FCPA Compliance and Ethics Blog

September 15, 2014

Internal Controls for Third Party Representatives in a FCPA Compliance Program

7K0A0246This week, I am continuing my podcast series, on the FCPA Compliance and Ethics Report, on internal controls in best practices anti-corruption compliance program, under the Foreign Corrupt Practices (FCPA), UK Bribery Act or other anti-bribery legislation. In this series, I am visiting with Henry Mixon, a top notch internal controls expert, to help explain what internal controls might be needed, how to assess the need and then how to implement the needed internal controls. This week I am running a two-part episode of the internal controls related to the management of third party representatives.

Mixon suggested that a compliance practitioner should perform an analysis of any third party representative to provide insight into the pattern of dealings with such third parties and, therefore, the areas where additional controls should be considered. He listed some basic internal controls that should be a part of any financial controls system. The general internal controls, which might be appropriate, could be some or all of the following:

  • A control to correlate the approval of payments made to contracts with third party representatives and your company’s internal system for processing invoices.
  • A control to monitor all situations in which funds can be sent outside the US, in whatever form your company might use, which could include accounts payable computer checks, manual checks, wire transfers, replenishment of petty cash, loans, advances or other forms.
  • A control for the approval of sales discounts to distributors.
  • A control for the approval of accounts receivable write-offs.
  • A control for the granting of credit terms to third parties or customers outside the US.
  • A control for agreements for re-purchase of inventory sold to third parties or customers.
  • A control for opening of bank accounts specifically including accounts opened at request of an agent or a customer.
  • A control for the movement / disposal of inventory.
  • A control for the movement / disposal of movable fixed assets.
  • Execution and modification of contracts and agreements outside the US.

Mixon also noted that in addition to the above there should also be internal control needs based on activities with third party representatives. These could include some or all of the following internal controls

  • A control for the structure and enforcement of the Delegation of Authority.
  • A control for the maintenance of the vendor master file.
  • A control around expense reports received from third parties.
  • A control for gifts, entertainment and business courtesy expenditures by third party representatives.
  • Charitable donations.
  • All cash / currency, inventory, fixed asset transactions, and contract execution in countries outside the US where the country manager has final authority.
  • Any other activity for which there is a defined corporate policy relating to FCPA.

While that may appear to be an overly exhaustive list, Mixon indicated that he believed there were four significant controls that he would suggest the compliance practitioner implement initially. He listed: (1) Delegation of Authority (DOA); (2) Maintenance of the vendor master file; (3) Contracts with third parties; and (4) Movement of cash / currency.

Mixon noted that a DOA should reflect the impact of FCPA risk including both transactions and geographic location so that a higher level of approval for matters involving third parties and for fund transfers and invoice payments to countries outside the US would be required inside an organization. He did concede that quite often the DOA is prepared without much thought given to FCPA risks. Unfortunately once a DOA is prepared it is not used again until it is time to update for personnel changes. Moreover, it is often not available, not kept current, and/or did not define authority in a way even the approvers could understand it. Therefore it is incumbent that the DOA be integrated into a company’s accounts payable (AP) processing system in a manner that ensures all high-risk vendor invoices receive the proper visibility. To achieve this you should identify the vendors within the vendor master file so payments are flagged for the appropriate approval BEFORE they are paid.

Furthermore if a DOA is properly prepared and enforced, it can be a powerful preventive tool for FCPA compliance. To support this Mixon used the following example: A wire transfer of $X between company bank accounts in the US might require approval by the Finance Manager at the initiating location and one officer. However, a wire transfer of $X to the company’s bank account in Nigeria, could require approval by the Finance Manager, a knowledgeable person in the Compliance function, and one officer. In this situation, the DOA should specify who must give the final approval for engaging third parties. Moreover, the DOA should address replenishment of petty cash funds in countries outside the US, as well as approval of expense reports for employees who work outside the US (including those who travel from the US to work outside the US).

I then asked Mixon about the vendor master file, which he believes can be one of the most powerful PREVENTIVE control tools largely because payments to fictitious vendors are one of the most common occupational frauds. The vendor master file should be structured so that each vendor can be identified not only by risk level but also by the date on which the vetting was completed and the vendor received final approval. There should be electronic controls in place to block payments to any vendor for which vetting has not been approved. Next manual controls are needed over the submission, approval, and input of changes to the vendor master file. These controls include verification that all vendors have been approved before their information (and the vendor approval date) is input into the vendor master. Finally, manual controls are also needed when “one time” vendors are requested, when a vendor name and/or vendor payment information changes are submitted.

Near and dear to my heart as a lawyer, Mixon also indicated that contracts with third parties can be a very effective internal control which works to prevent nefarious conduct rather than simply as a detect control. He cautioned that for contracts to provide effective internal controls, relevant terms of those contracts (commission rate, whether business expenses can be reimbursed, use of subagents, etc.,) should be extracted and available to those who process and approve vendor invoices. If there are nonconforming service descriptions, commission rates, etc., present in a contract such terms must be approved not only by the original approver but also by the person so delegated in the DOA Unfortunately contracts are not typically integrated into the internal control system. They are left off to the side on their own, usually gathering dust in the legal department file room.

Mixon said that the Hewlett-Packard (HP) FCPA enforcement action was an excellent example of the lack of internal control over the disbursements of funds and movement of currency because you had the country manager delivering bags of cash to a Polish government official to obtain or retain business. Mixon believes that all situations where funds can be sent outside the US (AP computer checks, manual checks, wire transfers, replenishment of petty cash, loans, advances, etc.,) should be reviewed from a FCPA risk standpoint. He went on to say that within a given company structure you need to identify the ways in which a country manager (or a sales manager, etc.,) could cause funds to be transferred to their control and to conceal the true nature of the use of the funds within the accounting system.

To prevent these types of activities internal controls need to be in place. Mixon presented the following example of how this could be managed: All wire transfers outside the US should have defined approvals in the DOA, and the persons who execute the wire transfers should be required to evidence agreement of the approvals to the DOA and wire transfer requests going out of the US should always require dual approvals. Lastly, wire transfer requests going outside the US should be required to include a description of proper business purpose.

Mixon continues to emphasize that internal controls are really just good financial controls. The internal controls that he detailed for third party representatives in the FCPA context will help to detect fraud, which could well lead to bribery and corruption.

You can listen to my podcast with Henry Mixon on internal controls for third parties in a FCPA compliance program, part I by clicking here.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

July 9, 2014

Mid-Year FCPA Report, Part I

Mid Year ReportAs we are now past the halfway mark of 2014, I thought it might be a good time to look at the year in review, so over the next couple of days, I will be reviewing what I believe to be some issues and developments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices (FCPA) world. In this Part I, I will look at an enforcement action which brought a company to No. 5 on the list of highest FCPA settlements, to a company which seemingly came back from the edge of very bad FCPA conduct and finally some individual prosecutions and one interesting settlement in a SEC action against individuals. 

