In FCPA Enforcement Sometimes Truth is Stranger than Fiction – The Cilnis Complaint

I often marvel at some of the stories which come up in the context of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) investigations and enforcement. If you made up some of the things which are reported, I fear that people might find you simply crazy. One of these stranger than fiction stories now appears to be playing out in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, where a Complaint was recently filed by the US government against one Frederic Cilnis, for obstruction of justice into an ongoing FCPA investigation.

Cilnis was arrested on April 14, 2013 in Jacksonville, Florida and charged with obstruction of justice for attempting to persuade an individual who is a Cooperating Witness (CW), to destroy documents which purport to show the bribery scheme engaged in to obtain mining concessions. In the Complaint filed in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) detailed five contracts which Cilnis sought to obtain from the CW and destroy. As reported by the Financial Times (FT), in an article entitled “Contracts link BSGR to alleged bribes”, Tom Burgis, Misha Glenny and Cynthia O’Murchu, reported documents related to allegations that “The resources arm of Beny Steinmetz Group agreed to pay $2m to the wife of an African president to help it secure rights to one of the world’s richest untapped mineral deposits”. The contracts “set out agreements for the company to make payments and transfer shares to Mamadie Touré, wife of the then president Lansana Conté.” As the quid pro quo for these commission payments, “Ms Touré would take “all necessary steps” to advance its efforts to win rights to the Simandou deposit, a February 2008 contract says. A further $2m would be dispersed among other people to facilitate the acquisition of the rights.”

In the Complaint the CW is only identified as “the former wife of a now deceased high-ranking official in the government of Guinea”. Mamadie Touré’s former husband, the then president Lansana Conté is now deceased. Cilnis is identified in the Complaint but his business relationship is only identified as “Entity”. In an article in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), entitled “BSGR Confirms Engaging Man in Guinea Charged with Obstruction”, Sam Rubenfeld reported that the company BSG Resources, Ltd. now says that it worked with Frederic Cilnis, although Cilnis was never an employee of the company.

The Complaint detailed five separate contracts which are alleged to show the efforts of Cilnis and his business relations to pay bribes and engage in corruption to obtain the mining concession. The Compliant specifies that Cilnis requested the CW produce original copies of the contracts and that he personally witness their destruction. In addition to the five contracts, Cilnis prepared for and had the CW sign an Attestation denying any involvement with him or helping his company obtain the mining rights in Guinea.

Protocol-1

This contract was dated June 20, 2007, and was between the CW and the Guinean subsidiary of the Entity. For her assistance in obtaining permits, the Entity’s Guinean subsidiary would transfer 5% of its shares to a company controlled by the  CW.

Protocol-2

This contract was dated February 28, 2008 and stated that the Entity “commits to giving 5% of the shares of stock of blocks 1 and 2 of Simadou [the mining concession]” to the CW.

Commission Contract

This contract is dated February 27, 2008. In this agreement, the CW’s company commits to “taking all necessary steps from the authorities the signature for the obtaining of the aforementioned blocks”. For this consideration, a $2MM would be made available for the distribution “among persons of good will who may have contributed to facilitating the granting of the blocks”.

Engagement Letter

This is an undated document. In it the Guinean subsidiary proposed to allow the CW up to a 5% shareholding stake in the Guinean subsidiary. There would be a further transfer of 17.65% of the capital by the Guinean subsidiary as well.

August 3, 2010 Contract

This is a contract dated August 3, 2010. In it the Entity’s holding company agrees to pay to the CW the additional amount of $5MM, in two tranches. The first payment of $2.5MM was to be paid at contract execution and the second to be paid 24 months later. Interestingly, the Compliant stated that this contract “required the CW to conceal the CW’s relationship with the Holding Company, reciting that the CW and the CW’s company ‘commit herewith to make no use of the document, in any manner, directly or indirectly, and not to use this document against the [Holding Company] and/or its partner and/or its associates in Guinea or elsewhere.’”

The Attestation

In addition to the documents that Cilnis sought to have destroyed, he prepared and presented to the CW a document entitled “Attestation”. The CW signed this Attestation and copies were made. According to the Complaint, the Attestation was drafted as if it was written and prepared by the CW herself and in it were the following statements:

1. I have never signed a single contract with the Entity, neither directly or indirectly through anyone else.
2. I never intervened with Guinean officials in favor of [the Entity]…
3. I have never received any money from [the Entity], neither directly or indirectly… [The Entity] never gave…any money, neither directly to me nor to anyone else on by behalf. They did not promise to pay me anything, neither to me, nor to anyone else on my behalf.

Destruction of Documents

The Complaint specified that Cilnis told the CW several times that the documents need to be destroyed urgently. Moreover, “they need to find a place to burn all of them, adding that they cannot do it at the CW’s house.” When the CW suggested that she could destroy the documents, Cilnis repeated that “Cilnis was instructed to see it happen in person and that Cilnis cannot lie when he is asked whether he, Cilnis, saw the papers being burned.”

For the destruction of the documents, the Complaint notes that Cilnis offered the CW $1MM. $200,000 of this total would be paid now and “$800,000 at a later date.” Further, Cilnis is alleged to have proposed an additional $5MM fee “if the group is not forced out” of Guinea but that the CW will receive “the $1million regardless of the outcome.”

I guess Cilnis has nothing on John Connally who once advised President Nixon to burn the White House tapes on the front lawn of the White House, in the full view of the American people. The WSJ article reported that BSGR said that “allegations of any improper conduct relating to how the company obtained a mining license in Guinea “are entirely baseless and motivated by an ongoing campaign to seize the assets” of the company.” Then BSGR claimed it is the real victim here as it has become “the victim of extortion attempts by individuals who are seeking economic gains.” Further, “The modus operandi of these attempts involved at times the use of forged documentation, blackmail and harassment.” No word from BSGR if anyone has asked them to burn documents.

Like I said, in the world of FCPA enforcement, sometimes truth is stranger than fiction.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

And Then There Was One – Willbros Related FCPA Enforcement Continues

Last week, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the sentencing of Paul G. Novak, a former consultant of Willbros International, Inc., a subsidiary of the Houston based Willbros Group, for his role in a conspiracy to pay more than $6 million in bribes to government officials of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and officials from a Nigerian political party. According to the DOJ Press Release announcing the sentencing, “Novak pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and one substantive count of violating the FCPA. Novak admitted that from approximately late-2003 to March 2005, he conspired with others to make a series of corrupt payments”. Novak was sentenced to serve 15 months in a federal prison.

The sentencing continues the long running saga of the company over efforts by Willbros, Novak, certain employees and others to make a series of corrupt payments totaling more than $6 million to various Nigerian government officials and officials from a Nigerian political party to assist Willbros and its joint venture partner, a construction company based in Mannheim, Germany, in obtaining and retaining the Eastern Gas Gathering System (EGGS) Project, which was valued at approximately $387 million. The EGGS project was a natural gas pipeline system in the Niger Delta designed to relieve existing pipeline capacity constraints.

The company itself paid $32.3 million and entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) to settle civil and criminal FCPA charges with the DOJ and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). According to the FCPA Blog, in a post entitled “Willbros Resolves FCPA Offenses”, “the FCPA violations involved former operations in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nigeria.” The DOJ’s “information included substantive violations of the FCPA’s antibribery provisions and violations of the books and records provisions. All twelve counts relate to operations in Nigeria, Ecuador and Bolivia during the period from 1996 to 2005. The SEC’s complaint alleged civil violations of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act, the antibribery provisions, and the reporting, books and records and internal controls provisions.” The company paid $22 million to settle the DOJ’s criminal case and $10.3 million relating to the SEC’s civil enforcement action. The company agreed to a three-year DPA with the DOJ and had a corporate monitor.  The company successfully completed its DPA, which was discharged in 2012.

