance stated it succinctly when it said, “Assessment of risk is fundamental to developing a strong compliance program, and is another factor DOJ and SEC evaluate when assessing a company’s compliance program.” The UK Bribery Act has a similar view. In Principal I of the Six Principals of an Adequate Compliance program, it states, “The commercial organisation regularly and comprehensively assesses the nature and extent of the risks relating to bribery to which it is exposed.” In other words, risk assessments have been around and even mandated for a long time and their use has not lessened in importance. The British have a way with words, even when discussing compliance, and Principal I of the Six Principals of an Adequate Compliance program says that your risk assessment should inform your compliance program.

Jonathan Marks, a partner in the firm of Crowe Horwath LLP, said the following about risk assessments in his 13-step FCPA Compliance Action Plan, “A comprehensive assessment of the potential bribery and corruption risks – both existing and emerging risks – associated with a company’s products and services, customers, third-party business partners, and geographic locations can serve as the basis for the compliance program. The risk assessment determines the areas at greatest risk for FCPA violations among all types of international business transactions and operations, the business culture of each country in which these activities occur, and the integrity and reputation of third parties engaged on behalf of the company.”

The simple reason is straightforward; one cannot define, plan for, or design an effective compliance program to prevent bribery and corruption unless you can measure the risks you face. Both the both the US Sentencing Guidelines, the UK Bribery Act’s Consultative Guidance list Risk Assessment as the initial step in creating an effective anti-corruption and anti-bribery program.

What Should You Assess?

In 2011, the DOJ concluded three FCPA enforcement actions which specified factors which a company should review when making a Risk Assessment. The three enforcement actions, involving the companies Alcatel-Lucent SA, Maxwell Technologies Inc. and Tyson Foods Inc. all had common areas that the DOJ indicated were FCPA compliance risk areas which should be evaluated for a minimum best practices FCPA compliance program. Both the Alcatel-Lucent and Maxwell Technologies Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) listed the seven following areas of risk to be assessed.

  1. Geography-where does your Company do business.
  2. Interaction with types and levels of Governments.
  3. Industrial Sector of Operations.
  4. Involvement with Joint Ventures.
  5. Licenses and Permits in Operations.
  6. Degree of Government Oversight.
  7. Volume and Importance of Goods and Personnel Going Through Customs and Immigration.

All of these factors were reiterated in the FCPA Guidance which stated, “Factors to consider, for instance, include risks presented by: the country and industry sector, the business opportunity, potential business partners, level of involvement with governments, amount of government regulation and oversight, and exposure to customs and immigration in conducting business affairs.”

These factors provide guidance into some of the key areas that the DOJ apparently believes can put a company at higher FCPA risk. These factors supplement those listed in the UK Bribery Consultative Guidance states, “Risk Assessment – The commercial organization regularly and comprehensively assesses the nature and extent of the risks relating to bribery to which it is exposed.” The Guidance points towards several key risks which should be evaluated in this process. These risk areas include:

  1. Internal Risk – this could include deficiencies in
  • employee knowledge of a company’s business profile and understanding of associated bribery and corruption risks;
  • employee training or skills sets; and
  • the company’s compensation structure or lack of clarity in the policy on gifts, entertaining and travel expenses.
  1. Country risk – this type of risk could include:

(a) perceived high levels of corruption as highlighted by corruption league tables published by reputable Non-Governmental Organizations such as Transparency International;

(b) factors such as absence of anti-bribery legislation and implementation and a perceived lack of capacity of the government, media, local business community and civil society to effectively promote transparent procurement and investment policies; and

(c) a culture which does not punish those who seeks bribes or make other extortion attempts.

  1. Transaction Risk – this could entail items such as transactions involving charitable or political contributions, the obtaining of licenses and permits, public procurement, high value or projects with many contractors or involvement of intermediaries or agents.
  2. Partnership risks – this risk could include those involving foreign business partners located in higher-risk jurisdictions, associations with prominent public office holders, insufficient knowledge or transparency of third party processes and controls.