Alcoa

In one of the more long-running international bribery and corruption sagas, Alcoa Inc. settled a FCPA action by having one of its subsidiary’s plead guilty to bribing officials in Bahrain to win contracts to supply the raw materials for aluminum to Aluminum Bahrain BCS or Alba. As reported by the FCPA Professor, “Alcoa entities agreed to pay approximately $384 million to resolve alleged FCPA scrutiny (a criminal fine of $209 million and an administrative forfeiture of $14 million to resolve the DOJ enforcement action and $175 million in disgorgement to resolve the SEC enforcement action – of which $14 million will be satisfied by the payment of the forfeiture in the criminal action).” Alcoa now sits as No 5 on the list of all-time FCPA settlements and has the distinction of paying the largest disgorgement.

Payments were made through shell corporations, agents and distributors. As reported in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), in an article entitled “Alcoa Snared in Bahrain Bribery Case”, although one of its subsidiaries, Alcoa World Aluminum, pled guilty to violating the FCPA, its parent Alcoa issues a statement that “neither the Department of Justice nor the SEC alleged or found that anyone at Alcoa “knowingly engaged in the conduct at issue.”” According to the WSJ article, the bribery scheme had been in place since at least 1989. Further, at least one in-house counsel had raised concerns in 1997 that the contracts around the bribery scheme when she wrote in an email to Alcoa’s corporate headquarters stating “The contract looks odd. Are these factors OK from an anti-trust and FCPA perspective?” I guess sometimes actual knowledge is really not actual knowledge.

Hewlett-Packard (HP)

In what can only be described as one of the most stunning failures of internal controls to be seen in the annuls of FCPA enforcement actions, HP resolved a matter through a guilty plea, a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) and a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA), for three separate bribery schemes in three countries. For a deal in Russia, HP paid a one-man agent approximately $10MM, which was simply a conduit to pay bribes. In Poland, HP’s Country Manager literally carried bags of cash in the amount of $600K to a Polish government representative for contracts. Finally, in HP’s Mexico subsidiary, according the to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Press Release, HP “paid a consultant to help the company win a public IT contract worth approximately $6 million. At least $125,000 was funneled to a government official at the state-owned petroleum company with whom the consultant had connections. Although the consultant was not an approved deal partner and had not been subjected to the due diligence required under company policy, HP Mexico sales managers used a pass-through entity to pay inflated commissions to the consultant.”

As noted by Mike Volkov, “In total the three HP entities paid $76 million in criminal penalties and forfeitures. In a related filing, the SEC and HP entered into a civil settlement under which HP agreed to pay $31 million in disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and civil penalties.”

The enforcement action is also notable for two other factors. The first is that HP did not self-disclose the conduct even after German authorities raided the company’s Germany subsidiary’s offices in connection with the Russia transaction. HP seemingly made a dramatic comeback in the eyes of the Department of Justice (DOJ), which leads to the second point of note. That involved the overall penalty assessed against HP. What are we to make of the criminal fines levied against the Russian and Polish subsidiaries of HP? The US Sentencing Guidelines for the Polish subsidiary suggested a fine range of $19MM to $38MM, yet the final fine was $15MM. The US Sentencing Guidelines for HP’s Russian subsidiary suggested a fine range of $87MM to $174MM, yet the final fine was $58MM.

What does it all mean? It would seem that a company could come back from the brink of very bad facts and no self-disclosure. How did HP do it? The resolution documents only reference HP’s ‘extraordinary cooperation’ and installation of a best practices compliance program. My hope is that HP will publicize the steps it took so that the rest of us might learn how they accomplished the results they received.

Individual Indictments, Arrests and Settlements

As reported in the FCPA Blog, there were a number of individuals who fell under FCPA criminal scrutiny in the first half of 2014.

PetroTiger

Joseph Sigelman, the former co-CEO of PetroTiger Ltd., was charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA and to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to launder money, and substantive FCPA and money laundering offenses. He is accused of bribing an official at Ecopetrol SA, Colombia’s state-controlled oil company, and defrauding PetroTiger by taking kickbacks. As reported by Joel Schectman in the WSJ, two other PetroTiger executives, Sigelman’s co-CEO, Knut Hammarskjold and the company’s former General Counsel (GC), Gregory Weisman, have already pled guilty to the charges.

It is alleged that Sigelman bribed an official in Colombia to help win an oil contract worth $39 million and of seeking kickback payments during the acquisition of another company, in exchange for a better price. Most interestingly, even after the company conducted an internal investigation, which uncovered the conduct and self-disclosed its findings to the DOJ, Sigelman has said he will go to trial and contest the charges.

Firtash and His Associates

In what may be an early preview of the corrupt doings of the old guard in Ukraine, there were a number of individuals arrested or indicted in connection with an alleged scheme to pay $18.5 million in bribes to officials in India to gain titanium mining rights. They include team leader, Dmitry Firtash, a Ukrainian national, who was arrested in Vienna, Austria, March 12, 2014, and the following were indicated with Firtash and charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA, and who are still at large: Andras Knopp, a Hungarian businessman,; Suren Gevorgyan a Ukrainian national,; Gajendra Lal, an Indian national and permanent resident of the US; Periyasamy Sunderalingam, a Sri Lankan. K.V.P. Ramachandra Rao, a member of parliament in India and former official of the state of Andhra Pradesh, has been charged along with the other five defendants with one count each of a racketeering conspiracy and a money laundering conspiracy, and two counts of interstate travel in aid of racketeering. Although he was not charged under the FCPA, the DOJ has asked India to arrest him.

Direct Access Partners

Continuing the investigation into the first investment bank, Direct Access Partners LLC (DAP), to be charged with FCPA violations, there were two more individuals charged, in addition to the four from 2013 who all pled guilty. Benito Chinea, former CEO of DAP, was charged in federal court in New York for bribery involving Venezuela’s state bank and Joseph Demeneses, a former managing director, was also charged in the 15-count indictment of paying kickbacks to a vice President of the Venezuelan Nation Bank BANDES, in exchange for the bank’s bond-trading business.

Noble Energy Executives

While it is not entirely clear if these cases belong in the first half or second half of the their, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rather unceremoniously dropped its enforcement action against one former and one current Noble Energy executives. The SEC had claimed that former Noble Corporation CEO Mark A. Jackson along with James J. Ruehlen, had bribed customs officials to process false paperwork purporting to show the export and re-import of oil rigs, when in fact the rigs never moved. These actions led to allegations that Jackson and Ruehlen directly violated the anti-bribery provisions, internal controls and false records provisions relating to the FCPA. For all of these claims the SEC sought injunctive relief and monetary damages.

But as reported in the FCPA Blog, “A docket entry from July 1 for the U.S. federal district court in Houston said all deadlines in the SEC’s civil FCPA enforcement action against two former Noble executives have been vacated “pending final settlement documents.”” Both defendants agreed not to violate or aid and abet any violation of the FCPA going forward. Pretty stout stuff when you consider that all US citizens have that obligation going forward, whether they agree to it in a court filed documents or not.

Tomorrow we continue with Part II.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

 

 

June 26, 2014

Coolness in Being the Bad Guy? Eli Wallach and GSK

Eli WallachEli Wallach died Tuesday. For my money, he was about the coolest bad guy out there. Not tough like Lee Marvin, just cool. My favorite Wallach roles were as Calvera in The Magnificent Seven and as Tuco in The Good, The Bad and The Ugly. An early proponent of method acting, Wallach performed on the stage and in films for over 60 years. Although originally from Brooklyn, Wallach was also a fellow Texas Longhorn, having attended the University of Texas. He served in France as a Second Lieutenant in France during World War II.