In addition to the charges against the company and Novak, three former Willbros employees were also indicted over the FCPA violations. According another post by the FCPA Blog, entitled “Prison for Ex-Willbros Execs”, two of these former Willbros executives received and successfully served prison time. “Jim Bob Brown, 48, was sentenced in federal court in Houston to one year and one day in prison and fined $17,500; Jason Edward Steph, 40, was sentenced to 15 months and fined $2,000. Steph, who once served as general manager of on-shore operations for Willbros International, pleaded guilty in November 2007. He said in his plea that in 2005 he, Brown, and others arranged to pay about $1.8 million in cash to Nigerian officials. Brown pleaded guilty in September 2006 to conspiracy to violate the FCPA.” This brings the sentencing for Willbros related FCPA violations up to date as the following:

Sentencing Box Score

Entity or Person	Fine	DPA Time and Resolution	Jail Time
Willbros Group, Inc. and Willbros International Inc.	$22MM to DOJ$10.30MM to SEC	3 year DPA with Monitor. Successfully completed.
Jim Bob Brown	$17,500.00		12 months and one day in prison, 2 years supervised release.
Jason Steph	$2,000.00		15 months in prison, 2 years supervised release
Paul Novak	$1MM		15 months in prison, 2 years of supervised release

A third former company executive, James Tillery, had been previously charged with conspiring to bribe Nigerian and Ecuadorian government officials to obtain and retain gas pipeline construction and rehabilitation business from state-owned oil companies in those countries. Tillery was indicted for one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA, two counts of violating the FCPA in connection with the authorization of specific corrupt payments to officials in Nigeria and Ecuador. Tillery was alleged to be a Willbros International employee and executive from the 1980s through January 2005. From 2002 until January 2005, he served as executive vice president and later as president of the company. Novak was an employee in the mid-1990s and later worked as an oil and gas consultant in Nigeria, purporting to provide consulting services to companies in that field.

Interestingly, in 2010, Tillery was arrested in Lagos, Nigeria. As reported by the FCPA Blog, in a post entitled “Tillery’s Extraction”, he was “seized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in Lagos and is being held by American authorities.” However, at some point later, the process was ceased due to intervention by the “Nigerian high court had halted the extradition at least until the end of the month because due process wasn’t followed.” In yet another twist to the saga, Tillery had apparently renounced his US citizenship and “had since naturalized as a Nigerian.” The FCPA Blog quoted a report from a Nigerian press source who said “normal extradition procedures weren’t followed and characterized Tillery’s arrest as an “extraction” and a “forceful extradition.””

So, now there is one left from the Willbros FCPA enforcement action, that being James Tillery. The Willbros bribery scheme was one of the most comprehensive and certainly one of the early cases in the post-2004 increase in growth regarding enforcement actions. It will be interesting to see if Tillery ever has to answer the charges brought against him in connection with this matter.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

FCPA Prosecutions Against Individuals? Check Out April

One of the oft-heard criticisms of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the lack of individual prosecutions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). That may well be on its way to changing as April 2013 may become known as “FCPA Individuals Month” for the charges and enforcement actions brought against various individuals for FCPA violations. The DOJ and SEC used several different types of enforcement actions, both criminal and civil, against a variety of individuals over the past month.

I.                   BizJet

One group of charges was the four enforcement actions involving individuals concerning BizJet. The lineup of those three BizJet executives and one employee involved in these enforcement actions is as follows:

1. Bernd Kowalewski – President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO);
2. Peter DuBois – Vice President of Sales and Marketing;
3. Neal Uhl – Vice President of Finance; and
4. Jald Jensen – Regional Sales Manager

Defendants DuBois and Uhl pled guilty in January, 2012 and had their pleas unsealed on April 5, 2013. Defendants Kowalewski and Jensen were charged by Criminal Indictment, also in January, 2012, but are still at large today. The DOJ Press Release states that “The two remaining defendants are believed to remain abroad.” The bribes were characterized as “commission payments” and “referral fees” on the company’s books and records. Payments were made from both international and company bank accounts here in the United States. In other words, this was as clear a case of a pattern and practice of bribery, authorized by the highest levels of the company, paid through US banks and attempts to hide all of the above by mis-characterizing them in the company’s books and records.

II.                Alstom

Two individuals from the company later identified as Alstom were charged or had their charges made public in April. According to a DOJ Press Release dated April 16, 2013, “Frederic Pierucci, 45, a current company executive [of Alstom] who previously held the position of vice president of global sales for the Connecticut-based U.S. subsidiary, was charged in an indictment unsealed yesterday in the District of Connecticut with conspiring to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and to launder money, as well as substantive charges of violating the FCPA and money laundering.” Pierucci was arrested. A former Alstom executive, “David Rothschild, 67, of Massachusetts, a former vice president of sales for the Connecticut-based U.S. subsidiary, pleaded guilty on Nov. 2, 2012, to a criminal information charging one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA.”

In a post by the FCPA Professor, entitled “Current And Former Alstom Employees Charged In Connection With Payments In Indonesia”, he stated the two were involved with the following: “The conduct at issue concerned the Tarahan coal-fired steam power plant project in Indonesia.” Both were charged around the same set of facts. Pierucci and Rothschild, together with others, paid bribes to officials in Indonesia, including a member of Indonesian Parliament and high-ranking members of Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN), the state-owned and state-controlled electricity company, in exchange for those officials’ assistance in securing a contract for the company to provide power-related services for the citizens of Indonesia, known as the Tarahan project. The charges allege that, in order to conceal the bribes, the defendants retained two consultants purportedly to provide legitimate consulting services on behalf of the power company and its subsidiaries in connection with the Tarahan project. In reality, however, the primary purpose for hiring the consultants was allegedly to use the consultants to pay bribes to Indonesian officials.

The Pierucci Indictment specified the following Counts for violations of the FCPA involving the first consultant.

Count	Date	Means and Instrumentalities of Interstate and International Commerce
Two	11/16/2005	Wire transfer in the amount of $200,064 from Power Company’s Connecticut bank account to Consultant A’s bank account in Maryland for the purpose of bribing Official 1.
Three	1/4/2006	Wire transfer in the amount of $200,064 from Power Company’s Connecticut bank account to Consultant A’s bank account in Maryland for the purpose of bribing Official 1.
Four	3/7/2007	Wire transfer in the amount of $200,064 from Power Company’s Connecticut bank account to Consultant A’s bank account in Maryland for the purpose of bribing Official 1.
Five	10/5/2009	Wire transfer in the amount of $66,688 from Power Company’s Connecticut bank account to Consultant A’s bank account in Maryland for the purpose of bribing Official 1.

III.             Frederic Cilnis

In a blog post, entitled “The Danger of FCPA “Proactive” Investigations”, Mike Volkov stated “At the recent Dow Jones Compliance Symposium in Washington, D.C., an FBI official warned the attendees that the Shot Show debacle would not deter law enforcement from using proactive investigations techniques. It was a stark warning because it was realized in less than thirty days.” This was dramatically demonstrated with the arrest of Frederic Cilnis.

An article in the Financial Times (FT), entitled “FBI sting says that ‘agent’ sought to have mining contracts destroyed”, it was reported that “Frederic Cilins held the last of a series of meetings with the widow of an African dictator to discuss what she was going to do with some sensitive documents.” What were these ‘sensitive documents’? The FT reported that it had seen “some of the documents” and “According to one copy of a contract seen by the FT” it appeared to agree to pay $4m the wife of the then President of the country to help to secure rights to a mining concession in Guinea. Unfortunately for Cilins he “did not realise that the woman he was talking to was wearing a wire and that FBI agents were watching. As he left the meeting, the agents arrested him carrying envelopes filled with $20,000 in cash, the indictment says. That was a pittance compared with the $5m he was taped offering the dictator’s widow during what US authorities say was a two-month campaign to tamper with a witness and destroy records.”

IV.              Uriel Sharef

Uriel Sharef was a former officer and board member of Siemens. According to the SEC Press Release announcing resolution of his matter, “The settlement resolves the Commission’s civil action against Sharef for his role in Siemens’ decade-long bribery scheme to retain a $1 billion government contract to produce national identity cards for Argentine citizens. The final judgment, to which Sharef consented, enjoins him from violating the anti-bribery and related internal controls provisions of the FCPA and orders him to pay a $275,000 civil penalty, the second highest penalty assessed against an individual in an FCPA case.”