Another approach was detailed by David Lawler, in his book “Frequently Asked Questions in Anti-Bribery and Corruption”. He broke the risk areas to evaluate down into the following categories: (1) Company Risk, (2) Country Risk, (3) Sector Risk, (4) Transaction Risk and (5) Business Partnership Risk. He further detailed these categories as follows:

  1. Company Risk-Lawyer believes this is “only to be likely to be relevant when assessing a number of different companies – either when managing a portfolio of companies from the perspective of a head office of a conglomerate or private equity house.” High risk companies involve, some of the following characteristics:
  • Private companies with a close shareholder group;
  • Large, diverse and complex groups with a decentralized management structure;
  • An autocratic top management;
  • A previous history of compliance issues; and/or
  • Poor marketplace perception.
  1. Country Risk-this area involves countries which have a high reported level or perception of corruption, have failed to enact effective anti-corruption legislation and have a failure to be transparent in procurement and investment policies. Obviously the most recent, annual Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index can be a good starting point. Other indices you might consider are the Worldwide Governance Indicators and the Global Integrity index.
  2. Sector Risk-these involve areas which require a significant amount of government licensing or permitting to do business in a country. It includes the usual suspects of:
  • Extractive industries;
  • Oil and gas services;
  • Large scale infrastructure areas;
  • Telecoms;
  • Pharmaceutical, medical device and health care;
  • Financial services.
  1. Transaction Risk-Lawyer says that this risk “first and foremost identifies and analyses the financial aspects of a payment or deal. This means that it is necessary to think about where your money is ending up”. Indicia of transaction risk include:
  • High reward projects;
  • Involve many contractor or other third party intermediaries; and/or
  • Do not appear to have a clear legitimate object.
  1. Business Partnership Risk-this prong recognizes that certain manners of doing business present more corruption risk than others. It may include:
  • Use of third party representatives in transactions with foreign government officials;
  • A number of consortium partners or joint ventures partners; and/or
  • Relationships with politically exposed persons (PEPs).

There are a number of ways you can slice and dice your basic inquiry. As with almost all FCPA compliance, it is important that your protocol be well thought out. If you use one, some or all of the above as your basic inquiries into your risk analysis, it should be acceptable for your starting point.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

August 8, 2014

Nixon Announces Resignation; GSK Just Resigns

Nixon Resignation SpeechOn this day, 40 years ago, President Richard Nixon announced that he would resign the Office of the President, effective the next day on August 9 at noon. I can still remember my father instructing us to watch the resignation speech on television because, as he put it, it was history in the making. Before a nationally televised address to the country, Nixon said, “By taking this action,” he said in a solemn address from the Oval Office, “I hope that I will have hastened the start of the process of healing which is so desperately needed in America.” His action was hastened along by the Articles of Impeachment voted by the House of Representatives relating to his involvement with the Watergate Affair. With his resignation, Nixon was finally bowing to pressure from the public and Congress to leave the White House.

Yet, even before this truly historic speech and spectacle the next day of Nixon helicoptering off the South Lawn of the White House, Nixon had transformed the America we all lived in. One area that resonates up to this day is his opening with China. If it had not been for Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s efforts, we might have waited a long time for an opening with China. But Nixon went there and opened China up to do business with the US and indeed the rest of the western world.

Unfortunately one of the much later fallouts from this visit and opening of China has been the corruption investigation by Chinese authorizes against western companies but most publicly the British pharmaceutical giant, GlaxoSmithKline PLC (GSK). And, more unfortunately, the bad news for GSK continues to trickle out into the press.

Next week, Shanghai’s No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court is scheduled to open a trial against Peter William Humphrey, a 58-year-old British national, and his wife, Yu Yingzeng, a 61-year-old American, on charges of illegally purchasing personal information about Chinese nationals. While the trial had originally been planned to be closed to the public, last month Chinese officials announced that the trial would be ‘open’ although the degree of openness is not completely clear.

Not only will the trial be open but the couple’s son, Harvey Humphrey, was allowed visited his parents in their detention center in Pudong, Shanghai, for the first time since their arrest. The visit came after some fierce lobbying by the US and UK consulates. As reported in the online publication FiercePharma, in an article entitled “GSK private eyes’ son allowed first visit to parents in China jail as trial nears”, their son said, “They didn’t quite believe I was coming. They were quite overwhelmed. My mum was shocked. My dad held himself together,” the younger Humphrey told the paper. “It’s a bit unusual for the Chinese to do this. I feel something has changed in the Chinese approach to my parents.” Son Harvey had written to the GSK’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Sir Andrew Witte last December to “take a few minutes to raise my father’s case” during a visit to the country, he told the Financial Times (FT), “I understand everything is complicated in China but it seems my parents are paying a big price”. But at this point there is no word on what if any involvement GSK might have in his parent’s defense.