I thought about Wallach’s über coolness when considering the most decided uncool position of the UK pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline PLC (GSK) recently. Last month the Chinese government issued a most very stern warning to GSK when it accused the former head of GSK’s China business of direct involvement in bribery and corruption. But more than this direct accusation, the move was a clear warning shot across the bow of not only western pharmaceutical companies doing business in China but also all western companies. In an article in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), entitled “Beijing Warns Sernly on Glaxo”, Laurie Birkett quoted Helen Chen, a director and partner at consultancy L.E.K., as saying “Focusing much of the blame on a foreigner sends a strong message to all. Companies will see that if authorities are willing to accuse even a foreigner, who is in senior management, the issue is being taken seriously, it’s a clear message that bribery is unacceptable in the market.” Burkitt went on to say, “Experts say China’s medical system is deeply underfunded, giving doctors, hospitals and administrators an incentive to overcharge and overprescribe. Glaxo, in the past, organized trips for doctors around China and to places such as Budapest and Greece as part of a broader effort involving perks and cash to get doctors to boost drug prescriptions, according to documents previously reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.”

Such reports of endemic corruption are not new. An article, entitled “GSK China probe flags up wider worries”, in the Wednesday edition of the Financial Times (FT) reporters Andrew Jack and Patti Waldmeir discussed not only the endemic nature of corruption in China but how, in many ways, the Chinese health care system is based on such corruption. The piece quoted George Baeder, an independent drug industry advisor, for the following, “Financial flows – both legal and illegal – tied to drug and device sales are funding perhaps 60-80 per cent of total hospital costs. Without this funding, the current system would collapse.” Further, “central and provincial Chinese governments cannot afford to pay doctors a living wage, and may patients cannot afford to pay the true cost of care.” And finally, “Up to now, Beijing has turned a blind eye as pharma companies find ways to subsidise doctor salaries and underwrite their medical education.” How about that for structural corruption?

Intertwined with this structural issue is the problem of the quantity and quality of the drug supply. Many Chinese doctors do not feel that there is an acceptable alternative to foreign pharmaceutical products. This drives up the cost of prescribed medicines, as this quantity is therefore limited. But even where indigenous Chinese generic drugs are available as alternatives, many patients do not trust these medicines. This restricts the quality of drugs available.

But with this recent round of accusations against GSK it appears that the Chinese government has opened a new front. In an article in The Telegraph, entitled “GSK bribery scan could cause ‘irreparable damage’, says China”, Denise Roland reported that “Beijing has apparently issued a warning to all foreign firms, cautioning that the corruption charges against GlaxoSmithKline executives could cause “irreparable damage” to the drug maker’s Chinese operations.” She quoted from the state news agency Xinhua for the following, “GSK’s practices eroded its corporate integrity and could cause irreparable damage to the company in China and elsewhere. The case is a warning to other multinationals in China that ethics matter.”

In addition to these charges against a senior GSK executive, which could lead liability up to the GSK boardroom, Jonathan Russell, also writing in The Telegraph, in an article entitled “GlaxoSmithKline is facing more than double jeopardy”, said that “GlaxoSmithKline’s problems are multiplying fast. In China authorities have identified 46 individuals connected to the company they claim were involved in “massive and systemic bribery”. In the UK the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) marked out its pitch this week, revealing it has opened an official investigation into allegations of bribery; and an internal GSK probe is looking at potential wrongdoing in Jordan and Lebanon.” More ominously, he also noted that “Given the slew of allegations so far it seems a fair assumption that other international law enforcement agencies, notably the US Department of Justice, will be taking a long, close look at the allegations.”

While Russell points to the general UK prohibition against prosecutions, which might invoke double jeopardy, he says “As ever with the law there are exceptions to the principle. However they are limited in scope and rare in number. It may also be the case that the principle of double jeopardy may not be invoked in this case if the alleged offences the SFO is investigating are separate to those under investigation in China. They could relate to matters that took place in Jordan or Lebanon.” Russell also pointed out that “international prosecutors carving up parts of prosecutions so they can all have their pound of flesh. A very painful prospect for GSK.” It will also be interesting to see if GSK is charged under the UK Bribery Act, under the prior law or both. If charges are brought under the Bribery Act, which became effective on July 1, 2011, do you think GSK would try and raise a compliance defense based on the Six Principals of Adequate Procedures? I guess having a compliance defense is pretty useless if your company engages in bribery and corruption.

While Russell talks about the aggressiveness of US prosecutors under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), he does not discuss what may be GSK’s greatest exposure in the US. GSK was under the equivalent of a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) called a Corporate Integrity Agreement (CIA) for its prior sins related to off-label marketing. This CIA not only applied to the specific pharmaceutical regulations that GSK violated but all of the GSK compliance obligations, including the FCPA. In addition to requiring a full and complete compliance program, the CIA specified that the company would have a Compliance Committee, inclusive of the Compliance Officer (CO) and other members of senior management necessary to meet the requirements of this CIA, whose job was to oversee full implementation of the CIA and all compliance functions at the company. These additional functions required Deputy Compliance Officers for each commercial business unit, Integrity Champions within each business unit and management accountability and certifications from each business unit. Training of GSK employees was specified. Further, there was detail down to specifically state that all compliance obligations applied to “contractors, subcontractors, agents and other persons (including, but not limited to, third party vendors)”.

For the compliance practitioner, one clear message from the GSK matter is to monitor, audit and continuously review your Chinese operations. I will have more to say about the China corruption crackdown in an upcoming blog post but just like Eli Wallach as Calvera in The Magnificent Seven told the gunmen hired to protect the Mexican village, you have been warned.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

April 21, 2014

Nursery Rhymes, a Chinese Proverb, the HP FCPA Enforcement and the Myth of the Rogue Employee

Cow Jumping Over the MoonHey diddle diddle,

The Cat and the fiddle,

The Cow jumped over the moon.

As my friend and colleague Jay Rosen is want to remind us, he continually learns much about compliance and ethics from his Kindergarten-aged daughters. I submit that you need only look to children’s nursery rhymes in the context of the recent Hewlett-Packard (HP) Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement (FCPA) to fully appreciate the inanity of the myth of the ‘rogue employee.’ HP has been cited as the prime example of the case where a small group of evil or ‘rogue employees’ purposely mislead their ultimate US corporate parent (HP Co) by engaging in bribery and corruption for which their US corporate parent, who did not engage in the corrupt action, were forced to pay the fines and penalties (and attendant investigative costs, remediation costs and negative publicity). For the purposes of this discussion we will leave out the millions of dollars that HP potentially benefited from via the illegal actions of its alleged ‘rogue employees’; or if there has ever been a case involving ‘rogue employees’ who, intentionally or otherwise, took a company down into FCPA grief.

I. HP-Poland – the Tale of Little Jack Horner – what a good boy I am

Little Jack Horner

Sat in the corner,

Eating a Christmas pie;

He put in his thumb,

And pulled out a plum,

And said ‘What a good boy am I!’

This is the one where commentators are having a Eureka moment. After all, the settlement documents point to one man, HP’s Poland Country Manager, and his John Le Carré-esque meetings. In this bribery scheme, the Country Manager engaged in a multi-year bribery scheme to pay bribes to one Polish government official to secure a large number of contracts. These bribes were paid surreptitiously, using a variety of techniques to evade detection but they all had one thing in common which I will ask you to figure out from the Bribery Box presented below.