The FCPA Professor, in his April 19 Friday Roundup, posed the following “The burning question of course is whether the SEC would have prevailed against Sharef if he put the SEC to its burden of proof. As highlighted in this previous post, Sharef’s co-defendant, Herbert Steffen, did just that and in February Judge Shira Scheindlin dismissed the SEC’s complaint against Steffen finding that personal jurisdiction over Steffen exceeded the limits of due process.” However, the SEC Press Release seemed to anticipate this query by stating that “Sharef met with payment intermediaries in the United States and agreed to pay $27 million in bribes to Argentine officials. Sharef also enlisted subordinates to conceal the payments by circumventing Siemens’ internal accounting controls.”

In the month of April, the US enforcement agencies certainly seemed to be answering the questions about bringing FCPA criminal charges and civil complaints against individuals. You may quibble about the sentences handed out in the BizJet case but that is another discussion for another day. For those who may have thought that the use of wire taps, cooperating witness and other proactive federal law enforcement techniques may not be used in FCPA cases after the Gun Sting cases dismissals, such techniques were used in both the BizJet matters and the action against Cilnis. Lastly, one phone call to the US may not create in personam jurisdiction but if you come to the US and engage in conduct which violates the FCPA, personal jurisdiction will attach.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

Actions Taken During a FCPA Enforcement Action-Lessons from Parker Drilling and Ralph Lauren

In the two most recent corporate Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement actions, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to communicate not only what they believe constitutes a best practices compliance program but equally importantly what actions a company can engage in which will significantly reduce a company’s overall fine and penalty. These matters involved Parker Drilling Company (Parker Drilling) and the Ralph Lauren Corporation. Parker Drilling received a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) and Ralph Lauren sustained a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA).

Fines and Penalties

Parker Drilling’s conduct earned it an “approximately 20 percent reduction off the bottom of the fine range” which suggested a fine of between $14.7MM to $29.4MM. The final DOJ fine was  $11,760,000. The company also agreed to pay disgorgement of $3,050MM plus pre-judgment interest of $1,040,818, to the SEC. Ralph Lauren  agreed to pay $882K to the DOJ and $593K in disgorgement and $141K in pre-judgment interest to the SEC.

Self-Disclosure

In the DOJ/SEC FCPA Guidance released last year one of the clear messages was that companies should self-disclose any potential FCPA violations. While this question is debated by the FCPA intelligentsia and in compliance/legal department across the country, one of the key takeaways is that companies should self-disclose. In the section on Declinations, which included stripped out information on six companies which received declinations to prosecute, one of the common factors was that each company self-disclosed its FCPA violation.

In the Ralph Lauren NPA, the DOJ stated that one of the factors which led to the NPA was “the Company’s timely, voluntary, and complete disclosure of the conduct”. This is contrasted with the Parker Drilling DPA, where there was no information listed regarding self-disclosure. In its Press Release announcing the resolution of the Parker Drilling matter, the DOJ stated it “stemmed from the DOJ’s Panalpina-related investigations.”

What Did You Do When You Found Out About It? Prong II – Extensive Cooperation

Both companies provided extensive cooperation to the DOJ and SEC throughout the pendency of their respective investigations. In the Ralph Lauren NPA, the DOJ detailed the company’s conduct by stating that “the Company’s extensive, thorough, and real-time cooperation with the Department, including conducting an internal investigation, voluntarily making employees available for interviews, making voluntary document disclosures, conducting a world-wide risk assessment, and making multiple presentations to the Department on the status and findings of the internal investigation and the risk assessment”. In the Parker Drilling DPA, the DOJ stated that “the Company’s cooperation, including conducting an extensive internal investigation and collecting, analyzing, and organizing voluminous evidence and information for the Department”.

What Did You Do When You Found Out About It? Prong I – Remediation

Implementing one of the prongs of McNulty’s Maxim No. 3, both companies engaged in extensive remediation during the investigations. The Ralph Lauren NPA stated that “the Company’s early and extensive remedial efforts already undertaken – including conducting extensive FCPA training for employees world-wide, enhancing the Company’s existing FCPA policy, implementing an enhanced gift policy as well as other enhanced compliance, control and anti-corruption policies and procedures, enhancing its due diligence protocol for third-party agents, terminating culpable employees and a third-party agent, instituting a whistleblower hotline, and hiring a designated corporate compliance attorney – and to be undertaken, including enhancements to its compliance program as described in Attachment B (Corporate Compliance Program);”.

Parker Drilling also engaged in extensive work to create a gold standard compliance program all the while undergoing its own internal investigation. According to the DPA, “the Company has engaged in extensive remediation, including ending its business relationships with officers, employees, or agents primarily responsible for the corrupt payments, enhancing its due diligence protocol for third-party agents and consultants, increasing training and testing requirements, and instituting heightened review of proposals and other transactional documents for all the Company’s contracts.” Parker Drilling also hired “a fulltime Chief Compliance Officer and Counsel who reports to the Chief Executive Officer and Audit Committee, as well as staff to assist the Chief Compliance Officer and Counsel.” The Company worked to strengthen its internal controls. Lastly, and I hope that you remember this from the Morgan Stanley Declination, Parker Drilling implemented “a compliance-awareness improvement initiative and program that includes issuance of periodic anti-bribery compliance alerts.”

Self-Monitoring and Reporting to the DOJ

In an area that is sometimes overlooked in both DPAs and NPAs, both companies agreed to self-monitor the effectiveness of their compliance programs and make no less than annual reports to the DOJ. In its three-year DPA, Parker Drilling agreed to monitor and “that it will report to the Department periodically, at no less than twelve-month intervals during a three-year term, regarding remediation and implementation of the compliance program and internal controls, policies, and procedures”. In its two year NPA, Ralph Lauren agreed to monitor and “report to the Department periodically, at no less than twelve-month intervals during a two-year term, regarding remediation and implementation of the compliance program and internal controls, policies, and procedures.”

Both the DOJ and SEC continue to communicate to the compliance practitioner what they expect from companies in the way of a best practices compliance program and what a company should do if they discover a potential FCPA violation. These communications, through enforcement actions, DPAs, NPAs and Declinations, are consistent with the information provided by the DOJ/SEC in the FCPA Guidance. Both of these enforcement actions demonstrate that if a company gets ahead of the curve, it can significantly lessen its overall penalty and pain.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

Using Bribery and Corruption to Steal Business – A Thyestean Feast?

Not much beats the ancient Greek House of Atreus for dramatic gore: infanticide, patricide, fratricide, filicide, matricide, cannibalism, incest and about every other horror which can befall one family occurs in the various stories of this, the ruling family of Mycenae. One of the most horrific stories involves the brothers Atreus and Thyestes. After Atreus steals the throne from Thyestes, Thyestes seeks his revenge by sleeping with Atreus’ wife Aerope. Atreus then invites Thyestes to a reconciliation banquet where he serves the roasted heads of Atreus’ two sons on platters as the main course. Atreus then puts a curse on Atreus and all his offspring, which lasted throughout Greek antiquity (i.e. longer than the Curse of the Bambino or Curse of the Billy Goat). To this day a Thyestean Feast is synonymous as cannibalistic feast. In other words, at what cost did you really prevail?

I thought about the above myth in the context of the arrest of two articles I wrote about yesterday which appeared in the Weekend Edition of the Financial Times (FT) about the arrest of Frederic Cilins, a French citizen, for seeking to obstruct a federal grand jury investigation about alleged Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violations. The two articles were “Contracts link BSGR to alleged bribes” (mine rights article) and “FBI sting says that ‘agent’ sought to have mining contracts destroyed” (FBI sting article). Both articles were by the same triumvirate of FT reporters, Tom Burgis, Misha Glenny and Cynthia O’Murchu.

To recap, the articles revolved around allegations that “The resources arm of Beny Steinmetz Group agreed to pay $2m to the wife of an African president to help it secure rights to one of the world’s richest untapped mineral deposits, according to documents seen by the Financial Times”. These payments were allegedly memorialized in “Copies of two contracts from 2007 and 2008, apparently signed by BSGR’s representatives in the mineral-rich west African nation of Guinea, set out agreements for the company to make payments and transfer shares to Mamadie Touré, wife of the then president Lansana Conté.”