It may be that GSK is way too busy right now worrying about all the other issues surrounding bribery and corruption. In an article in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), entitled “FBI, SEC Start Glaxo Inquiries Over China”, Christopher M. Matthews and Hester Plumridge reported that in late July “Glaxo received an anonymous email claiming its employees in Syria bribed doctors and pharmacists over the past five years to promote products including painkiller Panadol and toothpaste Sensodyne. The bribes took the form of cash payments, speaking fees, trips, free dinners and free samples, said the email, which was reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. The email cited names and dates. Syrian health officials allegedly received bribes from Glaxo employees to fast-track registration of its Sensodyne dental products, including cash payments and a trip to a 2011 conference in Rome, the email maintains. Glaxo employees also were involved in smuggling a narcotic product from Syria into Iran, the email alleges. The product in question, pseudoephedrine, is a raw ingredient of Glaxo’s congestion medicine Actifed.”

GSK once again reiterated its previously announced position that it was firmly against the payments of bribes by its employees. In response to the allegations of bribes paid in Syria the WSJ article said, “Glaxo said it would thoroughly investigate all claims made in the Syria email, and said it has asked the sender for more information. The company said it has zero tolerance for unethical behavior, adding, “We welcome people speaking up if they have concerns about alleged misconduct.”” Too bad GSK didn’t seek more information about its Chinese operations when the company’s internal investigation came up with no evidence of bribery and corruption.

Much more problematic for GSK is the fact that both the SEC and DOJ have opened formal investigations into allegations of bribery and corruption by the company. The WSJ piece notes, “Federal Bureau of Investigation agents have been interviewing current and former GlaxoSmithKline employees in connection with bribery allegations in China, according to a person familiar with the matter, as fresh claims of corruption surfaced against Glaxo’s operations in Syria. The interviews have taken place in Washington, D.C., in the past few months and are part of a Justice Department investigation into Glaxo’s activities in China, the person added. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission also is investigating the company’s business in China, according to people familiar with the matter.”

As readers of this blog will recall from previous posts, in 2012 GSK pled guilty and paid $3 billion to resolve fraud allegations and failure to report safety. The press release noted that the resolution was the largest health care fraud settlement in US history and the largest payment ever by a drug company for legal violations. The criminal plea agreement also included certain non-monetary compliance commitments and certifications by GSK’s US president and Board of Directors, which specifically included an executed five-year Corporate Integrity Agreement (CIA) with the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General. The plea agreement and CIA included provisions which required that GSK implement and/or maintain major changes to the way it does business, including changing the way its sales force is compensated to remove compensation based on sales goals for territories, one of the driving forces behind much of the conduct at issue in the prior enforcement action. Under the CIA, GSK is required to change its executive compensation program to permit the company to recoup annual bonuses and long-term incentives from covered executives if they or their subordinates, engaged in significant misconduct. GSK may recoup monies from executives who are current employees and those who have left the company. Additionally, the CIA also required GSK to implement and maintain transparency in its research practices and publication policies and to follow specified policies in its contracts with various health care payors.

The importance of the CIA for this anti-corruption investigation is that it not only applied to the specific pharmaceutical regulations that GSK violated but all of the GSK compliance obligations, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). In addition to requiring a full and complete compliance program, the CIA specified that the company would have a Compliance Committee, to include the Compliance Officer and other members of senior management necessary to meet the requirements of the CIA; the Compliance Committee’s job was to oversee full implementation of the CIA and all compliance functions at the company. These additional functions required a Deputy Compliance Officer for each commercial business unit, Integrity Champions within each business unit and management accountability and certifications from each business unit. Training of GSK employees was specified as a key component. Further, the CIA specifically state that all compliance obligations applied to “contractors, subcontractors, agents and other persons (including, but not limited to, third party vendors)”.

GSK is now under investigation, either internally or by anti-corruption regulators across the globe in at least four countries. Unlike other companies that have found systemic issues of bribery and corruption or systemic failures in internal controls, the allegations of bribery and corruption are not 10-15 years old. So today we commemorate Nixon’s resignation; and for GSK it may simply mean just resignation.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

July 9, 2014

Mid-Year FCPA Report, Part I

Mid Year ReportAs we are now past the halfway mark of 2014, I thought it might be a good time to look at the year in review, so over the next couple of days, I will be reviewing what I believe to be some issues and developments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices (FCPA) world. In this Part I, I will look at an enforcement action which brought a company to No. 5 on the list of highest FCPA settlements, to a company which seemingly came back from the edge of very bad FCPA conduct and finally some individual prosecutions and one interesting settlement in a SEC action against individuals. 