HP-Poland Bribery Box Score

Bribe Amount Method of Payment Year Paid Business Received
$150,000 Bag of cash, delivered to home of Polish gov official 2007 Contract valued at $15.7MM
$100,000 Bag of cash, delivered in parking lot to Polish gov official 2007
$130,000 to $140,000 Bag of cash delivered to Polish gov official 2008 Contract executed January 2008
$110,000 Bag of cash 2008 Contract executed in April 2008
$90,000 Bag of cash delivered to Polish gov official 2008 Contract executed May 2008
$30,000 Bag of cash delivered to Polish gov official 2008 Final 3 contracts totaled $32MM in value
$6,000 (offer) 2010 For contract signed in 2010 valued at $4MM
$30,000 Delivered as gifts 2007-2010 Total contracts valued at $60MM

For those of you not so quick on the draw the common element, at least until the end of the Box Score, is that all the bribes were paid in cash. For part of my in-house legal career, I did legal work for the energy industry and I have some familiarity in the amount of money that Country Manager’s made, at least the range of their salary and bonus, and it certainly was not enough to fund bribes in the amount of $600,000 in cash over a couple of years.

So let me get this straight, no one else at HP-Poland aided the Country Manager while he helped himself to the kitty? Didn’t anyone even notice, say in 2007, one of our $250,000 was missing? If not, the Country Manager had to have help in siphoning off funds from HP itself to fund these bribes? So my first question is where was HP internal audit? At the country level? At the region level? At the corporate level? Where was HP Co, when HP-Poland landed $60MM in contracts, in determining how these contracts were procured? Where were HP internal controls?

Was the Country Manager like Little Jack Horner? What a good boy I am?

II.   HP-Russia – Yes Sir, Yes Sir, Three Bags Full

Baa, baa, black sheep,

Have you any wool?

Yes, sir, yes, sir,

Three bags full.

HP-Russia seems to confuse commentators the most about the myth of the ‘rogue employee’. Here they point to the coded spreadsheets (the “Encrypted Spreadsheet”), which could only be unlocked and read by the conspirators themselves. And after all, they lied, lied, when they were asked about some of the details of the transaction in questions. I am sure Inspector Renoir is still shocked, shocked, to discover that gambling is still occurring on the premises of Rick’s Café American in Casablanca.

So why three bags full? Well, first of all, if you are from a certain university in central Texas you’ll immediately know what it means. For the less delicate among you, it would mean a large load of Col. Sherman Potter’s horse-hockey; three bags full in fact. This deal had been floating around HP for years, was well-known enough to raise multiple Red Flags inside the company and was simply internally shopped until it slid through by hook, nook or crook; or in this case, three bags full.

The initial deal was inked with the Russian government in June 2001 but as the Russian government could not fund it, they sought another foreign government to fund and that government was the US. However, to do so, it required that at least 85% of all goods and services were of US origin. To meet this requirement, the initial deal was changed to substitute a US intermediary (Intermediary 2) who replaced the Swiss intermediary on the deal (Intermediary 1). HP Co conducted due diligence on Intermediary 2 and then met with Intermediary 2 in the US to conduct additional due diligence. However, Intermediary 2 balked at answering more “pointed questions” about its expertise and financial wherewithal to handle the transaction. HP Co then told HP-Russia that they would not approve the transaction.

Not to be deterred from a good deal, the foreign government financing was switched from the US to Germany. In addition, Intermediary 2 was ditched for a one-man shop, Burwell Consulting Ltd (Burwell). Burwell and others were eventually paid nearly $21MM in bribes for the Russia government contract. There has been much discussion about how HP-Russia tricked HP-Germany’s employees through the use of “encrypted, password protected spreadsheets that tracked the deal’s financial inflows and outflows”. However, what I found more interesting was the discussion about how not only had HP-Russia shopped the deal internally and been told a resounding NO by HP Co for obvious Red Flags present but also the discussion of how HP-Russia internally funded the bribery scheme.

They did so by the classic ‘stuffing the channel’ that every software lawyer, accountant, bookkeeper, auditor, sales rep and anyone else subject to GAAP or IFSR learns on their first day of training on their first job. It goes like this: HP-Russia sold products to a channel partner; who then sold them to Intermediary 3; who then sold them back to HP with a mark-up and voila, you have a big pile of cash with which to bribe.

So what does the HP-Russia deal tell us about HP as a company? As with HP-Poland, you would have to question where was internal controls while this was playing out, at the country level, at the region level, at the anywhere level? But there is far more than simply internal controls going on here. Based on what was publicly announced in the settlement documents, HP Co had actual knowledge that the deal was rife with Red Flags as it was presented. It was so bad they shut it down. Of course, the business guys simply resurrected it in another place, in another guise. What does that say about the overall effectiveness of the compliance function at the time if HP-Russia could bring a Red Flagged deal to HP Co only to have it stopped, then to shove it through HP-Germany due to weak controls? What about the internal controls on how HP-Russia was able to generate $21MM in scammed money to pay the bribes in the first place? Think anyone else might have thought about running that scam through those robust internal controls? After all, its only three bags full…

III.   HP-Mexico – Fool Me Once…

Fool Me Once,

Shame on You;

Fool me twice,

Shame on Me.

The above did not come from George Bush (The Younger) but is purported to be an old Chinese proverb. I like that thought anyway and it certainly informs our look the claim of ‘rogue employee’ in Mexico. Here, for reasons far beyond my comprehension, HP was able to secure a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) from the Department of Justice (DOJ) for the actions of its subsidiary in Mexico in paying a bribe of $1.6MM to facilitate the winning of a contract worth $6MM. But the lesson learned from the ancient Chinese proverb certainly informs our look at the allegation of the ‘rogue employee’ down Mexico way.

HP-Mexico wanted to use a certain agent involving a deal with Pemex because he had a very close relationship with the Pemex official who would be making the decision on the contract. HP-Mexico even signed a contract with this agent where his description of services was an “influencer fee” for which he would receive a 25% commission. This agent could apparently neither meet HP Co’s due diligence requirements, accept HP Co’s mandatory commission rate or both but whatever the reason, they were not approved as an agent on the Pemex deal. But like all good HP business folks (beginning to see a pattern here?) HP-Mexico simply subcontracted this agent to an existing, approved HP channel partner. HP-Mexico then amazingly (or perhaps not) said that they needed to raise the commission rate of this channel partner from 1.5% to 26.5% because this channel partner was now “managing discounts with Pemex” which coincidentally, this channel partner had never done. Because this channel partner was previously approved by compliance, the request for increase in commission rate was never submitted to compliance for approval. Think an internal control or two might have been appropriate in this situation?

What do the nursery rhymes and Chinese proverb tell us about HP and the Myth of the Rogue Employee? All three of the bribery schemes involved showed that there were multiple failures of numerous systems that allowed the schemes to run rampant. But perhaps the thing that they speak to the most is the culture that existed at the company during the time frames in question. While the FCPA Professor and others have noted that some of the conduct in question began in Russia as long ago as 1999, the settlement documents speak to conduct in Poland as recently as 2010. Certainly, the NPA for HP-Mexico’s conduct was for actions in 2009. What was the tone set that not only allowed employees to think that they could get away with subverting the law but that they had to do so. That, perhaps, is the most troubling questions unanswered by the Myth of the Rogue Employee.