The FBI sting article also revealed a bit more of the history of the underlying mining rights at issue. The Australian company Rio Tinto “held the rights to the whole of Simandou, a mountain range groaning with iron ore in Guinea’s remote interior, for a decade.” But in August, 2008, the Conté government withdrew the mining group’s concession, “saying it had taken too long to develop a mine.” In December 2008, just days before the dictator’s death, the then Guinean government assigned over half the rights of Simandou to BSGR. The FT also reported that “One African mining veteran described BSGR’s sale as the “best private mining deal of our generation.”” After spending $160m developing its assets in Guinea, 18 months later, in April 2010, BSGR sold a 51% stake of its Guinean venture to Vale of Brazil for $2.5bn.

The FT also reported that after the transfer of mining rights from Rio Tinto to BSGR, another mining entity, “Vale of Brazil, the world’s biggest iron ore miner, bought a 51 per cent in BSR’s Guinea assets in April 2010. Late last year, as a Guinean government committee levelled corruption allegations against BSGR, Vale put the Simandou project on hold. Earlier this month, it suspended payments on the $2.5bn it agreed to pay for its stake.”

Now all of the above are only allegations at this point and BSGR has clearly stated that it believes the allegations have no merit. As the mining rights article noted, “BSGR said in a statement to the FT on Friday: “Allegations of fraud in obtaining our mining rights in Guinea are entirely baseless. We are confident that BSGR’s position in Guinea will be fully vindicated.””

But under such a scenario, what might be the cost to be to a company which engages in such conduct. Fortunately we have somewhat evolved past the blood feuds that the ancients Greeks engaged in were they wronged. We have developed the litigation system to help redress violations of law. In an interesting note, even this was foreshadowed in the Greek myths where the final play about the House of Atreus involved a trial rather than blood revenge.

In the above scenario, what might be some of the legal rights of the parties listed? In an article entitled “Use of the FCPA in State-Law Unfair Competition Cases”, Edward Little, Jr. explored the question of whether the FCPA can serve as the basis as a predicate act for civil liability under state unfair competition laws. He makes a powerful case that such lawsuits may be the next frontier for FCPA cases.

Little next noted that the violation of the FCPA may provide a basis for civil liability under federal or state anti-trust laws, “especially when it is proved that the foreign bribery had an anti-competitive effect within the United States.” Little pointed to the example of two Phillip Morris subsidiaries that bribed officials in several South American countries “to obtain price controls on tobacco.” There was also a recent FCPA/anti-trust enforcement action against Bridgestone which may provide such a trigger.

Little turned to state unfair competition laws which, if based on the Revised Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, can “provide severe penalties for violations of federal and state laws when committed in trade or commerce.” These penalties can include treble damages and attorneys’ fees. He pointed to a currently pending litigation matter styled “Newmarket Corp. v. Innospec, Inc. Civil Action No. 10-503-HEH (E.D Va.)” in which Newmarket has brought claims under the Sherman Act, the Robinson-Patman Act and the state of Virginia Business Conspiracy Act. This state law makes illegal “combinations of two or more persons for the purpose of willfully and maliciously injuring another in his…business…”

Most states have some type of law which broadly declares that “unfair methods of competition are…unlawful.” If a company admits to guilt under the FCPA the facts of liability are laid out in a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA). There is some discussion of the amount of bribes paid, usually referencing both the monetary value of the contract or other business obtained through the conduct, which laid the predicate for the FCPA violation. Lastly, there is often a specific amount of money identified as profit disgorgement that is remitted to the government. Doesn’t this sound something like “Did the defendant engage in illegal conduct which impacted the plaintiff?” and “If so, what are the plaintiff’s damages?”

As a recovering trial lawyer, I was proud to engage in a profession which can trace its roots back to ancient Greece. As a lawyer, who specializes in the FCPA, I wonder if a company which uses corruption and bribery to steal or even procure a contract or business might find that the cost of obtaining such business is too high if they are forced to defend themselves in a civil trial and pay out the amount of damages that their conduct caused. Indeed, might it even be the modern day equivalent to a Thyestean Feast?

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

What’s the Message from BizJet? Self-Disclose and Cooperate

Over the past week there has been a plethora of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement actions released. One group was the four enforcement actions involving individuals concerning BizJet. While I cannot say that the enforcement actions against the individuals were stunning, perhaps what was surprising were the penalties that two of the individual received. The lineup of those three BizJet executives and one employee involved in these enforcement actions is as follows:

1. Bernd Kowalewski – President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO);
2. Peter DuBois – Vice President of Sales and Marketing;
3. Neal Uhl – Vice President of Finance; and
4. Jald Jensen – Regional Sales Manager

Defendants DuBois and Uhl pled guilty in January, 2012 and had their pleas unsealed on April 5, 2013. Defendants Kowalewski and Jensen were charged by Criminal Indictment, also in January, 2012 but are still at large today. The Department of Justice (DOJ) Press Release states that “The two remaining defendants are believed to remain abroad.”

BizJet Bribery Box Score

From the previously released Bizjet Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) and the recently released documents, I have updated the “BizJet Bribery Box Score”.

BizJet Executive or Employee Named	Payment Made To	Amount of Payment	Others Involved
Jald Jensen	Official 6	Cell Phone and $10K	Peter DuBois and Neal Uhl
Jald Jensen	Official 3	$2K	Peter DuBois
Peter DuBois, Neal Uhl and Jald Jensen	Official 2	$20K
Neal Uhl	Official 2	$30K	Jald Jensen
Peter DuBois	Mexican Federal Police Chief	$10K	Neal Uhl and Jald Jensen
Neal Uhl	Official 5	$18K	Jald Jensen
Jald Jensen	Official 4	$50K
Jald Jensen	Mexican Federal Police	$176	Neal Uhl
Jald Jensen	Official 4	$40K
Jald Jensen	Mexican Federal Police	$210K	Neal Uhl
Jald Jensen	Official 5	$6K	Neal Uhl
Neal Uhl	Official 5	$22K

The above bribes were characterized as “commission payments” and “referral fees” on the company’s books and records. Payments were made from both international and company bank accounts here in the United States. In other words, this was as clear a case of a pattern and practice of bribery, authorized by the highest levels of the company, paid through US banks and attempts to hide all of the above by mis-characterizing them in the company’s books and records.

Penalty Box Score

As bad as the conduct of the BizJet executives and sales manager was – and it was very bad – the thing that stood out in the enforcement actions announced last week was the sentences. So without further ado here is the “Penalty Box Score” for defendants DuBois and Uhl.

Individual	Fine or Disgorgement	Potential Incarceration	Actual Incarceration
Peter DuBois	$159,950	108 to 120 months in jail	8 months home incarceration, 60 month’s probation
Neal Uhl	$10,000	60 months in jail	60 month’s probation

The clear import of the BizJet DPA was that a company can make a comeback in the face of very bad facts. In the BizJet DPA, the calculation of the fine, based upon the factors set out in the US Sentencing Guidelines, ranged between a low of $17.1MM to a high of $34.2MM. The final agreed upon monetary penalty was $11.8MM. This was a significant reduction from the suggested low or high end, or as was noted by the FCPA Blog “BizJet’s reduction was 30% off the bottom of the fine range, and a whopping 65% off the top of the fine range.” Finally, BizJet was able to avoid having an external monitor put in place.

Cooperation is the Key

What led to these sentence reductions? Quite simply the answer is full cooperation with the DOJ. The FCPA Professor stated, in a post entitled “Unsealed Documents In Enforcement Acton Against Former BizJet Executives Reveal A Trove Of Information”, that “As part of his plea agreement, DuBois worked in an undercover capacity for the government. The motion specifically states as follows. “As part of his work in an undercover capacity, Mr. DuBois has recorded conversations with former BizJet executives and other subjects of the government’s ongoing investigation.” Later, the motion to seal states that “public identification of Mr. DuBois as a defendant who likely is cooperating with the government may jeopardize the undercover aspect of the government’s investigation.”