Alcoa

In one of the more long-running international bribery and corruption sagas, Alcoa Inc. settled a FCPA action by having one of its subsidiary’s plead guilty to bribing officials in Bahrain to win contracts to supply the raw materials for aluminum to Aluminum Bahrain BCS or Alba. As reported by the FCPA Professor, “Alcoa entities agreed to pay approximately $384 million to resolve alleged FCPA scrutiny (a criminal fine of $209 million and an administrative forfeiture of $14 million to resolve the DOJ enforcement action and $175 million in disgorgement to resolve the SEC enforcement action – of which $14 million will be satisfied by the payment of the forfeiture in the criminal action).” Alcoa now sits as No 5 on the list of all-time FCPA settlements and has the distinction of paying the largest disgorgement.

Payments were made through shell corporations, agents and distributors. As reported in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), in an article entitled “Alcoa Snared in Bahrain Bribery Case”, although one of its subsidiaries, Alcoa World Aluminum, pled guilty to violating the FCPA, its parent Alcoa issues a statement that “neither the Department of Justice nor the SEC alleged or found that anyone at Alcoa “knowingly engaged in the conduct at issue.”” According to the WSJ article, the bribery scheme had been in place since at least 1989. Further, at least one in-house counsel had raised concerns in 1997 that the contracts around the bribery scheme when she wrote in an email to Alcoa’s corporate headquarters stating “The contract looks odd. Are these factors OK from an anti-trust and FCPA perspective?” I guess sometimes actual knowledge is really not actual knowledge.

Hewlett-Packard (HP)

In what can only be described as one of the most stunning failures of internal controls to be seen in the annuls of FCPA enforcement actions, HP resolved a matter through a guilty plea, a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) and a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA), for three separate bribery schemes in three countries. For a deal in Russia, HP paid a one-man agent approximately $10MM, which was simply a conduit to pay bribes. In Poland, HP’s Country Manager literally carried bags of cash in the amount of $600K to a Polish government representative for contracts. Finally, in HP’s Mexico subsidiary, according the to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Press Release, HP “paid a consultant to help the company win a public IT contract worth approximately $6 million. At least $125,000 was funneled to a government official at the state-owned petroleum company with whom the consultant had connections. Although the consultant was not an approved deal partner and had not been subjected to the due diligence required under company policy, HP Mexico sales managers used a pass-through entity to pay inflated commissions to the consultant.”

As noted by Mike Volkov, “In total the three HP entities paid $76 million in criminal penalties and forfeitures. In a related filing, the SEC and HP entered into a civil settlement under which HP agreed to pay $31 million in disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and civil penalties.”

The enforcement action is also notable for two other factors. The first is that HP did not self-disclose the conduct even after German authorities raided the company’s Germany subsidiary’s offices in connection with the Russia transaction. HP seemingly made a dramatic comeback in the eyes of the Department of Justice (DOJ), which leads to the second point of note. That involved the overall penalty assessed against HP. What are we to make of the criminal fines levied against the Russian and Polish subsidiaries of HP? The US Sentencing Guidelines for the Polish subsidiary suggested a fine range of $19MM to $38MM, yet the final fine was $15MM. The US Sentencing Guidelines for HP’s Russian subsidiary suggested a fine range of $87MM to $174MM, yet the final fine was $58MM.

What does it all mean? It would seem that a company could come back from the brink of very bad facts and no self-disclosure. How did HP do it? The resolution documents only reference HP’s ‘extraordinary cooperation’ and installation of a best practices compliance program. My hope is that HP will publicize the steps it took so that the rest of us might learn how they accomplished the results they received.

Individual Indictments, Arrests and Settlements

As reported in the FCPA Blog, there were a number of individuals who fell under FCPA criminal scrutiny in the first half of 2014.

PetroTiger

Joseph Sigelman, the former co-CEO of PetroTiger Ltd., was charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA and to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to launder money, and substantive FCPA and money laundering offenses. He is accused of bribing an official at Ecopetrol SA, Colombia’s state-controlled oil company, and defrauding PetroTiger by taking kickbacks. As reported by Joel Schectman in the WSJ, two other PetroTiger executives, Sigelman’s co-CEO, Knut Hammarskjold and the company’s former General Counsel (GC), Gregory Weisman, have already pled guilty to the charges.

It is alleged that Sigelman bribed an official in Colombia to help win an oil contract worth $39 million and of seeking kickback payments during the acquisition of another company, in exchange for a better price. Most interestingly, even after the company conducted an internal investigation, which uncovered the conduct and self-disclosed its findings to the DOJ, Sigelman has said he will go to trial and contest the charges.