Whatever the answer to HP’s culture of compliance may have been at the time of the conduct which led to the enforcement action, the claim that the company does not bear responsibility for either setting that tone, facilitating the conduct by looking the other way when convenient or not having appropriate internal prevention and detection controls in place to prevent massive fraud by its own employees; the reality is that when a employees of a company can evade controls to generate multi-millions of dollars to generate pools of money to pay bribes, there is no ‘rogue employee’ or even small group of rogue employees. Or there is about as much chance as a cow jumping over the moon.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

April 14, 2014

The HP FCPA Settlement

FCPA SettlementLast week the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) jointly announced the conclusion of a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement action against Hewlett-Packard Company (HP). In the settlement, HP agreed to pay $108MM in fines, penalties and disgorgements for criminal and civil acts. To say that it was one of the more perplexing FCPA settlements would seem to be an understatement. While some will read the settlement documents and see conduct which did not merit such a high total amount of fines and penalties, I am not from that camp.

The tale of this sordid affair of bribery and corruption occurred over 3 continents with multiple countries involved, evidencing an entire breakdown in company internal controls and a complete lack of a culture of compliance. Yet the settlement documents make great pains to emphasize that few employees were actually involved in the nefarious conduct. How bad was the conduct? Think right up there with BizJet because we had bags of cash delivered to a Polish government official. (But unlike BizJet, the Board of Directors did not approve the bribery scheme and it was not taken across the border.) For the Russian deal, it was shopped through several countries with multiple levels of company review, which did not seem to work or care much about anything except getting the deal done. For Mexico, they just seemed to get a free pass where the contract description for the agent who paid the bribe was “influencer fee”.

Finally, as most readers might remember, HP did not self-report this misconduct to the DOJ or SEC. Apparently, the story of HP’s bribery by its German subsidiary to gain a contract in Russia was broken by the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article in April 15, 2010. The next day, the DOJ and SEC announced they were investigating the allegations of bribery. However, HP was made aware of the allegations by its German subsidiary in December 2009, when German authorities raided HP’s offices in Munich and arrested one HP Germany executive and two former employees. Yet HP never self-reported. Not exactly the poster child for self-disclosure for any company going forward.

Of course HP’s public response at the time indicated its attitude, when a HP spokesperson was quoted in the WSJ article as saying “This is an investigation of alleged conduct that occurred almost seven years ago, largely by employees no longer with HP. We are cooperating fully with the German and Russian authorities and will continue to conduct our own internal investigation.”

More befuddlement comes from the reported facts around HP Germany. As noted by the WSJ report, one, then current, HP executive was arrested and two former employees were arrested in connection with the investigation by German authorities. There is no mention of them in any of the settlement documents. The WSJ article also reported that investigation-related documents submitted to a German court showed that German prosecutors were “looking into whether H-P executives funneled the suspected bribes through a network of shell companies and accounts in places including Britain, Austria, Switzerland, the British Virgin Islands, Belize, New Zealand, the Baltic nations of Latvia and Lithuania, and the states of Delaware and Wyoming”. While some of these countries were mentioned in the settlement documents there was no mentions of DOJ or SEC investigations into Wyoming, Belize, the British Virgin Islands or New Zealand.

What are we to make of the criminal fines levied against the Russian and Polish subsidiaries of HP? The Polish subsidiary pled guilty to a two count Criminal Information consisting of (1) violating the FCPA’s internal control provisions; (2) violating the FCPA’s books and records provisions. The US Sentencing Guidelines suggested a fine range of $19MM to $38MM, the final fine was $15,450,244.

For the Russia deal, the Russian subsidiary pled guilty to a four count Criminal Information consisting of (1) conspiracy to violate the books and records provisions of the FCPA; (2) violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions; (3) violating the FCPA’s internal control provisions; (4) violating the FCPA’s books and records provisions. The US Sentencing Guidelines suggested a fine range of $87MM to $174MM, yet the final fine was $58,772,250.

Finally, in Mexico HP’s subsidiary, according the to the SEC Press Release, “paid a consultant to help the company win a public IT contract worth approximately $6 million. At least $125,000 was funneled to a government official at the state-owned petroleum company with whom the consultant had connections. Although the consultant was not an approved deal partner and had not been subjected to the due diligence required under company policy, HP Mexico sales managers used a pass-through entity to pay inflated commissions to the consultant.” This was internally referred to by HP as an “influencer fee.” Pretty clear evidence of what it was to be used for, wouldn’t you say? Yet the DOJ did not to criminally prosecute the company’s Mexican subsidiary and entered into a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA), HP agreed to pay forfeiture in the amount of $2,527,750.

How did HP accomplish all of this? In a Press Release HP Executive Vice President and General Counsel John Schultz said, “The misconduct described in the settlement was limited to a small number of people who are no longer employed by the company. HP fully cooperated with both the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission in the investigation of these matters and will continue to provide customers around the world with top quality products and services without interruption.”

As reported by the FCPA Professor, in his blog post entitled “HP And Related Entities Resolve $108 Million FCPA Enforcement Action”, the HP Russian subsidiary Plea Agreement gave the following factors for the reduction in the fine from the Sentencing Guideline range:

“(a) monetary assessments that HP has agreed to pay to the SEC and is expected to pay to law enforcement authorities in Germany relating to the same conduct at issue …; (b) HP Russia’s and HP’s cooperation has been, on the whole, extraordinary, including conducting an extensive internal investigation, voluntarily making U.S. and foreign employees available for interviews, and collecting, analyzing, and organizing voluminous evidence and information for the Department; (c) HP Russia and HP have engaged in extensive remediation, including by taking appropriate disciplinary action against culpable employees of HP and enhancing their internal accounting, reporting, and compliance functions; (d) HP has committed to continue enhancing its compliance program and internal accounting controls … (e) the misconduct identified … was largely undertaken by employees associated with HP Russia, which employed a small fraction of HP global workforce during the relevant period; (f) neither HP nor HP Russia has previously been subject of any criminal enforcement action by the Department or law enforcement authority in Russia or elsewhere; (g) HP Russia and HP have agreed to continue to cooperate with the Department and other U.S. and foreign law enforcement authorities, if requested by the Department …”

In the same blog post, the Professor reported the following reasons were stated for reduction in the final fine by HP’s Polish subsidiary’s:

“(a) HP Poland’s cooperation with the Department’s investigation; (b) HP Poland’s ultimate parent corporation, HP, has committed to maintain and continue enhancing its compliance program and internal accounting controls …; and (c) HP Poland and HP have agreed to continue with the Department and other U.S. and foreign law enforcement authorities in any ongoing investigation …”

We have witnessed companies, which have engaged in ‘extraordinary cooperation’ with the DOJ during the pendency of their FCPA investigations. BizJet is certainly one that comes to mind. Further, there are clear examples of companies, which extensively remediated during the pendancies of their FCPA investigations, from which they clearly benefited. Two prime examples are Parker Drilling, which not only received a financial penalty below the suggested range but also was not required to have a corporate monitor, while they had C-Suite involvement in its bribery scheme. Weatherford seeming came back from the brink during mid-investigation when they hired Billy Jacobson and turned around not only their attitude towards cooperation with the DOJ but also their efforts toward remediation.