In addition to his work as an undercover operative, the Professor quoted from the DOJ Sentencing Memorandum that “assisted in the investigation from the outset and cooperated fully with the government throughout its investigation. DuBois submitted to multiple interviews by the government and has assisted in every way that the government has asked. DuBois told the truth to the government from the outset and continued to do so up until this very day. DuBois’ cooperation not only assisted the government in connection with its investigation into BizJet, but also led to the investigation of another maintenance, repair, and overhaul company engaged in a similar scheme to pay bribes to government officials overseas.”

With regarding to UHL, the Professor quoted from the DOJ Motion for a Downward Departure as follows, “Uhl “agreed to a voluntary proffer session and, when confronted by the government, admitted to the illegal conduct. Throughout the course of the investigation, Uhl was cooperative and provided truthful information that substantially assisted the government in confronting other co-conspirators and witnesses. Uhl offered to assist in any way that he could.”

In another post, entitled “Where Was the BizJet Board?”, the FCPA Professor noted that the conduct engaged in by BizJet was “egregious” and I would certainly second that, perhaps adding that it was about as bad as it could get in the FCPA world. He goes on to state that “Yet, BizJet was allowed to resolve the enforcement action via a deferred prosecution agreement, meaning that should it abide by the terms and conditions of the agreement, BizJet will never be required to plead guilty to anything.” He went on to pose the question, “If that is the DOJ position, then it must be asked – does corporate criminal liability actually mean anything if a company like BizJet – given the DOJ’s allegations – is not actually criminally prosecuted or required to plead guilty?” He ended his post with the following, “In short, the resolution vehicles the DOJ has created and championed has again lead to a “facade of enforcement” – albeit an instance on the opposite end of the spectrum that I normally highlight.”

I think that there is another way to look at the BizJet enforcement action and the individual enforcement actions against DuBois and Uhl. BizJet self-disclosed to the DOJ, engaged in what the DOJ termed “extraordinary cooperation” and remediated the people and conduct in question. Further, DuBois and Uhl not only offered themselves up but actively worked with and assisted the DOJ in its investigation going forward. If one of the goals of the DOJ is to achieve greater compliance with the FCPA, I think that the BizJet cases is a clear demonstration that if a company has FCPA violations they can self-disclose and be given credit for working very diligently in conjunction with the DOJ to remedy the conduct at issue and move the investigation forward.

I believe the same is true for individuals who have engaged in FCPA violations. If a person provides the same level of cooperation as DuBois and Uhl and the DOJ then prosecutes them to the full extent of the US Sentencing Guidelines, how much cooperation do you think the DOJ will engender going forward once the word gets out in the white collar defense bar?

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

Grand Central Station, Mary Jo White and the End of No-Admission Settlements in SEC Cases?

Last week we celebrated one of the world’s great urban architectural marvels, the London Underground. This week we celebrate one a little closer to home. This week is the 100^th anniversary of Grand Central Station. In an article this week in the New York Times, (NYT), entitled “Looking Out on the Grand Central, and Looking Back on Saving It”, reporter Clyde Haberman interviewed Kent L. Barwick, former Executive Director of the Municipal Art Society, who was instrumental in the fight to save the Station in the 1970s. I knew about the legal fight that the City of New York had put up after its designation of the venerable landmark had been overturned by a state judge. This landmark case went all the way to the US Supreme Court and ended with a victory for the City of New York and the establishment of the right of a municipality to protect the public environment and its history by historic designation. What I did not know about this process was that one of its most active supporters was Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis, who supported the cause with time, money and effort. It was a classic effort of several processes moving forward on several fronts at once which led to this important legal decision and one of the most compelling journeys in landmark preservation.

This article came to mind when I read another article in the NYT, entitled “Make Them Pay (and Confess)” by reporter Gretchen Morgenson, about President Obama’s nomination of Mary Jo White to head the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Morgenson used the nomination of White to argue that the SEC has not been aggressive enough in its prosecution of financial wrongdoing during the first four years of the Obama Administration. She believes that the no-admission settlement is merely a “slap on the wrist” for companies who are guilty of securities violations involving fraud. I believe that this would include Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violations.

One of the techniques that she argues should be used more often and would have greater impact is requiring companies to admit to facts in settlement agreements. As most compliance practitioners know, the SEC has, in the past, allowed companies to settle without admitting or denying the findings which are the basis for the enforcement actions. Generally the SEC has supported this position arguing that by doing so this helps it “avoid costly, time-consuming litigation that would tax already-stretched resources.” In addition to time-consuming trials, there is always the possibility that the SEC could lose at trial. Further, by having quicker settlements, more victims would be getting restitution faster.

But Morgenson argues that a no-admission settlement does not really qualify as a punishment. In addition to having no precedential value going forward, because there are no facts admitted, she maintains that even the financial penalties are meaningless. This is because ultimately the fines and penalties are paid by the shareholders or the company’s insurance carrier. Such situations are “not much of a deterrent.”

Morgenson points out that Preet Bharara, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, who was hired by Mrs. White when she ran the office, “has made it a priority to require admissions from defendants in civil fraud cases” brought by his office. Bharara has stated that “Such admissions are a way to hold defendants accountable, as well as being an important part of the public record.” By public record, Bharara means that plaintiffs can then use those admissions in shareholder derivative actions against corporations in tag along law suits. Do you think that the plaintiffs’ bar will be salivating over that prospect?

Morgenson discussed several reasons for the reluctance of the SEC to require such admissions of fact. The first and foremost is that you have to be ready, willing and able to go to trial. Bharara handles this in the Southern District with the following comment, “We’re not in the business of bluffing. When people know you’re not bluffing, they come to the table.” However, the SEC itself may not have this same attitude. Morgenson notes that “It won’t be easy to change the mind-set at the S.E.C. from one that regularly allows defendants to avoid culpability.” Other federal agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission also allow corporations to settle civil enforcement actions while not admitting to any facts.

Morgenson acknowledges that it will not be easy for the SEC to change its philosophy. Further, defendants will probably fight this change tooth and nail because they know that the cost of any settlement will increase exponentially if they make such admissions. The aforementioned plaintiffs’ bar will be waiting to jump on any corporations which make such settlements. Morgenson quotes William F. Gavin, Secretary of the commonwealth of Massachusetts and its securities regulator, who admitted that negotiating admissions of liability is challenging due to the fact that the cost of settlements will go up. His response, “Well, that’s kind of the idea – you did something wrong, you should be liable. You’re not going to change practices or behavior if there’s no penalty associated with it.”

Federal judges have also begun to question the use of SEC no-admission settlements. There is the quite well known example of Judge Rakoff and his initial rejection of the Citigroup settlement. A couple of other federal judges also initially rejected no-admission settlements but did so on the grounds that there was not enough evidence to enforce an injunction if there was a breach of the settlement by the defendant. Their concerns were addressed and they all eventually signed off on the SEC settlements. Now, however, Judge Richard Leon has rejected a SEC settlement with IBM, for FCPA books and records violations, as Judge Leon wanted IBM to report to the SEC if it sustained a FCPA violation going forward. IBM, with the SEC standing at its side on this point, said that to do so would be “too burdensome.” Judge Leon has set a hearing date of February 4, 2013 for IBM to present evidence of how they plan to collect the data to show that it is too burdensome. If IBM cannot do so, Judge Leon may well not approve the no-admission settlement.

Morgenson clearly wants Mary Jo White to engage in more and greater enforcement of financial fraud cases. She does not speak to FCPA cases specifically so it is not clear on whether her desire would also include FCPA books and records enforcement actions brought by the SEC when there is no criminal case brought by the Department of Justice (DOJ). However, if no-admission enforcement actions are no longer the norm in SEC financial fraud or other securities actions, this will probably also bleed over into FCPA actions. Judge Leon’s challenge to IBM and to the SEC may also portend an increasingly active judiciary which may delve into the substance of any FCPA settlement agreement with the SEC.