Firtash and His Associates

In what may be an early preview of the corrupt doings of the old guard in Ukraine, there were a number of individuals arrested or indicted in connection with an alleged scheme to pay $18.5 million in bribes to officials in India to gain titanium mining rights. They include team leader, Dmitry Firtash, a Ukrainian national, who was arrested in Vienna, Austria, March 12, 2014, and the following were indicated with Firtash and charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA, and who are still at large: Andras Knopp, a Hungarian businessman,; Suren Gevorgyan a Ukrainian national,; Gajendra Lal, an Indian national and permanent resident of the US; Periyasamy Sunderalingam, a Sri Lankan. K.V.P. Ramachandra Rao, a member of parliament in India and former official of the state of Andhra Pradesh, has been charged along with the other five defendants with one count each of a racketeering conspiracy and a money laundering conspiracy, and two counts of interstate travel in aid of racketeering. Although he was not charged under the FCPA, the DOJ has asked India to arrest him.

Direct Access Partners

Continuing the investigation into the first investment bank, Direct Access Partners LLC (DAP), to be charged with FCPA violations, there were two more individuals charged, in addition to the four from 2013 who all pled guilty. Benito Chinea, former CEO of DAP, was charged in federal court in New York for bribery involving Venezuela’s state bank and Joseph Demeneses, a former managing director, was also charged in the 15-count indictment of paying kickbacks to a vice President of the Venezuelan Nation Bank BANDES, in exchange for the bank’s bond-trading business.

Noble Energy Executives

While it is not entirely clear if these cases belong in the first half or second half of the their, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rather unceremoniously dropped its enforcement action against one former and one current Noble Energy executives. The SEC had claimed that former Noble Corporation CEO Mark A. Jackson along with James J. Ruehlen, had bribed customs officials to process false paperwork purporting to show the export and re-import of oil rigs, when in fact the rigs never moved. These actions led to allegations that Jackson and Ruehlen directly violated the anti-bribery provisions, internal controls and false records provisions relating to the FCPA. For all of these claims the SEC sought injunctive relief and monetary damages.

But as reported in the FCPA Blog, “A docket entry from July 1 for the U.S. federal district court in Houston said all deadlines in the SEC’s civil FCPA enforcement action against two former Noble executives have been vacated “pending final settlement documents.”” Both defendants agreed not to violate or aid and abet any violation of the FCPA going forward. Pretty stout stuff when you consider that all US citizens have that obligation going forward, whether they agree to it in a court filed documents or not.

Tomorrow we continue with Part II.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

 

 

June 18, 2014

SEC Sanctions Company for Whistleblower Retaliation

WhistleI drove my daughter to the airport today for her summer exchange program in Spain. On the way she asked me what I was going to blog about tomorrow and I told her whistleblowers. She was not familiar with that term so I explained it to her and her response was ‘Oh you mean a snitch’ which she then followed up with ‘Dad, nobody likes a tattletale.’ I digested these cheery thoughts for a few moments and I realized if that is what a 17 year old thinks about a person who tries to inform the appropriate parties of concerns, we still have quite a ways to go in this area.

In Compliance Week, Joe Mont reported that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought its first enforcement action for a company’s retaliation against a whistleblower. On Monday of this week, the SEC “charged an Albany, N.Y.-based hedge fund advisory firm with engaging in prohibited transactions and then seeking retribution against the employee who reported the illicit trading activity.”

The hedge fund in question, “Paradigm Capital Management and owner Candace King Weir agreed to pay $2.2 million to settle the charges. According to the SEC’s order instituting a settled administrative proceeding, Weir conducted transactions between Paradigm and a broker-dealer that she also owns while trading on behalf of a hedge fund client. Advisers are required to disclose that they are participating on both sides of the trade and must obtain the client’s consent. Paradigm also failed to provide effective written disclosure to the hedge fund and did not obtain its consent as required prior to the completion of each principal transaction. The SEC’s order adds that Paradigm’s Form ADV was materially misleading because it failed to disclose the CFO’s conflict as a member of the conflicts committee.”

Regarding the whistleblower, the SEC order reflected, “after Paradigm learned that the firm’s head trader had reported potential misconduct to the SEC, it engaged in a series of retaliatory actions that ultimately resulted in his resignation. Paradigm removed him from his head trader position, tasked him with investigating the very conduct he reported to the SEC, changed his job function from head trader to a full-time compliance assistant, stripped him of his supervisory responsibilities, and “otherwise marginalized him,” the order says.”