Both of these companies are headquartered in Houston and both have been quite active on the conference circuit talking about their compliance programs so most compliance practitioners are aware that these companies are on the forefront of best practices. Perhaps HP is on some circuit doing that, somewhere. If so, kudos to them. If their remediation work led to a best practices compliance program for the company and their extraordinary cooperation led to the astonishing reduction in penalties to their entities, I certainly tip my cap to them. If their lawyers were great negotiators and made great presentations to the DOJ and SEC, all of which led to or contributed to the final results, a tip of the cap to them as well.

So what is the lesson to be learned for the compliance practitioner? Other than befuddlement, I am not sure. Congratulating HP and its counsel is not a lesson it is an action. If HP now has a best practices compliance program, I hope they will provide the compliance community with the lessons that they learned and incorporated into their compliance program, which allowed them to obtain the fines below the minimum suggested range. If they have incorporated some enhanced compliance components into their program I hope they will share those enhancements too.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

April 7, 2014

The Battle of Shiloh, Corruption in Ukraine and Things to Come

Things to ComeOn this day 126 years ago the two-day battle of Shiloh ended. On the second day, the Union troops under General Grant largely recovered the ground that the Confederate troops had taken on the first day. Grant was severely criticized for allegedly being taken by surprise by the Confederate attack but he managed to survive the firestorm. The Confederates lost their most senior commander, General Albert Sydney Johnson, on the first day of the fighting.

With the successful Union counter-attack on the second day the battle is generally viewed as a tactical victory for the North. However, for me the thing that is most significant about this battle is that it was the first horrific slaughter of the Civil War. There were over 23,000 casualties on both sides. Unfortunately it presaged more to come. I will never forget Shelby Foote’s comments in Ken Burn’s documentary The Civil War. Shiloh was not an aberration but there were 25 more Shiloh’s to come. It truly was a sign of things to come.

The recent events in Ukraine have had a variety of interpretations, results and predictions. But one thing is clear, the government of Ukraine allowed systemic corruption to occur. One can look to the Archer-Daniels-Midland Corp. (ADM) Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FPCA) enforcement action to see the effects in play. In that matter, ADM paid bribes to obtain tax rebates to which it was legally entitled. Unfortunately for ADM it developed opaque schemes to fund bribery payments and then hid them on its books and records. Not good for FPCA compliance.

Or consider the case of Ikea. In an article in Bloomberg, entitled “Dashed Ikea Dreams Show Decades Lost to Bribery in Ukraine”, Agnes Lovasz wrote that Ikea has tried for over a decade to open a store in the country but has been unable to do so because it refuses to pay bribes to do so. She wrote that according to Transparency International’s (TI’s) Corruptions Perceptions Index (CPI), “Stuck between the European Union and its former imperial master Russia, Ukraine has emerged as the most corrupt country on the continent.” She quoted Erik Nielsen, chief global economist at UniCredit SpA in London, for the following, “Even before this latest crisis, Ukraine was a mess beyond description”. How about this recommendation from Lennart Dahlgren, a retired Ikea executive who led the company’s entry into Russia, who said in an interview with Russkiy Reporter magazine in 2010, that compared with Ukraine, Russia, the most corrupt major economy, “is whiter than snow”. Faint praise indeed.

While a US, UK, EU or other western government response is certainly appropriate, I thought about a business led response to such a situation when I read a recent article in the April issue of the Harvard Business Review (HBR), entitled “The Collaboration Imperative”, by authors Ram Nidumolu, Jib Ellison, John Whalen and Erin Billman. In this article they discussed business collaborations in the context of sustainability. I found their concepts should be considered by companies or industry groups when trying to develop strategies to fight corruption. As Jason Poblete continually reminds us, the marketplace is one important place to look for solutions to problems and this article certainly provides some starting points for such an analysis.

The authors posit that collaboration models should be divided into two categories: (1) coordinated processes and (2) coordinated outcomes. Adapting these to anti-corruption/anti-bribery programs, this means that under the ‘coordinated processes’ prong businesses should identify and share industry-wide operational processes that prevent and detect bribery and corruption. Under the ‘coordinated outcomes’ prong, the authors work translates into developing industry benchmarks and standardized systems for measuring anti-corruption/anti-bribery performance across the value chain.

The authors had some specific steps in their article which I thought also provided insightful for implementing their ideas in the anti-corruption/anti-bribery context. First you should being this journey “with a small, committed group.” The reason to do so is “to prevent the logjams that can occur when many stakeholders with conflicting goals try to work together, start by convening a small “founding circle” of participants. The members must have a common motivation and have mutual trust at the outset. This group develops the project vision and selectively invites subsequent tiers of participants into the project as it develops.” Next you should try to “link self-interest to shared interest.” This is because to help facilitate success, “collaboration initiatives must ensure that each participant recognize at the outset the compelling business value that it stands to gain when shared interests are met.” The participants need to then try to monetize the system value by “linking self-interest and shared interest is to quantify how the collaboration reduces costs or generates revenue for each participant.” It helps to build a direct path to some early successes because it is important “to generate momentum and commitment, the action plan must also emphasize quick wins. Business thrives on visible and immediate results, and sustainability collaborations are no exception. Even if these wins are small initially, the cost savings or incremental revenues provide proof to other executives inside participants’ organizations that the investment is worthwhile.”

As many in such a collaborative group will have conflicting priorities, the authors believe it is important to have “independent project-management specialists with demonstrated competence in trust building among diverse stakeholders. Additionally, the project management function must be seen by all participants as neutral and committed to the success of the project, rather than to any individual stakeholder.” Interestingly, the authors note that there should be built in competition which should be “structured to support shared goals.” Finally, and perhaps most obviously, any such group must have a culture of trust. Fortunately, in the anti-corruption/anti-bribery world there are very few trade secrets but beyond this, the “building and maintaining trust is an ongoing practice foundational to every other practice during the collaboration project.”

Perhaps the people or the leadership of Ukraine may at some point realize that the perceived endemic nature of corruption in their economic system, helped lead in part to its current problems. Maybe the citizens in Crimea thought the Russian government less corrupt. While I do not pretend to know the answers to these questions, the collaboration model that the authors have detailed for sustainability initiatives is certainly one that US companies might wish to consider on some type of industry wide basis.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

February 20, 2014

C’Mon Man Or the End of the World?

Prepare End of the WorldIt’s the end of the world as we know it,

It’s the end of the world as we know it

It’s the end of the world as we know it, and I feel fine

 The above lyrics came from REM and they reflect how I generally feel about law firm and lawyer pronouncements about the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement because [SPOILER ALERT] I am a lawyer, I do practice law and I do work for a law firm, the venerable TomFoxLaw. The FCPA Professor regularly chides FCPA Inc. for their scaremongering tactics, usually monikered as ‘Client Alerts’. Mike Volkov is even more derisive when he calls them the FCPA Paparazzi and cites examples from his days in Big Law, where law firm marketing campaigns are centered around doomsday scenarios about soon-to-occur FCPA; UK Bribery Act; or [fill in the anti-corruption law here] prosecutions and enforcement actions. I usually take such law firm scaremonger and blathering’s to be about worth as much as the paper they are printed on. Indeed I chide the FCPA Professor and Monsieur Volkov for their protestations. In other words, I feel fine.