So for you New Yorkers out there, or any of you travelling through New York, I would suggest that the next time that you go through Grand Central Station look up with some wonder and awe at one of the true architectural marvels of the city. You may not do so as I did the first time I went through it but still take a few minutes to think that it was headed for the wrecking ball back in the 1970s, scheduled to be replaced by a skyscraper. Morgenson argues that the SEC should become more aggressive in its prosecution of financial fraud and with her prosecutorial background the agency may well be headed that way.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

The FCPA Guidance on the Ten Hallmarks of an Effective Compliance Program

Many commentators are still mining the Department of Justice (DOJ)/Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) publication, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, (the “Guidance”), which was released last November. I continue to find nuggets to provide to the compliance practitioner, as do others. But as we are a Base 10 culture, today I want discuss the 10 points listed as the ‘Hallmarks of Effective Compliance Programs”. They are a change in style, but not content, from the prior 13 point minimum best practices that the DOJ has in the Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) since at least November, 2010 and, indeed, from prior information made available by the DOJ.

I.                   Where Have We Been

Beginning with at least the Metcalfe & Eddy Consent and Undertaking, filed in December, 1999, the DOJ has laid out its thoughts on what should go into a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) anti-corruption compliance program. In the Metcalfe & Eddy Consent and Undertaking, the DOJ laid out ten points of an effective FCPA anti-corruption compliance program. This was modified somewhat in Opinion Release 04-02, which laid out a best practices compliance program in 12 points, where the DOJ reviewed the proposal by an investment group who were acquiring certain companies and assets from ABB Ltd. ABB Vetco Gray Inc. and ABB Vetco Gray (UK) Ltd., two of the entities being acquired, had previously pled guilty to FCPA violations. The investment group desired to protect itself from further liability, to the extent possible, by proposing to the DOJ a comprehensive best practices compliance program. While the DOJ noted that this compliance program was not a shield against future violations, the DOJ would not “intend to take an enforcement action [against the investors] for violations of the FCPA prior to their acquisition from ABB.”

In the Panalpina DPA, issued in November, 2010, the DOJ laid out a 13 point minimum best practices compliance program. This number was changed this past summer when the Data Systems & Solutions LLC (DS&S) DPA was announced. In this enforcement action the DOJ listed 15 points on its minimum best practices FCPA anti-corruption compliance program. Then later in the summer, the DOJ moved to a 9 point compliance program in the Pfizer DPA. Even with all these changes in the number, the substance of each compliance program has remained the same.

II.                Where Are We Now? Hallmarks of Effective Compliance Programs

The Guidance cautions that there is no “one-size-fits-all” compliance program. It recognizes that depending on a variety of factors such as size, type of business, industry and risk profile that a company should determine what is appropriate for its own needs regarding a FCPA compliance program. But the Guidance makes clear that these ten points are “meant to provide insight into the aspects of compliance programs that DOJ and SEC assess”. In other words you should pay attention to these and use this information to assess your own compliance regime.

1. Commitment from Senior Management and a Clearly Articulated Policy Against Corruption. It all starts with tone at the top. But more than simply ‘talk-the-talk’ company leadership must ‘walk-the-walk’ and lead by example. Both the DOJ and SEC look to see if a company has a “culture of compliance”. More than a paper program is required, it must have real teeth and it must be put into action, all of which is led by senior management. The Guidance states that “A strong ethical culture directly supports a strong compliance program. By adhering to ethical standards, senior managers will inspire middle managers to reinforce those standards.” This prong ends by stating that the DOJ and SEC will “evaluate whether senior management has clearly articulated company standards, communicated them in unambiguous terms, adhered to them scrupulously, and disseminated them throughout the organization.”
2. Code of Conduct and Compliance Policies and Procedures. The Code of Conduct has long been seen as the foundation of a company’s overall compliance program and the Guidance acknowledges this fact. But a Code of Conduct and a company’s compliance policies need to be clear and concise. The Guidance makes clear that if a company has a large employee base that is not fluent in English such documents need to be translated into the native language of those employees. A company also needs to have appropriate internal controls based upon the risks that a company has assessed for its business model. Some of the risks a company should assess include “the nature and extent of transactions with foreign governments, including payments to foreign officials; use of third parties; gifts, travel, and entertainment expenses; charitable and political donations; and facilitating and expediting payments.”
3. Oversight, Autonomy, and Resources. This section starts with a discussion on whether a company has assigned a senior level executive to oversee and implement a company’s compliance program. Not only must a company assign such a person with appropriate authority but that person, and the overall compliance function, must have “sufficient resources to ensure that the company’s compliance program is implemented effectively.” Additionally, the compliance function should report to the company’s Board of Directors or an appropriate committee of the Board such as the Audit Committee. Overall the DOJ and SEC will “consider whether the company devoted adequate staffing and resources to the compliance program given the size, structure, and risk profile of the business.”
4. Risk Assessment. The Guidance states that “assessment of risk is fundamental to developing a strong compliance program”. Indeed, if there is one over-riding theme in the Guidance it is that a company should assess its risks in all areas of its business. The Guidance lists factors that a company should consider in any risk assessment. They are “the country and industry sector, the business opportunity, potential business partners, level of involvement with governments, amount of government regulation and oversight, and exposure to customs and immigration in conducting business affairs.” The Guidance is also quite clear that when the DOJ and SEC look at a company’s overall compliance program, they “take into account whether and to what degree a company analyzes and addresses the particular risks it faces.”
5. Training and Continuing Advice. Communication of a compliance program is a cornerstone of any anti-corruption compliance program. The Guidance specifies that both the “DOJ and SEC will evaluate whether a company has taken steps to ensure that relevant policies and procedures have been communicated throughout the organization, including through periodic training and certification for all directors, officers, relevant employees, and, where appropriate, agents and business partners.” The training should be risk based so that those high risk employees and third party business partners receive an appropriate level of training. A company should also devote appropriate resources to providing its employees with guidance and advice on how to comply with their own compliance program on an ongoing basis.
6. Incentives and Disciplinary Measures. This involves both the carrot and the stick. Initially the Guidance notes that a company’s compliance program should apply from “the board room to the supply room – no one should be beyond its reach.” There should be appropriate discipline in place and administered for any violation of the FCPA or a company’s compliance program. Additionally, the “DOJ and SEC recognize that positive incentives can also drive compliant behavior. These incentives can take many forms such as personnel evaluations and promotions, rewards for improving and developing a company’s compliance program, and rewards for ethics and compliance leadership.” These incentives can take the form of a part of senior management’s bonuses or simply recognition on the shop floor.
7. Third-Party Due Diligence and Payments. Here the Guidance focuses on the ongoing problem area of third parties. The Guidance says that companies must engage in risk based due diligence to understand the “qualifications and associations of its third-party partners, including its business reputation, and relationship, if any, with foreign officials.” Next a company should articulate a business rationale for the use of the third party. This would include an evaluation of the payment arrangement to ascertain that the compensation is reasonable and will not be used as a basis for corrupt payments. Lastly, there should be ongoing monitoring of third parties.
8. Confidential Reporting and Internal Investigation. This means more than simply a hotline. The Guidance suggests that anonymous reporting, and perhaps even a company ombudsman, might be appropriate to have in place for employees to report allegations of corruption or violations of the FCPA. Furthermore, it is just as important what a company does after an allegation is made. The Guidance states, “once an allegation is made, companies should have in place an efficient, reliable, and properly funded process for investigating the allegation and documenting the company’s response, including any disciplinary or remediation measures taken.” The final message is what did you learn from the allegation and investigation and did you apply it in your company?
9. Continuous Improvement: Periodic Testing and Review. As noted in the Guidance, “compliance programs that do not just exist on paper but are followed in practice will inevitably uncover compliance weaknesses and require enhancements. Consequently, DOJ and SEC evaluate whether companies regularly review and improve their compliance programs and not allow them to become stale.” The DOJ/SEC expects that a company will review and test its compliance controls and “think critically” about its own weaknesses and risk areas. Internal controls should also be periodically tested through targeted audits.
10. Mergers and Acquisitions. Pre-Acquisition Due Diligence and Post-Acquisition Integration. Here the DOJ and SEC spell out what it expects in not only the post-acquisition integration phase but also in the pre-acquisition phase. This pre-acquisition information is not something that most companies had previously focused on. Basically, a company should attempt to perform as much substantive compliance due diligence that it can do before it purchases a company. After the deal is closed, an acquiring entity needs to perform a FCPA audit, train all senior management and risk employees in the purchased company and integrate the acquired entity into its compliance regime.