The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower provisions not only allowed payment of a bounty for information, which leads to a SEC enforcement action, but also protects employees from retaliation. Sean McKessy, chief of the SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower, said in a statement “For whistleblowers to come forward, they must feel assured that they’re protected from retaliation and the law is on their side should it occur. We will continue to exercise our anti-retaliation authority in these and other types of situations where a whistleblower is wrongfully targeted for doing the right thing and reporting a possible securities law violation.”

The difficulties faced by whistleblowers on Wall Street have been well documented. In an article in the Financial Times (FT), entitled “Wall Street Whistleblowers”, William D. Cohen wrote about three such persons. Oliver Budde, a former legal advisor for Lehman Brothers, who was quoted as saying “When the tone at the top is ‘anything goes’ anything will go.” Eric Ben-Artzi, a former analyst at Deutsche Bank, who was quoted as saying “They accused me of trying to bring down the bank.” Peter Sivere, a former compliance officer at JP Morgan Chase, who was quoted as saying “I wish I had known that the house always wins.” All three men had tried to blow the whistle internally but were not only rebuffed but suffered retaliation.

For his article, Cohen interviewed the three men. He found that all of them had “made allegations of wrongdoing at their banks, made strenuous efforts to report what they had discovered through internal and external channels and all three were either fired from their jobs after trying to share the information they had stumbled upon or quit in frustration.” But, equally importantly, Cohen believes that their stories, “and the details of what happened to them are important. Not only do they illustrate the existential risks that whistleblowers take when they attempt to point out wrongdoing that they uncover at powerful institutions. They also matter because their stories show just how uninterested these institutions genuinely remain – despite the lip service of internal hotlines and support groups – in actually ferreting out bad behaviour.”

The article also quoted Jordan Thomas, a former SEC enforcement official now in private practice at the firm of Labaton Sucharow, where he heads the firm’s whistleblower practice. Thomas thinks that the anonymous reporting provisions of the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower provisions will help protect whistleblowers. He said, “Essentially most whistleblower horror stories start with retaliation and to be retaliated against, you have to be known. The genius of Dodd-Frank was it created a way for people with knowledge to report without disclosing their identity to their employers or the general public. That has been a game changer because now people with knowledge are coming forward with a lot to lose, but they have a mechanism where they can report this misconduct without fear of retaliation or blacklisting.” Thomas also said “the fact that the SEC could award $14m to a single whistleblower whose identity has remained unknown, despite efforts by the media to uncover it, sends a powerful message that whistleblower identities will be protected.”

One person who is uncomfortable with this anonymous reporting is Beatrice Edwards, director of the Government Accountability Project. She pointed to a recent SEC payout to an anonymous whistleblower, where “The SEC didn’t even reveal the nature of the wrongdoing the whistleblower uncovered, so both the company’s shareholders and the public remain in the dark about what was specifically uncovered and where. All that is known is that the SEC did bring a major enforcement action against a financial institution that resulted in a large penalty and the corresponding $14m award to the whistleblower.” Edwards argued that “the SEC is a disclosure agency, so they should have to establish that [not revealing the information] is really required in order to protect the whistleblower, if they’re going to in a sense subvert their mission . . . They really are not able to justify why they are silent about the name of the company or the nature of the fraud.”

Perhaps the SEC bounty program and the Paradigm Capital Management enforcement action will change the way that company’s view and treat whistleblowers. I certainly hope so because a company’s own employees are its best source of information about what is going on inside the company. As to my daughter’s perception about whistleblowers, I asked her if her school had any type of reporting system if a student saw or was subject to inappropriate behavior. She said that you are supposed to report it to a school counselor. When I explained that was a whistleblower system she relented somewhat. But then she added, No one should rat out their friends. Just like the SEC, I guess we have a ways to go.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

May 29, 2014

May Flowers for GSK? The Corruption Investigation Deepens

Chelsea Flower ShowApril showers bring May flowers, at least that is the old truism. One place it is decidedly correct is at the RHS Chelsea Flower Show, which began its run as one of the, if not the greatest, annual flower shows in the world in May 1862. The event draws some 157,000 people during its five-day run each May. The event has royal patronage and there is always a large contingent of royalty who visit the show.

Unfortunately one group of Englishmen and women who will not be stopping by to ‘smell the roses’ this year are those from the increasingly embattled UK company GlaxoSmithKline PLC (GSK). Yesterday the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) announced that it had “opened a criminal investigation into the commercial practices of GlaxoSmithKline plc and its subsidiaries.” To top off this bouquet of May flowers from the SFO, in the same Press Release the SFO said, “Whistleblowers are valuable sources of information to the SFO in its cases. We welcome approaches from anyone with inside information on all our cases including this one – we can be contacted through our secure and confidential reporting channel, which can be accessed via the SFO website.” It then proceeded to provide the SFO’s secure reporting website.