I am a proud card-carry member of FCPA Inc. because not only can I spell FCPA (and UKBA for that matter), I also make FCPA related pronouncements from time-to-time and practice law in the FCPA space. I think we generally do a pretty good job of getting information out there. But last week one missive occurred that not only met the above impugning adjectives but created a veritable tsunami of mis-information as it made its way from China to Europe and to the US that even I thought was beyond the pale. How absurd was it? So absurd that not only did the FCPA Professor and I agree about it, but we decided to post blogs about it today.

On February 5 a law firm client alert stated, “While the number of enforcement actions may decrease or hold steady, we can expect some “blockbuster” settlements in 2014 of matters that have long been under investigation.” Blockbuster…really? Do you think this law firm was implying that the Siemens record FCPA fine of $800MM, plus its equivalent $800MM fine in Germany, that’s a total of $1.6 bn for those of you keeping score at home, is seriously in danger of falling by the wayside in 2014? How about Halliburton’s comparatively paltry $579MM penalty? To be slapped aside like a green-skinned witch yelling, “I’m melting!” BAE coming in at No. 3 with a measly $400MM must be quaking it is British Wellington boots about now.

As inane as this comment was, the thing that attracted my attention was the tidal force wave by which this quote rode its way all the way to the US. By February 10th, this quote had morphed into the following, written in the South China Morning Post, “The United States is expected to impose “blockbuster” fines on companies bribing foreign officials this year, with China a likely target of US investigations, lawyers say. A report by US law firm WilmerHale predicts “blockbuster” settlements under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). “US enforcement authorities have stated there are a number of very large settlements in the pipeline,” said Jay Holtmeier, a partner at WilmerHale. “Given the attention paid to China in recent years, it is a safe bet some of those large settlements will involve conduct in China.”” Two days later the full storm reached the shores of the US when this article was referenced in the Wall Street Journal’s (WSJ’s) Corruption Currents.

So now not only do we have ‘blockbuster’ FCPA settlements coming; we will have them coming out of China. Various marketing departments will use these statements as ‘authoritative’, yet another reason to purchase their company’s products or services.

There are plenty of great FCPA resources out there, which inform the compliance practitioner, or indeed the non-compliance specialist, about the costs of a FCPA enforcement action. But more importantly there is more than a wealth of free, at no cost, information about how to craft a compliance program with any anti-corruption law, which currently exists. There is the same amount of information about how to ‘do compliance’, once again free and available at no charge. Is it marketing? My answer is either yes or better yet; who cares? Good solid information is good solid information no matter what the motives behind putting it out there are.

But here is the problem with making such statements which newspapers then follow them up by brandishing them as even more dire predictions. Someone might actually believe it. Next Congress will want to investigate these ‘blockbuster’ settlements or, perhaps, why after it was reported that they were coming, the Department of Justice (DOJ) did not have any ‘blockbuster’ settlements in 2014?

I thought about writing this blog post around the tale of the Boy Who Cried Wolf but I realized there is always another law firm or lawyer out there will to say the end of the world is coming “this year”. But perhaps the better analogy is the ESPN segment entitled “C’Mon Man!” during which each color commentator will describe a play or series of plays that made them scratch their heads and say “C’Mon Man!” So while I generally feel fine about the information disseminated by and from FCPA Inc., my suggestion is that everyone just take a deep breath and consider such information for what it is worth.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

February 13, 2014

What is the Role of An Apology In Anti-Corruption Enforcement?

ApologyWhat is the most famous apology in literature? Plato’s Apology for Socrates certainly is in the conversation. In addition to presenting Plato’s views on his teacher, it is believed to be the most authentic account that has been preserved of Socrates’ defense of himself as it was presented before the Athenian Council. I thought about the change in the meaning of an apology in modern times whilst reading an article in the New York Times (NYT) DealBook column over the past few weeks on the subject of apologies.

This exploration of apologies began with two DealBook articles earlier this month. One was a guest article, entitled “Calling for an Apology Cease-Fire”, by Dov Seidman, founder of LRN, who has been tracking apology trends for many years. The second was by Andrew Ross Sorkin and was entitled “Too Many Sorry Excuses for Apology”. Seidman laid out the problem as follows, “I am also offended because there are some authentic, legitimate apologies that are sent forth into the world. But bad apologies drive out good, so that those who take their apologies seriously, and work tirelessly to live up to them, are dismissed along with the drivel. Apologies can and should be hugely important actions and mechanisms, blessed with enormous power and lasting impact. But they must be two-way exchanges of trust and healing that are open and transparent. It is because I mourn the loss of the genuine apology that I propose an apology cease-fire.”

Sorkin viewed the problem from a slightly different angle when he wrote, “But what should you do when you don’t think you should apologize but everyone else does? You know the situation: Leaders “apologize” but clearly don’t mean it because they don’t think they should be apologizing in the first place. They apologize to gain some good will from the public rather than defend the behavior that is being criticized.”

Seidman finds that most apologies today do not provide any substance behind them. He said “our values have been so distorted that most people – and I’m considering both prominent apologizers and the rest of us – operate as though the purpose of an apology is to get out of something with the minimum pain and suffering possible. So you tell the aggrieved party you’re sorry – that you regret stepping on their foot, stepping on their self-confidence or stepping on their insurance policy. They accept mechanically, and we all move on.”

Seidman believes there are five essential characteristics of an authentic apology and they are: 

  • They must be painful. If an apology doesn’t create vulnerability and isn’t therapeutically painful, it’s not an apology at all.
  • They must be authentic and not an excuse. An apology can’t have ulterior motives or be a means to an end.
  • They must probe deep into the personal or organizational values that permitted the offense. Apologizers need to conduct a “moral audit” by looking themselves in the mirror and asking, “How did I get here and how did I drift from the person I aspire to be?”
  • They must encourage feedback from the aggrieved. This includes truly opening up to input and two-way conversation during and after an apology, and embracing ideas as to how to improve.
  • They must turn regret into a real change in behavior. The new behaviors they elicit must be continuing, reinforced by a sustained investment in avoiding the same mistakes in the future.

I often use what I characterize as McNulty’s Maxims on questions that would be asked by a regulator in any Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement action: (1) What did you do to prevent it?; (2) What did you do to detect it?; and (3) What did you do when you found out about it? I find that Seidman’s prescriptions for an authentic apology resonate with McNulty Maxim Number 3, which in many ways is the most important maxim. Did your company move forward to remediate the issue that caused the FCPA violation? What steps did you take? Did you terminate those responsible? Were there any internal penalties against senior management or the Board that oversaw the conduct in question? Was your company accountable?

Seidman ends his piece by suggesting that there be a new “apology metric” to determine how authentic and how effective an apology is over time. He states, “Let’s commit to demanding more from business and public figures — and from ourselves — when contrition is being pursued. It will not be easy. But by returning to a search for redemption that accepts its difficultly, we can rediscover its real possibility. I invite you to join me in continuing both a personal and public exploration of the authentic apology. Let’s hold ourselves accountable for restoring the value of a precious and noble commodity.”