As I commented earlier in this article, the DOJ and SEC have communicated what they believe are the important parts of a risk based, anti-corruption compliance program for many years. I do not think that a compliance defense could be set out any more succinctly. However, I do like things set out in Base 10 and the “Hallmarks of Effective Compliance Programs” is an excellent compilation of where we are and what you need in place to go forward. I recommend this as a good a starting point for any compliance practitioner to implement a new compliance program or to evaluate the state of an ongoing compliance regime so assess your company’s risks and use these hallmarks as a basis to move forward.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

Internal Audit Review of Charitable Donations Under the FCPA

When is a rose not a rose? When it is a charitable donation not made for philanthropic purposes and it violates the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). I thought about that concept when reviewing the Eli Lilly and Company (Lilly) FCPA enforcement action brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) late last month. The Lilly enforcement action discussed a bribery scheme utilized by Lilly in Poland. The scheme and FCPA violations mirrored an earlier FCPA enforcement action, also brought by the SEC as a civil matter, rather than by the Department of Justice (DOJ) as a criminal matter, against another US entity Schering-Plough, for making charitable donations in Poland which violated the FCPA. One of the remarkable things about both of these enforcement actions, brought almost eight years apart, was that they involved improper payments to the same Polish charitable foundation to wrongfully influence the same Polish government official to purchase products from both of these companies.

I.                   The Bribery Schemes

Both companies were involved in negotiations for the sale of products with the Director of the Silesian Health Fund (Health Fund). He had also established a charitable foundation, the Chudow Foundation to engage in restoration of ancient castles in Poland. Both companies made donations to the Chudow Foundation at or near the time decisions were made regarding the purchase of their respective products by the Health Fund. The FCPA books and records violations for the donations stated that they were all mischaracterized on the respective company’s books. The donations were made by each company with the description for the donations as follows:

LILLY BOX SCORE OF DONATIONS MADE TO CHUDOW FOUNDATION

	Date	Amount of Donation	Listed Reason for Donation
1	6/21/2000	$2,730	Purchase of computers
2	11/13/2000	$1,855	To support the foundation in its goal to develop activities in [Chudow Castle]. It was also noted that the ‘value of the request’ was indirect support of educational efforts of foundation settled by Silesian [Health Fund]
3	5/22/2001	$8,019	Rental of castle for conferences
4	11/05/2001	$2,438	Rental of castle for conferences
5	3/27/2002	$7,779	Rental of castle for conferences
6	6/14/2002	$7,434	Rental of castle for conferences
7	11/20/2002	$5,112	Rental of castle for conferences
8	1/29/2003	$2,622	Rental of castle for conferences
	Total	$37,989

Although all of these donations were approved by a team within Lilly, the “Medical Grant Committee [MGC]”, who reviewed the request for such donations, the MGC’s approval was “largely based on the justification and description in the submitted paperwork.” While Requests 1 & 2 may have had tangential value to the stated purpose of the Chudow Foundation to restore castles in Poland, even Request 3 was clearly a quid pro quo as an action to obtain business. Just as clearly, ‘rental of castle’ is not a charitable donation but an expenditure, even with that understanding, the SEC Complaint noted that Lilly held no conferences at any castles so it was an outright misrepresentation.

SCHERING-PLOUGH BOX SCORE OF DONATIONS MADE TO CHUDOW FOUNDATION

	Date	Amount of Donation	Listed Reason for Donation
1	2/23/1999	$777	Covering fight against viral hepatitis
2	3/17/2000	$4,909	Support of health campaign within county of Gliwice
3	7/19/2000	$8,065	Financing second stage of health prevention campaign in Gliwice
4	11/8/2000	$8,766	Financing for the Foundation
5	12/20/2000	$9,292	Financing second stage of research
6	3/19/2001	$4,340	Financing lung cancer prevention program
7	3/22/2001	$4,854	Financing screening examinations to detect skin cancer
8	4/25/2001	$4,958	Support of lung cancer prevention program
9	6/4/2001	$5,019	Support of lung cancer prevention program
10	10/29/2001	$4,878	Support of a coronary disease prevention program and promote the image of the company in the medical community
11	12/18/2001	$10,067	Support of an anti-chain smoking health program and promote the company as one that cares about the people of Silesia
12	12/19/2001	$5,067	Financing of Foundation
13	3/25/2002	$4,868	Support actions of Foundation in preventing infectious diseases of the liver
	Total	$75,860

The Schering-Plough SEC Complaint noted that the company Manager involved in the payment scheme, “provided false medical justifications for most of the payments on the documents that he submitted to the company’s finance department.” Additionally, he structured the payments so that they were at or below his approval limit so that he did not have to ask for permission to make the improper payments. The Manager in question viewed the donations as “dues that were required to be paid for assistance from the Director.”

II.                The Red Flags for Charitable Donation

 a.     Schering-Plough

What were the factors which should become red flags for the review of charitable donations under the FCPA? The Schering-Plough SEC Complaint listed several items which it deemed indicia of red flags.

1.      No due diligence. The first is that no due diligence was performed on the charity to identify the Director of the Silesian Health Fund as the founder or his role in the Chudow Foundation.

2.      Donations not related to health care. While the company permitted donations to healthcare related programs there was no follow up to determine the purposes or uses of the donated funds.

3.      Outside normal range of donation. The next red flag was that the donations made to this single charitable foundation approximately 40% of the company’s promotional budget in 2000 and 20% in 2001.

4.      Disproportionate sales. The company’s sales increased disproportionately compared with its own sales of the same products in other areas of Poland. Up to 53% of one product was sold in the region run by the Director of the Silesian Health Fund.

b.  Lilly

The Lilly SEC Complaint listed several items which it deemed indicia of red flags.

1.      No due diligence. Once again there was no due diligence performed on the charity to identify the Director of the Silesian Health Fund as the founder or his role in the Chudow Foundation.

2.      Donations not related to health care. Unlike Schering-Plough, the reasons listed for the charitable donations did not relate to health care. Moreover, they were approved by a Lilly committee specifically tasked with reviewing such requests failed to investigate beyond the submitted paperwork, which was apparently not correct.

3.      Outside normal range of donation. The SEC Complaint quoted an email from a Lilly manager who said that he had decided to commit 70-75% of the [charitable donation] budget and the Director of the Silesian Health Fund was given a “free hand to manage the Lilly investment, emphasizing the fact we only doing this for him…”

4.      Suspicious Timing. The donations were made at or near the time that decisions on the purchase of Lilly products were made by the Director of the Silesian Health Fund. One donation was made two days are the Director of the Silesian Health Fund agreed to make a purchase of Lilly products.

Here Lilly used charitable donations to a charitable foundation which was, as stated in the SEC Complaint, “founded and administered by the head of one of the regional government health authorities at the same time that the subsidiary was seeking the official’s support for placing Lilly drugs on the government reimbursement list.” There were a total of eight payments made to the charitable foundation. In addition to the charitable donations made, Lilly “falsely characterized the proposed payments”. Lilly had a group which reviewed the request for such donations called the “Medical Grant Committee [MGC]” which approved the payments “largely based on the justification and description in the submitted paperwork.”

III.       The Role of Internal Audit

Jon Rydberg, Principal of Orchid Advisors, has categorized the Lilly situation as one of a failure of internal controls. I would add that there was also a failure of internal audit. What does internal audit need to review in the context of charitable donations under the FCPA? Internal audit needs to start with the DOJ FCPA Guidance regarding charitable donations. Internal audit should begin by asking the following five initial questions:

(1)   What is the purpose of the payment?

(2)   Is the payment consistent with the company’s internal guidelines on charitable giving?

(3)   Is the payment at the request of a foreign official?

(4)   Is a foreign official associated with the charity and, if so, can the foreign official make decisions regarding your business in that country?

(5)   Is the payment conditioned upon receiving business or other benefits?