In an article in the New York Times (NYT), entitled “GlaxoSmithKline Under Investigation by Serious Fraud Office”, Chad Bray reported that the SFO “is investigating Glaxo’s business activities in “multiple jurisdictions,” according to a person familiar with the investigation who was not authorized to speak publicly.” As most readers will recall, “Chinese authorities have been investigating the drugmaker’s business practices related to payments to doctors and other health care professionals since last year and questions have been raised in recent months about the company’s practices in Iraq and Poland.”

James Titcomb, reporting in The Telegraph, in an article entitled “SFO opens criminal investigation into GlaxoSmithKline”, went further when he noted that GSK has been in contact with the SFO “in recent months in the wake of claims that it funnelled hundreds of millions of pounds to doctors and officials in countries around the globe to boost sales of its drugs.” Moreover, “Chinese police have accused the company of dispensing 3bn yuan (£285m) in bribes under the leadership Mark Reilly, the former head of its Chinese business. Authorities in the country say the bribes resulted in billions of pounds in “illegal revenue” for the company.”

On the Chinese side of the investigation, the NYT article reported that during the month of May, “Chinese authorities accused Mark Reilly, the former head of Glaxo’s operations in China, of ordering employees to bribe doctors and other hospital staff to use the drug maker’s products, resulting in more than $150 million in illegal revenue. Two other Chinese-born Glaxo executives were also charged in the matter.”

When news of the Chinese investigation broke last summer, GSK claimed that “Certain senior executives of GSK China who know our systems well, appear to have acted outside of our processes and controls which breaches Chinese law,” Glaxo said in July, after meeting with the Chinese authorities. “We have zero tolerance for any behavior of this nature.” [Read: Rogue Employees] However it appears the Chinese authorities have not fallen for this age-old attempt at corporate misdirection. But Andrew Ward, reporting in a Financial Times (FT) article entitled “SFO opens criminal inquiry into GSK, said that the Chinese authorities had engaged in a “ten-month investigation” which had identified 46 current or former GSK employees as “suspects”. Rogue indeed.

Where might the US Department of Justice (DOJ) or Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) be on these issues? Clearly, these would seem to be areas of at least inquiry under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), but consider the following about GSK, in July of 2012 GSK pled guilty and paid $3 billion to resolve fraud allegations and failure to report safety data in what the DOJ called the “largest health care fraud settlement in U.S. history” according to its press release. The DOJ press release went on to state “GSK agreed to plead guilty and to pay $3 billion to resolve its criminal and civil liability arising from the company’s unlawful promotion of certain prescription drugs, its failure to report certain safety data, and its civil liability for alleged false price reporting practices.” The press release noted that the resolution was the largest health care fraud settlement in US history and the largest payment ever by a drug company for legal violations.

You would think that any company that has paid $3 billion in fines and penalties for fraudulent actions would take all steps possible not to engage in bribery and corruption. Indeed as part of the settlement GSK agreed to a Corporate Integrity Agreement (CIA). This CIA not only applied to the specific pharmaceutical regulations that GSK violated but all of the GSK compliance obligations, including the FCPA.

In addition to requiring a full and complete compliance program, the CIA specified that the company would have a Compliance Committee, inclusive of the Compliance Officer and other members of senior management necessary to meet the requirements of this CIA, whose job was to oversee full implementation of the CIA and all compliance functions at the company. These additional functions required Deputy Compliance Officers for each commercial business unit, Integrity Champions within each business unit and management accountability and certifications from each business unit. Training of GSK employees was specified. Further, there was detail down to specifically state that all compliance obligations applied to “contractors, subcontractors, agents and other persons (including, but not limited to, third party vendors)”. So while GSK may have separate FCPA liability to be investigated by the DOJ; it may be more of an issue that the company could be in violation of its CIA.

GSK has of course averred that it is fully cooperating with all of the various investigations into its alleged bribery and corruption. Further, as reported in Ward’s FT article, “GSK said it was “committed to operating its business to the highest ethical standards”. The company had “previously denied any systemic problem with corruption and said the latest Chinese allegations were “deeply concerning to us and contrary to the values of GSK”.”