Sorkin, coming at his piece from his reporter hat, proposes a complimentary approach. He has started an ““Apology Watch” on the DealBook website  and on Twitter using the hashtag #ApologyWatch. It is his hope that DealBook “readers will participate by helping us track new apologies and, more important, follow up on what companies, institutions and individuals have done post-apology.”

Should an apology be a part of any settlement of a FCPA enforcement action? If not, when is an apology appropriate for a corporate leader when his or her company admits to violations of the FCPA, UK Bribery Act, Chinese domestic anti-bribery laws or another other similar anti-corruption regimes? Indeed are there simply too many insincere apologies being made by corporate executives? I think that the answer falls within McNulty’s Maxim No. 3. For if your actions belie your words, it probably means that your words have no meaning and indeed are simply empty words. If that is true you may well end up with what Seidman portends, “For those caught in an empty apology, the results could be expensive and embarrassing.”

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

January 29, 2014

The Sussex Vampyre and the ADM FCPA Settlement

Sussex VampyreToday I want to use the story of The Sussex Vampyre as the starting point for an inquiry into the recent Archer-Daniels-Midland Corp (ADM) Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement action. In the story, Holmes receives a letter from Robert Ferguson, who has become convinced that his second wife has been sucking their baby son’s blood and is a vampire. He has a crippled son from his first marriage who is terribly jealous of the new baby in their home. It turns out that this lame son, Jack, has been shooting poisoned darts at his baby brother and his stepmother’s behavior is actually sucking the poison out of the baby’s neck. The baby’s wounds were caused by Jack sending the darts, not by the mother biting her baby. In other words, what might be seen as something very scary is easily explained.

Once again demonstrating that the FCPA Professor and myself look at the same thing and come to different conclusions are reflected by those he states in his article “Why You Should Be Alarmed By the ADM FCPA Enforcement Action”. I see the ADM enforcement action as a continuation of the available case law favoring interpretations of the business nexus requirement to be applied broadly, where it is clear that bribery and corruption have occurred.

When I look at the facts laid out in the ADM settlement documents, I see the following: four separate bribery schemes hidden in the companies books and records clearly designed to influence the decision of a foreign government official. From 2002 to 2010, the company’s Ukrainian subsidiary rolled up VAT receivables of up to $46MM. What I see is a company, which over several years of slow and no response to its application for VAT tax refunds for goods purchased in Ukraine, responded to this problem by engaging in bribery and corruption to help them get the money that they were believed they were owed.

So what were these bribery schemes? There was the Charitable Donation Scheme, which according to the SEC Complaint, “an ADM executive in the tax department sent an e-mail to the head of an international tax organization and stated, “One of our affiliates operates in the Ukraine. In order to recover 100% of their input VAT they have to pay 30% of the amount to local charities.”” Next was the Stevedoring Company Scheme where two ADM subsidiaries made “payments to a stevedoring company in the port of Odessa so that it could pass on nearly all of those payments to Ukrainian officials in order to obtain VAT refunds on behalf of ACTI Ukraine.” Next was the Mischaracterization of Write-offs Scheme where ADM’s German subsidiary reported to the US parent that they had to write off 18% of the tax refund due back to the company. However upon payment of the VAT refund it would be at 100% of the total due. As the German subsidiary had taken a write off of 18% of the total, the corresponding amount of money would be funneled to “third-party vendors so that nearly all of those monies could be provided to Ukrainian government officials.” Finally, and most ingenuously, was the Fake Insurance Premiums Scheme. In this scheme, ADM’s Ukrainian subsidiary, arranged for an insurance company to falsely bill it for crop insurance, which said “Insurance Company never intended to honor, adjusting the premiums to be roughly 20% of the VAT refund.” This inflated amount was then paid to Ukrainian officials.

The FCPA itself says:

(a) Prohibition

It shall be unlawful for any issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 781 of this title or which is required to file reports under section 780d of this title, or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such issuer, to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to—

(1) any foreign official for purposes of—

(A)

(i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity,

(ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or

(iii) securing any improper advantage; or

(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality,

 in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person;

In the case of US v. Kay, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals exhaustively reviewed the legislative history of the FCPA, from its passage in 1977 through the two amendments in 1988 and 1998. The Kay decision stands for the proposition that the defendant intend the paying of bribes to be a quid pro quo, which would assist (or is meant to assist) the payor in obtaining or retaining business. Further, it specifically stated that the “business nexus is not to be interpreted narrowly.” The facts in Kay were different than those presented in the ADM matter. However, with the admonition that the business nexus requirement is not to be interpreted narrowly, I believe the holding in Kay is such that it is not a stretch to see the conduct engaged in by ADM did assist, or was meant to assist, it in doing business in Ukraine. Indeed, the Kay decision stated, “In addition, the concern of Congress with the immorality, inefficiency, and unethical character of bribery presumably does not vanish simply because the tainted payments are intended to secure a favorable decision less significant than winning a contract bid.” Thus I look at Kay and see the conduct of ADM as falling within the broad outlines of the Kay decision.

How about the facilitation payment exception and that somehow the ADM subsidiaries were making payments exempted out of the FCPA because they were for routine services?

The FCPA itself states:

(b) Exception for routine governmental action

Subsections (a) and (g) of this section shall not apply to any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official, political party, or party official the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action by a foreign official, political party, or party official.

Further, the term “routine governmental action” is defined as one of the following:

  1.  Obtaining Permits;
  2. Processing visas and work orders;
  3. Providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery;
  4. Providing phone services and utilities;
  5. Actions of a similar nature.

There is nothing in the statute about processing multi-million dollar tax refunds as a routine governmental action. Once again the Kay decision spoke to the issue of facilitation payments, similar to those made in the context of the ADM settlement, when it said “This observation is not diminished by Congress’s understanding and accepting that relatively small facilitating payments were, at the time, among the accepted costs of doing business in many foreign countries.” One key there is that facilitating payments be “relatively small”. Whatever 18% of $46MM might be, it certainly is not “relatively small”.

All of this leads me to see the ADM settlement as a continuation of the very limited case law interpretation that exists around the FCPA. So just as Holmes looked at the facts in The Sussex Vampyre and did not see something which could not be explained or need be feared; I look at the ADM enforcement action and see a company which engaged in bribery and corruption, knew it was doing so and actively tried to hide the corrupt payments in its books and records.

And once again, I would cite that the easiest response to all of this might be the advice given by Department of Justice (DOJ) representative Greg Anders, in his testimony to the House Judiciary Committee regarding amending the FCPA, that being that companies should not engage in bribery.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2014

January 3, 2014

The FCPA Year in Reivew-the eBook

I am pleased to announce the release of my eBook, “2013-the FCPA Year in Review” available through amazon.com. The past year saw the highest number of U.S. prosecutions of corporate bribery overseas since the banner year of 2010.  Some of the key corporate cases were Parker Drilling, Total and Weatherford. 2013 also saw 13 individuals prosecuted for FCPA or related criminal or civil violations. This jump in prosecutions illustrates the government’s commitment to aggressively pursuing these cases.

In this book, I review the underlying facts which led to the FCPA enforcement actions and the key lessons to be learned by the compliance practitioner going forward. I am certain that you will find this book useful in assessing your compliance program for 2014 and beyond.

It is a great value at $4.99. You can purchase a copy of the eBook, “2013-the FCPA Year in Review” by clicking here.

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