Next internal audit should make inquiries based upon the DOJ Opinion Releases issued regarding charitable donations. Some of the protections a company can do to comply with the FCPA regarding charitable donations are as follows:

1)      Have the donation recipients certified that they or the entity will comply with the requirements of the FCPA;

2)      Has the recipient provided audited financial statements; and

3)      Has the recipient restricted the use of the donated funds to humanitarian or charitable purposes only;

4)      Were the funds transferred to a valid bank account; and

5)      Ongoing auditing and monitoring of the efficacy of the charitable donation program.

Based upon the Schering-Plough and Lilly SEC enforcement actions, there are some additional inquiries that internal audit should make, they are as follows:

a.      What was the timing of the charitable donation or promise to make a donation in relation to the obtaining or retaining of business?

b.      Did the company follow its normal protocol for requesting, reviewing and making a charitable donation or is there a pattern of unusual donations outside the protocol?

c.       Did any one person make multiple donations just below their authority level so that it did not have to go up the line for review?

d.      Was the total amount donated to one charitable foundation out of proportion to the rest of the country or region’s charitable donation budget?

e.       Did the sales in one area, region or country spike after a pattern of charitable donations?

The information on the red flags from the prior Opinion Releases and the best practices, as set out in the FCPA Guidance, have been available for some time. I think that the information found in both the Schering-Plough and Lilly enforcement actions have a different focus for internal audit. In addition to looking at the timing of charitable donations to see if they are at or near the time of the awarding of new or continued business, I think that internal audit may now need to look at overall increases in sales to determine if they are tied to a pattern of charitable donations. I once heard my colleague Henry Mixon explain how the award of a contract may be the product of fraud or corruption. By looking at the timing and quantum of charitable donations, internal audit may be able to ascertain that a spike in sales is tied to corrupt conduct. This may not be something that is on the current radar of auditors when they review charitable donations, but may now be something they need to consider.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013

Top Ten Enforcement Actions for 2012

As we welcome in 2013, it is appropriate to reflect back on some of the things which have occurred over 2012 and in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement world, it was quite a significant year. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) both have used enforcement actions to educate compliance professionals on several different aspects of the FCPA and FCPA compliance. This is my list of what I believe to be the most significant enforcement actions over the past year and the lessons which can be drawn from them.

1. Morgan Stanley - without a doubt the most significant enforcement action of 2012 was the Declination given to Morgan Stanley, when one of its Managing Directors, Garth Peterson, pled guilty to a FCPA violation. The DOJ Press release set out the detailed compliance program which Morgan Stanley had and the specific trainings, certifications and acknowledgements from Peterson all avowing he was in compliance with the FCPA.

Key Takeaway - if anyone ever doubted that the DOJ provides credit for a robust compliance program, this Declination made clear that the DOJ does so. The Press Release gives information on what steps you can take immediately to improve the quality of your FCPA compliance program.

2. Smith and Nephew - the first in several enforcement actions from 2012 that answered once and for all the issue of whether distributors in the sales chain are covered by the FCPA. Smith and Nephew used Isle of Mann domiciled distributors, receiving up to 40% discounts on the list price of the products, to sell medical devices into Greece.

Key Takeaway - once and for all time distributors are treated the same as agents, resellers, sales representatives and any other third parties in the sales chain.

Double Key Takeaway - do not use any foreign sales representatives, who are domiciled in the Isle of Mann, for work outside that country.

3. BizJet - a company which literally sent ‘bags of money’ across the border to pay bribes received a penalty ⅓ below the Sentencing Guidelines suggested minimum fine. The potential fine ranged between a low of $17.1MM to a high of $34.2MM. The final agreed upon monetary penalty was $11.8MM. BizJet’s reduction was 30% off the bottom of the fine range and a whopping 65% off the top of the fine range.

Key Takeaway - no matter how bad the facts appear to be if a company engages in ‘extraordinary cooperation’, after self-disclosure to the DOJ, it will obtain much credibility in the settlement negotiations and can potentially lead to a significant fine reduction.

4. Biomet - for reported bribes paid somewhere over $1.5MM, the company had documented fines, penalties and losses of over $29MM, which did not include any of the investigative costs. The company’s internal auditors had completely failed to follow up on obvious red flags. These included the fact that Internal Audit was aware of the bribery and even discussed the payments in a memorandum to Biomet’s home office. Biomet’s Internal Audit took no steps to determine the reason for royalty payments to doctors or why they were 15-20% of sales. Internal Audit did not obtain any evidence of services which the doctors might have performed entitling them to the payments.

Key Takeaway - the Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) outlined some of the DOJ’s most current thinking of the role of Internal Audit in a FCPA compliance program.

5.      Eli Lilly - the company engaged in multi-year, multi-country FCPA violations, those countries being Russia, Poland, Brazil and China. There were multi-bribery schemes used with all forms of the sale chain model; employees as sales representatives, distributors and commissioned agents. However the company only paid fines and penalties of $29MM to the SEC based upon a civil Complaint. There was no DPA nor any criminal allegations of FCPA violations made by the DOJ.

Key Takeaway – this enforcement action has one of the best discussions of the different types of bribery schemes and the compliance tools available to prevent, detect and ultimately remedy such systematic failure.

6. Orthofix - when Mexico passed a law that hospital administrators could no longer approve contracts, in a bid to end corruption in the health care system, Orthofix simply began to bribe the regional government official charged with taking over the contract letting process.

Key Takeaway - if your foreign employees to do not speak English, you really need to translate your Code of Conduct and FCPA compliance policy into their native tongue. For extra credit - do not call your bribe payments ‘giving chocolates’. It insults Forest Gump and gives chocolates a bad name.

7. Pfizer - a massive and multi-year internal investigation turned up a plethora of FCPA violations, yet the company received only a $15MM fine. But it did join the Top Ten list of profit disgorgements for its $45.2MM in disgorgement and pre-judgment interest to the SEC. The Company’s “Enhanced Compliance Obligations” provided an excellent discussion of how to structure a compliance group within a company, the role of a Chief Compliance Officer (CCO), what disciplines should be a part of a FCPA audit team and what their roles should be, how to perform risk assessments and proactive reviews and post-acquisition FCPA obligations.

Key Takeaway - today’s ‘Enhanced Compliance Obligation’ will become tomorrow’s best practices.

8. Tyco - a company which was under a prior DPA for past FCPA violations discovered a wide-ranging and systemic bribery program in at least twelve different post-injunction illicit payment schemes occurring at Tyco subsidiaries across the globe. However, due to extraordinary cooperation of Tyco, it only received a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) from the DOJ and a fine of $26MM.

Key Takeaway - the Tyco SEC Compliant is chocked full of information regarding what an internal auditor needs to look for in reviewing expenses charged by employees; commissions paid to employees; invoices by agents and other third party representatives and over-inflated sales contracts; all used to disguise corrupt payments..

9. Oracle - the company got into hot FCPA water because its Indian subsidiary directed its distributor to set up a separate slush fund of monies which could be, and were used, to pay monies to persons unknown.

Key Takeaway - if your company uses distributors to handle or supplement its sales channels, you should immediately review the entire process, from business purpose, to due diligence, to contract terms and post-contract management, to make sure that your company is following minimum best practices with regards to this sales mechanism.

10. Allianz – the German company had shares and bonds registered with the SEC. It invested in an Indonesian joint venture, which made, without the company’s apparent knowledge or approval, improper payments to employees of state-owned entities in Indonesia between seven to eleven years ago.

Key Takeaway - a company does not have to be listed on a US stock exchange to be an ‘issuer’ for FCPA purposes. Jurisdiction can also lie if shares and/or bonds are registered with the SEC.

 Every year has its share of interesting, topical and important FCPA enforcement actions. I think that 2012 will be remembered as a year where both the DOJ and SEC provided solid information about their views on a minimum best practices compliance program. The 2012 enforcement actions, coupled with Opinion Releases and the FCPA Guidance, give direct, informative and practical advice to allow a compliance practitioner to create, enhance and implement a best practices compliance program.

This publication contains general information only and is based on the experiences and research of the author. The author is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, legal advice, or other professional advice or services. This publication is not a substitute for such legal advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified legal advisor. The author, his affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person or entity that relies on this publication. The Author gives his permission to link, post, distribute, or reference this article for any lawful purpose, provided attribution is made to the author. The author can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

© Thomas R. Fox, 2013