So I guess the GSK team probably missed the Chelsea Flower Show this year. ON the other hand, maybe they might be like former BP President Tony Hayward, who during the first few of weeks of the worst oil spill in the history of the world ever, went yachting…

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

May 28, 2014

What Does an Effective Compliance Program Look Like? – The Regulators Perspective

Compliance ProgramWhat does an effective compliance program look like? Is it one that follows the Ten Hallmarks of an Effective Compliance Program as set out in the 2012 FCPA Guidance? How about one that uses the Six Principals of Adequate Procedures relating to the UK Bribery Act as its guideposts? Or should a company follow the OECD Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance? More importantly, for anti-corruption enforcement under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), what does the Department of Justice (DOJ) or Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) look for when assessing a compliance program?

Over the years, we have heard various formulations of inquiries that regulators might use when reviewing a compliance program. While not exactly a review of a compliance protocol, one of my favorites is what I call McNulty’s Maxims or the three questions that former United States Deputy Attorney General, and  Baker & McKenzie LLP partner, Paul McNulty said were three general areas of inquiry the he would assess regarding an enforcement action when he was at the DOJ. They are: first: “What did you do to stay out of trouble?” second: “What did you do when you found out?” and third: “What remedial action did you take?”

Paul’s former partner at Baker & McKenzie, Stephen Martin, who still runs Baker & McKenzie Compliance Consulting LLC, said that an inquiry he might make was along the lines of the following. First he would ask someone who came in before the DOJ what the company’s annual compliance budget was for the past year. If the answer started with something like, “We did all we could with what we had ($100K, $200K, name the figure), he would then ask, “How much was the corporate budget for Post-It Notes last year?” The answer was always in the 7-figure range. His next question would then be, “Which is more business critical for your company; complying with the FCPA or Post-It Notes?” Unfortunately, it has been Martin’s experience that most companies spent far more on the Post-It Notes than they were willing to invest into their compliance program.

Last week at Compliance Week 2014, Andrew Ceresney, Director of the Division of Enforcement of the SEC, gave one of the Keynote Addresses. In his remarks he talked about the importance that the SEC is putting into compliance. He said “I start from the premise that the companies that have done well in avoiding significant regulatory issues typically have prioritized legal and compliance issues, and developed a strong culture of compliance across their business lines and throughout the management chain. This is something I observed firsthand while in private practice and have come to fully appreciate from my perch at the SEC.”

But, more importantly, he said that he has “found that you can predict a lot about the likelihood of an enforcement action by asking a few simple questions about the role of the company’s legal and compliance departments in the firm.” He then went on to detail some rather straightforward questions that he believes can show just how much a company is committed to having a robust compliance regime.

  • Are legal and compliance personnel included in critical meetings?
  • Are their views typically sought and followed?
  • Do legal and compliance officers report to the CEO and have significant visibility with the board?
  • Are the legal and compliance departments viewed as an important partner in the business and not simply as support functions or a cost center?

Beyond simply going into the DOJ or SEC and claiming that your company is very ethical and does business in compliance with the FCPA, how can a company demonstrate the above? This is where the Tom Fox Mantra of Document, Document and Document comes into play. No matter how much input the compliance function has into the above suggested inquiries if the inputs are not documented, it is if they did not exist. So for meetings, you should keep attendance sheets or notations. A compliance representative can put a short, three to four sentence memo into the file about the recommendations and the response thereto. If the compliance department advise was not followed, there should be a business reason documented for the decision. Moreover, if there is a rejection of the compliance function advise and the course of action leads to some type of FCPA issue, it may well be assumed the company knew or should have known that the course of action taken could reasonably lead to a FCPA issue if not full blown violation. As to the issues of compliance visibility at the Board level, once again the documentation of any presentation and their substance can provide evidence to answer the query in the affirmative. But the key to all of these questions is if there is documentation to prove the assertions that they actually occurred.

Near the end of his presentation, Cerensey said that “Far too often, the answer to these questions is no, and the absence of real legal and compliance involvement in company deliberations can lead to compliance lapses, which, in turn, result in enforcement issues. When I was in private practice, I always could detect a significant difference between companies that prioritized legal and compliance and those that did not. When legal and compliance were not equal partners in the business, and were not consulted as a matter of course, problems were inevitable.”

McNulty’s Maxims, Martin’s question on budget and now Cerensey’s questions all provide significant guideposts to how regulators think about FCPA compliance programs. For me, I think the point is that companies which actually Do Compliance are easy to spot. For all the gnashing of teeth about how hard it is to comply with what the DOJ and SEC want to see in FCPA compliance, when the true focus can be distilled into whether a company actually does compliance as opposed to saying how ethical they are, I think it simplifies the inquiry and the issues senior management and a Board of Directors really needs to pay attention to.

For a copy of the full text of Director Cerensey’s remarks, click here.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

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